

THE ATTITUDE
OF
TENNESSEANS
TOWARD THE UNION
1847-1861

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FIRST EDITION

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To CLAUDE

P R E F A C E

The sole aim of this book, which originated as a master's thesis at Vanderbilt University, is to reveal the attitude of Tennesseans toward the Union during the troubled period immediately preceding the War between the States, or the Civil War, and upon the outbreak of hostilities. Such being the case, there is no attempt either to justify or to condemn individuals, great or small, for their respective courses of action when the turn of events plunged them into a war which was certainly neither of their making nor to their liking. Inasmuch as there appeared to be little doubt that their state would quickly become a major theatre of war, Tennesseans were convinced that speed was of the essence in placing their state in the best possible position for that eventuality. At the same time, since they were aware of the deep cleavages between the vast majority of the citizens of Middle West Tennessee, on the one hand, and the vast majority of the citizens of East Tennessee, on the other, in their respective attitudes toward the Union, they sought earnestly to reconcile their differences so as to preclude the possibility of secession or revolution within the borders of the state itself.

The author, a third and/or fourth generation Tennessean, with a deep sense of state, sectional, and national loyalty and with a strong belief in rugged and responsible individualism, has sought to attain the highest possible degree of objectivity in this study. Insofar as she has failed to do so, she hopes that she has at least succeeded in presenting "the other side" in a polite manner, as she was successful in having done upon another occasion, according to a friend who entertained opposite views, from hers on the subject of "Tennessee's Attitude Toward the Union, 1847-1861." If she has been able to set forth the views of Tennesseans of the period accurately, she feels that she has made it clear that they acquitted themselves well during the most tragic period in the state's history.

The writer has based this book largely on primary sources. Although the manuscript material is generally somewhat fragmentary and rather

limited in quantity, it does reveal the attitudes of many Tennesseans, of both high and low estate, toward the Union. The newspapers in the state during the period, admittedly partisan in tone, probably led and also seemingly reflected public opinion. Government documents, both state and regional, in a period when there was apparently much interest in public affairs, are valuable sources of information.

I wish to express my gratitude to the members of the staffs of the numerous libraries, departments of archives, and historical societies or commissions who, from time to time over a considerable period of years, have graciously and effectively assisted me in my research. I am particularly grateful to the late Mrs. John Trotwood Moore, State Librarian of Tennessee, from 1929 to 1949, for her consideration and assistance.

I am especially appreciative of the generosity of the late Honorable Lemuel R. Campbell of Nashville, the youngest son of the Honorable William B. Campbell, the last Whig governor of Tennessee, for having permitted me to make use of the David Campbell Papers, of which the Papers of Governor William B. Campbell are a part.

It was my good fortune to have been born into a Tennessee family with some knowledge of and a deep respect for history and with a continuing interest in public affairs. For their great aid and encouragement as well as for the interest and assistance of friends, I am most grateful.

It was also my good fortune to have had many excellent history teachers, and never to have had a bad one. The teacher to whom I am most indebted for inspiration and guidance in my study of one aspect of Tennessee's history from 1847 to 1861 is the late Dr. Frank Lawrence Owsley, Professor of History at Vanderbilt University from 1920 to 1949, who, as my major professor, directed the study from its inception as a master's thesis to the time of its completion as a doctoral dissertation. I am likewise deeply indebted to the late Mr. Irby R. Hudson, Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University, who, as my minor professor, assisted in the direction of my study through its development from master's thesis to doctoral dissertation. I am also obligated to Dr. William C. Brinkley, formerly Professor of History at Vanderbilt University and now Professor of History at Tulane University, who kindly supervised much of the final preparation of my dissertation during Dr. Owsley's absence from the Vanderbilt campus.

My greatest debt of gratitude in connection with the publication of my book, and the one which I take particular pleasure in acknowledging, is to my husband, Claude Arthur Campbell, who has assisted in every way possible in its preparation.

The expansion of my doctoral dissertation into a book is my own doing. Obviously, mine is the responsibility for any errors that the book may contain.

Tallahassee, Florida.

MARY ROBERTSON CAMPBELL

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THE ATTITUDE
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1847 - 1861

CHAPTER I

Geographic, Social and Economic Conditions

Tennesseans were extremely reluctant to take part in the Civil War, or the War between the States, sometimes characterized as the first modern war, which was the fruition of the sectional struggle of the preceding fifteen years, sometimes characterized as the first cold war. Throughout the period of more or less acute conflict between the North and the South inaugurated by the bitter debate on the Wilmot Proviso and culminating in the outbreak of hostilities in 1861, they sincerely deplored the sectional strife and sought constantly to allay it. They believed that the incessant and acrimonious agitation of the differences between the North and the South, imperiled the existence of the Union. To them, the preservation of the Union, as established by its founders, was of paramount importance since they saw in it the best guarantee of their continued happiness and prosperity. Until after the fighting had actually begun at Fort Sumter, a large majority of the people of Tennessee took the position that war could and should be averted. Their involuntary participation in the ensuing struggle constitutes the major tragedy in the state's history.

Because of Tennessee's position as a border state, its interests were altogether typical of those of neither the North nor the South. Within the state itself a wide variety of geographic conditions created a diversity of social and economic interests which further increased the difficulty of obtaining concerted action in matters of political concern. It was particularly difficult, therefore, for the people of Tennessee to reach agreement when it was no longer possible to postpone a decision on the question of the relation of their state to the Union. Consequently, they found it impossible to prevent their state's becoming not only the second greatest theatre of war in the struggle between the North and the South, but also the scene of a miniature civil war between sections within its own borders.

While Tennesseans necessarily expressed their views on state and national policies through the medium of political action, many factors in addition to political considerations entered into the formulation of these attitudes. Any attempt adequately to understand the political activities which culminated in the state's Declaration of Independence in 1861, therefore, must have as its basis a consideration of the geographic, social and economic conditions which formed the setting in which they lived.

The three stars within their encompassing circle of white emblazoned upon the blue and red background of Tennessee's flag are indicative of the three well-marked geographical divisions which comprise the state. These sections, in order of their settlement, are East, Middle and West Tennessee.

Three different geographical areas make up East Tennessee. The Unaka Mountains, a part of the Appalachian chain containing some of the highest peaks east of the Rockies, extend across the extreme eastern portion of this section. The relatively fertile valley of East Tennessee, consisting of the Tennessee River and its valley and numerous low ridges of mountains and their intervening valleys paralleling its northeasterly and southwesterly course, lies immediately to the west of the Unakas. The greater part of the rather sterile Cumberland plateau, a comparatively level plain in whose southern half lies the small but fertile Sequatchie valley, extends from the valley of East Tennessee to the highland rim.


Immediately west of East Tennessee lies Middle Tennessee, consisting of the extreme western portion of the Cumberland plateau, the highland rim and the central or Cumberland basin. The highland rim, which is several hundred feet higher than the central basin which it encircles, extends eastward to the western edge of the Cumberland plateau and westward to the Tennessee River, the western boundary of Middle Tennessee. The soil of some portions of the highland rim is fertile while that of other parts of it is very poor. The Cumberland River traverses both the eastern and western sections of the highland rim and the central basin in northern Middle Tennessee. The central or Cumberland basin is the fertile blue-grass region of the state and the very heart of Middle Tennessee.

West Tennessee is that part of the state lying between the Tennessee and Mississippi rivers. It consists of the coastal or gulf embayment plain, a fertile and comparatively level area except for the sterile hilly region lying along the west bank of the Tennessee River, and

the Mississippi bottoms or flood plain, a strip of fertile flat alluvial soil cut by numerous rivers emptying into the Mississippi River.¹

East, Middle and West Tennessee together make up a long narrow state which lies within the Mississippi valley between the thirty-fifth and thirty-seventh parallels. Its greatest length east and west is four hundred thirty-two miles and its average width north and south is one hundred miles. Its area of 42,022 square miles,² or 26,894,080 acres, includes many varieties of soils³ which, with the exception of certain portions in the mountainous district, generally lend themselves well to some type of farming. It enjoys a mild climate, having a mean temperature of 58.3 degrees,⁴ and an abundant rainfall, averaging fifty to fifty-two inches annually.⁵ Tennessee includes within its borders a portion of the corn, winter-wheat and cotton belts.⁶ It is one of the largest tobacco-producing states. In addition, the production of practically any other crop adapted to the North Temperate Zone is possible in the state.

PHYSIOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS OF TENNESSEE*



A—Appalachian Mountains
V—Great Valley of East Tennessee
C—Cumberland Plateau

H—H—Highland Rim
B—Cumberland Basin
G—Gulf Embayment Plain
M—Flood Plain of the Mississippi

*R. Nunn, "The Climate of Tennessee," *The Resources of Tennessee* (Vol. III, No. 1, P. 8).

Although some factors made for unity among the three clearly defined geographical divisions of Tennessee, others tended to accentuate their differences. In the years just preceding the Civil War, their points of dissimilarity called forth considerable discussion. There was a tendency to emphasize especially the divergency between the social and economic interests of East Tennessee on the one hand and those of Middle and West Tennessee on the other.

Tennessee presented much the same social and economic pattern at the beginning of the sixth decade of the nineteenth century as it did at its close. By 1847 the state had definitely passed beyond the

frontier stage of its history. Despite somewhat slow but steady social and economic development on already well-defined lines, however, it had not established the plantation system by 1861. Nevertheless, the predominance of a semi-plantation regime based to a great extent upon slavery seemed to indicate rather clearly that such was apparently the trend of the state's social and economic evolution at that date.

There were no material changes in the character of Tennessee's population during this period. It was preponderantly native born, the foreign born having amounted to only three-fourths of one per cent of the total white population in 1850 and to only ninety-one hundredths of one per cent in 1860. It was very largely rural. Nashville, the capital city, located on the banks of the Cumberland River in Middle Tennessee, was the only city having a population of over eleven thousand in 1850; and Memphis, situated on the east bank of the Mississippi in West Tennessee, was the only other city having a population in excess of eight thousand. There were just three other cities, South Nashville, Clarksville, located on the Cumberland below Nashville in Middle Tennessee, and Chattanooga, situated on the Tennessee in East Tennessee, with populations of three thousand or more each. By 1860, the population of Memphis,⁷ which was rapidly outstripping Nashville, was in excess of twenty-two thousand five hundred, and that of Nashville was almost seventeen thousand. The population of Knoxville, situated at the head of the Tennessee in East Tennessee, like that of South Nashville, Clarksville, Chattanooga and probably a few other places, exceeded three thousand in 1860.⁸

The total number of Tennessee's inhabitants increased from 1,002,717 in 1850, to 1,109,801 in 1860. Its white population grew from 756,836 to 826,782; its free Negro population, from 6,422 to 7,300; its slave population, from 239,459 to 275,719. The state ranked fifth in total, ninth in white, sixteenth in free Negro and eighth in slave population in 1850; and in 1860, it ranked tenth in both total and white, sixteenth in free Negro and eighth in slave population. The moderate gain of 10.68 per cent in total population placed Tennessee next to the lowest among Southern states in point of gain in population.⁹ A 9.24 per cent increase in white, a 13.67 per cent increase in free Negro and a 15.14 per cent increase in slave populations placed Tennessee below the national average in each of these respects. In 1850, the ratio of Tennessee's Negro population to its total population was 24.52 per cent and that of its slave to its total population, 23.88

per cent. Ten years later there had been a one point increase in each of these figures. Therefore, free Negroes still constituted only seven-tenths of one per cent of the total population in 1860, and slaves still made up slightly less than one-quarter of it.¹⁰

Not only were there changes in the distribution of the total population of the state among East, Middle and West Tennessee between 1850 and 1860, but there were also changes in the distribution of the various groups of the total population among these sections. Although there were numerical increases in the population in each of the three grand divisions of the state, there was a proportionate decrease in one of them. While West Tennessee's proportion of the state's total population increased 1.57 per cent, and that of East Tennessee rose 0.84 per cent, that of Middle Tennessee declined 2.41 per cent. West Tennessee's proportion of the state's white population increased 1.3 per cent, its proportion of the slave population, 1.98 per cent and its proportion of the free Negro population, 0.26 per cent. East Tennessee's proportion of the white population increased 1.15 per cent, its proportion of the slave population, 0.60 per cent and its proportion of free Negro population, 5.18 per cent. On the other hand, Middle Tennessee's proportion of the state's white population decreased 2.45 per cent, its proportion of the slave population, 2.58 per cent and its proportion of the free Negro population, 5.44 per cent.

Furthermore, there were changes in the relative positions of the various elements of the population within each of the three sections of the state. There was a decline, more marked in West and Middle than in East Tennessee, in the percentage of white population in each of these divisions. There was, on the other hand, a gain, more notable in Middle and West Tennessee than in East Tennessee, in the percentage of slave population in these areas. Although there were very slight increases in the percentages of free Negroes in East and Middle Tennessee, their percentage in West Tennessee remained virtually stationary.

There were only two counties—Scott, located in the Cumberland Mountains in East Tennessee, in 1850, and Cheatham, a newly organized county situated on the highland rim in Middle Tennessee, in 1860—in which there were no free Negroes. Davidson county, the site of the state's capital city, had the largest number of free Negroes, 854 in 1850 and 1,209 in 1860. Of the nineteen counties containing more than one hundred free Negroes each in 1850, ten¹¹ were in East Tennessee, eight,¹² in Middle Tennessee, and one, Shelby, the site of

Memphis, in West Tennessee. By 1860 there were three additional counties in East Tennessee—Bledsoe, Claiborne and Monroe—with free Negro populations of more than one hundred each. There was an increase of one in the number of counties in Middle Tennessee¹³ having a free Negro population of over one hundred each in 1860. It is evident, therefore, that free Negroes constituted only a negligible portion of the population in any county.¹⁴

Scott was the only county in Tennessee having fewer than one hundred slaves in either 1850 or 1860. Thirty-one counties out of seventy-nine in 1850, and thirty-one out of eighty-four in 1860, had fewer than one thousand slaves. Eighteen of these counties in each instance were in East Tennessee, nine, in Middle Tennessee and two, in West Tennessee. The nine¹⁵ in Middle Tennessee were located on either the less fertile portion of the highland rim or on the Cumberland plateau. The two in West Tennessee, Benton and Decatur, were situated in the sterile and hilly area along the west bank of the Tennessee.

While East Tennessee contained a large majority of the counties having the smallest numbers of slaves during this period, it did not contain any of the fifteen counties in 1850 or any of the twenty-one in 1860 having slave populations of over five thousand each. In 1850, Knox, in the valley of East Tennessee, was the only county in this section with more than two thousand slaves. By 1860, Jefferson county, also in the valley of East Tennessee, had over two thousand slaves.

Middle Tennessee contained four counties, Davidson, Williamson, Maury and Rutherford, all lying in the central basin, except for the extreme western edges of Davidson, Williamson and Maury counties, having slave populations of over ten thousand each; and six,¹⁶ located in the central basin and on the highland rim, having slave populations of over five thousand each in 1850. By 1860 Middle Tennessee had five counties¹⁷ with more than ten thousand slaves each and five¹⁸ with over five thousand slaves each. Only one county in Middle Tennessee, Williamson, in 1860, ever had a slave population of more than fifty per cent of its total population.

West Tennessee had one county, Fayette, located on the southwestern edge of the gulf embayment plain, with a slave population of over fifteen thousand, the largest of any county in the state; one, Shelby, situated in the flood plain of the Mississippi, with a slave population of over ten thousand; and three others, Hardeman, Haywood and Madison, all situated in the gulf embayment plain, with slave populations of over five thousand each in 1850. By 1860 West


Tennessee contained two counties, Fayette and Shelby, with slave populations of more than fifteen thousand each; two, Haywood and Madison, with slave populations of more than ten thousand each; and four, Hardeman, Gibson, Henry and Tipton, with slave populations of over five thousand each. Throughout the period Fayette county had a slave population of more than fifty per cent of its total population. In 1860 Haywood county also had a slave population of more than fifty per cent of its total population. However, while Shelby, with almost seventeen thousand slaves, had the largest slave population of any county in the state in 1860, its slave population amounted to only 35.3 per cent of its total population.¹⁹

The slave holdings of the 33,864 who owned slaves in Tennessee in 1850, and of the 36,844 who owned them in 1860, varied in size from one to between three hundred and four hundred ninety-nine. Roughly twenty-two and one-half per cent of the slave properties in 1850, and roughly twenty-one per cent in 1860, were in one slave. Slightly more than thirty-one per cent of them in 1850, and slightly less than thirty-one per cent in 1860, were in two to four slaves. About twenty-four and one-half per cent of them in 1850, and about twenty-five per cent in 1860, were in five to nine slaves. A little more than fourteen per cent of them in 1850, and a little less than fifteen per cent in 1860, were in ten to nineteen slaves. Less than one per cent of the slave properties in 1850, and only a little over one per cent of them in 1860, were in more than fifty slaves. The single largest group of slave properties, a little less than one-third of the total, were in two to four slaves. Slightly over three-fourths of them were in less than ten slaves, and a little over nine-tenths of them were in less than twenty slaves. Thus, throughout the period, the pattern of slaveholdings was remarkably stable, with a variation of slightly less than one per cent.

In spite of an increase of 2,980 in the number of slave-holders in Tennessee between 1850 and 1860, the percentage decreased from 3.38 per cent of the total population to 3.32 per cent of it. Therefore, despite an increase of 36,260, or 15.14 per cent, in the number of slaves in the state during the decade, slavery apparently was fast approaching the limits of its expansion. The fact that there was a small decrease in the number of those owning fewer than five slaves, and a small increase in the number of those owning five slaves or more, indicated the beginning of a trend toward the concentration of slave properties into larger units. Nevertheless, in general, Tennesseans in

1860 continued to use their slaves as household servants and as laborers on farms of varying sizes and on small plantations.²⁰

THE DISTRIBUTION OF SLAVES IN TENNESSEE IN 1850




By 1859 the slaveowners of Tennessee had an investment of \$110,-960,257 in slave property. This represented an increase of 54 per cent during the preceding decade. The value of slaves more than doubled in East and West Tennessee. The value of slaves in Middle Tennessee, whose slaveholdings were worth more than those of East and West Tennessee combined, lacked only a very little of having doubled also. As a matter of course, the average value of slaves rose greatly throughout the state. The increase was least in East Tennessee and greatest in West Tennessee.

Slightly more than 29 per cent of the taxable property in the state was in slaves. Slaves made up approximately 16 per cent of the taxable property in East Tennessee, about 24 per cent of that in Middle Tennessee and approximately 36 per cent of that in West Tennessee. Thus, while the entire state had a substantial interest in slavery, that of West Tennessee, which had proportionately the largest amount of any section invested in them, was more than twice that of East Tennessee, which had the smallest amount invested of any section.²¹

Since the population of Tennessee included not only all types of whites but also both slaves and free Negroes, the rate of illiteracy was relatively high between 1850 and 1860. While illiteracy was far too widespread in Tennessee at this time, it was decreasing throughout the decade. There were 78,619 people over twenty years of age in the state who could neither read nor write in the middle year of the nineteenth century. Of this number, 77,522 were whites and 1,097 free Negroes. In 1860 Tennessee's illiterates numbered 72,054, of

THE DISTRIBUTION OF SLAVES IN TENNESSEE IN 1860



whom 70,359 were whites and 1,695, free Negroes. Thus, illiteracy had declined from 7.84 per cent in 1850 to 6.40 per cent in 1860. It is notable, however, that this total decline of 1.44 per cent in illiteracy represented a decline of 1.73 per cent among whites but an increase of 4.92 per cent among free Negroes. Generally speaking, the whole body of slaves was almost entirely unacquainted with the "three R's" in 1860 as it had been in 1850.²²

Although Tennessee possessed substantial facilities for educational purposes in 1850, they had become much more adequate by 1860. The number of its colleges, which received no support from taxation, increased from eighteen to thirty-five. The number of their instructors rose from eighty-three to 149; the number of their students rose from 1,705 to 2,932; and the amount of their income increased from \$65,307 to \$92,106. Academies and "other schools," which received practically no support from taxation, grew from 264 to 2,174. The number of their instructors rose from 404 to 618, the number of their pupils from 9,928 to 15,793 and the amount of their incomes from \$155,902 to \$581,561. The number of common schools, which drew their revenue from taxation, increased from 2,680 to 2,965. The number of their teachers rose from 2,189 to 3,064, the number of their pupils from 104,117 to 138,809 and the amount of their incomes from \$198,518 to \$402,904. Many families in Tennessee employed governesses and tutors to train their children, whom they subsequently sent to Northern and European colleges and universities.

Perhaps the most unusual phenomenon relative to Tennessee's educational system during this period was the prominence of academies

and "other schools." These institutions had a larger enrollment and a greater income, derived chiefly from tuitions, than those of any of the other Southern states. Indeed, in these two respects they ranked seventh and third respectively in the nation.²³

Much more important from the standpoint of the welfare of the state's entire citizenship, however, was the advance which public education made during this decade. This improvement came almost entirely as a result of the urgent recommendations of Governor Andrew Johnson which the legislature enacted into law. This law, passed on February 28, 1854, involving as it did the "imposition of a tax on both property and polls," marked Tennessee's first recognition of the obligation of providing educational opportunities for white children at state expense. Significantly, an analysis of the vote of the House showed that East Tennessee, the poorest section of the state, gave the bill strong support, while Middle Tennessee accorded it nominal support and West Tennessee positively opposed it.²⁴ The large slaveholding and more prosperous sections of the state, it seems, had little fondness for the idea of fastening upon themselves a tax-supported system of public education.

Institutions of learning were not the only sources from which Tennesseans gained information in the sixth decade of the nineteenth century. Local publishers supplied them with eight daily, two or more tri-weekly and thirty-six to sixty-one weekly newspapers, and four or more magazines. Political publications ranked highest in public favor. Those of a religious nature were second in popularity. Many people of course subscribed to various well-known newspapers and magazines published outside of the state.²⁵

The many private and the thirty-four public, college, school and Sunday-school libraries which Tennessee had in 1850 supplemented the reading matter available in current newspapers and periodicals. By 1860 there was a total of 387 libraries containing 245,228 volumes in the state. Of this number, 335 were public libraries, twenty-three were public school and college libraries, and twenty-nine were Sunday-school and church libraries. Of especial interest was the State Library, which had consisted almost entirely of court reports, Congressional documents and a few other publications of a public nature until 1854, when the legislature appropriated \$5,000 for the purchase of books and employed a man to select and purchase them. The legislature created the position of state librarian in 1856, and established the policy of making an appropriation for the payment of his salary.

The private libraries of the more affluent citizens further increased the reading matter within the state.²⁶

It was at the beginning of the decade, on February 1, 1850, that the legislature passed an act incorporating the Tennessee Historical Society. Since there was a gap in the minutes of the organization from April 5, 1851 to December 5, 1856, there were apparently no meetings of the body during those years. The Society held its meetings in the State Library from May, 1857, through September, 1859, when they ceased because of the agitated condition of affairs just prior to the beginning of the Civil War.²⁷

The people of Tennessee, like those in the other states of the antebellum South, showed genuine interest in, and had some knowledge of, the natural sciences. The advertisements and curricula of schools and colleges gave emphasis to scientific study. Several magazines carried articles on scientific subjects. The *Nashville Journal of Medicine and Surgery* was a significant publication in its field. There were both professional and amateur scientists who collected data and/or specimens. Tennessee's prewar development in scientific fields though small laid the foundation for later development.²⁸

There were 632,551 members of the various religious denominations in Tennessee in 1850. This number had increased to 728,661 by 1860. The Methodist, Baptist and Presbyterian churches had by far the largest memberships of any of the churches in the state. In 1850 Tennessee's congregations worshipped in 2,207 churches; and in 1860 they worshipped in 2,311. The total value of church property had increased from \$1,246,951 in 1850 to \$2,558,330 in 1860. The proportionately large church membership and the relatively great value of church property bore witness to the religious character of a big percentage of Tennessee's population.²⁹

Although the churches felt the pressure of the slavery controversy before the state did,³⁰ there was no division in any of the churches in Tennessee between 1847 and 1861 on the slavery issue. While there were differences of opinion on the subject among the members of the various congregations, Presbyterian, Episcopalian and Baptist, for example, the governing bodies of the denominations took no action.³¹ All three conferences of the Methodist church in the state were affiliated with the Methodist Church, South. The Holston conference, which included churches in southwestern Virginia, western North Carolina and East Tennessee, however, had suggested and advocated a plan of compromise in 1844 and 1845, which it had

hoped would avert the final separation of the two branches of the Methodist church.³² Unlike Kentucky and Virginia, Tennessee had no members of the Methodist Episcopal church within its borders.³³

The abnormal elements in Tennessee's population were small both in 1850 and 1860. In 1850 its insane and idiotic numbered 1,136; its deaf, dumb and blind numbered 717; its paupers numbered 994; and its criminals in prison numbered 288. By 1860 the state had 1,367 idiotic and insane people, 554 blind people and 436 deaf and dumb people. It had 935 paupers. Its criminals in prison numbered 511. Thus, Tennessee's total abnormal population increased by only 668 between 1850 and 1860, and there was an actual decrease of fifty-nine in the number of paupers in the state. In his message to the legislature in 1859, the governor urged that body to provide for needed improvements at the penitentiary to care for the gradually increasing number of convicts and to continue the policy of giving "a liberal support" to the Hospital for the Insane and the "Institutions for the education of the Blind and the Deaf and Dumb."³⁴

Tennesseans gained their livelihood from a great variety of occupations in the sixth decade of the nineteenth century. By far the largest number, 118,979 in 1850 and 130,182 in 1860, were engaged in agricultural pursuits. While the census of 1850 makes no distinction among planters, farmers and farm laborers, that of 1860 subdivides those engaged in agriculture into 78 planters, 103,835 farmers, 25,990 farm laborers and 279 nurserymen and gardeners. Especially significant is the fact that the number of overseers grew from 642 in 1850 to 1,687 in 1860, an increase of 163 per cent in the decade. The number of nonagricultural laborers increased from 17,559 in 1850 to 24,357 in 1860. There were 23,432 engaged in commerce, trade, manufacturing³⁵ and the mechanic arts in 1850, and this number had increased measurably by 1860. The number in the professions rose from 6,952 in 1850 to 7,053 in 1860. Government officials increased in number from 705 in 1850 to 844 in 1860.³⁶

Average wages for all types of workers rose between 1850 and 1860. Whereas farm laborers had received \$8.67 per month in addition to food and lodging in 1850, they received \$11.94 per month with board in 1860. The pay of women servants increased from \$4.00 per month with board in 1850 to \$5.12 per month with board in 1860. The wages of day laborers rose from 45¢ per day with board, or 58¢ per day without board, in 1850 to 59¢ per day with board and 84¢ per day without board in 1860. Daily wages for skilled work-

men also increased. For example, daily wages without board for carpenters rose from \$1.38 in 1850, to \$1.85 in 1860. Average annual wages for workers in industry increased from \$189.27 in 1850, to \$271.03 in 1860.³⁷

The first year of the last decade of Tennessee's evolution from frontier to semi-plantation economy found it a preponderantly agricultural state. Agriculture in the state, as elsewhere in the South, was comparatively prosperous, a condition which tended to make Tennesseans, like their fellow Southerners, increasingly content with their economic system. On the whole, agricultural development was reasonably well balanced. To a certain extent at least, diversified farming prevailed. In the face of higher prices not only for the staples, cotton and tobacco, but also for grain, livestock and other products, the pleas of reformers for still greater diversification met little response. Moreover the people seemed to have paid little heed to reformers' claims that high prices, resulting in part from the increased supply of gold coming from California's gold mines, would be only temporary.³⁸

The legislature's establishment of the Tennessee State Agricultural Bureau in 1854 grew out of and subsequently lent impetus to the movement to conserve and develop the state's agricultural resources. In an address at the Fair of the Tennessee State Agricultural Bureau at Nashville on October 11, 1858, the governor, *ex officio* president of the organization, called attention to the "high and proud position" that Tennessee had attained among agricultural states, emphasizing especially the fact that at the recent World's Fair at London Mark R. Cockrill of Davidson county had won the premium for the finest fleece and that John Pope of Shelby county had won the premium for the best cotton. He urged the farmers and planters of Tennessee to increase their efforts to produce a greater variety of crops, to diversify agricultural labor and to improve the soil. Approximately a year later, at a planters' convention in Nashville, one of a series of twenty such meetings held intermittently in the *ante-bellum* period, the convention voted to collect cotton statistics, to urge the United States Navy to survey the Mississippi, with a view to enlarging the Mississippi levee system, and to establish an agricultural journal.³⁹

In 1850 there were 5,175,173 acres of improved and 13,808,849 of unimproved land in farms in Tennessee; and in 1860, there were 6,795,337 acres of improved land and 13,873,828 acres of unimproved land in farms. This represented gains of approximately 24 per cent in the amount of improved land in farms and of slightly less

than one-half of one per cent in the amount of unimproved land in farms during the decade. Increases in the amount of improved land in farms was considerably greater in Middle and West Tennessee than in East Tennessee. On the other hand, the decline in the amount of unimproved land in farms in East Tennessee was greater than were the increases of unimproved land in farms in Middle and West Tennessee.⁴⁰

The number of farms and plantations in Tennessee increased from 72,735 in 1850 to 82,836 in 1860. The average size of farms rose from 261 to 351 acres. Although the farms ranged in size from three to more than 1,000 acres in 1860, more than half of them contained from fifty to 500 acres. Of the 158 plantations of 1,000 acres or more at this time, seventy-five were in Middle Tennessee, fifty-seven in West Tennessee and twenty-six in East Tennessee.⁴¹

The cash value of the farms in Tennessee almost tripled between 1850 and 1860. There was an increase of approximately 68 per cent in the value of those in Middle Tennessee and increases of approximately 64 per cent and 63 per cent in those of East and West Tennessee respectively. By 1860 the cash value (a little more than fifteen million dollars) of the farms in Maury county, which was in Middle Tennessee, was the highest of any county in the state. The three other counties, Davidson, Rutherford and Williamson, each having farms whose cash value aggregated more than ten million dollars, were all in Middle Tennessee. With the exception of Shelby, Gibson, Haywood and Madison counties, all of which were in West Tennessee, and Greene county, which was in East Tennessee, the thirteen counties⁴² containing farms whose cash value amounted to between five and ten million dollars per county were in Middle Tennessee. On the other hand, there were only two counties in West Tennessee, Benton and Decatur, each of whose farms had a cash value of less than a million dollars each. There were seven counties in Middle Tennessee⁴³ and seven in East Tennessee⁴⁴ each of whose farms had a cash value of less than a million dollars. The cash value (less than a quarter of a million dollars) of the farms in Scott county was the lowest of any county in the state. In 1859 the average taxable value of land per acre in the state at large was \$8.19. In Middle Tennessee, it was \$10.89; in West Tennessee, \$8.07; and in East Tennessee, \$5.14.⁴⁵

Farmers and planters had a comparatively small amount of money invested in farm implements and machinery. Their estimated value amounted to \$5,360,210 in 1850 and to \$8,465,792 in 1860. This was

an increase of about 37 per cent in value during the decade. The increase was largest in East Tennessee and least in West Tennessee.⁴⁶

Farmers and planters in Tennessee produced a large variety of crops during this period. Although their chief interest, generally speaking, was in the staples, cotton and tobacco, they were giving increasing attention to the raising of livestock. They also produced corn, wheat and numerous other crops of lesser importance.

Tennessee's 194,532 bales, or 77,762,800 pounds, of cotton made it the fifth largest cotton-growing state in the Union in 1850. Despite the fact that it raised 294,494 bales, or 118,585,600 pounds, in 1860, its rank as a cotton-growing state was only eighth. Although Tennessee was growing an increasing amount of cotton throughout the decade, the shifting of the cotton-producing areas in Middle and East Tennessee was indicative of a certain amount of instability in the industry in about two-thirds of the state.


Cotton grew in all of the three grand divisions of Tennessee. However, eighteen counties in East Tennessee in 1850 and sixteen in 1860 failed to produce any. On the other hand, only three counties west of the mountains, De Kalb, Jackson and Overton, all located on the highland rim in the eastern part of Middle Tennessee, did not produce any during the decade.

Throughout the period West Tennessee, where all of the counties except Benton, which had ceased to produce any at all by 1860, and Henry, which had decreased its production by that date, had increased their production, raised more cotton than Middle and East Tennessee combined. With the exception of Marion county, in East Tennessee, in 1850, and Lawrence county, in Middle Tennessee in 1860, the five largest cotton-producing counties in the state during the decade, Fayette, Shelby, Haywood, Madison and Hardeman, were in West Tennessee. Fayette was the leading cotton-growing county in the state in 1850, and it ranked second to Lawrence, which led the state, in 1860. Ten counties in this section raised larger quantities of cotton than did any county in East Tennessee.

Chiefly because the big increase in production in Lawrence county (which led the state in 1860) more than offset substantial decreases in Rutherford and in Maury, Williamson and other smaller producing counties, Middle Tennessee raised more cotton in 1860 than it had raised in 1850. It is perhaps significant that the second- and fifth-largest producing countries in the section in 1850, Giles and Lincoln, which lay to the east of Lawrence along the Alabama line, increased

their production of cotton during the decade. Macon county, situated on the northern part of the highland rim on the Kentucky border, which had not produced any cotton in 1850, had become the fifth-largest producing county in the section by 1860. The total number of counties decreasing production during the period was smaller than the total number increasing it.

Counties in Tennessee Producing More Than One Million Pounds of Cotton or Tobacco and Livestock to the Value of More Than One Million Dollars in 1860



In contrast to the situation in West and Middle Tennessee, the production of cotton was decreasing rapidly in East Tennessee. It declined approximately 69 per cent between 1850 and 1860, largely because Marion county, which had produced about 94 per cent of the cotton grown in the section in 1850 and had ranked second in the state in production at that time, had ceased to raise any at all by 1860. Monroe, which supplanted Marion as the leading cotton-raising county in the section in 1860, grew less than one-fourth as much as Marion had grown. While there had been only ten cotton-producing counties in East Tennessee in 1850, there were fourteen in 1860. Thus, as was the case in Middle Tennessee, the cotton-growing area was shifting, but it was becoming a little more widespread.⁴⁷

The production of tobacco was more widespread in Tennessee between 1850 and 1860 than was that of cotton. Only four counties—Cocke, in East Tennessee, Van Buren, in Middle Tennessee, and Shelby and Tipton, in West Tennessee—failed to raise any in 1850. By 1860 all counties were growing it.

While Tennessee's production of cotton increased approximately 34 per cent between 1850 and 1860, its production of tobacco in-

creased approximately 54 per cent. The state more than doubled the amount of tobacco grown between 1850 and 1860, having increased production from 20,148,932 pounds to 43,448,097 pounds. As a result, it rose in rank from fourth to third among tobacco-producing states, being exceeded only by Virginia and Kentucky.

All sections shared in this gain. West Tennessee, which more than tripled its production, led. Middle Tennessee more than doubled its production; and East Tennessee increased its production by a little more than one-third. Five of the seven counties raising in excess of a million pounds of tobacco each in 1850—Montgomery, Smith, Robertson, Williamson and Wilson—were in Middle Tennessee; and two, Weakley and Henry, were in West Tennessee. By 1860 eight of the fourteen counties raising more than one million pounds of tobacco each⁴⁸ were in West Tennessee; the other six⁴⁹ were in Middle Tennessee. In 1850 only one county in East Tennessee, Polk, grew more than twenty-five thousand pounds of tobacco. Sullivan, which raised slightly more than one hundred thousand pounds by 1860, was the largest tobacco-producing county in this division of the state by the end of the decade. Although nineteen counties—four in West Tennessee, seven in Middle Tennessee, and eight in East Tennessee—decreased their production of tobacco during this period, sixty-five—fourteen in West Tennessee, twenty-nine in Middle Tennessee, and twenty-two in East Tennessee—increased theirs.⁵⁰

The livestock industry in Tennessee grew appreciably between 1850 and 1860. The value of livestock produced increased from \$29,978,016 in 1850 to \$60,211,425 in 1860. Nevertheless, Tennessee's rank in the value of livestock produced sank from fifth to sixth place in the nation during the decade, though it retained its rank of second among Southern states.

Throughout the decade, Tennessee raised more mules than any other state in the Union. Its production of hogs decreased, and it dropped from first to fourth place among the states of the Union in this field. Nevertheless, it continued to hold the lead in the South in their production. The state's production of sheep and cattle increased during the decade. However, its rank as a cattle-growing state dropped from eleventh to thirteenth; and its rank as a sheep-raising state sank from ninth to tenth. It retained its ranks of sixth and third respectively among Southern states in these fields.

The growth of the livestock industry was general throughout the state between 1850 and 1860. The value of livestock raised in both

Middle and West Tennessee doubled, and that grown in East Tennessee lacked only a little of doing so. The value of the livestock produced in Middle Tennessee was more than that produced in East and West Tennessee combined. Eleven of the sixteen largest livestock-producing counties in the state in 1850 were in Middle Tennessee;⁵¹ four, Gibson, Fayette, Madison and Shelby, were in West Tennessee; and one, Greene, was in East Tennessee. The ten largest livestock-raising counties in 1860 were all in Middle Tennessee.⁵² In addition, two other counties, Smith and Robertson, which grew more than one million dollars' worth of livestock each, were in Middle Tennessee. Four counties in West Tennessee, Gibson, Fayette, Madison and Shelby, produced over one million dollars' worth of livestock each in 1860. At this time, Greene, still the largest livestock-growing county in East Tennessee, lacked only a little of raising one million dollars' worth of livestock. Maury county, in which the value of the livestock grown had almost tripled, maintained its position as the leading livestock-growing county in the state throughout the decade.⁵³

The Cumberland, or Nashville, basin in Middle Tennessee was one of the most outstanding livestock-producing areas in the South. The highest type of animal husbandry in the South prevailed in the bluegrass region of Kentucky and in the Nashville basin.⁵⁴

Tennessee's 52,276,223 bushels of corn, its 7,703,084 bushels of oats and its 1,619,386 bushels of wheat gave it rankings of fifth, eighth and thirteenth respectively among the states of the Union in the production of these commodities in 1850. Since its production of corn was a little less in 1860 than it had been ten years earlier, it ranked only sixth among the corn-growing states in 1860. Its oat crop was so small that its rank as an oat-raising state was just sixteenth in 1860. Although it more than tripled its production of wheat during the decade, it was unable to do more than retain its rank of thirteenth as a wheat-growing state. In addition to these cereals, Tennessee raised appreciable quantities of rye, buckwheat and barley. It almost doubled its production of hay during the period. It also grew varying amounts of certain other crops of minor importance. In general, farmers and planters raised sufficient garden or truck and orchard products for their own use and a small surplus for local markets. The state's production of dairy products increased between 1850 and 1860.⁵⁵

Despite the predominance of agriculture, and despite an attitude of indifference toward manufacturing on the part of the majority of the

people in Tennessee during the decade of the fifties, there were those in the state who advocated a more diversified economy, with manufacturing in a key role. The state did not experience the industrial growth typical of that of many of the Northern states, but it was not static. Although the manufacturing that developed was in the "less productive branches," mainly in the "primary transformation of raw materials," it played a minor yet important part in the economic life of the state from 1850 to 1860, and laid the foundation for substantial growth later as well.⁵⁶

In 1850 there were 2,861 "Individuals and establishments" with a capital valuation of \$6,975,279 engaged in manufacturing in Tennessee. The 2,572 manufacturing establishments in existence in 1860 represented a capital investment of \$14,326,270. While the manufacturing industry expended \$4,900,952 for raw materials and turned out finished products valued at \$9,000,738 in 1850, by 1860 it expended \$8,836,784 for raw materials and turned out finished products valued at \$17,986,325. Manufacturers paid their 12,032 workers \$2,277,288 in 1850; and in 1860 they paid their 12,436 workers \$3,370,587.⁵⁷

It seems evident then that the trend in manufacturing was toward larger establishments and the increased use of machinery. Although there were fewer manufacturing units in 1860 than there had been in 1850, the capital invested in manufacturing more than doubled. While there was only a very small increase in the number of workers employed, both the amount spent for raw materials and that received for finished products had nearly doubled.

The copper-mining industry, in which there was "frenzied speculation" in the fifties, was the only two-million-dollar industry in Tennessee in 1860. The production of pig iron and various iron products, which had existed since pioneer days, was a million-and-a-half-dollar business. Lumbering and milling were million-dollar industries. The manufacture of cotton goods, in which there was relatively little progress, tobacco and leather, the production of bituminous coal, and printing, in which Tennessee led the Southern states, were industries ranging in value from nine to six hundred thousand dollars.⁵⁸

Geography was apparently the most important factor in determining the distribution of manufacturing in Tennessee during this period. Although there was a larger number of manufacturing establishments and a larger capital investment in manufacturing in Middle Tennessee than in East Tennessee, Middle Tennessee's proportionate share of both was much smaller than East Tennessee's. West Tennessee had


only a few more than half as many manufacturing plants as either Middle or East Tennessee, and it had less than half as much capital investment in manufacturing as did either of them. Therefore, it appears that East Tennessee, which had the largest proportionate share of manufacturing enterprises, was the most highly industrialized section of the state; and that West Tennessee, whose manufacturing interests were the smallest, was the least industrialized area of the state.

Between 1850 and 1860 the growing demands of agriculture and industry—more particularly of agriculture, of course—necessitated an expansion of transportation facilities in Tennessee. The state made noteworthy progress in supplying this need. The Federal census of 1860 showed no canal and river improvements and made no mention of highway construction during the decade. It was true, however, that Tennessee had already made considerable progress in the construction of macadamized turnpikes in Middle Tennessee and had already effected minor improvements in the navigability of rivers in East and West Tennessee.⁵⁹ The outstanding development in transportation during this period, therefore, was in the field of railroad building. Although there was not a mile of railroad in the state in 1850, there were 1,268.62 miles by 1860.⁶⁰

The immediate stimulus for the successful completion of the railroad system in operation in Tennessee in 1861 came from the "Southern and Western Convention," over which John C. Calhoun had presided in Memphis in November, 1845.⁶¹ Nevertheless, since Tennesseans had long realized that Tennessee, an inland state, would necessarily have to co-ordinate its railways with those of adjoining states in order to gain access to markets and sources of supplies, practically all of the railroad lines completed during the decade of the fifties had had their origins in those projected in the decade of the thirties.⁶² Therefore, by the spring of 1861, Tennessee's system of railroads afforded connections not only with the South Atlantic ports but also with leading cities on the Gulf of Mexico, on the North Atlantic and in the Ohio and Mississippi valleys.

These railroads, generally extending in a north-south direction across the state, were chiefly main lines connecting the three sections of the state with important cities or regions outside the state which served as markets or sources of supplies. Such little connection as they afforded among the three main divisions of the state itself were incidental and for the most part unimportant. Thus, Tennessee's railroads like its other internal improvements,⁶³ promoted the economic devel-

SYSTEM OF RAILROADS IN TENNESSEE, 1861



opment of the three respective sections of the state without linking them together. The lack of an integrated state system of railroads did nothing to lessen the sectional animosities already existing within the state itself or to promote a feeling of unity.

Agricultural and industrial development in Tennessee also led to an enlargement of the state's banking facilities between 1850 and 1860. The number of banks and branches increased from twenty-three to thirty-four.⁶⁴ The greater part of this expansion came as a result of the passage of a law in 1852 creating a free banking system. Although twelve of the twenty-two banks which came into existence under this and a subsequent measure in 1856 were in either voluntary or involuntary liquidation by 1859-60, ten of them remained in operation. In addition, there was an increase of five in the number of branches of already existing banks. The fact that East and West Tennessee's proportionate shares of these new banks and branches was larger than Middle Tennessee's had the effect of rectifying inequalities in the banking facilities among the three sections of the state.

Between 1850 and 1860, the capital of the banks in Tennessee increased from \$6,881,568 to \$8,067,037. During the same period their deposits rose from \$1,917,757 to \$4,324,799; but their circulation decreased from \$6,814,376 to \$5,538,378. Their specie increased from \$1,456,778 to \$2,267,710. Their loans increased from \$10,992,139 to \$11,751,019.⁶⁵

The state not only expanded its banking system but it also strengthened it during the decade. Laws of 1852 and 1856 placed the issue of currency on a reasonably sound basis. As a result of the panic of 1857, the state's legislators enacted additional laws during the sessions of 1857-58 and 1859-60, for the further improvement and more stringent regulation of the banking system.⁶⁶

The variety of geographic conditions and the diversity of social and economic interests to which they gave rise made it exceedingly difficult for the people of Tennessee to arrive at satisfactory solutions of their political problems. When the necessity of resolving the most crucial political crisis in the state's history confronted them, they found it impossible to reach agreement as to the most desirable course of action.

Between 1847 and 1861, as had been the case throughout a great part of the state's history, both unifying and divisive forces were operative. While the homogeneous character of the state's white population tended to create unity, topographical differences among its three well-defined sections were conducive to the development of a spirit of sectionalism. Physiographic factors decided the state's agricultural products, which, in turn, determined to a large extent its types of land culture and labor system, which varied somewhat in character among its three grand divisions. In view of the state's relatively slight industrial development, it was inevitable that its social and economic structures should have had their bases in its agricultural system, in which the cultivation of the staples cotton and tobacco predominated despite a comparatively high degree of diversification. The relatively rapid growth of a system of railroads within the state during the decade of the fifties contributed substantially to its material prosperity. These railroads, however, served rather to link the three sections of the state with adjoining states than to draw them together into a compact whole. Changes in law and practice during the decade not only expanded and equalized banking facilities in all sections of the state but also reformed and strengthened the state's banking system.

In 1861 the people of Tennessee were thoroughly aware of the fact that their state had made sound and steady progress not only along economic but also along social lines during the preceding fifteen years. Although a great majority of them felt that their social and economic interests were more closely identified with those of the South than with those of the North, a substantial minority did not share this view. Since Tennessee was a border state, however, its citizens did not

wish to become alienated from either section. Tennesseans were firmly convinced that the maintenance of the Federal Union, as established by the Constitution, constituted the best guaranty of their continued happiness and prosperity.

CHAPTER II

The State and the Sectional Dispute between the North and the South, 1847-50

By 1847, when the first of the important and bitter debates immediately preceding the Civil War began, Tennessee had ceased to be a part of the frontier. Its social and economic interests, conditioned to a great extent by geographical factors, were diverse. Although there were indications of a positive trend toward the establishment of a plantation system in West Tennessee and toward the creation of at least a semi-plantation regime in Middle Tennessee, such, generally speaking, was not the case in East Tennessee, where small-scale farming and grazing still predominated. Because of the popular preoccupation with agriculture and the lack of transportation and capital, commercial and industrial development was slow, although there was some progress in these areas. The fact that the state as a whole was still in a transitional stage of development tended somewhat to complicate political matters.

The historical factor likewise contributed greatly to the complexity of the political situation in the state. In the earliest years of its history as a state, Tennessee had given allegiance to the party of Thomas Jefferson. Later it had enthusiastically supported Andrew Jackson and the type of democracy of which he was the leading exponent. During President Jackson's second administration, however, a group of political leaders who had become extremely restive under his dictatorial domination of political affairs in the state took advantage of the resentment which his real or fancied slight to a fellow Tennessean, Hugh L. White of Knoxville, had created to form a political organization in opposition to him. This group subsequently became a part of the national Whig party. From the time of Jackson's second Presidential administration to the outbreak of the Civil War there were

two surprisingly evenly matched and strongly antagonistic political parties in Tennessee.

Party loyalty transcended sectional lines to a marked extent. Each of the two political parties drew supporters from all three sections of the state. Middle Tennessee was the center of Democratic strength, but the party polled a substantial minority vote in each of the other two sections. Similarly, although East and West Tennessee, despite the diversity of their economic and social systems, were the main strongholds of the Whig party, it had a considerable body of adherents in Middle Tennessee. As a result of the relatively equal and comparatively evenly distributed strength of the two parties in the state, political contests in Tennessee were often bitter and always spirited and hard fought.

In Tennessee, as in the other states of the South during this period, party divisions were by no means surface matters. Generally speaking, they cut so deeply as to form virtually impossible barriers to the shifting of party allegiance.¹ Sometimes there were bitter political feuds between members of the two political parties.² In addition, very keen intra-party rivalries often existed among aspirants for office.

Sectionalism, which had existed prior to statehood, also complicated political affairs in Tennessee. The earliest manifestation of sectional feeling after the formation of the state, growing in the main out of the personal antagonism between John Sevier and Andrew Jackson, was between East Tennessee and the rest of the state.³ Subsequently, the Jackson and White incident further accentuated the division between the Eastern and Middle sections of the state. Later, the development of different points of view, generally between East Tennessee on the one hand and Middle and West Tennessee on the other, concerning economic issues, particularly internal improvements,⁴ greatly increased East Tennessee's sense of grievance. There was a substantial difference in outlook between East Tennessee, where slavery was neither widespread nor strong, and Middle and West Tennessee, where it was both widespread and strong. Cutting somewhat across this alignment of East versus Middle and West Tennessee, however, was the occasional combination of East and West Tennessee against Middle Tennessee for the purpose of gaining political offices.⁵

Definite though not well-defined convictions concerning state rights and the extra-legal right of revolution antedated statehood in Tennessee. Either because of, or in spite of, the fact that Andrew Jackson had dominated the state from 1824 until about 1834, there was ap-

parently very little open criticism of his policy in either the controversy over nullification in South Carolina or the Indian controversy in Georgia. It seems, therefore, that the political philosophy of the Democratic party, which remained under the spell of Jackson's powerful personality until virtually the outbreak of hostilities in 1861, included emphasis on both state rights and nationalism.⁶ Since the organization of the Whig party in Tennessee had not originally involved a repudiation of Jackson's national program, it, like the Democratic party, emphasized both state rights and nationalism without attempting to draw any definite line of demarcation between the two.⁷

The beginning of the revolutionary movement, which culminated in Tennessee's withdrawal from the Union in 1861, was coetaneous with the dawning realization that the efforts of certain groups in the North to prohibit the extension of slavery to the territories was not only a blow at the institution of slavery but also a decided threat to Southern expansion and even to the maintenance of the South's position of importance in the Union. The discussion attendant upon the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso in Congress brought this matter graphically to the people of Tennessee. The belief that continued Northern encroachments, especially those which jeopardized the future of slavery, the warp of the social and economic fabric of the state, threatened its future prosperity was widespread in Tennessee. A difference of opinion as to the best means of obtaining redress of grievances and of safeguarding slavery in particular as the best way of guaranteeing the perpetuity of their mode of living formed the basis of party divisions upon the subject within the state.

The people of Tennessee generally shared the belief of President James K. Polk, at that time the state's most prominent citizen, that the Wilmot Proviso was a "mischievous and foolish amendment." They agreed that it was difficult to conceive "what connection slavery had with making peace with Mexico."⁸

On March 3, 1847, the writer of an editorial in the *Knoxville Register* called attention to the fact that the House had just passed the "Three Million Bill," with the Wilmot Proviso attached.⁹ This bill, he said, was similar to that which the House had passed and which the Senate had vetoed in the previous session, and he declared that the public would wait with "no little anxiety" the present Senate's action on it. He approved of the action of Tennessee's entire delegation in the House, Whigs and Democrats alike, in voting against the Proviso.⁹

Although the biennial gubernatorial and Congressional elections of 1847 in Tennessee occurred while the Wilmot Proviso was still pending in Congress, it was not an issue. However, there was no dearth of issues. Of the utmost importance was the fact that the party which won the legislature would select a United States Senator. Naturally each party wished to control the state's Congressional delegation. Furthermore, as the tri-weekly *Nashville Union*, an ardent supporter of President Polk, pointed out, the two parties had been so nearly balanced for several years in the state that neither had taken a defeat to indicate despair of success in the next venture.¹⁰

There were numerous aspirants for the gubernatorial nomination of the Whig party.¹¹ The most prominent among these were William B. Campbell, who at the time was serving with gallantry in the Mexican War; Meredith P. Gentry, a representative in Congress from the sixth district; Gustavus A. Henry, an outstanding orator and political figure in the state; and Neill S. Brown, also a prominent political leader in the state. Campbell withdrew his name from consideration before the party's state convention. Even after Allen A. Hall, the editor of the *Nashville Whig*, had announced Campbell's position in "a beautiful article well calculated to place you properly before the country," there was still considerable uncertainty in the Whig ranks as to who should be their candidate.¹² The Democratic tri-weekly *Nashville Union* declared that Neill S. Brown had a "neighborhood popularity in Giles [County]," but that it supposed that Henry, who had "made his speech about the eagle all over the state in '44," would be the Whig candidate.¹³ A fortnight later the same paper declared that the Whigs had turned from Gentry, who had had considerable strength at first, because of his speech in Congress on the Mexican War expressing sentiments "which disgrace Americans."

The Whig state convention met in Nashville on March 25. The chief contenders for the nomination were Brown and Henry. When Henry's friends, who had exerted strenuous efforts to make him the party nominee, saw that Brown had a majority, they withdrew his name and "united cordially in the will of the majority."¹⁴

In contrast with the situation among the Whigs, there was apparently no doubt as to who would be the nominee of the Democrats. When the state convention met, it nominated Governor Aaron V. Brown for re-election as a matter of course.¹⁵

The ensuing gubernatorial campaign was spirited. The Whigs, who knew that they could not win without the exertion of great effort,

took the offensive. They called attention to the effectiveness of Democratic discipline and pointed out that

. . . the whole weight of Executive patronage and influence will be thrown into the conflict, and Tennessee will become a battleground on which the Whig Party must contend not only with their opponents at home, but with the great head and front of Locofocoism at Washington—the mighty James K. Polk himself.

They insisted that victory was possible, nevertheless, if the Whigs maintained the "perfect harmony and ceaseless activity" which they owed to "*the cause*." They took the position that they were "contending for correct principles, and against error, misrule and corruption in high places."¹⁶

The Democrats, apparently somewhat too optimistic, appeared to be confident of victory provided there were no "petty quarrels about who shall run for Congress or the Legislature." They evidently thought that "a thorough organization of the party and a liberal circulation of Democratic newspapers" was all that was wanting to insure their success.¹⁷

Questions of state policy played virtually no part in the campaign. Since both parties differed among themselves as much as they did with their opponents on these matters, they were glad to turn their attention to the field of national affairs, in which the main topic of discussion was the Mexican War. The Whigs denounced the manner of bringing on and prosecuting the war, but, with few exceptions, they were in favor of continuing it until it was possible to obtain an "honorable peace."¹⁸ The Democrats maintained that the war was both necessary and just, and of course approved of fighting it to a successful finish. They claimed credit for the general prosperity of the country and charged that the Whigs avoided the old issues of a national bank and distribution and failed to discuss the tariff question with their accustomed boldness, although they had committed themselves against the existing tariff.¹⁹

The Whig candidate, Neill S. Brown, defeated the Democratic candidate, Aaron V. Brown, by a vote of 61,469 to 60,454. The Whigs won a majority of ten in the legislature. The Democrats, however, with victories in six out of eleven congressional districts, won a majority of the state's Congressional delegation.²⁰

The Whigs exulted over their "glorious victory." They said that the Democrats had fought as hard as they could because they knew the advantage of having Polk's own state endorse him. They attributed the defeat of the Democrats to the "blunders and usurpations of the party in power." To them, this apparently meant that the President had plunged the country into an expensive war without having consulted the representatives of the people and had added "appendages to the Union" and set up governments in them. Some even went so far as to say that the people, disregarding the politicians entirely, "consulted their own good sense and patriotism" and voted accordingly.²¹

By virtue of their majority in the legislature, the Whigs were able to choose the successor of Spencer Jarnagin in the United States Senate. There was keen competition among Whig leaders from all sections of the state for the position. Sectionalism became an issue.

On September 1, the Knoxville *Register* called attention to the fact that certain Whig papers in West Tennessee had already raised the "question of locality" and thereby put the matter in dispute. It regretted the fact that both the Memphis *Enquirer* and the Memphis *Eagle* had "planted themselves upon the position that West Tennessee should furnish the Senator." Its own position was that East Tennessee had always had a Senator and should continue to have one because it had certain leading interests which differed from those of Middle and West Tennessee. It continued:

The State of Tennessee is divided nominally into *three*, but actually into only *two* parts. There is but one real, substantial dividing line, and that is the Cumberland Mountains. That section of the State which lies on this side of the range is East Tennessee and that which lies on the other is West Tennessee . . . whether the term Middle be applied to a portion of it or not.

The Memphis *Enquirer*, replying to an editorial in the Knoxville *Tribune* attacking the *Eagle* and the *Enquirer* because of their demand that West Tennessee²² should supply the Senator, asserted that "East Tennessee, jealous of her 'ancient prerogative,'" had become alarmed and was "marshalling her forces to reassert her claims—not the less preposterous because so long submitted to—to monopolize one-half of the Senatorial honors of the State." It angrily denied the *Tribune's*

charge that the Whigs of West Tennessee would vote for a Democrat before they would support a Whig from Middle or East Tennessee. It sarcastically pointed out that

... according to the organ of East Tennessee it is "pushing pretensions beyond reasonable bounds" for us to set forth the broad national grounds upon which we claim the choice of a Senator from the West; while it evidences a "spirit of conciliation and *moderation*" to set up a perpetual claim thereto, as a matter of right, on behalf of the hills and hollows bordering upon the "State of Buncombe."

Finally, it declared that West Tennessee not only had right and justice but also power on its side, because Middle Tennessee²³ would not put forth a sectional claim, and John Bell, "the only man in the state whose commanding abilities render him the common property of the Commonwealth," it understood, would not permit the use of his name.²⁴

Meanwhile, the Whig leaders of Middle Tennessee, which already had the junior Senator, Hopkins L. Turney, a Democrat, made the most of the opportunity offered by the wrangling between East and West Tennessee. At any rate, the legislature, after "protracted effort," elected John Bell of Nashville—one of the founders of the Whig party in Tennessee and for many years a member of the House of Representatives, of which he had once been speaker—to the Senate. He received fifty-one votes to the forty-six scattered among his colleagues and Democratic aspirants.²⁵

Although the Wilmot Proviso had not been an issue in the campaign of 1847, the state senate looked upon it as a measure sufficiently inimical to the South and to Tennessee as a Southern state to call forth its protest. On October 11, 1847, Isham G. Harris, a young Democrat from West Tennessee who was just entering politics, submitted strongly pro-Southern resolutions upon the subject. The preamble of these resolutions stated that the general assembly should warn the people of the united, energetic and purposeful attack upon slavery which the abolitionists were leading, and should "devise, adopt, and announce in their name, and by their authority" measures which, by "vindicating the guarantees of the constitution," would check their drive. The resolutions declared that the position which the legislature of Virginia had recently assumed concerning the Wilmot Pro-

viso represented the "views and opinions" of the general assembly of Tennessee; that the "government of the United States has no control, directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately, over the institution of slavery, and that in lacking any such control it transcends the limits of its legitimate functions, by destroying the internal organization of the sovereignties which formed it"; that "under no circumstances will this body recognize as binding, any enactment of the Federal Government which has for its object the prohibition of slavery in any territory to be acquired by conquest or treaty south of the line of the Missouri Compromise," because every citizen of the Confederacy has a right to carry his property wheresoever he wishes; that the passage of the Wilmot Proviso by the national House of Representatives made it necessary for the slaveholding states to take concerted action in the emergency; and that the general assembly opposed any Presidential candidate who did not "unconditionally, clearly, and unequivocally" oppose the principles of the Wilmot Proviso.²⁶

The committee on Federal relations, to which the state senate had referred these proposals, recommended in its report three resolutions in lieu of those which Harris had presented. They were more moderate in tone than those of Harris; yet they were clearly indicative of opposition to legislation deemed to be unfriendly to the South.

The senate accepted the committee's resolutions as being expressive of its sentiments on the Wilmot Proviso. First, it resolved by a vote of fourteen to eleven that "it is inexpedient for this Legislature to define the duties of the General Government, because those duties are already defined by the Constitution of the United States."²⁷ Second, it resolved, further, by a vote of fifteen to ten, that "it is impolitic for the Legislature to declare that it will not recognize the acts of the General Government because this would be nullification in advance."²⁸ Finally, it resolved unanimously that "this Legislature is opposed to the 'Wilmot Proviso' in every shape and form; they believe that its adoption by the Congress of the United States, would produce great discord in our nation; and that no possible good would ever grow out of it."²⁹

By substituting the resolutions of the committee on Federal relations for those which Senator Harris had introduced, the Senate, which the Whigs controlled, refused in effect either to endorse the position which the legislature of Virginia had taken on the Wilmot Proviso or to inject the Wilmot Proviso into the Presidential campaign of 1848. By a partisan vote on the first two of the committee's resolutions, it expressed its belief that the course recommended in Harris'

second and third resolutions was both inexpedient and imprudent. It also indicated its feeling that Constitutional provisions were sufficient to guide Congress in its legislation with reference to slavery and showed no disposition to try to threaten or intimidate that body. It unanimously accepted the committee's third resolution, which though it failed to advocate concerted action in opposition to the Wilmot Proviso in case it should become law, as Harris' fourth resolution had done, unmistakably revealed pronounced hostility to that measure.

Although Whigs and Democrats alike disagreed among themselves as to the Constitutionality of the Wilmot Proviso,³⁰ both groups were agreed in their opposition to it. They were decidedly not in agreement as to whose was the blame for the measure. Each party tried to shift responsibility for it to the other. Each likewise held the other accountable for the evil consequences which it believed would grow out of it.³¹

Meanwhile, a portion of the Whig press of the state had been laying the groundwork for the Presidential contest of 1848 since practically the beginning of the gubernatorial campaign of 1847. At that time it had brought forward General Zachary Taylor as its candidate for the Presidency and had relied greatly upon that move to bring success in the state elections.³² Neill S. Brown had announced his support of General Taylor for the nomination during his gubernatorial campaign.³³ Many other Whigs were working actively in Taylor's behalf also.

Whig papers generally presented General Taylor in extravagant terms as the "*People's* candidate."³⁴ One editor declared that except for Washington no man had had greater popular favor than Taylor. "The people," he said, "need no nominating convention to bring his name before them." He took the position that the press had not led public sentiment in this matter, but had merely given correct expression to it.³⁵

Nevertheless, General Taylor was not to win the Presidential nomination of his party without a contest. Henry Clay made a notable speech at Lexington, Kentucky, on November 11, 1847, presenting certain resolutions which expressed his views on the war and the terms on which peace ought to be made. This speech constituted an avowal of his candidacy for the Whig nomination for the Presidency and an assumption of the party leadership. Of the Whig papers in the nation, only the *New York Courier and Enquirer* and the *Nashville Whig*, "most militant of the Taylor press," failed to applaud warmly.³⁶

The Democrats in Tennessee, unlike the Whigs, had no military hero to bring forward as the candidate for their party's Presidential nomination. Furthermore, the situation in the Democratic party was such that there was considerable doubt as to who would be the nominee. Governor Brown, therefore, refused to allow his Whig opponent to draw him out on the subject during the gubernatorial campaign.³⁷

When it became clear that President Polk was definitely not to be a candidate for re-election, the Democrats in Tennessee concerned themselves with the problem of helping to decide who should be his successor. A. O. P. Nicholson, an outstanding Democratic leader in the state, who had filled out Felix Grundy's unexpired term in the Senate and who was then president of the Bank of Tennessee, wrote a letter to Governor Lewis Cass of Michigan requesting a statement of his views concerning the acquisition of territory from Mexico and concerning the Wilmot Proviso. With reference to the territorial question, Cass replied that the United States should insist upon a reasonable reparation for the injuries which Mexico had done. Since the territorial extent of this indemnity was, in the first instance, a subject of executive consideration, he felt that "it would be indiscreet to commit the country to any line of indemnity, which might otherwise be enlarged, as the obstinate injustice of the enemy prolongs the contest." As to the Wilmot Proviso, Cass declared that he opposed the exercise of any jurisdiction over the matter of slavery in the territories by Congress, and that he favored leaving to the people of any territory which the United States might acquire the right to regulate it themselves under the general principles of the Constitution.³⁸ Since these views were acceptable to the Democrats of Tennessee, they did not oppose the candidacy of Cass.

The Democratic state convention, over which Nicholson presided, met on January 9, 1848. It listened to routine resolutions and brief addresses. Its main business apparently was the selection of Presidential electors.³⁹

Early in February, 1848, the Whig members of the legislature met in caucus and nominated General Zachary Taylor for the presidency. "Politically speaking," declared the Nashville *Whig*, "they faithfully discharged their duty," for the "people of Tennessee" had in effect nominated Taylor in the state election in the preceding August. It maintained that this action of the legislators reflected the views of Whigs all over the state better than any convention would. Subse-

quently the Whig members of the legislature and others, "in accordance with usage," met and nominated two electors for the state at large and recommended the holding of conventions in each congressional district for the purpose of nominating district electors. Therefore, said the *Whig*, it was entirely unnecessary to hold a state convention.⁴⁰

Nevertheless, there were Whigs in Tennessee who favored the candidacy of Clay rather than that of Taylor. Among the leaders of what John Bell referred to as the "*Clay and Confusion* movement" were James C. Jones of Memphis, a former governor; Ephraim H. Foster, a former Senator; Boyd McNairy, a Whig leader in Davidson county; and Milton Brown, a Whig leader of Memphis.⁴¹

The Nashville *Whig* took the unique position that Tennessee should not send delegates to the Whig national convention, on grounds of both expediency and "honor." It held that the "resolute maintenance of the determination so unqualifiedly avowed by the Whigs of Tennessee to support General Taylor" would exercise a much more favorable influence for him with the Whig national convention than would "the abandonment of the ground they have occupied, and the sending of delegates to that body." If Tennessee sent delegates, it argued, it would have to abide by the decision of the convention. The *Whig* was not prepared to pledge support to "any individual whom a majority" of the convention might possibly nominate because of the possibility of the nomination of "some individual under whose banner the Whigs of Tennessee and of the *South* could not stand up long enough to be knocked down."⁴² It saw no inconsistency, however, in sending delegates to participate in the selection of the vice-presidential nominee, since neither the Whig party nor the Whig press had committed itself to any candidate.⁴³

The Memphis *Enquirer* regretted the fact that the *Whig* had assumed an attitude of antagonism to Tennessee's participation in the selection of the Presidential nominee by the Whig national convention. It could not see how Taylor's nomination, which the *Whig* had said was certain, was possible if his friends stayed away from the convention. Congressman Washington Barrow of the eighth, or Nashville, district, among others, shared the *Enquirer's* point of view.⁴⁴

The Knoxville *Tribune* made a strong plea for party harmony, which it held to be absolutely essential to victory in the coming election. It said that a united Whig party could elect any candidate whom

it would nominate. It pledged its unqualified support to anyone whom the Whig national convention should nominate.⁴⁵

The national conventions of the Whig and Democratic parties nominated Zachary Taylor and Lewis Cass as their respective candidates for the Presidency. The Whigs and Democrats of Tennessee worked diligently to secure the election of their respective standard bearers. There was a belief among Whigs that all that would be wanting to give Taylor such a majority as Harrison had obtained "was the same sort of exertions which we made use of in 1840." They realized that the Democrats would make a desperate attempt to carry the state in order that Cass might have a chance to win.⁴⁶

By the latter part of October, the Whigs were confident of carrying the state for Taylor. Ephraim H. Foster wrote Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky that "With the exception of our old friend McNairy, who . . . ought to be laced in a straight jacket, dissatisfaction has passed away and the Whigs seem to me to present an almost united Front." The "basis of the betting" on the election was that Taylor would get a majority of two to five votes in the state.⁴⁷

Tennessee's vote in the election of 1848 was unusually large. Taylor carried the state by a vote of 64,532 to 58,438. A comparison of these returns with those of the gubernatorial elections of 1847 and 1849 reveals the fact that Taylor drew some support from the Democrats. The editor of one Democratic paper attributed the Whig victory to "a want of correct historical information among the people." It seems that Taylor's military record and the fact that he was a Southerner were probably the deciding factors in Tennessee.⁴⁸

The Taylor Whigs had healed the preconvention breach between themselves and the Clay Whigs in order to be able to carry the state for Taylor. Nevertheless, some of the leaders of the Taylor faction expected the incoming administration to favor them in the matter of patronage.⁴⁹

The Whigs of Tennessee felt that their effective support of Taylor entitled their group to representation in his cabinet. In this connection the names of John Bell, Meredith P. Gentry and James C. Jones were most prominent. Taylor subsequently tendered the appointment of postmaster-general to Gentry,⁵⁰ who declined to accept it.⁵¹

In the meantime, on January 15, 1849, Senator John C. Calhoun had presented "The Address of Southern Members of Congress to Their Constituents" to a meeting of the Southern members of Con-

gress. Senator John M. Berrien, a Whig, submitted an address in lieu of Calhoun's to this body.⁵²

On January 16, Senator Calhoun called on President Polk to discuss the slavery question and the meeting of the Southern members of Congress. Although Calhoun opposed the admission of California in particular, he proposed no plan of adjusting the slavery controversy in general. He "insisted that the aggressiveness of the North upon the South be resisted and that the time had come for action." In reply to Calhoun, Polk expressed the hope that "government might be provided for California and New Mexico, and especially the former, by admitting it into the Union without having the bill for the purpose embarrassed by the Wilmot Proviso."⁵³ He believed that the admission of California into the Union as a state to be the only practical solution of the slavery controversy at that time. His position was that "In this form the question would be left to the people of the new States when they have to form a State constitution for themselves." During the course of the conversation Polk became perfectly convinced that Calhoun did not wish Congress to settle the slavery dispute during the current session, and that "he desired to influence the South upon the subject." Polk expressed a strong attachment to the Union, emphasized the desirability of preserving it and impressed upon Calhoun the fact that "he gave no countenance to any movement which tended to violence or the disunion of the States."⁵⁴

Like Polk, all but two of Tennessee's Congressional delegation opposed Calhoun's plan to "influence the South" on the slavery issue. These two were Senator Hopkins L. Turney and Representative F. P. Stanton of the Memphis, or eleventh, district.⁵⁵

The first public endorsement in Tennessee of the state-rights doctrine which, if carried to its logical conclusion, might eventually lead to the secession of states from the Union, came from the state Democratic convention of 1849. This body met in Nashville on April 19, 1849 and chose A. O. P. Nicholson as its presiding officer. It adopted the report of the resolutions committee only after debate and amendment. The tone of the platform was distinctly pro-Southern. It approved Polk's administration. It asserted that

. . . the Government of the United States has no control directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately, over the institution of slavery, so as to impair the rights of the slaveholder, and that in taking such control it transcends the limits of its legitimate func-

tions by destroying the internal organization of the sovereignties who created it.

It declared that all territory which the United States acquired belonged "to the several States of this Union, as their joint and common property, in which all have common rights," and that the Federal government's enactment of any law which prevented the

. . . citizens of any State from emigrating, with their property, of whatever description, into such territory, would be a discrimination unwarranted by and in violation of the right of the States from which such citizens emigrated, and in derogation of that perfect equality that belongs to the several States as members of this Union would tend directly to subvert the Union itself.

After having stated that it was the duty of all in the United States to oppose the passage of laws like the Wilmot Proviso, and having pointed out that the threatened enactment of such a measure made it the duty of all slaveholding states and their citizens, "as they value their dearest privileges, their sovereignty, their independence, their rights of property, to take firm, united and concerted action in this emergency," it commended the "noble stand" which the legislatures of Virginia, North Carolina and Florida had taken in their resolutions relative to the Wilmot Proviso. It regarded a law abolishing the slave trade in the District of Columbia as a "direct attack upon the institutions of the Southern States." It resolved,

That in the event of the passage by Congress of the Wilmot Proviso, or any law abolishing slavery or the slave trade in the district of Columbia, we are ready, heart and soul, with a united front, to join Virginia, the Carolinas, Florida and the other Southern States, in taking such measures for the vindication of our rights, and the preservation of our selves and those whom we hold dear, as the highest wisdom of all may, through a Southern convention or otherwise, suggest and advise.

It affirmed its belief that,

. . . in the recent movements of a large portion of the people of

the north, in Congress, in the legislatures of the States, in the civil courts, in the primary assemblies of the people, in their continued efforts to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, in the establishment of the principles of the Wilmot Proviso, and in the protection of fugitive slaves, we perceive a total disregard and a reckless violation of all their pledges in the Constitution and a design not only to prevent that extension of slavery into the newly acquired territory but to abolish it forcibly, at no distant day, in all the States of the Union where it now exists.

It called for a reorganization of the Democratic party in the state, and unanimously recommended General William Trousdale as candidate for governor.⁵⁶

The *Daily Union* said that a fine spirit of "union, harmony and concession prevailed in the selection of a candidate." Landon C. Haynes of East Tennessee was Trousdale's chief contender for the nomination.⁵⁷ Despite a desire to honor East Tennessee, however, the majority thought that General Trousdale, the "Veteran of Three Wars," would probably be able more thoroughly to unite the whole party, "including many who were Taylor Democrats," than any other and therefore gave him the nomination by a decisive vote on the first ballot.⁵⁸ The *Union* characterized as able the debate between Andrew Ewing and General L. H. Coe on the slavery question. Ewing made a brilliant and powerful speech questioning the expediency of passing one of the resolutions which the platform committee had recommended.⁵⁹ General Coe spoke eloquently and convincingly for its passage. The majority agreed with Coe "that the time for a firm declaration of our purpose to resist the encroachments of Northern fanaticism, when pushed to extremity had arrived," and passed it.⁶⁰

Apparently the Democratic convention in Tennessee endorsed the position which Senator Harris had incorporated in the resolutions concerning the Wilmot Proviso which he had introduced in the state senate in 1847, and that which Senator Turney and Representative Stanton had taken in signing the Southern Address.⁶¹ The fact that there was opposition to this course in the body itself, however, was significant.

Prior to the meeting of the Whig state convention, there was some discussion as to the advisability of renominating Governor Neill S. Brown as the party's standard bearer in 1849. The Whigs of East Ten-

nessee were disgruntled with Brown, mainly on the question of internal improvements, it seems.⁶² T. A. R. Nelson, a prominent East Tennessee Whig, was apparently the choice of the majority of this group for the nomination in the event that Brown should decline to make the race for a second term. Governor Brown, however, was eager to be the candidate.⁶³

The Whig state convention met in a short session at Nashville on April 22, 1849. It followed its custom of renominating a governor for a second term and named Governor Brown as its candidate.⁶⁴

On April 25 the *Daily Union* observed that

As the Whig party in this state have held their convention, nominated their candidate for Governor, and adjourned without expressing by resolutions or an address, their sentiments or positions upon any of the questions that interest the country, the sentiments, opinions and positions of their candidate . . . must necessarily be taken as the sentiments, opinions and positions of the party, and for them will the party justly be held accountable and responsible.

Governor Brown, it said, was less cautious than the convention, however, and he made a speech setting forth his views on the most important questions agitating the country. He accepted the South's position on slavery. He was opposed to the Wilmot Proviso. If it passed, he thought that the South should submit, because "Congress could do nothing that would justify any section of the States in resisting its decrees." He deprecated the passing of resolutions by legislatures and public meetings in the South "recommending to the citizens of the southern States, in the event of the passage of the Wilmot Proviso, to resist its enforcement and to break off commercial relations with the North" as much as he did the "fanaticism of the North." He believed it to be possible to effect a compromise by agreeing upon some line in the territories beyond which slavery would not go. He favored the construction of a railroad from Nashville to Knoxville by the general government in what appeared to be a deliberate attempt to win back the support of East Tennessee.

While Governor Brown's views upon national issues found favor with a great majority of his party, there was a minority in a few western districts who bitterly attacked anti-slavery measures and indicated a willingness to sanction extreme methods of redress. The *En-*

quirer of Memphis represented this point of view in its open advocacy of disunion if the South could not get its rights in the Union.⁶⁵ Thus, within the Whig party as well as within the Democratic party there were divergent views on the Wilmot Proviso and on the issue upon which it focused attention.

The campaign of 1849 was by no means as exciting as the contests of 1847 and 1848 had been. The Whigs were distinctly apathetic. Ex-Governor James C. Jones wrote letters to prominent Whig leaders throughout the state urging them to exert themselves in Governor Brown's and the party's interest. The "patronage war" between the two Whig papers in Knoxville reacted unfavorably upon the Whig cause. The chairman of the Whig Central Committee stressed the importance of victory in Tennessee to the Taylor administration to little avail, it seems. Governor Brown urged the Whigs to organize and rally if they valued his re-election.⁶⁶

Although the Democrats were not as lacking in enthusiasm as were the Whigs, they relied to a great extent on General Trousdale's military record. Some felt that the Democrats gave too much time to the discussion of the Wilmot Proviso. While some Democratic leaders thought that General Trousdale made more effective speeches than the Governor, the campaign did not greatly impress them.⁶⁷

The Democrats were victorious in the election. Trousdale defeated Brown by a vote of 61,740 to 60,350. The Democrats won seven out of eleven seats in Congress. They gained a majority of three in the lower house of the legislature, but the Whigs gained a majority of three in the upper house.⁶⁸

The Whigs attributed Governor Brown's defeat mainly to apathy resulting from blind overconfidence and disaffection or factionalism in their own party. They declared that the Democrats' "studied and unceasing misrepresentation" of his position on the slavery issue had also been a big factor. "His course did not differ materially from that of Trousdale and not at all from Ewing's," they said, "and yet he was called a traitor to the South."⁶⁹ They pointed out, too, that Trousdale's military record had contributed largely to his success.⁷⁰

In an editorial entitled "The South Will Resist," the *Nashville Union*, greatly elated over the Democratic victory, declared that the real cause of Brown's defeat was "the apathy which he produced in his own party by the very vulnerable position which he occupied in regard to the slavery question."⁷¹ It accused him of being a submissionist and declared that such a position was indefensible.⁷²

Nevertheless, it is highly probable that Governor Brown's summary of his position on the slavery controversy in his message to the legislature, at the opening of the session of 1849-50, was a very close approximation of the prevailing sentiment upon the subject in the state. He said that "slavery in any aspect of it, does not properly admit of legislation by Congress, either to determine where it shall or shall not go, or to abolish, limit, or impair it where it is." Congressional silence on the subject would please the South. Furthermore, he continued,

While this is so, the termination of slavery, if it is to have a termination, is deeply involved in the prudence and forbearance of those, who are desirous to witness such event. Every attempt to limit or interfere with it, by direct or indirect means, tends but to perpetuate, and what is more, to weaken, and alienate the feelings and affections of one section of the Union towards the other.

He advocated letting the people who should inhabit new territories decide upon the question of slavery "when they meet to establish a State government." All admitted their right to do so, he said; however, he pointed out that "to exclude slavery from the territories in advance, by the action of what is called the Wilmot Proviso is, in effect, to foreclose the whole question." He believed that the establishment of state governments in California and New Mexico would put an end to the immediate difficulty on the subject in a manner satisfactory to all except perhaps "a few political agitators, both in the North and South, who have found in this question a prime element for commotion and disturbance." He had no sympathy for the threats of violence and disunion by either side as this was "not the proper mode of vindicating rights," and as the existing situation warranted neither threats of nor actual recourse to such remedies. He felt that if there should be a future emergency, it could dictate its own remedy. "In the meantime, let us insist on our rights by all Constitutional means, and also . . . resolve to maintain the Union 'at all hazards and to the last extremity.'" With the Union there was "everything to inspire the hopes and impel the energies of patriotism, amid the vast field of improvement that lies before us." Without it, there would be nothing "worth living for—worth dying for!" He expressed his belief that

Whether slavery is right or wrong—founded in good or bad policy, it will run its course and maintain its place. And whenever slave labor ceases to be profitable, the institution will no doubt be dispensed with in the same way and from the same motives, which terminated it in the North-Eastern States, where it formerly existed. It asks for no protection, but simply demands to be let alone. It cherishes no spirit of propagandism, but acknowledges the right and power of those who dispense with it to do so.

In conclusion, he urged that the legislature, in order to vindicate "our rights" and allay existing sectional agitation,

. . . memorialize Congress in a firm, vigorous and temperate appeal, against all legislation on the subject, and leave the evil, if it be an evil, to correct itself under the auspices of local public sentiment, and local legislation—and allow the blessing, if it be a blessing, to be enjoyed unmolested under the sanctuary of State authority.⁷³

In view of the outcome of the election of 1849, however, it was natural that the Democracy of Tennessee should respond enthusiastically to the call of the convention at Jackson, Mississippi, in the fall of 1849 for a convention of the slave-holding states to meet at Nashville,⁷⁴ in June, 1850, to "devise and adopt some mode of resistance to these [Northern] aggressions." Proponents of this convention held that it was to be wholly defensive. Its chief purpose was "generally conceded to be the presentation of a united protest from the South against the attempt to exclude Southern men with their slaves from the national territories which had recently been won from Mexico."⁷⁵

The press of Tennessee, including Whig as well as Democratic papers, heartily endorsed the Nashville, or Southern, Convention at first.⁷⁶ This approximate unanimity of sentiment is attributable to the fact that there was universal agreement that further guarantees for the preservation of the rights of the South were necessary. The proposed convention was merely a means of voicing the protest of a united South, particularly with respect to the unfair discrimination against Southern institutions in the territories and against Northern violations of Constitutional provisions regarding slavery.

There was apparently no recognition of positive disunion senti-

ment in the move for the Southern Convention, until January of the year 1850 itself. Then, when Senator Henry Clay's compromise proposals began to loom large in discussions of national politics, his Whig supporters became conscious of hitherto unsuspected evils which might grow out of such a meeting. The *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*, which had promised the delegates to the proposed Southern Convention "a warm welcome to our midst" in the preceding fall, seems to have been among the first to have perceived the latent dangers inherent in such a gathering. In explanation of its changed point of view it said,

We could see nothing particularly wrong in the assembling of the convention then—truly! As projected then, no voices were calling for Disunion—for a "Dissolution of the Union" amongst its advocates. But the case is altered now. The old Disunionists—the nullifiers of the Carolinas are making their voices heard! . . . There was no treason *then* in calling a Convention to take counsel together in relation to the rights of the South! But now there is; its avowed purpose is disunion.⁷⁷

Meanwhile, the *Memphis Eagle* asserted that the bitter and violent tone of the response of the legislatures of many Southern states to the call for the Nashville Convention augured ill for peaceful settlement. The words, "At all hazards and to the last extremity emblazoned on the banners," were anything but conciliatory in character. It feared that the ultra-Southern group would control the convention and injure the cause of the South by their intemperance. It declared that,

We have no relish for any deliberative body which shall pretend, unchecked and uncontrolled, to decide absolutely and decisively upon the highest principles, the most vital interests of the Southern states; and the members of that body not deriving their authority from the votes of the people. We should, and will, whether we approve or disapprove of its action, look upon the Southern Convention as merely a committee of gentlemen, very irregularly appointed, reporting their opinions to the public.

It expressed the opinion that the convention would not meet, because Clay's compromise resolutions, "broad, conciliatory, comprehensive

in their spirit, inoffensive to the North and yet conservative of the rights, honor and interests of the South," would remove the necessity for holding it. It went on to say, however, that

If the North will not abide by these resolutions—if she will not adopt them in the spirit of substance, then, indeed, the Southern slogan may be raised and a bitter struggle must begin, then a Southern Convention, properly constituted, and backed by the unanimous public sentiment of the South, can, will, and must meet.⁷⁸

Brownlow's Knoxville Whig and Independent Journal, "devoted to Politics, Religion, Internal Improvements, New Agriculture, Literature, and General Intelligence," and bearing the scriptural injunction to "Cry Aloud—Spare Not; Show My People Their Transgressions, And the House of Jacob Their Sins," told the people of East Tennessee that, in spite of the fact that a portion of the Southern press had tried to create the impression that "a Southern Convention is imperatively demanded to take action for the defense of Southern institutions," such was not the case. It asserted that

Many of the leading men in the South, bitterly opposed to the mad schemes of the Northern Abolitionists, are opposed to this project of a Southern Convention *yet awhile*. And of this faith are we. It is a move which has not originated with the people, and to say the least of it, it is an imprudent step, as well as a stretch of power. The people of the South are prepared to resist the encroachments upon their rights, by the North, but they are not yet prepared for a dissolution of the Union.

It asserted that the object of the convention was disunion, but declared that the Southern people would not agree to such a step until Constitutional rights were no longer secure within the Union. It urged Whigs to have nothing to do with this "*plot* against the Union." It did not want Tennessee to be the stamping ground for "nullifiers," "disunionists" and "traitors." In conclusion, it pointed out that Clay would "compromise the existing difficulties."⁷⁹

Meanwhile, as early as March the *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*, in reply to the Democratic Union's taunts of inconsistency, declared that the ultra-Southern group had talked of disunion before

having even tried Constitutional remedies. It then signified its readiness, should "Constitutional remedies" fail, "to go with him who goes farthest in defense of the rights of the South."⁸⁰

The Whig denunciation of the convention not only continued unabated until its meeting, but it also became increasingly bitter. About the last of April, for example, *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig and Independent Journal* predicted that not one delegate from East Tennessee would go. It declared that while it did not favor mobs, it believed that the people of the state should not allow the proposed meeting. It felt that if the people would not prevent the meeting, however, that President Taylor should, by armed force if necessary.⁸¹

The Whigs now undoubtedly felt that the move for such a meeting was premature. The chief reason for their attitude, it seems, was the fact that such a gathering might be prejudicial to the success of Clay's proposed compromise resolutions which they favored. The *Memphis Eagle* even declared that if the convention should "assemble to approve that Plan . . . it will have our heartiest commendation."⁸²

The attitude of the Democratic press, which had favored the Nashville Convention almost unanimously from the start, stood out in sharp contrast to that of the Whig press.⁸³ The Democratic papers of Tennessee generally looked upon it as a salutary measure devoid of active disunion sentiment. The *American* took the *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig* to task for its change from a favorable to an unfavorable attitude toward the convention. It then pointed out that the fanatics of the North and the agitators of Congress had not refrained from their aggression toward the South, for

They are, day by day, striving to fell the pillar of our Constitutional liberty and involve the whole in ruin. Such is the position of affairs at Washington, that even the boldest hearts are trembling for the endurance of the Union. . . . Let the convention meet and discuss the mode and manner of redress, and adopt measures to guard against aggression. It is no disunion convention. . . .

While the *American* conceded that certain inflammatory papers in the South were creating the impression that the convention was for the purpose of furthering disunion, it scouted the idea for its own part.⁸⁴ The *Union* said,

The object of the convention is *to preserve the Union*, by adopting efficient measures to prevent Northern fanatics from destroying it. The Union was formed for the protection of all. The South values it this way and does not intend for it to become an engine of oppression.⁸⁵

The allegiance of the Democratic press to the convention did not waver when Clay's compromise measures came to occupy a large place in public discussions of possible solutions of the difficulties between the North and South. Democratic papers in general apparently did not consider Clay's plan the complete panacea for the ills of the South which the Whigs claimed it to be. The *American* indubitably took advanced ground, however, when it declared that Clay's proposition was equal to the Wilmot Proviso, since it provided that the South would give up territory north of the Missouri Compromise line to be free and asked only to go into the territory south of it on an equal plane with the North. It declared that, as a matter of course, the South could not accept such a solution.⁸⁶

Since the people of Tennessee were earnestly desirous of settling the controversy between the North and South, Daniel Webster's speech of March 7, 1850 made a very favorable impression upon a large majority of them, it seems. The *Plebian* of Knoxville was somewhat more extravagant in its praise than most of the papers of the state, however, when it said,

Webster has proved himself the man for the crisis. Whilst but yesterday the storm was rocking this magnificent and glorious Union to its centre—today, the rainbow of peace has appeared upon the cloud over the capitol of the Nation, and sends a thrill of joy to the bosom of every friend of the rights of the South and the integrity of this mighty Union.⁸⁷

J. M. Anderson, the Whig Congressman of the third district, undoubtedly exaggerated also when he said that, had Webster "spoken out before this, I verily believe the Nashville Convention had not been thought of."⁸⁸ Andrew Ewing, the Democratic Congressman from the Nashville district, who heard Webster's speech, probably expressed the general view in Tennessee when he wrote, "It is hardly necessary to add that *for the time* he dissipated the darkness which hung over

the capitol and broke the weight of the angry clouds which had gathered upon us so thick and menacing." ⁸⁹

Meanwhile, the action of the Tennessee legislature relative to the choice of delegates to the Nashville Convention revealed the fact that the people's representatives viewed the matter in a partisan light. The Democratic lower house passed a resolution requesting the governor to appoint two delegates from the state at large and two from each Congressional district to represent the state in the convention. The Whig senate defeated a proposal requesting that the people adopt measures in their primary assemblies to send delegates to the convention.⁹⁰ Both the house and senate considered various strongly pro-Southern and some intensely nationalistic resolutions.⁹¹

The reaction of the press to the action of the legislature was characteristic. The *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig* declared that Tennessee was against the convention and adduced as proof of its statement the legislature's refusal to countenance it not only by "*refusing to appoint Delegates to it*," but also by condemning "its purposes as set forth by some of its advocates, in a most decided manner."⁹² The *American* replied that the legislature had done no such thing. The Democratic house, it affirmed, had passed strong resolutions upholding the convention and Southern rights and appointing delegates, and "they were killed by the votes of *two Whig Senators* representing *Democratic districts* . . . But for these 'accidentals' in the Senate, the voice of both Houses would have been sent forth."⁹³ The *Union* declared that Tennessee was in favor of the convention and would send its best men as delegates to it: "The sovereign people will take matters into their own hands and right the wrong done them by the Whig senate."⁹⁴

Some of the "sovereign people," generally Democrats, did proceed to take matters into their own hands and choose delegates to the convention. All in all, Tennessee sent one hundred representatives to the Nashville Convention. Indeed, its delegation was larger than the combined delegations of all other states represented.⁹⁵

As the time for the convention to convene drew nearer, a growing number of people found it increasingly difficult to convince themselves that there would not be an appreciable amount of disunion sentiment in the gathering. They recalled President Jackson's attitude toward South Carolina in 1832, and, as Thomas H. Benton phrased it, they felt now that "a disunion convention met at Nashville, met

at the home of Jackson, but after the grave had become his home."⁹⁶

The Southern, or Nashville, Convention met as predetermined on June 4, 1850 in Nashville in the face of a somewhat hostile public sentiment.⁹⁷ Since recognition of some character of the convention, either by formal legislative action or by somewhat less regularly constituted bodies, had been general throughout the South, delegates from Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas, Alabama, Florida and Tennessee were there. Former Governor A. V. Brown of Tennessee called the meeting to order. The convention then chose Judge W. L. Sharkey of Mississippi as president by acclamation.⁹⁸

The proceedings of the convention were thoroughly harmonious on the main subjects under consideration. These were the absolute equality of states; the doctrine of state sovereignty; the right of a state to settle its own domestic relations and shape its policy toward the institution of slavery; and the right of each state to equal participation in all territories with national protection of its property. The convention went on record as favoring a division of the territories between the two sections by extending the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific "in the event a dominant majority shall refuse to recognize the great Constitutional rights we assert, and shall continue to deny the obligations of the Federal Government to maintain them." It viewed its willingness to accept this dividing line as a generous concession, a price of peace in default of just claims. While the convention made no threats in case Congress did not comply with its wishes, it closed its session with a provision for reassembling after Congress had adjourned.⁹⁹

The moderate viewpoint of Tennessee's delegation as a whole reflected the inherent conservatism of the state's citizenship. Although it had voted for both the resolutions and the more radical address, it had exercised a moderating influence throughout the session of the convention.¹⁰⁰

The first session of the Nashville Convention, "imposing in numbers and dignified in action,"¹⁰¹ made a deep impression in Tennessee. A Northern individual, at that time resident in the South, who visited the convention declared that,

It was no assemblage of young politicians ambitious for notoriety. Everywhere, as I looked over the house, my eyes fell on gray heads venerable by wisdom. The majority of the members were

men who are known to the world with distinction—men who are the pride, and glory, and honor of the South.¹⁰²

The *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig* conceded that the personnel of the convention was able.¹⁰³ Even *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig and Independent Journal* admitted that "it embraced a considerable amount of talent and experience."¹⁰⁴

Democratic opinion in the state, as it found expression in Nashville's two leading Democratic papers, was entirely complimentary in its estimate of the work of the convention. The *American* exulted that,

The phantom of treason did not once intrude upon its deliberations. . . . They met as men who know their rights and intend to assert them. They claimed nothing but *equal rights*; and maintained them in resolutions temperate and mild yet firm and unyielding.¹⁰⁵

The *Union* felt that the proceedings of the convention had dissipated the fears of those who had opposed its assembling. It admitted, however, that while it considered the convention decidedly beneficial, it could not wholeheartedly endorse all of the opinions expressed by its members. It declared that the sentiment of the convention was for "The Union forever, under the guarantees of the Constitution," and that its members showed a "disposition to concede, for the preservation of the Union, everything consistent with Southern safety and honor."¹⁰⁶

While the Whig press was by no means as enthusiastic as the Democratic in its commendation of the convention, its comments were favorable. Even so partisan a paper as *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig and Independent Journal* declared that "it is due to those who attended to state that the proceedings were orderly and decorous throughout." Moreover, in commenting upon the convention's address, which it published, it informed its subscribers that although they would "not approve of some things shamefully erroneous, skillfully interwoven with much of the truth," they would "read the whole with much interest."¹⁰⁷ The *Nashville Gazette* entertained the same opinion as that expressed by Brownlow's paper concerning the address and made a like observation with relation to the interweaving of both good and bad in the resolutions. It remarked, however, that the "results of the deliberations, should Congress fail to adjust the questions in contro-

versy between the North and the South, will doubtless have the effect of causing every Southern State to send delegates to the convention when it meets again." Furthermore, it warned the North that there was a certain point beyond which Southern endurance would not go.¹⁰⁸ The *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig* declared that the convention, which had professed love for the Union and at the same time talked separation and Southern Confederacy, was not really representative of the South. It rejoiced that the Whigs had had no part in it. It asserted, however, that despite its belief that the convention was premature, and that it should have been only a last resort, it indicated the tone of Southern opinion and suggested that the North would do well to take warning.¹⁰⁹

After the adjournment of the first session of the Nashville Convention on June 12, the Whig press resumed with vigor its task of influencing public opinion in Tennessee in favor of the Compromise of 1850. The *Memphis Eagle*, in discussing the opinions of A. O. P. Nicholson on the convention, scored the action of that body in having recommended the extension of the Missouri Compromise line as a solution of the dispute between the North and South concerning slavery in the territories. It insisted instead upon the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the territories as essential to the preservation of the rights of the South. It considered Clay's proposed compromise measures, which recognized the principle of Congressional nonintervention, as the most satisfactory solution possible of the slavery question. It observed that Nicholson himself favored acceptance of the compromise proposals and that he had called upon other leading Democrats to endorse common-sense patriotism rather than ultraism.¹¹⁰ After having made severe strictures upon the "ultras of both North and South—a set of *Utopian* gamblers who never can be satisfied," *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig and Independent Journal* urged the acceptance of the compromise proposals then before the Senate. It emphasized the fact that,

This republic was formed, cemented, and extended—not that the South or North might dictate terms to all other sections of the Union, and lay down the law by which it was to be governed; but that all sections should yield to the imperious demands of harmony, under the best Constitution on earth.¹¹¹

Since the majority of Tennessee's citizenship was intensely eager

for the North and South to compose their differences, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority¹¹² of its people, largely irrespective of party, welcomed the news that Congress, through the united action of moderate Whigs and Democrats,¹¹³ had passed the last of Clay's compromise measures in September. The vote of Tennessee's Congressional delegation, which had taken a prominent part in the debates on them,¹¹⁴ was apparently fairly representative of sentiment in the state. The group, although it consisted of eight Democrats and five Whigs, was for the most part favorable to the proposals. Senator Hopkins Turney, Democrat from Middle Tennessee and one of the signers of the Southern Address, however, opposed all of the bills except that providing for more stringent enforcement of the fugitive-slave law. Senator John Bell, Whig from Middle Tennessee, who had himself originally introduced a compromise plan,¹¹⁵ supported all of the propositions except the one providing for the prohibition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia. Four Democratic representatives, Isham G. Harris, John H. Savage, James H. Thomas, all from Middle Tennessee, and F. P. Stanton from West Tennessee, and a signer of the Southern Address, voted against the admission of California as a free state. Representative Stanton and two Whig Representatives, J. M. Anderson from East Tennessee and M. P. Gentry from Middle Tennessee, cast their votes against the abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia.¹¹⁶

Although there were some who viewed the Compromise of 1850 as a more or less temporary solution of the questions agitating the country, a large majority apparently regarded them as a final solution. Therefore, rejoicing over the prospect of an early abatement, if not a complete cessation, of the slavery agitation, which had threatened the perpetuity of the Union, was almost universal throughout the state.

Such being the case, the idea, then, that the Nashville Convention should reassemble was absurd to most Tennesseans. Nevertheless, the convention, "shorn of numbers and strength, reassembled on November 11 in an atmosphere distinctly hostile."¹¹⁷ According to one prominent Whig leader, "Tennessee was in part represented—that is to say, the Democratic party were represented, in the persons of their leaders, Gen. Pillow, Gov. A. V. Brown, A. O. P. X. Y. Z. Nicholson, and a few others. . . ." ¹¹⁸ Another asserted that "the Convention is made up of fire and water, out and out secessionists and men who only desire to croak and make a little demagoguical capital upon an unfortunate sectional agitation."¹¹⁹

The demands of the convention, consisting chiefly of radicals from the depleted ranks of the delegations of the seven states represented, were, as a matter of course, extreme.¹²⁰ Many members endorsed the proposition of Cheves of South Carolina for immediate secession, and the tenor of the resolutions which the convention adopted was distinctly ultra-Southern. The Tennessee delegation, although itself divided,¹²¹ "attempted to stem the tide of radicalism by the introduction of the 'Tennessee Resolutions' which were more moderate in tone than those adopted by the Convention."¹²² Although their attempt failed, the sponsors of these resolutions succeeded in having them printed, and so widened the scope of their influence.¹²³

Condemnation of the second session of the Nashville Convention was well nigh universal in Tennessee. The *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig* exulted that the Whigs had not participated in it, denounced its unhallowed doctrines of "Disunion and Nullification," and called upon the people to repudiate its action.¹²⁴ The *Memphis Eagle* said that it had pointed out in the beginning that the South was not ready for a convention and that its certain failure would weaken the cause of the South by creating an appearance of conflict and dissension. The advocates of the convention were of the "rule or ruin" type, however, and refused to listen. "Now," it continued, "the best the South can hope is, that they have done nothing—that they will leave not the faintest ripple upon the political waters. They proposed a tragedy; they have accomplished a comedy. . . ." ¹²⁵ *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig and Independent Journal*, in a characteristically partisan manner, declared that the slim excuse of A. V. Brown, Pillow, Nicholson and other Democratic leaders, who had "*pretended* not to sanction some of the ultra measures proposed by the South Carolina Nullifiers and Disunionists," would

. . . not be taken by the people of Tennessee, on the stump, next spring and summer, because they went into this second edition of the *Hartford* Convention, knowing what its objects were. They knew, as did the whole country, that they met there to resolve themselves out of the Union and to rebel against the General Government.¹²⁶

Even the notably Southern-rights Democratic *American*, although it "preferred the man who went too far in defence of Southern rights to the one who did not go far enough," would neither endorse all the

doctrines of the preamble and the resolutions nor approve all that the convention did.¹²⁷

Various factors had contributed to the complexity of the political situation existing in Tennessee by 1847 when two rather evenly balanced political parties were fighting to gain control of the state government. Eschewing consideration of state policies because of intra-party differences of opinion, each party turned its attention to a consideration of national affairs on which there was intra-party harmony by and large.

The great majority of the people of both parties were expansionists. Their differences of opinion concerning the Mexican War were along party lines mainly, and generally had to do with President Polk's manner of inaugurating and conducting it. The introduction of the Wilmot Proviso into Congress in connection with the proposal to make peace with Mexico served to excite the people of Tennessee greatly on the slavery¹²⁸ issue. It led some of them to draw up an indictment of their grievances as citizens of a Southern state against the North. For the first time, a group in the state calculated seriously the value of the Union.

With relatively few exceptions, Tennesseans regarded the Compromise of 1850 as either the most desirable or the only practical solution of the slavery problem then in dispute between the North and South. Regardless of whether their acceptance was willing or reluctant, it signified their intense devotion to the Union. Just as unmistakably, it seems, it also indicated their insistence upon a cessation of Northern encroachments upon their rights as the price for the perpetuation of the Union.

CHAPTER III

Political Rivalry and Union Sentiment in the Fifties

The people of Tennessee, a state which had given the nation two Presidents, one of whom was the colorful "Old Hickory," during the preceding quarter of a century, had come to take their politics seriously long before 1850. By that time, however, the Whig party, even in such a stronghold of Whiggery as Tennessee, was beginning to disintegrate and the Whig leaders were frantically seeking to form an opposition party which would serve effectively to check the ever-growing power of the Democracy. Nevertheless, the Democratic party, despite its increasing ascendancy, was somewhat lacking in harmony. While questions of both state and national policy affected the realignment of political parties in Tennessee, national developments probably exerted the greater influence. Events in the field of national affairs itself were certainly of such a character as to command the earnest attention of the state's populace.

The people of Tennessee looked forward with keen anticipation to the important gubernatorial contest of 1851, which had already begun before the adjournment of the second session of the Nashville Convention. This campaign would afford them an opportunity to give expression to their views on the Compromise of 1850. In addition, each of the two political parties was especially desirous of victory in this election because the winner would not only select a United States Senator but would also re-district the state.

Insofar as platforms were concerned, the Democratic and Whig conventions were largely matters of form. Both the Democrats and the Whigs restated their usual positions on questions of state policy in their conventions on February 25 and March 20, respectively. They emphasized their positions on national issues, particularly on the matters of slavery and the rights of the South.¹

Apparently there was little doubt among the Democrats as to the advisability of renominating Governor Trousdale. A presumably "united Democracy" placed him in the race.² The Whigs took his selection as the Democratic standard-bearer for granted and recognized him as a strong opponent.³

None of the prominent Whigs wished to make the race for the governorship, it seems. They were aware of the fact that the party had not completely recovered from the Clay-Taylor feud of 1848. M. P. Gentry, for example, frankly admitted that he was out of favor with certain cliques, the Clay group in particular, and with many other leading Whigs besides.⁴ Since there was a factional fight between the Whigs in upper and lower East Tennessee, it appeared certain that no East Tennessean would be able to win the votes of both groups.⁵ Various Whig leaders had senatorial ambitions, also. All of them, with the exception of William B. Campbell, lacked military records at all comparable with Governor Trousdale's. This was of course an important consideration.⁶

General Campbell apparently did not desire to be his party's candidate for the governorship. Since Whig leaders throughout the state insisted that he was the only one of their number who could ensure Trousdale's defeat, however, he finally permitted them to draft him.⁷ The party then rallied enthusiastically to his cause as a matter of course.

Both parties definitely subordinated state to national affairs throughout the campaign. They were still thinking primarily in terms of the Wilmot Proviso, the Nashville Convention, and the Compromise of 1850. Each sought not only to justify the position which it had taken with reference to these questions, but also to prove that its policy was the one best calculated to preserve the Union and at the same time to safeguard the rights of the South. The parties were agreed that the main issue before the country—that is, the comparatively enthusiastic acceptance of, or the more or less resigned acquiescence in, the Compromise of 1850, or its rejection—was no ordinary one.

The Democrats asserted that there had never been a time when their party was more deserving of success than in the election of 1851. The Democratic party, they said, opposed the "dangerous fanaticism of the North," against which even "the fire-eaters of the South" sought only to protect themselves and their institutions. It favored the maintenance of the Union by the only true method of preserving it, that is, "by the rigid enforcement of the compromises of the constitution."

Regardless of whatever difference of opinion existed among them as to the "intrinsic merits of the compromise measures, either as they might affect the rights of the South or North," they were all agreed, they said, "in acquiescing in them and supporting them as a final adjustment of all difficulties."⁸

The Democrats accused Campbell of being willing to "*submit*" to repeal of the fugitive-slave law. They charged the Whigs with being allies of the abolitionists.⁹

Governor Trousdale declared in his campaign speeches that he favored acquiescing in and maintaining the compromise measures of 1850. He characterized them on the whole, however, as being oppressive and unjust to the South. He insisted that the fugitive-slave bill, the only one of the bills which he would have supported had he been in Congress, was unnecessary because of the Constitutional provision concerning it and the old law of 1793 dealing with it. He asserted that Campbell and the Whig party were "too favorable to Northern views and feelings in their discussions of the Compromise." He declared his devotion to the Union and branded the charge that he was a disunionist as slander.¹⁰

General Campbell maintained, on the other hand, that the compromise bills were the "work of the wisdom and patriotism of the country in a great crisis of sectional agitation, to allay sectional controversy and save the Union." He believed them, in the main, "to be just and reasonable, and entitled to the approbation of all sections of the country." He asserted that California had a right to be admitted with a constitution of her choice. Since he thought "with Cass, Polk, Buchanan and A. V. Brown that slavery would probably not be profitable there," he pointed out that the admission of California as a single state was advantageous to the South. In the matter of territorial adjustments, the South had gained the rejection of the Wilmot Proviso, he said. If "this was nothing, then the democratic leaders in Tennessee had trifled with the feeling of the people two years ago, when they promised to *resist* it 'at all hazards and to the last extremity.'" He could see nothing injurious to Texas in the settlement of its boundary controversy. It was strange, he asserted, that if Trousdale deemed the fugitive-slave law and other compromise measures of as little value to the South as he indicated that he should still insist on their enforcement. As for himself, Campbell said that,

.. he had proclaimed throughout Tennessee, in accordance with

the Whig address, that if this law was repealed or distinctly modified, it would then be time for the South to look out for her rights, even at the hazard of disunion—For Our Rights Must Be Protected.

He insisted, however, that the compromise would protect these rights adequately if the government executed it faithfully. He charged that the effect of Trousdale's arguments against the compromise bills was to weaken their hold upon popular confidence and approbation and thus, unintentionally perhaps, to aid the disunionists of the North and South alike.

Campbell criticized Trousdale for his failure to condemn South Carolina along with the abolitionists of the North for constantly fomenting strife. He himself "was for enforcing the fugitive-slave law at the north even to the shedding of blood, if necessary—even if the army and militia had to be called out; but he was for enforcing the laws in South Carolina as well as in Massachusetts." Campbell stressed the fact that the nation's army and navy presented a bulwark of defense against European aggression on American slavery. He showed that in the event of the dissolution of the Union "the Southern states would most probably fall under the tender mercies of England, the great grandmother of abolitionism."¹¹

Although Campbell attributed disunion sentiment to Trousdale and the Democratic leaders, he vindicated the masses of the Democrats from such charges. "We have said, and we repeat it, the misguided policy of such agitators as the *American* and A. V. Brown favors the schemes of 'traitors and disunionists,' whether so intended or not."¹²

The Whigs made a determined attempt to break party lines within the state on national issues. The following editorial, "Disunion and Democracy," constituted a strong appeal for the support of the small body of more or less independent voters who had for many years decided the closely contested elections between the Whigs and Democrats. It said among other things that,

A crisis has arrived in our affairs in Tennessee, in which it behooves every free citizen and independent voter of the State, without concealment, to discover his political sentiments touching the compromise measures of Congress, and the insidious efforts of certain ultra Democrats of the South, to dissolve this Union. It is the duty of the Union papers of both parties, to make a

vigorous and effective charge into the enemy's camp, and fully expose the designs of those who denounce the compromise measures, whilst professing a willingness to acquiesce in them.

It declared furthermore that,

The whole country is looking to the result of the contest in Tennessee; and if Trousdale is elected Governor of the State, it will be claimed as a triumph by his associates in South Carolina, Mississippi, and Alabama. . . . We call upon Whigs and Democrats, who are true friends to their country, as thousands of them are, to aid by their counsels, examples, and votes, in saving the gallant State of Tennessee from entering upon the dangerous hazards of Disunion.¹³

In similar vein, General Campbell said that he would vote for Fillmore or any other Presidential candidate whom his party might nominate "provided he was sound on the Union Compromise question—but he would vote for a Democrat sound on this question, as Foote or Cobb, before he would vote for an unsound Whig."¹⁴

The fact that the largest number of voters in the state's history participated in the election clearly indicated the widespread popular interest in, and awareness of, the gravity of the national crisis that had been resolved by the Compromise of 1850. General Campbell won the governor's chair by a vote of 63,633 to 61,673, with a majority of slightly less than 2,000 in a total vote of slightly more than 125,000. The Whigs secured majorities in both houses of the legislature. Democratic candidates, however, were victorious in seven out of the eleven congressional districts in the state.¹⁵

While the Whigs emphasized Governor-elect Campbell's conservative support of the "Constitution and the laws enacted in pursuance thereof" in accounting for his victory, they also stressed his unyielding insistence upon the "maintenance of Southern rights upon the basis of compromise." They declared that,

. . . but for some untoward features in the canvass, resulting from the infatuated and impracticable policy of those in other States calling themselves Whig (but who, if they insist upon making these impracticable abstractions the rule of their action, cannot

continue to be regarded as Whigs) his majority would doubtless be three times as large as it is.

The "free-soil and anti-slave-law agitators will find no more formidable and determined adversary in the prosecution of their infernal and disorganizing schemes, than is Gen. Campbell." ¹⁶

The Whigs insisted that the real reason for Trousdale's defeat was that he and some other leading Democrats "took a position upon the great exciting question of the day in which the masses of their own party did not concur." The main body of Democrats, like the Whigs, preferred the candidate who proposed "yielding to the Compromise a hearty, unequivocal, efficient support" to the one who advocated giving a "complaining, reluctant, *enduring* 'acquiescence' calculated to engender anew the elements of sectional strife, and reopen a dangerous and unprofitable sectional controversy." The vast majority of Democrats and Whigs alike were "conservative to the core—firmly resolved to maintain at once the rights of the South, against all assaults from whatever quarter—standing immovably upon the old Republican basis of conservative, Constitutional rights." ¹⁷

Although the Democrats had anticipated the re-election of Governor Trousdale, they did not let his defeat dishearten them. The fact that Trousdale, who, they said, had been a good candidate, had not received the cordial support which he deserved from his own party contributed greatly to his defeat. They asserted that he had been a victim of misrepresentation by the Whigs, and they emphasized the fact that "He, whose life has been devoted to the Union, whose person is covered with scars received fighting under the flag of the Union, in defense of the honor and integrity of the Union, has been denounced as a *disunionist*." ¹⁸

The Democrats resented and declared false the Whigs' charges of secession against their party in the South in general and in Tennessee in particular. While virtually everyone conceded the "revolutionary right of a state to throw off intolerable oppression," very few believed that the "formers of our Constitution intended to confer on each member of the Confederacy the *privilege of walking out at pleasure*." The comparatively few, not all of them Democrats, however, who believed in the abstract right of secession did not favor its exercise at this time. Not one of the Democrats in Tennessee's congressional delegation believed in "the Constitutional right of a State to secede even

as an abstraction," despite the assertion of some Whigs to the contrary.¹⁹

An analysis of the Democratic vote in Tennessee in the election of 1851 by Andrew Jackson Donelson, a Tennessean who was at that time serving as the editor of the *Washington Union*, the Democratic organ in the capital city of the nation, aroused the resentment of the extreme Southern-rights Democrats in the state. Donelson based his statements on the observations that he had made when he returned to Tennessee to vote. He asserted that as far as the Compromise of 1850 was a test in the Congressional elections, the victory of the Democrats in seven out of eleven districts fully offset that of the Whig governor, and he attributed the Whig majority in the legislature to the fact that there was no conflict between the opinion of the Whig gubernatorial and legislative candidates. He declared that Trousdale's failure cordially to endorse the Compromise of 1850, to repudiate "all attempts to reopen the question under the expectation that future agitation would afford guarantees not already provided by the constitution and laws of the land," and especially to rebuke "those disorganizing spirits who are seeking to found upon the discontent of the South a plea for dissolving the Union" caused his defeat. Thus, Trousdale, whose personal loyalty to the Union no one doubted, had taken a position which "fell short of that portion of the public opinion which had been wounded by the attempts of such men as Mr. Cheves of South Carolina to enlist Tennessee in the project of a southern Confederacy." In conclusion, Donelson observed that the people of Tennessee,

as in Kentucky and other portions of the South and West, begin to see that the execution of the fugitive slave law and the overthrow of the higher-law men of the North can only be certainly obtained by the cooperation and union of the democratic party on the basis of its ancient organization and oft-tested principles.²⁰

After the *Nashville American*, the "favorite organ" in Tennessee of Langdon Cheves and R. B. Rhett, had failed to attack Donelson's analysis as the *Fayetteville Observer* had confidently expected it to do, the *Observer* itself made rather severe strictures upon it.²¹ Several other papers in the state copied and endorsed this editorial.²²

Donelson, in replying to the *Observer*, emphasized the fact that he was not hostile to Trousdale whom he had known all of his life and

who had been a friend of Jackson's. He insisted, nevertheless, that,

this did not render us the less sensible to the fact that his arguments in reconciling the people of Tennessee to the support of the Compromise were less decisive than those of his competitor in exposing to the public scorn the disunion which would have been produced if the schemes of resistance advocated by the Nashville Convention had been sanctioned by the voice of the South.

He declared furthermore that the whole aim of the clique in Tennessee which was making noise about injustice to Trousdale was not to defend him but to

exculpate themselves from just reproach and deserved condemnation. . . . If that clique could have sunk Gov. Trousdale to their level, he, too, would have felt the necessity of acknowledging that the public sentiment of his State was opposed to him—not as a democrat, but as a disunionist—not as a State rights man, as Jefferson, Jackson, and Polk were, but as a disorganizer like Mr. Cheves who believes that our republican system has failed. We protest against the orthodoxy of this clique, and deny their right to cover their follies with the mantle of Gov. Trousdale's fame.

The Democrats would have been wise to have talked less about "fighting at 36 30, and *wheeling into line with South Carolina* in redressing Southern wrongs" and more about the calamities which disunion would have brought, Donelson said.²³

The *Union* of Nashville published Donelson's reply to the Fayetteville *Observer* out of justice to Donelson, it said. It stated that Donelson's article "breathed the proper spirit and was well calculated—as intended—to place the position of the democratic party of this State in its true light before the whole country." As some had apparently questioned Donelson's support of Trousdale, the *Union* stated categorically that he had voted for him.²⁴

Meanwhile, the *American* of September 10 had stressed the fact that the Democratic party of Tennessee was loyal to the Union. Although many Democrats had opposed the Compromise of 1850 because they felt that the North gained by it and the South did not, this was not evidence that they were either disunionists or "fire-eaters" as the Whigs had alleged. The Democrats of Tennessee, it said, were

equally opposed to the formation of either a "*Union party*" as such or a secession party as such.²⁵

Second in interest only to the gubernatorial race itself in the election probably was the contest between Senator Hopkins L. Turney, whose senatorial term was expiring, and Jesse Arledge, a "compromise Democrat," of Franklin county for the post of representative in the lower house of the state legislature. Arledge beat Turney by a vote of almost two to one.²⁶ The Whigs contributed greatly to this result. In fact, they were so intent upon defeating Turney that "everything else was nearly neglected," and thus Trousdale's vote was larger than it should have been. They were not downcast, however, because,

Though overwhelmed by impracticable Locofocoism here yet thank *God* we were able to Successfully maintain our Whig principles and Gloriously to defeat the notorious disunionist, H. L. Turney and . . . his fire-Eating following.²⁷

In his message to the legislature, retiring Governor Trousdale reiterated his acquiescence in the Compromise of 1850, but doubted that it would serve as a final solution of the sectional dispute between the North and South. Even so, he deemed it "the duty of every good citizen to give this attempted adjustment a fair trial, and to endeavor by all honorable means to reconcile the disturbed elements, and to restore peace and harmony to the country."²⁸

Governor William B. Campbell, in his inaugural address, said that he regarded the Compromise of 1850 "as a great final settlement of the questions connected with slavery." He asserted that,

Under the circumstances existing at the time of the passage of these measures, I believe that settlement the best that could have been effected, both for the North and South—that in no other way could the peace of the country and the integrity of the Union have been preserved; and that any attempt now to disturb it, if successful, would tend to the extreme peril of the Union, and that peace, prosperity and happiness which we so eminently enjoy under it. . . . I rejoice to witness, from day to day, increased evidence, that the American people will sustain this signal achievement of wisdom and patriotism, and thus secure its complete and ultimate triumph over the mischievous purposes of designing politicians both at the North and the South. I do not

doubt that its provisions will be strictly and rigidly enforced by the patriotic administration now in control of the Government; and I am strongly persuaded that a sound public opinion will firmly maintain them inviolate on the statute book.

Governor Campbell expressed the opinion that the legislature "should reflect in some form of public expression, the sentiments of the people of our state, in connexion with the great questions which have so recently disturbed the peace, the harmony and the safety of the Union"; for "Tennessee is not without a powerful influence in the confederacy—an influence to which the valor of her sons in war, and her wisdom and moderation in peace have justly entitled her." He declared that the people of Tennessee

... are patriotic, devoted to the Union, true to the peculiar rights of the South, faithful to the laws, and ever steadily loyal to the true glory and greatness of this country. They have stood as a mighty rock amid the surges of the sea, whether the tempests of passion have come from the North or the South, sternly repelling the threatening tide of abolition on one side, and the angry billows of disunion on the other. The peace and glory of the Republic may yet depend upon a proper observance of moderate and patriotic counsels, such as it is your honored privilege to give utterance to, as the chosen representatives of the people of Tennessee.²⁹

After their sweeping victory in the gubernatorial and legislative races in Tennessee, some of the Whigs at least considered the possibility of selecting two United States Senators. That is, they proposed not only to choose a successor for Senator Hopkins Turney, whose term ended in 1851, but also either to re-elect John Bell, whose term did not expire until 1853, or to elect someone to replace him. There were those who saw in this scheme a means of satisfying the senatorial demands of both East and West Tennessee.³⁰ However, the plan failed.

Many Whig leaders had begun active campaigns to secure election to the United States Senate long before the legislature met. The most prominent of these were T. A. R. Nelson, John Netherland³¹ and James A. Whiteside of East Tennessee; John Bell, Ephraim H. Foster and Gustavus A. Henry of Middle Tennessee; and James C. Jones,

Robertson Topp and Milton Brown of West Tennessee.³²

Obviously, then, when the legislature assembled, it faced a difficult problem in choosing a Senator. As one observer stated, "Candidates for the Senate, seeking election with the avidity of candidates for doorkeeper, is the prominent feature of the session, and of all things seems to be the most entitled to be called the 'apple of discord.'" ³³ The Whig members finally solved the problem, perhaps as a result of the intervention of Governor Campbell,³⁴ in a caucus on the night preceding the day on which the election actually occurred. Their choice fell upon James C. Jones of West Tennessee. Consequently, West Tennessee furnished a Senator for the first time in the state's history.

Since the Democrats knew that they could not bring about the election of a Democrat to the Senate, they did not attempt to reach an agreement upon a candidate for the nomination. Ex-Governor Trousdale received thirty-eight of the Democratic votes; James Fulton, three; and Andrew Johnson and A. O. P. Nicholson, one each.³⁵

The next interesting and highly important matter with which the Whigs in the legislature had to deal was that of re-districting the state on the basis of the census returns of 1850. They of course wished so to divide the state as to make a clear majority of both Congressional and legislative districts safely Whig in future elections. Especially significant was their successful attempt to gerrymander Andrew Johnson of the first Congressional district out of Congress by making his district preponderantly Whig.³⁶

The legislature acted upon Governor Campbell's suggestion that it set forth its opinion of the Compromise of 1850. It is likely that the views of the majority of the people of Tennessee on this subject found their most accurate expression in the resolutions which this body passed during the session of 1851-52. The preamble of the "Federal Resolutions" declared that the people of Tennessee, in view of the fact that,

... opinions have been advocated at the North and at the South, in reference to the compromise measures passed by the last Congress, and the questions growing out of slavery in the United States, which if persisted in are calculated to bring the general government in conflict with the states of the Union, and threaten the destruction of the Constitution, and the liberties of the country, desired "distinctly to state," through their legislature . . .

their views on these questions. The resolutions declared that the people of Tennessee "feel and ardently cherish an abiding devotion to the Union and Constitution of the United States." The Constitution does not recognize the right of secession, and the "people of the United States" in its adoption "did ordain and establish a government of limited powers, and not a confederacy merely; and that it proceeds upon the idea that it is to be perpetual, like other forms of government, subject only to be dissolved by revolution." They asserted that although they recognized the right of revolution, "there is no cause at present for the exercise of such right." While this state, they said, would aid the "Executive, whenever necessary, by all legal means, in executing the Constitutional laws of the United States," it unqualifiedly condemned antislavery agitation and activities of Northern "fanatics and abolitionists" and warned that repeal, nonenforcement, or material modification of provisions impairing the efficiency of the fugitive-slave law by states of the North would "tend to a train of deplorable consequences, from which a dissolution of the Union will be the most probable result." They pledged the state to the support of the Compromise of 1850, which they did not regard as a triumph of either North or South but as the best compromise under the circumstances, as "a final settlement of the dangerous and exciting subjects" embraced. Finally, they commended the President for his patriotism and statemanship.⁸⁷

During the gubernatorial campaign of 1851, as had been the case in that of 1847, the Whigs of Tennessee had anticipated the forthcoming Presidential election. General Campbell and other Whig leaders had eulogized President Fillmore and had asserted repeatedly in their campaign speeches that he was not an abolitionist.⁸⁸ Governor Campbell had also praised him in his inaugural address.⁸⁹

When the Whig state convention met in Nashville on February 9, 1852, it recommended Millard Fillmore and James C. Jones for the Presidency and vice-presidency respectively. It appointed Gustavus A. Henry and T. A. R. Nelson as electors for the state at large.

In a letter informing Nelson of the proceedings of this convention, Henry said that he, himself, had accepted the position of elector and he urged Nelson to do likewise. He declared that he heartily endorsed Fillmore and that the vice-presidential candidate did not matter much except that he was afraid that "if our ticket succeeds Jones' luck will kill Fillmore before his term expires." There was quite a bit of maneuvering to commit the convention to anyone else as fully as to

Fillmore. This move, the object of which was eventually to put Jones forward for the Presidency if opportunity offered, however, had failed.⁴⁰

Although the convention's choice of Jones as vice-presidential nominee displeased many of the Whigs of the state, they were all enthusiastic in their support of Fillmore. They all but demanded Fillmore's nomination as the party's standard bearer by the national convention. At the same time they made evident their pronounced hostility to General Winfield Scott, who had strong support in the North.⁴¹ Some of Jones' most ardent supporters saw a chance for his selection as the Presidential candidate if, in the event of the convention's turning from Fillmore to Scott, they should attack Scott and put Jones' name forward.⁴²

The Whig party in the nation at large had already become a victim of factional quarrels between its Northern and Southern wings before the formal opening of the Presidential campaign of 1852. M. P. Gentry apparently presented one view of the situation rather accurately when he stated that "the two great political parties, in a national point of view were malformations—'unnatural monsters'; that the only sound platform was the one upon which the Whigs of Tennessee and the Southern Whigs generally had stood from the beginning."⁴³ Southern Whigs had by that time lost confidence in the Northern wing of the party, which had by no means indicated its belief in the finality of either the fugitive-slave law specifically or of the Compromise of 1850 as a whole. The idea of calling the finality of the Compromise into question was very objectionable to the Whigs of Tennessee who had long regarded its author, Clay, as almost a superman.

Meanwhile, Gentry and one of his colleagues from Tennessee, C. H. Williams, had joined the block of "Southern Whigs" in Congress, a group "devoted more to the interests of their section than to those of the national party."⁴⁴ After this group had failed to secure a commitment to the finality of the Compromise in the Whig Congressional caucus prior to the party's national convention at Baltimore, Gentry, among others, went the length of airing party quarrels in Congress.⁴⁵ He questioned the availability of Scott, the man who at that time seemed most likely to receive the nomination, declared that the party would never become nationalized by passing compromise resolutions and nominating Scott, and indicated that he was prepared to do all that he could to destroy the party unless it did become nationalized.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, Scott became the party's nominee for the Presidency in 1852. The Tennessee delegation helped to make his nomination possible by giving him three votes after it had become clear that Fillmore could not be the nominee.⁴⁷

General Scott's nomination was distinctly unpopular with a great many of the Whigs in Tennessee. Gentry and Williams of Tennessee, along with seven other Whig members of Congress, signed a card refusing to support him. Upon receiving the news of Scott's nomination, William G. Brownlow, who was an ardent supporter of Fillmore, declared in the columns of his paper that "the popular will was trodden underfoot by an unprincipled band of Abolitionists headed by *William H. Seward*, the worst man in America, and the whole South was forced to eat *Northern Dust*. The *nationality* of the Whig party is destroyed. . . ." He maintained, furthermore, that Scott did not have the confidence of the Southern people and should not and would not get the Southern vote. He said that although he would not support the nominee, he would not vote the Democratic ticket. He believed, however, that Pierce would carry the state.⁴⁸ T. A. R. Nelson declined to serve as a Scott elector, but he later agreed to support the nominee.⁴⁹ With the exception of Gentry,⁵⁰ Williams and Brownlow, practically all other Whig leaders exerted some effort to carry the state for Scott. The activity of Senator Jones and Representative William Cullom was especially noteworthy. William T. Haskell, a Whig leader of West Tennessee, spoke effectively in support of Scott in East Tennessee. He vindicated General Scott from the "foul charge of Abolitionism and Free-Soilism" in his speech at Athens.⁵¹ He made an excellent speech at Knoxville at a later date in which he praised Scott on the basis of a program of internal improvements, a project which was always dear to East Tennesseans.⁵² So successful were the loyal Whig leaders in allaying suspicion against Scott that by the end of the campaign there was apparently little popular disaffection in their party in the state.

The Democrats of Tennessee, unlike their Whig opponents, were neither unduly enthusiastic about nor unalterably opposed to any leading aspirant for their party's Presidential nomination, it seems. In a letter of April 4, 1852 to D. T. Patterson concerning possible Democratic candidates, Andrew Johnson wrote from Washington that Cass was "in the sun," but that the difficulty lay in winning the support of the necessary two-thirds in the convention. He said that both the friends and foes of Sam Houston agreed that he would win the elec-

tion if he could get the nomination. Johnson himself thought then that Houston was the only one who could beat Scott. He discounted Douglas' chances of becoming the nominee, saying that,

Douglas, the candidate of the cormorants of our party and some few adjuncts from the other, is now considered a dead cock in the pit, unless some throe in the agony of political death should enable him to kill off his opponents which is not likely to occur. . . . He is a mere hot-bed production, a precocious politician warmed into and kept in existence by a set of interested plunderers that would in the event of success disembowel the treasury, disgrace the country and damn the party to all eternity that had brought them into power. . . .⁵³

Other Democratic leaders in Tennessee, like Johnson, could not foresee who the Democratic nominee would be. Furthermore, they were keenly interested in the promotion of harmony in their party in both the state and the nation. They apparently felt no reluctance in supporting Franklin Pierce, the choice of the national convention.⁵⁴

The fact that Tennessee's vote in the Presidential election of 1852 was the smallest which it cast between August, 1847 and August, 1861 spoke eloquently of its citizens' lack of real enthusiasm for either of the two candidates. The Whigs of Tennessee carried the election for Scott and so won the last Presidential contest in the state in which their party existed as a national organization. Scott received 58,802 votes and Pierce, 57,123 in the state.⁵⁵

Meanwhile although national issues had loomed large in the last gubernatorial election, they played either a minor part or were virtually nonexistent in the gubernatorial elections from August, 1853 through August, 1859. During these campaigns the Democrats and their political opponents fought each other bitterly to win control of the state. The people of Tennessee, nevertheless, continued to maintain a lively interest in national affairs, as their active participation in the Presidential campaign of 1856 in particular indicated.

Almost as soon as the Presidential election of 1852 was over, the political parties in Tennessee found themselves confronted with the necessity of beginning the gubernatorial campaign of 1853. In view of the fact that the Whig party, although torn by dissension and weakened by some defections, was not dead and that Andrew Johnson, whom the Whigs had gerrymandered out of Congress, was loom-

ing as the probable Democratic candidate for the governorship, this contest promised to be a spirited one.

Governor William B. Campbell's refusal to accept renomination gave rise to some argument between the Scott and anti-Scott Whigs as to who the candidate should be. Prior to the meeting of the state convention, however, the Whig press of the state generally was advocating the nomination of Gustavus A. Henry, the "Eagle Orator." The convention chose Henry by acclamation as the party's gubernatorial nominee. It adopted a platform, essentially the same as that of 1851, which stressed devotion to the Union. It endorsed the administration of Governor Campbell as a matter of course.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, at a meeting of the state Democratic committee in the fall of 1852 preparatory to the coming gubernatorial campaign of the next year, George W. Jones, a friend and colleague of Andrew Johnson's in Congress, had put forth Johnson's name as a candidate for the Democratic nomination for governor.⁵⁷ During the time between this meeting and the convening of the state convention in 1853, many county conventions endorsed various individuals for the nomination, but Johnson received more of these endorsements than did all of the rest combined.⁵⁸

When the state convention met, Democratic leaders, for the most part hostile to Johnson,⁵⁹ made an unsuccessful attempt to bring about the nomination of Andrew Ewing. The names of Judge Dunlap, Isham G. Harris,⁶⁰ A. O. P. Nicholson and others were before the convention also. The fact that the county conventions had instructed a large majority of the delegates for Johnson, however, indicated that he was always the favorite of the convention.⁶¹ When an opposition leader announced Ewing's withdrawal, he said, "It seems that Johnson is strong enough to run all the Democrats out of the Convention, and can run Henry out of the State."⁶² Johnson's nomination then became unanimous.⁶³ The *Union and American* declared that Johnson's nomination was inevitable and satisfactory. It pictured the "Mechanic Statesman" as being strong in intellect, patriotic and honorable. He had no superior, it said, in the "brilliant galaxy of Tennessee statesmen," although this group included Nicholson, Trousdale, Harris, Ewing and Dunlap. It saw in Johnson's nomination a prelude to "overwhelming victory."⁶⁴ A Whig paper in East Tennessee, after having remarked that the Democratic convention lacked harmony, asserted that Johnson was a "pretty strong man" and would no doubt be generally acceptable to his party.⁶⁵

Johnson did not attend the convention. He accepted the nomination without expressing any appreciation to the convention.⁶⁶

Throughout the ensuing campaign the Whigs iterated and reiterated their loyalty to the Union. Henry was eloquent in his defense of the Constitution and attacked Johnson on the ground that he proposed to undermine it. In this connection he made much of resolutions which Johnson had introduced in the state senate in 1842 proposing to change the basis of Tennessee's Congressional representation from the "federal ratio" plan to one of free population only. This, Henry declared, "would be 'a violation of long-established usage, form a pernicious precedent and invite and encourage assaults upon the three-fifths principle by the anti-slavery men of the North.'" In explanation of the legislature's manner of redistricting the state, Henry said that the people's election of a Whig legislature in 1851 had constituted a mandate "to give the Whig party 'a decided ascendancy in the apportionment.'" At the same time, he criticized Johnson as having been one of the "Immortal Thirteen" state senators in 1841 who had deprived Tennessee of full representation in the United States Senate for the following two years. Henry cited instances in which he said that Johnson had opposed what he termed "necessary internal improvement measures."⁶⁷

From the very beginning of the campaign, Johnson made clear the fact that he was running upon his own merits and not upon those of President Pierce or any other nationally prominent figure. He affirmed his pride in his plebeian origin and declared that it made him able to sympathize with those who had to earn their own livelihood. He advocated amendments to the Constitution providing for the popular election of President and vice-president and United States Senators and for the limitation of the tenure of Federal judges to twelve years. These changes, he believed, would make the national government more immediately responsive to the popular will. He denounced the Whigs' redistricting measure which he said had "Henrymandered" him out of Congress. He defended himself against Henry's charges concerning his past opposition to certain internal improvement measures. In Middle and West Tennessee, he refuted Henry's accusation of having advocated Congressional representation on the basis of free population only, while in East Tennessee, however, he appealed to the vote of the laboring man by a denunciation of the Federal ratio plan of representation.⁶⁸

The count of votes on election day revealed that the Whigs' re-

districting bill, which had gerrymandered Johnson out of Congress, had proven a boomerang, for Johnson won the governorship. He defeated Henry by a vote of 63,160 to 61,160. The Democrats also elected five out of ten Congressmen. In the state legislature, they did not fare so well, however, winning a majority of only one in the senate and losing the house by a majority of thirteen.⁶⁹

According to one leading Democratic politician, "Johnson has gained a great triumph in Tennessee, he has beat Henry, the Whig party, as well as a large part of the leaders of the Democratic." The masses were largely responsible for the victory. If he had had the ardent support of all Democratic leaders and the Democratic press, he would have won by "at least a 10,000 majority."⁷⁰

Governor Johnson stated in his inaugural message that he would not deal with questions of national policy. He declared that there had been, and might again be, times "when it may be not only proper but an imperative duty for the state legislature to discuss, with freedom, and to boldly announce their opinions and sentiments on national questions," but at the present time "there is no sufficient cause to invoke your special attention to any subject other than those over which, by the Constitution, you have exclusive control." He observed that the recent sectional agitation which had alarmed the country had "happily subsided" and that while there still existed some factions desirous of overthrowing the government, they were "inevitable attendants of every system of government." He was glad that,

Fortunately there exists in Tennessee no such sectional feeling, no such divisions of sentiment upon the great questions which have of late disturbed the councils of some of the other States, as will be likely to interrupt your deliberations, or divert your attention from the ordinary and more legitimate subjects committed to your charge.⁷¹

Inasmuch as the Whigs had a majority in the legislature, they were able to select the man who would represent Tennessee in the United States Senate for the next six years. Since there were, as usual, numerous Whig candidates for the position, however, the Democrats hoped indirectly at least to have a voice in the election. On the forty-ninth ballot the legislature chose John Bell to succeed himself. T. A. R. Nelson of East Tennessee was his nearest Whig competitor. Cave Johnson received the bulk of the Democratic votes. However, the *Union and*

American charged that Democratic votes re-elected Bell. William G. Brownlow, a strong supporter of Nelson, said that although the "Western District Democrats" had indicated at first that they would support Nelson and had later mentioned Watkins and Gentry "or any one but the candidates in the field," they were for Bell all of the time.⁷²

Early in 1854, only a few months after Governor Johnson had eschewed any discussion of national issues as irrelevant, Senator Stephen A. Douglas, Democrat of Illinois and potential Democratic Presidential candidate in 1856, introduced the Kansas-Nebraska bill in Congress. This measure, re-opening as it did the discussion of the status of slavery in the territories, to a degree revived the sectional feeling in Tennessee which had largely died down after the adoption of the Compromise of 1850. In the main, the discussion of the measure in Tennessee quickly resolved itself into a partisan struggle, with the Democrats supporting it and the Whigs opposing it.

The Democrats looked upon the bill as an application of the principle of Congressional nonintervention rather than of "Squatter Sovereignty," and so considered it a concession to the South. Furthermore, they felt that taking away the power of Congress to legislate regarding slavery in the territories other than to insure Constitutional protection of it and leaving the determination of its status to the people of the territories themselves, the Supreme Court alone having the power to pass on their laws, insured the permanence of the institution there. Moreover, they contended that the South should support the measure because of their belief that the Supreme Court would adequately protect its rights.⁷³

The Whigs, on the other hand, warned the South not to support the bill, characterizing it as "humbug." "If," said the *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*,

the principle of squatter sovereignty, which is incorporated in the bill is accepted by the South and once established, it requires no great sagacity to perceive that there will never be another slave state formed out of any territory we now possess or which we may hereafter acquire . . . although such territory will be acquired by the *common* treasure or the *common* blood of *all* the states.⁷⁴

Except for the vote of Representative George W. Jones, Democrat, who opposed the bill, and those of Representatives F. K. Zollcoffer and Charles Ready, and Senator James C. Jones, Whigs, who

avored it, the votes of Tennessee's Congressional delegation followed partisan lines.⁷⁵ The Whig press in general commended Senator John Bell, the leader of the Whig delegation in Congress, especially for his course in voting against the bill.⁷⁶ The *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig* asserted "that after giving the measure the most patient reflection and searching examination, . . . no such necessity existed for its passage as would authorize him to yield his objections to it, and that the *good* expected to result from it would be outweighed by the *evil*."⁷⁷ *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig and Independent Journal* also endorsed Bell's course, declaring that he was "disposed to keep our faith with the North, entered into in the adoption of the compromise measures, and when Southern Whigs and Democrats repeal the Missouri Compromise, we had no right to suppose that our distinguished Senator would act with them." At the same time, it recommended Bell for the presidency in 1856.⁷⁸

Governor Andrew Johnson's first gubernatorial administration saw the rise of two new political parties in the United States. One of these, the Republican, secured no following in Tennessee prior to the Civil War. The other, the American, or Know Nothing, party, drawing practically its entire strength from the membership of the old Whig organization, however, became for a short time a powerful factor in state politics. By 1855 the Know Nothing party, a secret organization, had gained sufficient power to contest the gubernatorial election in Tennessee with the Democrats.

Prior to the meeting of the state convention, Governor Johnson, who had won the favor of the common man by eschewing partisan Federal issues and devoting himself wholeheartedly to the practical task of improving conditions within the state, received the endorsement of virtually all Democratic county conventions.⁷⁹ The state convention therefore perforce renominated him, but the fact that he failed to attend the convention and the fact that it did not accord his administration wholehearted endorsement reflected the continuing bitterness existing between him and the party leaders.⁸⁰

It seems probable that a secret meeting of the state council of the American, or Know Nothing, party selected M. P. Gentry, as the candidate of that organization for the governorship in 1855. At any rate, the Whigs had no convention; and Gentry, a former Whig Congressman, announced his candidacy from his home in response to the solicitations of his friends.⁸¹ While in his announcement in February Gentry had alluded neither to party nor to political principles, he

apparently accepted the support of the Know Nothings who, in a secret convention in Nashville in the following May, endorsed him and made public the platform of the party in Tennessee.⁸²

The gubernatorial campaign of 1855 was a very bitter one. While other matters received some attention, the paramount issue between Gentry and Johnson was Know-Nothingism.⁸³ Johnson attacked the principles of the Know Nothing party as intolerant in both politics and religion and therefore un-American. Gentry defended the Know Nothing plans of depriving aliens of naturalization and the right to vote until after a twenty-one-year period of residence and of excluding Catholics from office as being necessary to the preservation of republicanism, and therefore legitimate and right.

Election results showed that Johnson had defeated Gentry by a vote of 67,499 to 65,352. The Know Nothings and Whigs, however, won the legislature by a majority of two. Since the Democrats won in only four Congressional races and the Know Nothings and Whigs won in six,⁸⁴ the Know Nothings and Whigs controlled the State's Congressional delegation.

The Presidential campaign of 1856 in Tennessee was probably the most hotly contested one between 1844 and 1860.⁸⁵ Since the newly organized Republican party had no following in the state,⁸⁶ the struggle was between the Democrats on the one hand and the Know Nothings or Americans on the other.

At first, both parties willingly but rather unenthusiastically accepted the nominees of their respective national conventions. Millard Fillmore of New York and Andrew J. Donelson of Tennessee were the candidates of the American party, and James Buchanan of Pennsylvania and John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, of the Democratic party.

The Clarksville *Jeffersonian*, in discussing the Democratic ticket for 1856, declared that the South could rely upon Buchanan "to maintain and vindicate their Constitutional rights, for he has no black record of abolition to mortify his party, or upon which they will be called to plead the limitations of the statute." It affirmed also that "In the vice-presidential nominee, Hon. John C. Breckinridge, we have a gentleman of exalted character, unimpeachable integrity, extraordinary talents, and splendid oratorical powers."⁸⁷

Quite in contrast with these sentiments were the apathetic remarks of Governor Johnson, the chieftain of the Democratic party in the state, who wrote as follows concerning the party's candidates and platform:

As to the nomination which has been made by the Cincinnati convention I will say but little in this not more than to express the hope that we can carry it in this state. . . . If the parties were organized as they have heretofore been it would be an unfortunate nomination for us in Tennessee, but with the Whig party broken up and Know-Nothing being crushed and still on the wane there is some hope of our being able to carry the state. Mr. Buchanan with his antecedents is harder to defend than any one of the candidates who were before the convention. Breckinridge is a man of talent and fine address, has been in politics but a short time, yet not very consistent. . . . The platform in the main is a sound one. There are some things incorporated in it that might have been left out. . . . We must take the platform *"and the candidates."*

In a letter written two days later he reported that a Fillmore demonstration in Nashville on the night of June 26 had proved unsuccessful. "If we had a man that was popular on our ticket," he added, "we could carry the state by seven thousand or ten thousand votes; as it now stands there is no telling what will be done. . . . There is an acquiescence in his nomination but no decided zeal felt or manifested for him."⁸⁸ Nevertheless, Johnson's subsequent participation in the campaign was sufficiently enthusiastic to call forth the praise of Cave Johnson, who had been working in Buchanan's behalf since shortly after his return from Washington at the end of his term in Polk's cabinet.⁸⁹

The American party claimed that its candidates represented the "sound, conservative, patriotic and anti-ultra spirit of both the Northern and Southern sections in the Union." Both of the nominees were leaders "around whom may consistently rally all the sound, conservative men, North and South, who have at heart the deliverance of the country from the evils and dangers of sectional agitation, and the promotion of harmony and of the Union."⁹⁰

Very early in the campaign, however, the Knoxville *Register* felt called upon to refute charges that the platform of the American party was sectional and that Donelson was merely a disappointed office seeker.⁹¹ The Athens *Post*, in commenting upon efforts of Democrats and Republicans to bring about the withdrawal of the American ticket, insisted that if the only national party in the race should withdraw it would leave the field to sectional parties. In that event, it

argued, the Black Republicans would win; it warned the Democrats, therefore, to beware of such a course. Many in the American party professed to fear that the victory of their party was the only alternative either to immediate or to ultimate civil war.⁹²

As time passed and it became increasingly clear that Fillmore could not win over Buchanan and Fremont, the chief aim of the Americans in Tennessee apparently came to be to throw the election into the national House of Representatives. This they believed to be their only chance of winning the Presidency. The Democrats, however, accused them of conspiring with the Republicans to bring about the election of Fremont rather than that of Fillmore by this plan. They therefore warned that a Tennessean who voted for Fillmore gave Fremont a chance to win the election in the House. The Democrats declared that the election of Fremont would endanger the Union, and the Americans made the same assertion concerning the election of either Buchanan or Fremont.⁹³

The efforts of Governor Johnson, Isham G. Harris, William H. Polk, Cave Johnson, James C. Jones,⁹⁴ and other prominent Democratic leaders in behalf of the Buchanan electoral ticket in the state proved successful. Buchanan defeated Fillmore by a vote of 73,638 to 66,178.⁹⁵

The Democrats felt that they had won a brilliant victory in the state. They also regarded Buchanan's election as hopeful for the future of the nation.⁹⁶ The Clarksville *Jeffersonian* exulted over the defeat of both Know-Nothingism and Black Republicanism which it said would "find no food upon which to fatten in another Presidential contest." Black Republicanism's day of triumph, it said,

... if it was ever destined to have one, is postponed for another four years, and before that period shall have expired, the territorial questions will be settled by the people, and slavery will have been finally rejected or adopted by all the territories, concerning which there could be any controversy. Consequently this was the the death struggle of anti-slavery fanaticism. Defeated, now it can rally no more, and with it expire the dangers to our government, which have grown out of its birth and existence.⁹⁷

The American, or Know Nothing, press by no means shared this optimistic view concerning the future. The rather conservative *Repub-*

lican Banner and Nashville Whig, which had supported Fillmore and Donelson, alluded to the fact that the *Union and American* regarded Buchanan's election as auguring well for the future and expressed its own opinion that the outlook under him was "cloudy—doubtful, at best." It observed that Northern Democrats had supported him believing him opposed to slavery, while Southern Democrats had favored him thinking him friendly to it.⁹⁸ Even though many concurred in the statements of the *Republican Banner*, few shared the extreme opinions of Parson Brownlow, who observed,

Well, the great battle is over, and Foreignism, Disunionism, Romanism, and sham Democracy, through James Buchanan, have achieved a great victory. Mr. Fillmore is beaten—struck down by the North and the South—proof that his sound conservative principles, his tried integrity, and his unsullied character are unsuited to the corrupt majority of these States, and to the wild and revolutionary times in which we live.

He said that this election has proved,

that the great body of the Northern people are utterly and irrevocably opposed to Negro slavery, as it exists in the South and they will not favor its extension, if indeed they will tolerate its existence where it is. This Republican party has been built up and strengthened by the Democratic party, the party now in power, whose reckless and unwise policy in the management of national affairs, led to the nomination of Fremont. The Democratic party reopened the sectional agitation, by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and brought into the field a third party, headed by Fremont, which, though it has not overwhelmed the sham Democracy, has shown its power to do so, and if it becomes compacted and knit together as it certainly will, for the next four years, gaining strength from the corruptions and blundering mismanagement of the party in power, it will sweep the sixteen Free States with their 176 electoral votes. Notwithstanding, Mr. Buchanan is a *minority* President, and falls short of absolute majority of the Electors, it is the duty of all good citizens, and Christian patriots, to bow submissively to the will of the nation, legally and Constitutionally expressed. The American party will

do so, as they would have done, even had Fremont been elected. Our remedy for evils of this character is the *ballot box*, and we will not consent to resort to any other.⁹⁹

Many of the Americans consoled themselves with the thought that although they had not achieved the "highest good," that is, the election of Fillmore, they had accomplished an "important good, the overthrow of the mischievous free-soil party."¹⁰⁰

Governor Johnson and Senator Bell, despite their divergent political views, were rather uncertain and fearful as to the probable turn of future events. Governor Johnson felt that Buchanan's victory, which he said had not been "a triumph of a man, but of principle over faction and sectionalism," was vitally important. He said that,

If Mr. Buchanan will take a BOLD and at the same time a PRUDENT course in his administration the abolition sentiment can be drawn back at least for some time to come; but if on the contrary, the recent development of their strength will only cause them to redouble their energies and to come up to the next contest with more ardor and determination to elect a sectional abolition candidate for the Presidency, which will be tantamount to a dissolution of the Union. They now seemingly confine their intention to excluding slavery from the territories, but will be pressed into the states.¹⁰¹

Senator Bell found that leading Republicans were waiting to see what would be the course of the Democratic party before determining their future policy. He said that if they found it to be "favorable to peace and harmony," they would "look to some modification of their policy and a union with the South." If, on the other hand, they should "persist in the course of President Pierce" or "pursue a course in conformity with extreme Southern notions they [Republicans] will adhere to their present organization, and expect to carry a Northern candidate in 1860."¹⁰²

While Tennesseans generally rejoiced that the election of 1856 had not resulted in untoward developments, they were apparently somewhat apprehensive of the future. For example, some were beginning to criticize the Southern Commercial Conventions adversely. The original purpose of holding such meetings, said the *Patriot*, probably grew out of a desire to obtain relief from the South's dependence upon

the North for "commercial facilities" and was doubtless "good and highly patriotic." It might again be well for the "active business men of the Southern country, of all classes, farmers, merchants and mechanics," to meet and consider ways and means of promoting the economic prosperity of the South. However,

... for two or three or more years past these conventions seem to have been composed of inconsiderate political hotspurs, rather than of the solid and deeply thinking commercial men of the Southern country. They have been appointed hastily, and have hastily packed their portmanteaus and trundled themselves into the convention, with but one idea in their heads, and that, commercial non-intercourse with the North.

Such a course tended to "aggravate the political discussions which divide the two sections of the Union" and was definitely injurious. The *Patriot* hoped that the convention soon to meet at Knoxville would "steer clear of the errors of its predecessors" and "devote itself to its true duties." According to one observer at the first session, however, it seemed likely that the Knoxville Convention would give "more of its attention to the nigger question than to Commerce or Manufactures, or any other subject of practical character."¹⁰³ In addition, others were fearful of the formation of a "southern Party."¹⁰⁴ According to the *Athens Post*, such action was traitorous to the best interests of the section and detrimental to the Union. It remarked that there was need for a "great National party." "But," it said, "build up no *Southern* party with political agitation for its basis, and looking to dismemberment as its result."¹⁰⁵ At any rate, "From 1856 . . . until 1861 there was an incessant time of political excitement," it seems.¹⁰⁶

Meanwhile, in 1857 Governor Johnson, who had continued the constructive policies of his first term through his second, refused to consider a third gubernatorial nomination. He took an important part in the campaign, however, with a view to securing the election of a legislature which would elect him to succeed James C. Jones in the United States Senate. He apparently exerted his influence also to bring about the election of A. O. P. Nicholson in 1857 to replace John Bell upon the expiration of his term in 1859 or earlier if he should resign.¹⁰⁷ Johnson supported Isham G. Harris of Memphis, whom the Democrats nominated to succeed him as governor, although he and Harris were not friendly. The *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*

declared at one time that Johnson had criticized Harris for the manner in which he was conducting the campaign and at the same time expressed the view that Harris' "friends, with *his* sanction no doubt, are laboring in the West" to defeat legislative candidates who would pledge themselves to support Johnson for the Senate.¹⁰⁸

Although the Whig, Know Nothing, or American, party had gone into virtual eclipse nationally after its defeat in 1856, it was still visible in Tennessee in 1857. There was considerable doubt among the Americans as to who their gubernatorial candidate should be. Some urged former Governor William B. Campbell to allow the American state convention to consider his name.¹⁰⁹ Congressmen Felix K. Zollicoffer, Charles Ready, and William Haskell considered making the race.¹¹⁰ Apparently John Bell, who the *Union and American* declared controlled his party in the state, dictated the nomination of Robert Hatton, a young lawyer in Wilson county and a former member of the state legislature.¹¹¹

The *Union and American* declared that the real issue in the election was the "re-establishment of the John Bell dynasty in Tennessee." "Shall their [Bell dynasty] policy in Congress upon the slavery question, and in the legislature upon internal improvements and State extravagance," it asked, "be recognized and endorsed as the true position of the majority of our people?" It indicated that the Black Republicans would be pleased at their return to power.¹¹²

The Americans took the position that the main issue was the question of the election of Andrew Johnson to the United States Senate.¹¹³ They, therefore, bitterly assailed Governor Johnson, who, they said, was neglecting his office by participating in and directing the campaign. They attacked him as a radical and an agrarian and as an ally of the Republicans, in effect. In proof of their charges they cited his advocacy of the popular election of the President, the vice-president, United States Senators, and Justices of the Supreme Court, the reduction of the terms of Senators, and the limitation of the tenure of Justices of the Supreme Court to twelve years. Such changes, they said, would give the North complete control of affairs by virtue of numerical superiority and "the only alternative left to the South would be unconditional submission or revolution and disunion."¹¹⁴ They urged the people to shake Johnson and his "vile radicalism into the pool of oblivion."¹¹⁵

The Americans sought unsuccessfully to split the Democratic vote on the issue of Johnson's radicalism. "The radical and agrarian ideas

of Gov. Johnson are repudiated by the reflecting, conservative men of his party," they insisted. They suggested, too, that there were other able and deserving Democrats who would accurately and adequately represent the sentiment of the people of Tennessee in the United States Senate.¹¹⁶

Although the candidates touched upon numerous subjects, the other main topics of discussion were slavery, foreigners, Catholics, and the advisability of the United States government's distributing to the states the proceeds of the sale of public lands. Governor Johnson made much of the fact that all Americans, or Know Nothings, in the North were abolitionists. Some Americans declared that Johnson had been "repeatedly charged with being a co-laborer with the Black Republicans," but that the people seemed "slow to fully appreciate the fact."¹¹⁷

The Democrats were overwhelmingly victorious in the election. They not only placed Harris in the governor's chair by a vote of 71,178 to 59,807, but they also secured substantial majorities in both houses of the legislature. In addition, they also elected seven of the state's ten Congressmen.¹¹⁸

The new legislature, despite the vociferous protests of the Americans, proceeded to make the Democratic victory complete by electing two United States Senators. Governor Johnson replaced James C. Jones, whose term had just expired. A. O. P. Nicholson was to fill the place then occupied in the Senate by John Bell either upon his resignation or upon the expiration of his term in 1859. At one time, Nicholson thought that Bell would resign in the event that the legislature should elect his successor.¹¹⁹

The Democrats felt that the legislature's election of Johnson to the Senate was

... but a formal record of the verdict and election of the People of the State last August. The question was then decided by the great popular tribunal, with a unanimity and enthusiasm which has had no parallel since the days of the illustrious Jackson. . . . The man of the People is recognized as such alike by the masses for whom he labored and by their representatives in the State Capitol.

Obviously the Democracy of Tennessee was extremely grateful to Johnson for having established the ascendancy of their party in the state.¹²⁰

The Americans deeply resented Johnson's elevation to the Senate. On October 10, the day after his election, the *Republican Banner* of Nashville made a very bitter attack upon him. It declared that the "only ingredients" of a speech which he had made the night before were "egotism and mobocracy" and that it was "brimming full of class bitterness, and low-flung class prejudices." Johnson, it said, "is for 'levelling down, instead of up, and he thus strikes a deadly blow at the very heart of our government. . . . He is . . . an unmitigated and most dangerous mobocrat."

While the *Union and American* characterized the election of two Democratic Senators as the "proudest epoch in our political history since the division of parties in this State," it indicated that the selection of A. O. P. Nicholson as the second of these Senators was by no means unanimous. It believed, however, that the people would hail his election as satisfactory.¹²¹

The legislature of 1857-58, completely dominated by the Democrats, passed resolutions calling upon John Bell to redeem his pledge to resign if his course in opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska bill should evoke dissatisfaction in the state. In addition, it instructed Tennessee's delegation in Congress to support the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton constitution.¹²²

Bell resented the legislature's action and refused to resign. In the course of his remarks on the subject, he made "such strictures upon its members, that Mr. Johnson felt called upon to defend their action." An unfortunate altercation between Johnson and Bell thereupon ensued on the Senate floor.¹²³

In comparison with the gubernatorial election of 1857 in Tennessee, that of 1859 was somewhat dull. However, in the light of the events which occurred during the next biennium, it proved to have been of considerable importance.

The Democratic state convention met on March 17. John K. Howard of Lebanon served as its president and Andrew Ewing of Nashville served as chairman of the resolutions committee.¹²⁴ The platform set forth clearly the attitude of the party on the leading state and national issues. The first, second and third resolutions respectively favored a strict construction of the Constitution, a tariff for "revenue only," and the acquisition of Cuba. The fourth resolution, which dealt with the Dred Scott decision, read as follows:

...we are satisfied with the views announced by the Supreme

Court of the United States in the celebrated case of 'Dred Scott,' on the right of slaveholders and the status of slavery in the Territories, and we are willing to abide by the principles announced in that decision. Slavery and the rights of slaveholders are protected by the Constitution of the United States, and by an appeal to the action of the judicial tribunals of the Union, until the formation of a Constitution by the people of a Territory; and [sic] then the State must decide for itself on that as well as other legitimate subjects of government.

The fifth and seventh resolutions dealt with banking reform, especially with reference to the issuance and redemption of notes, and to supervision, and with the question of legislative control over charters of incorporation in the state. The sixth resolution endorsed President Buchanan's administration and pledged it continued support. The final resolution was a relatively enthusiastic but somewhat vague endorsement of Governor Harris' administration.¹²⁵ The convention renominated Governor Harris, practically as a matter of course, by acclamation.¹²⁶

The Opposition party, consisting of former Whigs and Know Nothings, or Americans, held its state convention on March 29. Its first and second resolutions, which were especially significant, provided:

1st. That the Union, as established by the Federal Constitution, is the surest guaranty of the rights and interests of all sections of the country, and should be preserved.

2d. That while we will maintain with unwavering firmness our constitutional rights in relation to slavery, we believe that the further agitation of the question tends to no practical good to any portion of the country, and should, therefore, cease; regarding the principle as settled that the people of the Territories when they come to form a Constitution and establish a State government, shall decide the question for themselves.

Other resolutions opposed direct taxation and advocated a protective tariff, favored the annexation of Cuba, insisted that the "old States" as well as the new ones share in the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of public lands, and favored "a sound and well-regulated Banking system."¹²⁷ The convention drafted John Netherland of East Tennessee to oppose Governor Harris.¹²⁸

The aim of the Opposition—"h-opposition," as some Democrats said—was to bring about a revolution in politics in Tennessee.¹²⁹ The party's campaign paper, the *Opposition*, which the *Republican Banner* and the *Patriot* published jointly to aid in the election of Netherland and the Opposition ticket, declared in its first issue that its name was "significant of its purpose," which was "Opposition, in fine, to Modern Democracy. . . ." Among the long list of things to which the journal was opposed, the following, in view of the unsettled condition of national affairs, were particularly notable:

Opposition to the further agitation of the slavery question as leading to no practical good to any portion of our country, but fraught with peril to the peace and perpetuity of the Union.

Opposition to the division of the country into two sectional parties—of the continued ascendancy of the Democratic party in the Southern States.

Opposition to the fomenting of jealousies, dissensions and heart-burnings between different sections of our common country, by misrepresenting the aims and opinions of the people of the different sections in regard to one another.

Opposition—determined, untiring opposition—to a dissolution of the Union, and to all parties as such which *cherish* and *uphold* as *leaders* men who are known to entertain the spirit of disunion in their hearts, or whose professions, doctrines and acts manifestly tend to that result.¹³⁰

The campaign, as usual, was hotly contested. The main local issue was the currency. There was no material difference between the parties on the sectional dispute between the North and the South. Both parties enthusiastically endorsed the Dred Scott decision. In addition, the Opposition specifically urged the cessation of the agitation of the slavery question, and stressed its devotion to the Union.¹³¹ Inasmuch as the preliminary maneuvering for the Presidential contest of 1860 was already under way, however, each party accused the other of being unduly friendly to the North. The Democrats asserted that the Opposition was contemplating fusion with the Republicans. The Opposition denied the accusation and replied that the Democrats would not deny that they might support Stephen A. Douglas for the Presidency.¹³²

Governor Harris defeated Netherland by a vote of 72,262 to 68,159. Although only a few hundred more voters cast ballots in this race

than had voted in the election of 1857, the Opposition cut the Democrats' majority almost in half. The Democrats retained control of the legislature by a reduced margin. The Opposition's election of seven out of ten Congressmen, almost an exact reversal of the alignment in the preceding election, was a further indication that the Democrats had certainly not gained complete and uncontested control of the state.¹³³

Within scarcely more than two months after this election, which had revealed a conservative trend in the state on national issues, the news of John Brown's raid at Harper's Ferry caused consternation in Tennessee as it did elsewhere throughout the South. On December 2, 1859, the legislature, which was already in session when the incident at Harper's Ferry occurred, passed five resolutions expressing its reaction to the affair by a decisive vote. Two of these read as follows:

Resolved . . ., That we recognize, in the recent outbreak at Harper's Ferry, the natural fruit of the treasonable "irrepressible conflict doctrine," put forth by the great head of the Black Republican party, and echoed by his subordinates; and it becomes the imperative duty of national men of all parties throughout the Union, to announce to the world their sense of its infamy, and to unite in crushing out its authors as traitors to their country and as deadly enemies to the public peace, the rights of the States, and the preservation of our Republican Institutions.

Resolved, That we record it as the sense of the Tennessee legislature, that the declaration of Mr. Seward, that a respectable portion of the Southern people, under the lead of such men as Cassius M. Clay and Francis P. Blair, will unite with the Black Republican party to prevent the extension of slavery, and will eventually "rise up against slavery" is a libel upon the honor and loyalty of the Southern people, and will not but serve to make them more watchful and exacting of their public servants in the national councils.

In substance, the other three urged Tennessee's Congressmen not to co-operate with the Black Republicans in organizing the House, commended the national administration for its promptness in suppressing the insurrection at Harper's Ferry and directed that the state's Senators and Representatives receive copies of these resolutions.¹³⁴

The members of Tennessee's Congressional delegation, who, like the members of the state legislature, were alarmed for the safety of the Union, felt impelled not only to convey to their colleagues in the first session of the Thirty-sixth Congress, which convened on December 5, 1859, their impression of the reaction of the people of their state to the incident at Harper's Ferry but also to exert as great measure of leadership as possible in composing the quarrel between the North and the South. Every member of this comparatively balanced bipartisan group except one participated to some extent in the Congressional debate on the sectional crisis.

The first to speak was Representative Thomas A. R. Nelson, of the Opposition, or American, party, whose supporters in Tennessee had apparently made an organized attempt to promote his candidacy for the speakership. Since the discussion of sectional differences in the House revolved around the election of the speaker, it was in this connection that Representative Nelson spoke. His speech was in support of an attempt by Representative John A. Gilmer, American of North Carolina, to amend the resolution which Representative John B. Clark, Democrat of Missouri, had introduced on the first day of the session declaring in effect that no one who had endorsed Hinton R. Helper's *The Impending Crisis of the South—How to Meet It* was fit to be speaker, by substituting a resolution (as amended) to the effect that anyone who refused to accept the finality of the Compromise of 1850, and who failed to oppose the agitation of the slavery question in any form, was not fit to be speaker.

In this widely acclaimed speech, Representative Nelson strongly deprecated the slavery agitation in "every shape and form," and vigorously attacked disunionists in both the North and the South. Said he, "We want no abolition, no secession, no disunion, no nullification, no civil war, no reeking carnage, no blazing fields, no burning cities, no military despots. . . ." In calling attention to the "alarming crisis" of the country "temperately and moderately" he asked both Northern and Southern men if they could make no sacrifices in behalf of this "glorious Union," for which he, himself, expressed the greatest devotion.¹³⁵

Subsequently, with the exception of Representative James H. Thomas, Democrat, the other members of the delegation in the House in either brief observations or lengthy speeches likewise emphasized their love for, and loyalty to, the Union. Some pledged unconditional loyalty to the Union while some predicated their loyalty to the Union upon the condition that the administration of national affairs be in

accordance with the principles of the founding fathers. Although all denounced Northern aggressions against the South and demanded redress of grievances, they expressed their abhorrence of sectionalism *per se*. They deplored agitation of the slavery question. With one exception, their speeches, which exhibited some partisan bias, were moderate and conciliatory in tone and reflected a national and conservative point of view.¹³⁰

Tennessee's Senators, who were leaders of more than state-wide reputation, were no less concerned over the threatening aspect of national affairs than were her Representatives. They, too, sought to make known the views of their constituents and to exert all of the influence possible in the interest of national harmony.

Senator Andrew Johnson, on December 12, 1859, took occasion to set forth his views in connection with the discussion of the resolution which Senator James M. Mason of Virginia had introduced on the first day of the session requesting the appointment of a committee to investigate the insurrection at Harper's Ferry. He regretted that there should be any debate on this resolution to investigate an affair which obviously needed investigation and deprecated the injection of partisan politics into the matter. In this connection, he attacked Senator Lyman Trumbull, Republican of Illinois, who had moved to amend Senator Mason's resolution so as to provide for the investigation of the Liberty, Missouri, incident of 1855, preceding the invasion into Kansas, and criticized certain doctrines of the Republican party. He challenged the consistency of Trumbull and the Republican party on the question of the equality of the white and black races. He alleged that the condition of the free Negro in Illinois, whom he characterized as a slave without a master, was worse than that of the slave in the South because the state had taken away virtually all of his civil rights. By asking Senator Trumbull whether or not he would admit the territory of Arizona into the Union on an equal footing with the other states if its population should come to be composed entirely of blacks, Johnson forced him to admit that he would not like to endanger the peace of the Union under existing conditions by admitting a sovereign state whose citizenship consisted solely of either Indians or Negroes. "There is," Trumbull said, "a distinction between the white and black races made by Omnipotence himself." Although he insisted that this distinction did not apply to "natural rights," Johnson declared¹³¹

He says the difference begins with the very origin of man. If

the Deity himself, according to the Senator's own admission, has made difference between the races, how can they have been created with practically the same equal rights and privileges? The differences began with the Deity. . . . All this clamor and clap-trap about liberty falls to the ground, and the construction which should be put on the Declaration of Independence is clear and unobscured.

Denying Trumbull's contention that favoring "the spread or the maintenance of slavery" was "the touchstone of the Democratic party," he said that the Democratic party assumed to be a "national party," and assumed to maintain the Constitution which guaranteed slavery "wherever found within the United States." In advocating the Constitution "as it is," the Democratic party "stand by this institution called slavery," but in so doing "propose no innovation," and make "no advance upon the North."

Senator Johnson declared that Seward's statements purporting to show that there was an irrepressible conflict between free and slave labor were false. After having asked which was worse, the aristocracy of money in the North or that of labor in the South, he declared that while the South, which had invested money in labor, was friendly to it, the North, which had no investment in labor, was oppressing it. The conflict, therefore, was "between the dollars and cents of the North and the free labor of the North, not between free and slave labor."

He said that the South viewed the plan of Seward and other prominent men in the North to destroy slavery with justifiable alarm, and declared that he, himself, would not support for office any man holding Seward's sentiments. He objected to the glorification in the North of John Brown's raid, and insisted that talk of enmity between sections and of the possible dissolution of the Union led to just such incidents. Finally, he pointed out the fact that the country was in such a state as it had never been before, saying:

There is no outburst, there is no passion, but there is deep decided feeling in the country; and the idea is obtaining too much currency that this Union is to be dissolved. That seems almost to be a foregone conclusion, and it has got to be in the minds of many, a belief that it is simply a question of time.

Do we not see what the inevitable result of pressing such doctrine upon the country will be, in this state of public feeling? For myself, I am no dissolutionist; I am no madcap on this subject. Because we cannot get our constitutional rights, I do not intend to be one of those who will violate the Constitution. When the time comes, if it ever does come, when it shall be necessary . . . I intend to plant my feet upon that Constitution which I have sworn to support, and to stand there and battle for all its guarantees; and if the Constitution is to be violated, if this Union is to be broken up, it shall be done by those who are steadily and insidiously making encroachment upon its very foundation. I intend to stand upon the Constitution to the very last, and I tell the North it is with them; they have the Union in their hands, and if it is broken up, it will be their own work, not that of the South; for all we ask is the Constitution of the country and the fulfillment of its guarantees, and upon them we intend to stand, be the consequences what they may.

Asserting that encroachments on the Southern states and their institutions should cease, and observing that the South was almost through making appeals to the North, Senator Johnson declared that "you must either preserve the Constitution or you must dissolve this Union."¹³⁷

It was on January 30, 1860, more than a month after Senator Johnson had addressed the Senate, that Senator A. O. P. Nicholson spoke. His speech was a part of the debate on the resolution which Senator A. G. Brown, Democrat of Mississippi, had introduced about ten days earlier declaring in effect that the territories were the common property of all of the states, whose citizens therefore had the right to take any type of property into them with the guarantee that any governmental unit exercising power therein, Federal or territorial, would protect it.

At the outset of his speech, in which he proposed to "examine the relations which subsist between the systems of labor that prevail in the two sections of the country, for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is a conflict between them that is irreconcilable and irrepressible." Senator Nicholson read the resolutions which the legislature of Tennessee had passed by a decisive vote on December 2, 1859, expressing its views on the sectional controversy. He observed that those resolutions, severe though they were, came from a conservative South-

ern state whose people had a Jackson-like devotion to the Union. They expressed the feeling of a people "who fully comprehend and appreciate the benefits of the Federal Union as it came from the hands of our fathers" and who are convinced that "its continued existence is endangered by the prevalence in the North of the sectional doctrine which they denounce with so much energy."

Although incidents such as John Brown's raid had not caused the feeling of alienation, amounting almost to hostility, existing among the people of the South, they had intensified it because Southerners were convinced that there existed in the North "a prevailing sentiment of hatred of slavery, that is resolved to be satisfied with nothing short of its entire annihilation." There had been no abatement in the zeal of the Republican party which had excluded slavery from Kansas either by arousing public opinion in the North or by "'private action' in the form of aid societies and Sharpe's rifles," although there was "no other free territory into which slavery threatens to make an incursion." Therefore, the Republicans, who advocated a policy of gradualism within the letter of the Constitution, and the abolitionists, who openly attacked the Constitution and were willing to employ immediate force to exterminate slavery, had the same end in view. Said he,

They boldly declare their purpose and make open war on the Constitution. You keep your ulterior purpose in the background, covering it under the cloak of opposition to the expansion of slavery; making war on the decisions of the Supreme Court, which impede your progress, and on the court itself; but being content if you can keep within the letter of the Constitution, however grossly its spirit may be violated. The Abolitionists would employ immediate force, moral or physical, to exterminate slavery. You object to so summary a move of reaching the end—you would take time to starve us out by restoring to the "force of public opinion and private action" in confining slavery to its present limits. You would take time to secure such an increase of sectional strength as will enable you to reorganize the Supreme Court, and obtain its sanction to laws repealing the fugitive-slave law and abolishing slavery in this District, and wherever else it may now lawfully exist outside of the States. You would avail yourselves of "the force of public opinion and private action," to organize new free states as rapidly as possible, with the view

of hastening the consummation of your object of exterminating slavery by an amendment of the Federal Constitution.

Senator Nicholson specifically attacked the position of Senator William H. Seward, Republican of New York, whom he said the people of the South considered to be the chief proponent of the idea of destroying slavery. Seward, said Nicholson, had no special sympathy for the slaves; his chief interest was in the whites. The Senator protested in the name of the white laboring men of the South against this "pragmatic kindness." These men, a *majority* in the South, could take care of their own rights, he said, and he adduced

...them as witnesses to testify against the assumption that slave labor is that degrading and blighting system which must perish from inherent error. . . . They know how it affects their interests; and their united testimony is, that whenever the system is invaded they feel their own interest is assailed and with all their strength and all their energies they will repel the assault.

While Southerners, including "white laboring men," conceded that free labor was the system best suited to the North, they held that slave labor was the system best suited to the South. Moreover, Senator Nicholson insisted that while there was no conflict between slave labor, which produced staples chiefly, and free labor, which produced other commodities, there was a conflict between capital and labor in the North itself, a situation giving rise to new problems in that section which demanded action.

Asserting that the real argument on slavery concerned its morality, Senator Nicholson insisted that this matter did not belong in the realm of politics. Conscience on slavery should not take the place of the Constitution, the "supreme law of the land." Moreover, the South did not ask the North to concede that slavery was morally right. It simply claimed the same right of freedom of conscience on the subject that it granted.

The Supreme Court, Nicholson declared, had sustained the South's contention that Congress had no power to prevent the extension of slavery into the territories because the Constitution "guarantees the right to take and hold slaves under its protection in our Territories." The Republicans, who held that the Court had misunderstood and

misconstrued the Constitution, proposed to agitate the question until the Court reversed its decision. The first step in the realization of this objective was the election of a Republican President, who, through the appointive power, might be able to change the character of the Court so that it would hold that the Congress could prohibit the extension of slavery in the territories. Is it, he asked, "upon the calculation of possible chances and contingencies like these that the country is to continue to be convulsed by sectional agitation?"

Senator Nicholson, who concurred fully in the opinion that "the permanent ascendancy of a strictly sectional majority, animated by the spirit that characterizes the acknowledged champions of the Republican party . . . must be of necessity, the destruction of the Confederacy," refused to say in advance "what contingency should be taken as conclusive evidence that the reign of sectional despotism will be hereby inaugurated." Unity of action, upon which the legislatures of the respective states would have to decide, was essential in the matter. The South's declared determination not to submit to the domination of a "sectional anti-constitutional majority," he reiterated, was not an idle threat.

He would not have Southerners "swell the torrent of sectionalism." Rather, he would have them adhere to their "resolution that 'the Federal Union must be preserved,' by a faithful compliance with all the requirements of the Constitution," and say, "in a spirit of fraternal warning" to their Northern opponents that "when a long train of abuses and usurpations, by a dominant sectional majority, pursuing, invariably, the same object, evinces a design to reduce [the South] under absolute despotism, it is their duty to throw off such government, and to provide new grounds for their future security." Still, having faith in the "practicability of a Federative Government," and in the capacity of the people to rescue the country from "its present perils," he declared that "Moderation, mutual toleration among friends on subordinate questions, firmness and fidelity in the maintenance of great essential principles and an unshaken trust in the intelligence, integrity, and patriotism of the people" would win another victory for "constitutional conservatism."

Senator Nicholson declared that the people of his state neither sympathized nor held counsel with disunionists of either North or South. They had equally little tolerance for submissionists from either North or South. Their sympathies were with those who love the Union under "a Constitution faithfully construed and administered,"

but who will "resist aggressions and usurptions inconsistent with a faithfully administered Constitution, even to the disruption of the ties that bind us in common federation."¹³⁸

Political rivalry and discussions concerning the nature of the Union made the decade of the fifties a time of intermittently intense political excitement in Tennessee. Although the Whigs won the first gubernatorial contest of the period and although they carried the state for Scott in the party's last national contest, their party as such disappeared after its unsuccessful gubernatorial contest of 1853. The Know Nothing, or American, party rose upon the ruins of the old Whig organization, but it met quick defeat at the hands of the Democrats' plebeian governor, Andrew Johnson, who had become the leading figure in the party in the state. During the last years of the decade the Democratic party, although dominant in the affairs of the state, found itself still compelled to take into consideration the opinions of a comparatively strong Opposition party.

Throughout this entire period, most Tennesseans of all political beliefs evinced feelings of strong attachment for the Union. They held various opinions concerning the relationship existing between the several states and the Union, however, and they were not agreed as to the best method for settling the increasingly bitter dispute between the North and South. The vast majority of them had proven themselves glad to accept any compromise which they thought tended to decrease and perhaps eventually to eliminate animosities which the dispute concerning slavery had aroused. Nevertheless, by 1860, the bulk of the people of Tennessee, genuinely alarmed by John Brown's raid at Harper's Ferry, felt that the Union was definitely in jeopardy.

CHAPTER IV

The Presidential Election of 1860

The people of Tennessee realized that national affairs had reached a critical stage by 1860. Moreover, they were well aware that the Presidential election of that year, coming as it did upon the heels of the John Brown incident, was fraught with momentous possibilities for evil. Many believed that it would be "a war between Nationalism and Sectionalism—between constitutional liberty and higher-lawism—between the questions of public peace and all the dangers of a threatened revolution."¹ Since a preponderant majority of the citizens of Tennessee held conservative views on the slavery issue and were thoroughly devoted to the Union, they were hopeful that nothing would occur to place the institution of slavery in real or fancied jeopardy and thereby endanger the existence of the Union. Their immediate objective was to help secure the election of a President in whom the people of all sections would have confidence. They had the feeling that such a chief executive would be in position to lead in an attempt to bring about the amicable settlement of the sectional controversy then shaking the Union to its very foundation. The reasons which caused a difference of opinion among the electorate as to the man most capable of achieving that end had their roots in the past and bore witness to the complexity of the situation confronting the voter not only in Tennessee, but also in the country at large in 1860.

Tennesseans had been speculating concerning the election of 1860 ever since the exciting Presidential race of 1856.² It was not until 1859, however, that the campaign actually began in the state. There was some talk about the matter of Presidential candidates in the state elections of that year. This discussion consisted in the main of charges by the Democrats that the Opposition was planning to unite with the Republican party and attempts by the Opposition to maneuver the

Democratic party into committing itself definitely for or against the candidacy of Stephen A. Douglas.³ Very soon after the gubernatorial election a great portion of the press turned its attention in earnest to the preconvention phase of the Presidential contest of the coming year.

On October 4, 1859, the *Nashville Union and American* quoted a dispatch from the *Columbia Herald*, calling attention to a recent issue of the *Memphis Avalanche* which contained a resume of the political career of Isham G. Harris and a suggestion that his name might well be on the Democratic Presidential ticket. In case the South named the nominee, the *Union and American* hardly knew which would be preferable, Harris or General Joe Lane, but it heartily approved of either. In a subsequent issue, the same paper published a communication from a Shelby County correspondent who suggested the names of Daniel S. Dickinson of New York and Isham G. Harris of Tennessee for the Presidency and vice-presidency respectively. It endorsed the idea enthusiastically and stated that it made little difference which of the two men received first place on the ticket.⁴

There were also those who favored the selection of Andrew Johnson as the Democratic Presidential nominee in 1860. In their opinion, he had "all the elements suitable for the position, the times, and the necessities of the country, and his nomination would infuse into the party a confidence of success that would ensure success." In addition, the *Lincoln Journal*, mindful of the way by which Johnson had secured and retained the leadership of the party in the state, called upon those who favored him "to urge his nomination from this time until the meeting of the Convention—to speak out in their conversations, in primary meetings and through the press."⁵

At the same time that the Democratic papers were promoting the candidacies of Harris and Johnson as Tennessee's favorite sons, a very large portion of the Opposition press was pointing to John Bell as the logical man in their ranks for the Presidential nomination.⁶ The *Nashville Patriot*, among others, had already begun carrying his name at the head of its columns as its candidate for the Presidency by the autumn of 1859.⁷

Meanwhile, the *Republican Banner*, the leading Opposition paper in the state, was continuing the unsuccessful attempt to create dissension among the Democrats by provoking a discussion concerning the candidacy of Stephen A. Douglas. It declared that it had heard that certain Democrats were turning to Douglas because of their belief that he was the only available Democrat who could win support in

all sections. Its contemporary, the *Union and American*, the leading Democratic organ of the state and the mouthpiece of the state administration, said the *Republican Banner*, was in a position to confirm or deny this rumor and so to bring to an end the speculation about it.⁸

By late autumn, however, some Democratic papers claimed that they had become aware that their opponents were engaging in an attempt to form a new party. The *Union and American* called attention to the fact that,

The Murfreesboro *News*, which always talks to the point, truthfully says that papers in Tennessee that only a few weeks ago published articles in favor of a speedy union between the American and Republican parties on terms alike honorable to both, are now as silent as the grave on the subject of the union. They are now in favor of a new party, a third party, though there is no room for one, nor any necessity for such a thing.

The Opposition press had constantly to defend their party from charges of working with the Republican party during the autumn of 1859. In an editorial concerning the organization of the House of Representatives for the session of 1859-60, the *Union and American* expressed the fear that the Southern Opposition, which held the balance of power in the House, would co-operate with the Republicans to elect a Republican to the speakership. It declared that,

It has been manifest for many months that the leaders of the Southern Opposition were preparing to sell out their party to the Abolitionists. We have taken some pains to lay before our readers the evidence of a plot between the political managers of both sections of the Opposition by which the Black Republicans are to obtain control of this government.⁹

The Nashville *Union and American* attributed this allegedly sudden and remarkable change in the Opposition press to the powerful force of public sentiment against "Black Republican excesses."¹⁰

Shortly thereafter, the *Union and American* pointed out in an editorial that the responsibility which would rest on the National Democratic Convention of 1860 was much greater than any which had ever before rested upon a similar body. It declared that it was imperative that the Democrats of the state select proper men to represent them

in their state convention because of the fact that its action would bind the Democracy of the state. It made no recommendation, however, as to the Presidential candidate to whom the convention should give its support. It said that,

It matters little who the nominee of the Democracy at Charleston may be, so that he is an able, faithful, representative man, standing upon the great principles of the party and ready to carry them forward. . . . A few individuals may be concerning themselves about special favorites; but the great mass of people want a true and able representative, and not a mere man, the champion of private interests and individual ends.¹¹

The Opposition party formally inaugurated the Presidential campaign of 1860 in Tennessee. The Opposition members of the state legislature met on the evening of January 11, 1860, to prepare for the coming election. This group unanimously resolved: that the Opposition party in Tennessee approved of, and would participate in, the proposed National Union Convention; that it was the duty of the Opposition in Tennessee to unite with citizens in all sections to oppose the Democratic administration then in power and to select some man for the Presidency who was loyal to the Union and the Constitution and who would crush out sectionalism; that the Opposition party in Tennessee insisted on the Constitutional protection of slavery, but deprecated the constant agitation of the question; that the Opposition party in Tennessee hailed the Northern Union meeting with pleasure and would reciprocate; and that the Opposition party in Tennessee nominated John Bell for the Presidency. It called a Union State convention to meet at Nashville on February 22.¹²

Early in January the Democrats of Jefferson County held a meeting at Dandridge in which they passed numerous resolutions indicative of their attitude toward the existing political situation. They reaffirmed the national doctrines of the Cincinnati platform and endorsed the Buchanan administration. They expressed reverence for the Union as a "confederation of equal states" and affirmed their belief that the Constitution afforded sufficient protection for "all" rights and property. They approved the Northern Democrats' condemnation of Brown's treason and Helper's "infamous pamphlet." They commended President Buchanan's and Governor Wise's prompt punishment of Brown. Finally, they declared,

That the National Democracy is the only organized party that can, consistently with its essential principles, administer the general government on the principles of the Constitution and secure the blessings of the Union to ourselves and our posterity, and therefore esteeming *principles* of far more importance than *men* and having full confidence in the wisdom and integrity of those who will compose the National Convention, which is to meet at the city of Charleston on 23d April next to select candidates for President and Vice President, we will support the nominees of that Convention upon a sound National platform.¹³

In the same issue which contained the account of the Dandridge meeting, the *Democrat* carried an editorial, entitled "Democracy Offered for Sale," in which the writer severely criticized the state senate for having passed a resolution advising the state's Democratic representatives in Congress to unite with the Southern Opposition to elect one of their number speaker of the house. He declared that the resolution, regardless of the motives back of it, was "a surrender of our whole armament and of the Constitution to an insignificant faction which will end in shame, mortification and disgrace of over three millions of freemen." He asserted that the Democrats of the State would not submit to such abandonment of principle. Said he,

The idea of the whole national democracy abandoning their principles—the principles of Jefferson, Jackson, Polk, Pierce, and Buchanan—for the Fillmorites, whose leader has recently gone over to the Black Republicans, and who themselves would have been ere this, but for the recent foray at Harper's Ferry, is *rich*, racy and delectable. . . . Spirits of Jefferson and Jackson forbid the damnable and unholy alliance! This little corporal's guard of Know Nothings that pout about in the corners of the capitol at Washington, with their fingers in their mouths, like spoiled children, should be lashed into obedience, . . . until they were made to know and take their places.

We are glad to know that the House put those resolutions where they ought to be, not on the table, but under it—there let them sleep until Gabriel sounds the funeral of time. . . . The indignation of the Democracy of the State at the humiliating insult of

being sold to their old enemy, whom they have nearly entirely vanquished, who had abandoned entrenchment after entrenchment until they had become a wandering faction without purpose or position—could scarcely have found vent, had both Houses passed both those resolutions.

While the great body of the Democratic party did not express themselves in the extremely partisan manner of the writer of this editorial, they did maintain that the Democratic party, because of its national character, was the only one which could save the country from disunion.

The Democratic state convention met in Nashville on January 17. The fact that the group was larger than usual apparently indicated that in the opinion of many the issue before the country was that "nationalism under a Democratic, or sectionalism under an Abolition Administration must rule." Former Congressman George W. Jones, a personal and political friend of Senator Andrew Johnson, was the presiding officer of the convention. The body rejected the "platform of principles" which Honorable Cave Johnson reported on behalf of the committee on resolutions. After some discussion, it recommitted these resolutions together with some suggested amendments.¹⁴ Later the convention adopted the amended platform which read as follows:

Be it Resolved, That we hereby reaffirm the principles announced in the Platform of the Democratic party, adopted in Convention at Cincinnati, in June, 1856, and that we hold them to be a true exposition of our doctrines on the subjects embraced.

Resolved, That the views expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the decision of the case of Dred Scott, are, in our opinion, a true and clear exposition of the powers reposed in Congress upon the subject of the Territories of the United States, and the rights guaranteed to the residents in the Territories.

Resolved, That the States of the Confederacy are equals in political rights; each to have or not to have slavery, is one of the prerogatives of self-government—the States did not surrender this right in the Federal Constitution, and Tennessee will not now do so.

Resolved, That the Federal Government has no power to interfere with slavery in the States, nor to introduce or exclude it from the Territories, and no duty to perform in relation thereto, but to

protect the rights of the owner from wrong and to restore fugitives from labor; these duties it cannot withhold without a violation of the Constitution.

Resolved, That the organization of the Republican party upon strictly *sectional* principles, and its hostility to the institution of slavery, which is recognized by the Constitution, and which is inseparably connected with the social and industrial pursuits of the Southern States of the Confederacy, is war upon the principles of the Constitution and upon the rights of the States.

Resolved, That the late treasonable invasion of Virginia by an organized band of Republicans, was the necessary result of the doctrines, teachings and principles of that party; was the beginning of the "irrepressible conflict" of Mr. Seward; was a blow aimed at the institution of slavery by an effort to excite a servile insurrection; was war upon the South, and as such it is the duty of the South to prepare to maintain its rights under the Constitution.

Resolved, That if this war upon the Constitutional rights of the South is persisted in it must soon cease to be a war of words. If the Republican party would prevent a *conflict* of arms, let them stand by the Constitution and fulfill its obligations—we ask nothing more, we will submit to nothing less.¹⁵

This platform was apparently successful in composing the differences between the Johnson and Douglas¹⁶ factions in the convention.

The convention passed resolutions complimentary to both Senator Andrew Johnson and Governor Isham G. Harris. It named Johnson as its candidate for the Presidential nomination.¹⁷ It went on record as having full confidence in its delegates¹⁸ to the Charleston Convention and pledged support to the Charleston nominee.¹⁹

The Nashville *Union and American*, which expressed approval of the proceedings of the Democratic state convention, declared that, "In point of numbers, general intelligence, an anxious concern for the result of its deliberations, zeal and enthusiasms, it surpassed any similar convention that has ever assembled in our State." Democratic representatives "from the workshop" were aware of the crisis and were animated with a patriotism which inspired us with "increased confidence that the great Democratic brotherhood of the Union, standing upon the Constitution, would prove equal to any emergency, however difficult and dangerous it may seem." Ordinarily, it continued,

a reaffirmation of the principles of earlier state and national conventions would have been sufficient:

...but in an emergency like the present, involving the Constitution and the Union, . . . the position of the Democratic party had to be taken with boldness, and declared in terms not equivocal, concerning which there could be no disputes or reasonable ground for misunderstanding hereafter. Hence, when the Committee on Resolutions, re-endorsing the platform adopted at Cincinnati in 1856, coupled with the Dred Scott decision, touching rights of slavery in the common territory, notwithstanding the high character and influence of the intelligent gentlemen composing the committee, the Convention was unwilling to receive their report; and manifesting their objections by a vote almost unanimous referred it back to them with virtual instructions that it should be so amended not only to endorse the decision of the court, but to repudiate the attempted misconstruction which our sectional enemies are seeking to give it, prejudicial to the institution of slavery and the rights of Southern States.

After the committee had carried out these instructions, it concluded, the convention then approved their work.

The convention's choice of delegates to the Charleston Convention met with the wholehearted approval of the *Union and American*. It asserted, "The sterling integrity of the gentlemen composing our delegation gives assurance that the known sentiment of the Democracy of Tennessee will be respected and correctly represented in the Democratic National Convention."

The *Union and American* emphasized the fact that the convention received the resolution complimentary to Andrew Johnson, which the committee on resolutions had reported separately and independently of the platform of principles, with vociferous applause. It observed, "The devotion of the Democratic masses in Tennessee to this unflinching champion of their rights, amounts almost to idolatry." If Johnson should be nominated, he would be elected, it declared.

The *Union and American* also called attention to the resolution complimentary to Governor Isham G. Harris which received the "most cordial endorsement" of the convention. "Like Governor Johnson, he is a self-made man and his heart throbs in unison with the hearts of the people," it said. If the Democrats selected a Northern man as

their candidate for the Presidency, Harris was a possible candidate for the vice-presidency.²⁰

The independent *Daily News*, Nashville, did not consider the position of the Democratic state convention as bold and straightforward as the *Union and American* had said it was. According to its point of view, the convention did not take "unequivocal" ground on the slavery issue. It refused to endorse the Douglas squatter-sovereignty doctrine "for years past held and denounced by nineteen-twentieths of the Southern Democrats as 'more fatal to the rights of the South' than the Wilmot Proviso." It also declined to give approval to the Buchanan or Southern Democratic interpretation of Congress' duty to protect slave property in the territories as the Dred Scott decision set it forth. Furthermore, calling the Dred Scott decision a "clear exposition" of Congress' power over slavery in the territories was absurd, when prominent members of the Convention itself differed radically as to what this exposition was. Although there were majority and minority reports on the resolutions, the platform ultimately proved to be generally satisfactory to all groups in the Convention because it was somewhat in the nature of a compromise and apparently lent itself to varied interpretations.²¹

The Opposition papers asserted that there was a decided lack of harmony in the proceedings of the convention. The *Patriot* exulted that there were "Troubles in Council!! Stormy Proceedings."²² The *Clarksville Chronicle* declared that the convention came very near splitting over the question of protection to slavery in the territories. Old members, "grown gray bartering Southern rights for Northern aid," did not want it mentioned because of their desire to placate the North, but the younger ones insisted on discussing it.²³

During the latter part of January, in accordance with its acceptance of an invitation from the citizens of Louisville to join the legislature of Kentucky in a joint celebration in honor of the completion of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, the legislature of Tennessee made a trip to Louisville. While the party at Louisville was still in progress, the legislatures of Kentucky and Tennessee accepted the invitation of the legislature of Ohio to proceed to Columbus for a visit with it. Throughout the period of festivities by the three legislatures, there was much talk about the community of interest among the three states and about their common devotion to the Union. While the people of Tennessee apparently did not attach much weight to the expedition of the legislature, they were hopeful that it would promote the growth

of sentiment in favor of the maintenance of the Union.²⁴ Some were of the opinion that the legislature had simply gone on "a pleasure excursion," or in "more vulgar parlance a 'regular tare.'" Most undoubtedly felt that "mere eulogies to the Union without reference to the dangers that environ it or the means of its rescue" would do very little good.²⁵

Meanwhile, as the time for the Opposition state convention drew near, the old-line Whig papers rallied enthusiastically to Bell's cause. The *Clarksville Chronicle* said that "with John Bell as President, wisdom will guide the councils of the nation; integrity enforce the laws, patriotism stimulate obedience to the laws, and nationality stamp the seal of unity upon the entire Confederacy."²⁶ The *Maury Press* declared that Bell, who had "never been a trimmer or time-server," was the "most available man . . . in the ranks of the Opposition; and that with him as their Union candidate for the Presidency, the conservative element of the country will triumph over the wild reckless spirit of agitation and revolution, now existing both North and South."²⁷ Just a week later, it carried an account of the meeting of the Maury County Union Convention which had adopted the following preamble and resolutions:

We, the people of Maury County here assembled, solemnly believe that the public welfare, and safety of our republican institutions imperatively demand the repression of that spirit of discord and sectional controversy which has so long distracted the country, and which now threatens the disruption of the bonds of the Federal Union. . . .

Resolved, That, the unanimous presentation of our distinguished fellow citizen, John Bell, by the Opposition members of the Legislature, for the support of patriotic, Union-Loving and Law Abiding citizens of all sections, for the Presidency meets with our hearty concurrence.

Resolved, That we regard the preservation of the Federal Union as the paramount consideration with patriotic men of all sections of the Confederacy, and esteem it as the palladium and safeguard of the interest of the whole country, and above all price, and that we cherish an immovable attachment to it and are resolved to maintain it.²⁸

The Opposition State Convention met in Nashville as predeter-

mined on February 22 and seemed to catch patriotic inspiration from the fact of its meeting on the birthday of the first President of the United States. It enthusiastically endorsed John Bell as its candidate for the Presidency and selected delegates²⁹ to the national convention of the Union party.³⁰ It declared itself to be "unalterably opposed to all sectionalism whether it comes from Republicans of the North or the Democrats of the South," and to "know no duty and have no higher obligation than to preserve the Union against the assaults of both, and the purity of their government from the attacks of the latter."³¹

In his speech accepting the Opposition state convention's recommendation for his nomination as the Presidential candidate of the Union party, John Bell refused to discuss issues. He stressed the preservation of the Union. "To save the Union under the present circumstances—to prevent civil war—to prevent the crumbling of the most glorious edifice of political liberty ever erected in tide of time" should be the aim of any President, he declared.³²

According to the Opposition press and leaders, the Opposition state convention was highly successful both because of the members present and the remarkable unanimity which prevailed. *The Gazette of Chattanooga* interpreted the large attendance and harmonious proceedings to mean that the people were determined that the "*Union shall be preserved.*"³³ Balie Peyton of Gallatin, an outstanding figure in the Opposition party in the state, wrote Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, one of the organizers of the Constitutional Union Party, that,

Our Convention was one of the largest and most enthusiastic that ever convened in this State: and was marked by the most perfect unanimity of sentiment. Nothing could have been more satisfactory and encouraging.³⁴

The Democratic press was neither as hopeful nor as happy concerning the outlook for the Union party then in process of organization as was the Opposition. Certainly the *Nashville Union and American* did not share the optimistic views which the leaders of the Opposition entertained concerning "The inauguration of the 'New' Party." With regard to the Tennessee state Opposition convention, it merely mentioned the fact that there had been no great outpouring of people at the convention of its Know Nothing, or American, Whig and Opposition "friends" the previous day and asserted that those present had come mainly from Davidson County and adjoining areas. It gave no account

of the proceedings of the body.³⁵ The *Lincoln Journal*, which observed that Tennessee and Kentucky had been the first to take action in the formation of the new party, doubted whether enough states would join in the movement to justify a national convention. "There can be no question," it continued, "that the contest is between Abolitionists and Democrats and that all efforts to rally a third party must be vain and fruitless, yet men persevere in their efforts to maintain a dissolving organization with an adherence worthy of a better cause."³⁶

Meanwhile, on February 28, Governor Harris transmitted to the legislature the "Resolutions in Relation to Federal Affairs" which the legislature of South Carolina had passed in December, 1859, and which Governor Gist had subsequently sent to the governors of the slaveholding states together with the "Resolutions upon Federal Relations" which the legislature of Mississippi had passed upon the receipt of those of South Carolina. South Carolina proposed, in view of the fact that "assaults upon the institution of slavery, and upon the rights and equality of the Southern States have unceasingly continued, with increasing violence, and in new and more alarming forms," that the slaveholding states should immediately meet to "concert measures for united action." Mississippi declared that the election of a President by a sectional party bent on the destruction of slavery would justify the Southern states in taking counsel for protection and safety. Therefore, in order to be prepared in the event of such a contingency, it accepted South Carolina's proposal and suggested that the convention meet on the first Monday in June, 1860, at Atlanta.

Although Governor Harris believed that he should transmit the resolutions of South Carolina and Mississippi to the legislature, he declared in the message which he sent with them that he did not concur in their recommendations, "not seeing the necessity or propriety of a convention of the slaveholding States of the Union at this time." He expressed the belief that the people of Tennessee were

...loyal to the Constitution in all its parts, and with each and all of its guarantees, possessing a jealous regard for the rights of the States; and feeling justly apprehensive of encroachments upon them, they would feel and demonstrate, when necessary, their identity with their sister States, in resisting any unjust and unconstitutional warfare upon them or their institutions.

He thought that,

...before widening the breach in the manner designated in the resolutions herewith submitted, our policy should be to exhaust every means consistent with honor and the Constitution in an earnest effort to check the tide of aggression, and restore the era of good feeling and fraternity throughout the whole country.³⁷

The legislature expressed its reaction to the resolutions of South Carolina and Mississippi in the "Joint Resolution on States' Rights Resolutions," which it passed on March 23. It resolved,

That the General Assembly of Tennessee, recognizing in our present relations with the non-slaveholding states, an imperative necessity for decisive measures, does not yet distrust the capacity of the Southern States, by a wise and firm exercise of their reserved powers to protect the rights and liberties of the people, and to preserve the Union. For this purpose we earnestly desire the concerted action of the Southern States, but the General Assembly respectfully submit for the consideration of South Carolina and her sister States of the South, that the most efficient policy for preserving our liberties and the Union, will be found in such direct legislative action upon the part of the Southern States as may be necessary; and by offering united opposition at all times to the sectional Black Republican party, and that such a line of policy is more likely to obtain the great end in view, than the agency of an assemblage which can exercise no power except to debate and devise.

It declared, therefore, that it was inexpedient in its opinion to appoint delegates to the conference proposed by South Carolina and favored by Mississippi. It requested the governor to communicate this expression of its sentiments to the "Governor of the State of South Carolina, and to the Governors of the other slaveholding states."³⁸

Long before Tennessee's Democratic delegation set out for Charleston, the Opposition press in the state was predicting an "irrepressible conflict" in the convention between the Northern and Southern Democrats on the question of the status of slave property in the territories. One paper had called attention earlier to the fact that the Alabama delegation already had instructions to withdraw unless the platform incorporated the Southern position.³⁹ On March 31, Brownlow published an editorial in which he stated that he had noticed

... great change in the tone and sentiments of most of our Democratic exchanges, as it regards the nomination of Douglas for the Presidency. Some excuse his Squatter Sovereignty; others assert that he is slandered and not understood; and others say that he is the best man the South can run, and the only man they can run with success!

Now the truth is we have never doubted that Douglas would get the Charleston nomination. We now believe that he will have no competition for the nomination, and that he will be the only man whose name will be brought before that body. Should, therefore, the race narrow down to him and the nominee of the Chicago convention, we will not support either.⁴⁰

At any rate, when the Democratic delegates arrived at Charleston, they found that everyone was very definitely for or against Douglas. On the day preceding the opening of the Convention, observers did not expect Tennessee to withdraw in the event of Douglas' nomination.⁴¹

In view of the fact that Tennessee's delegation was not finally committed to any particular candidate and that it had a compromise platform which its state convention had adopted as being acceptable to all factions in the state, it was in a strategic position to assume the role of mediator at Charleston. This it did. From the very beginning of the controversy over the platform, it sought to reconcile the divergent interpretations which the North and South placed upon the Cincinnati platform.⁴² On the fourth day of the Convention, Wall of Tennessee offered the resolutions which the Tennessee state Democratic convention had adopted as a compromise platform for the Charleston convention.⁴³ As the breach between the North and South kept widening, the Tennessee delegation continued its attempt to harmonize their conflicting points of view. Howard of Tennessee offered, on the part of the border slave states, Kentucky and Tennessee, the following resolution upon which it seemed possible that the North and South might unite:

Resolved, That all the citizens of the United States have an equal right to settle, with their property, in the Territories of the United States, and that, under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, which we recognize as a correct exposition of the

Constitution of the United States, neither rights of person nor property can be destroyed or impaired by Congressional or territorial legislation.

In effect, this resolution apparently constituted the ultimatum of the South.⁴⁴

After the seceders had withdrawn from the Convention, Howard moved that "two-thirds (202) of a full Convention (303) be required to nominate." The Convention adopted this resolution by a vote of 141 to 112. The Tennessee delegation cast one vote against it.⁴⁵

When the balloting for the Presidential nominee began, Tennessee cast its vote for its "favorite son," Andrew Johnson. On the thirty-seventh ballot it transferred its vote to James Guthrie, whom it supported during the remainder of the Convention.⁴⁶ The fact that Senators Johnson and Nicholson, and Representatives Wright and Avery of Tennessee recommended acquiescence in the nomination at Charleston gave Samuel Milligan, a close personal and political friend of Johnson, W. C. Whitthorne, Speaker of the State House of Representatives, and Andrew Ewing, a former Democratic Congressman, the necessary force to "restrain the delegation hotheads, and to prevent Tennessee's joining the Gulf States bolt."⁴⁷

After all efforts in the interest of harmonious and united action had proven futile, the Convention broke up in what Parson Brownlow called a "general row."⁴⁸ The outlook for a reunion of the divergent wings of the Democratic party was indeed gloomy. The delegates from Tennessee, as a matter of course, therefore, returned home in a distressed frame of mind concerning the future of their party as an effective national organization.

An Opposition paper in Tennessee commented as follows upon the situation:

The Democracy in Charleston, at the same time they have proved the unsoundness of their Northern wing upon the question of slavery, have proven that the intemperate zeal and hotheaded spirit of their Southern wing will admit of no other policy than that of dissolving the Union. . . .

The action, then, of the delegates to Charleston has been most disastrous to Democracy. . . .

The burthen of the country now is upon the conservative Opposition. The rights of the South, the preservation of the Union and the enforcement of the laws are laid upon their shoulders. The Democratic party, which under its most favorable circumstances, with a single nominee and platform, could not have been able successfully to resist the election of an ultra-Republican, is now dwindled away, shorn of its strength—its forces scattered, and its power broken.⁴⁹

The Democrats by no means conceded that their power was broken. They did feel, however, that the disruption of the Charleston convention and its failure to select nominees had "thrown the party far out at sea, without chart or compass, and how the voyage is to end the oldest and best-skilled mariner cannot tell." They hoped that the convention which was to meet at Baltimore might be more harmonious than the one at Charleston. The delegates, as a result of their direct contacts with the voters, would have clearer ideas of the wishes of the people than they had had from merely having attended the state convention prior to the meeting at Charleston. Many apparently could not believe that,

...the people of the nation, North or South, are yet willing to sacrifice their interests in the government, upon the isolated question of, whether the people of a Territory, while a Territory, may legislate upon the question of slavery, or be required to wait until the formation of their State Constitution, as at most, it resolves into a question of time. . . . And whether done under a Territorial organization or State organization, the same people holding the same opinions and desiring the same ends, the result will necessarily be the same, and, consequently the question should not be permitted for one moment to mar the harmony, much less break up and destroy the government.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, an able delegation represented Tennessee in the Constitutional Union Convention which convened in Baltimore on May 9. Harmony prevailed throughout the sessions of this body. It avoided altogether the direct discussion of the slavery issue, although there were indirect references to it. Neill S. Brown of Tennessee "thanked God that he had at last found a Convention in which the Nigger was

not the sole subject of consideration." The convention made no mention of Americanism, but took the point of view that it was a gathering of a new party. It adopted as its platform, "The Union, the Constitution, and the Enforcement of the Laws."⁵¹

John Bell of Tennessee, Sam Houston of Texas and John J. Crittenden of Kentucky were the leading aspirants for the Presidential nomination of the Constitutional Union Party. Bell received the nomination on the second ballot. Edward Everett of Massachusetts became the Party's candidate for the vice-presidency.⁵²

Gustavus A. Henry of Tennessee, who had recently been to Washington's monument to rekindle the fires of his patriotism, addressed the convention upon its having made Bell's nomination unanimous on the second ballot. Tennessee had presented Bell to the convention, he said, in the belief that he was "sound, constitutional and able, and that the country could not, under any circumstances, do better than to elect him to the Presidential chair." He emphasized the fact that Bell's views were national and not sectional. "You have the guaranty in his past history," he continued, "that the administration of John Bell, should he be elected, will be pure, constitutional, economical, and patriotic." He took the position that the convention consisted of "Union men" who were determined not to sit still and see the "glorious Union dissolved." Henry declared that the Democratic party "was stranded upon the rock of squatter sovereignty" and that the Republican party would "be broken down under the weight of the 'irrepressible conflict,' while the vessel that bears our fortunes shall 'walk upon the waters like a thing of life.'"⁵³

The Opposition party in Tennessee, which had now become a part of the new Constitutional Union Party, heartily approved of the proceedings of the Baltimore Convention. It was jubilant over Bell's nomination. One writer said that,

John Bell has always belonged more to the country at large than to any state or even party. While duly regarding the rights of the section which honored him with her representation, he has shown himself in the course of his life the truest of national men. His comprehensive patriotism embraces the interest of every part of his country.⁵⁴

The Democrats in Tennessee, however, remained skeptical concerning the future success of the Constitutional Union party. Some of them

observed that notwithstanding the fact that the men composing it had "failed to obtain the confidence of the country, under every name and upon every platform heretofore adopted," they were appearing again with a new name but without any declaration of policy. They said that the Bell and Everett ticket was one of which the "very katy-dids may sing: 'No Chance: No Chance!'"⁵⁵

Tennessee, unlike Kentucky and Virginia, had no representatives at the national Republican convention which met in Chicago on May 16. It did not participate, therefore, in the nomination of Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin as that party's candidates for the Presidency and Vice Presidency, respectively. The Republican convention did not choose a national committeeman for Tennessee.⁵⁶ Thus, the Republican party played no active part in the Presidential campaign of 1860 in Tennessee. However, at least one Tennessean, in a letter ordering a copy of "Greeley's Political Textbook for 1860," who said that he was voting for Bell and Everett because of his "location," who disliked the Democratic party, and who was confident of the victory of Lincoln, in whom he saw the "perfection of glorious principles as once inculcated by Clay & other distinguished statesmen and patriots," predicted that by 1864, there would be a "regularly organized Republican party in Tennessee & with some degree of hope for Success."⁵⁷

On June 18, the day on which the Democratic Convention reassembled in Baltimore, Andrew Johnson wrote Samuel Milligan a letter requesting that Tennessee refrain from presenting his name to that body. Johnson expressed his gratitude for the loyalty with which the delegation from Tennessee had supported his candidacy. He withdrew his name as a candidate, however, in order that the state's delegation might be free to act as it thought wise in the critical situation which confronted it. He pointed out the necessity of harmonious and united action incumbent upon everyone "to the end that correct principles may be maintained, the preservation of the only national organization remaining continued, and, above all, that the Union, with its blessings, guarantees and protection of its Constitution, be perpetuated forever."⁵⁸

When the president announced that the convention was in order for the transaction of business, Howard of Tennessee offered a resolution "that the President of this Convention direct the Sergeant-at-Arms to issue tickets of admission to the delegates of the Convention as originally constituted and organized at Charleston." Church of New York offered a resolution as an amendment to Howard's which pro-

vided for the referring of the credentials of all persons claiming seats in the convention to the committee on credentials, and directed this committee to report the names of those entitled to seats with the understanding that those accepting seats bound themselves in honor to abide by the convention's actions and support its nominees. After there had been some debate on this proposition, Church proposed to withdraw the latter part of his resolution and thus leave only the simple reference to the committee on credentials. The convention accepted this compromise proposal.⁵⁹

W. H. Carroll, Tennessee's representative on the committee on credentials, signed the minority report of that body, which recommended in effect the seating of the delegates who had represented their respective states at Charleston in the cases where there were contesting delegations. The move to substitute the minority platform for that of the majority lost by a vote of one hundred and fifty to one hundred and one-half. Tennessee gave ten votes for it and one against it. The delegation did not cast one of its votes.⁶⁰

When this motion failed to carry, Ewing of Tennessee announced that its supporters in his delegation wished to withdraw for consultation. He said:

The delegation from Tennessee have exhibited, so far as they knew how, every disposition to harmonize this Convention. . . . They were the first, when the majority platform was not adopted, to seek for some proposition for compromise. . . . They have a candidate who was dear to them. They cast away his prospect for the sake of harmony. They have yielded all that they can. They have endeavored, with all their power, to accomplish the result they came here for; but they fear that the result is not to be accomplished in a manner that can render a just and proper account to their constituents. We have consulted together, and, after anxious and long deliberation, without knowing exactly what phase this matter might finally present, we have not adopted any decisive rule for our action; but a large majority of our delegates—some twenty to four—have decided that, upon the result now obtained, we shall ask leave of this Convention to retire, that we may consult and announce our final action. We shall take no further part in the deliberations of this Convention, unless our minds should change; and of that I can offer you no reasonable hope.⁶¹

Later in the same session Ewing announced to the president of the convention that nineteen of the twenty members of the Tennessee delegation who had retired to consult had decided to withdraw from the convention. This left five representatives from Tennessee in the convention. One of these, George W. Jones, who was chairman of the state central Democratic committee,⁶² and a lifelong Democrat, had hoped that those who had retired to consult would come back. Watter-son, another one of those who refused to withdraw, had prophesied just prior to the consultation that some "gallant spirits from the land of Jackson" would remain.⁶³

The portion of the Tennessee delegation that remained in the convention cast three votes for Douglas, who subsequently became the Presidential nominee of the Baltimore Convention of the Democratic party.⁶⁴ C. Knox Walker of Memphis became a member of Douglas' national executive committee.⁶⁵

The members of the Tennessee delegation who had withdrawn from the Baltimore Convention, together with those from other states who had done likewise, joined the Charleston seceders at Richmond. Ewing of Tennessee called this group together. It unanimously nominated John C. Breckinridge for the Presidency and Joe Lane of Oregon for the Vice Presidency.⁶⁶

Tennessee's Democratic delegation returned home from Baltimore and Richmond divided and prepared to enlist support in the interest of each of the Democracy's two aspirants to the Presidency. It remained for the election to show how accurately the action of the state's representatives to the Democratic National Convention had reflected the sentiment of the Democratic voters of the State.

The Presidential contest in Tennessee waxed warm from the time when the delegates to their respective national conventions returned home until the casting of the last ballot. The state's own political leaders of both parties campaigned actively. In addition, Stephen A. Douglas and William L. Yancey were among the number of nationally prominent figures who made numerous speeches in the state. The press was, as usual, in the thick of the fight. All of the large Democratic papers, with the notable exception of the powerful *Appeal* of Memphis, which advocated the cause of Douglas and Johnson, and practically all of the small ones as well supported the Breckinridge and Lane ticket.⁶⁷ The former Whig and Opposition papers were united in their enthusiastic efforts on behalf of Bell and Everett.

The chief objective of the supporters of each of the three Presi-

dential aspirants in the state was to convince the voters that their candidate was the only one who could allay the strife between the sections and so guarantee the perpetuity of the Union. The Democrats, as the group in power, of course, had to defend the national administration. Then each of the two wings of the party, both of which campaigned actively in the state, attempted to prove that its candidate had a national rather than a sectional appeal and was therefore the only man in the race who could bring to an end the sectional controversy then raging in the nation. The Constitutional Union party, which included in its ranks all in the state who opposed the Democracy, attacked the administration bitterly, pointed out that the Democratic party, especially since its split, could no longer claim truthfully to be a national party, and declared that its candidate, through his appeal to conservatives everywhere, was the only one of all the Presidential aspirants who, if elected, could preserve the Union. The Republican party, which had no organization in Tennessee, was the object of violent denunciation on the part of both Democratic organizations and the Constitutional Union group.

The regular Democratic organization in Tennessee supported John C. Breckinridge for the Presidency. At a meeting in Nashville on June 30 for the purpose of ratifying the action of the seceding Democratic delegates at Baltimore, Governor Harris said that the Tennessee delegation had "used every means of conciliation, and had offered to make every concession consistent with the maintenance of the Constitution of the United States, and the protection of the rights of the citizens," before it withdrew. He declared that "the purely national principles asserted in the platform, as well as the antecedents of the present position of our candidates" branded the charge that the Breckinridge group was leading a disunion movement "as an unmitigated slander and falsehood."⁶⁸

Harris spoke convincingly and effectively throughout the state in behalf of the Breckinridge ticket. C. H. Mills of Cleveland called the attention of Brownlow to this fact in a letter concerning the rallies of the Breckinridge and Douglas groups scheduled for August 25 at that place. He wrote:

These calls will draw the respective followers of each faction out in large numbers. We can afford to let the Douglas men take care of their wing as best suits them, but if we had such a man as Honorable T. A. R. Nelson to meet the "Governor" and show

to the Breckinridge followers the distinctive tendencies of that party it would do an immense amount of good.⁶⁹

At about the same time Brownlow (through the columns of his paper) was trying to discredit Harris by charging him with disunion sentiment. Said he,

It is perhaps not generally known that Governor Harris, though not a regular appointed delegate, attended the adjourned Convention of the late Democratic party at Baltimore. We are creditably informed that Governor Harris was very active in advising the delegates from Tennessee as to what course they should pursue, and that he made a speech in that delegation at a caucus at Washington, before the time had arrived for a reassembling of the Convention and before it would have been known what would be the course of the Convention, and that in that speech he counseled the Tennessee delegation, *in advance, to secede*.⁷⁰

Senator Andrew Johnson also campaigned in behalf of Breckinridge and Lane in Tennessee. His efforts, however, were lacking in enthusiasm. While he disliked and distrusted Douglas and therefore refused to support him, he cared little for Breckinridge and still less for the leaders who endorsed him. He supported Breckinridge simply as the candidate who was the more favorable to the Union,⁷¹ or rather as the one whose election was more likely to prevent its dissolution. Although Johnson's support was perfunctory, it won Breckinridge many votes, especially in East Tennessee, where a great part of the Democracy looked to Johnson for guidance. Of course, there were those in East Tennessee, like Dr. J. G. M. Ramsey, the president of the Breckinridge and Lane Club in Knoxville,⁷² who felt that their interests were identical with those of the lower South and supported Breckinridge because they believed that he represented them.

Meanwhile, the supporters of Douglas insisted that they were the regular Democrats since they "clung to the old organization to the last" and therefore retained "whatever there is of nationality left." They were especially bitter toward those in control of the *Union and American*, the chief organ of the Breckinridge group in the state, and toward Governor Harris. They disliked intensely the "authoritative tone assumed by the *Union and American*," and the "summary manner" in

which it "proceeds to undemocrat every man who refuses to answer its summons." They felt that "if Gov. Harris and other *undelegated* gentlemen had remained at home, there would have been no such a *Tennessee stampede*, from the Baltimore Convention."⁷³

The supporters of Douglas were late in effecting an organization in Tennessee. They held a convention in July, however, and organized themselves for action. They provided for the establishment of the Nashville *Democrat*, a campaign paper, to further the cause of Douglas. The Douglas movement had some strength, especially in West Tennessee, and a few outstanding men elsewhere, William H. Polk and Harvey M. Watterson, for example, were supporting Douglas.⁷⁴

The Memphis *Appeal* made vigorous and effective attempts to advance Douglas' cause in Tennessee. It affirmed its belief that every Tennessean wanted Lincoln beaten; therefore, it insisted, since Douglas was the only one who could poll enough votes in the North to do it, that Democrats in Tennessee should support the National Democratic party. It attacked the ultra-Southern Memphis *Avalanche* bitterly for having rebuked it for its commendation of a speaker who had praised Douglas. "Our neighbor of the *Avalanche*," it said, "forcibly reminds us of a rattlesnake in August completely blinded by the dog days of disunion, crawling about, crippled and maimed, in the bushes of Breckinridgism, and splenetically shrieking at every *sound* that falls on its sensitive ear." It declared that Andrew Johnson had confused his platform and candidates. He chose the platform and waited, as a good politician would, to see which candidate would be stronger in the state. In announcing that Douglas would speak in Memphis on the night of August 24, the *Appeal* said:

He comes among us as the defender of the South against the foul aspersions of abolition fanatics—he comes as the defender of the Constitution against those who would ruthlessly violate it—he comes as the defender of the Union against the assaults of those who are plotting for its dismemberment. His towering intellect, his acknowledged statesmanship, his political integrity and his Jackson-like intrepidity, all combine to justify the *vox populi* in honoring him as the *Man of the People* who should be called to the helm of State in these "times that try men's souls" by one universal shout of acclamation.

Just a week after Douglas' speech in Memphis, the *Appeal* asserted

that the people should repeat and maintain Jackson's toast, "The Federal Union—it must and shall be preserved."⁷⁵

Apparently all Opposition or Constitutional Union leaders in Tennessee worked unceasingly in the interest of their candidate, John Bell. Some felt that Bell lacked popular appeal. For example, C. F. Trigg of Knoxville had written in 1859 that he regarded Mr. Bell as "a statesman, in fact, but unfitted to make an impression upon the masses. . . . His speeches are adapted to deliberative assemblies, and not to the tastes of the multitude, who always like, in a political sense, to be in a storm." Old-line Whig politicians who recalled the tricks of the Harrison and Taylor campaigns overcame that difficulty, however, by employing every known device for arousing patriotic and popular fervor. For example, *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig* reported that there was a "Terrible and overwhelming Union meeting in Knoxville" in which there were "Ten Thousand Bell Men in Council." It was glorious and successful, "equal in numbers and grandeur to anything we have ever witnessed in Knoxville since 1840." On the morning of the rally, it continued,

The Cleveland Brass Band headed the procession—the mounted men followed—carriages and Buggies came next—the Persimmon tree covered with fruit and a live coon on its limbs attracted great attention. Fine Banners were strung along the entire line, and a "universe of people were in motion. . . ."

At night, the torch-light procession on horseback, the men on foot with transparencies and banners, attracted universal attention and brought into Main Street an overwhelming crowd.⁷⁶

Meanwhile, as early as June the *Maury Press* had declared that the Democratic party no longer remained as one "from which anything can be hoped." It had asserted that,

The Constitutional Union party, with all old names which could excite prejudice, has also buried all platforms, and stands only upon the Union, the Constitution and the Enforcement of the Laws. . . . The grand issue before the country is sectionalism or conservative unionism, we repeat, and the latter can only conquer the former upon the platform on which stand Mr. Bell and Mr. Everett.

It said a few weeks afterward that while the "rabid Democracy of the South are denouncing John Bell as an abolitionist, the Republicans at the North are denouncing him as a pro-slavery advocate." It regarded "such denunciations as *prima facie* evidence that the denounced is right, safe, and will do to trust."⁷⁷

Only a little later, Brownlow declared that it was necessary to keep before the Democracy "The odious doctrine of Squatter Sovereignty, commonly called 'Popular Sovereignty'" which had destroyed their party and to call attention to their consistency on it. He asserted that,

The leaders will deny it as they will deny all they have said and done—they will fly from pillow to post—and with the impudence of *Old Nick*, they stand up and against it:

I wheel about an' turn about
 An' do jist so;
 An' every time I turn about
 I jumps Jim Crow.

He then alleged that "This fellow 'no chance' who damaged Fillmore so much in 1856, is now on the side of Bell and Everett pouring hot shot into Breckinridge and Douglas," and said that many believed that there was "no chance for any candidate for the Presidency against Lincoln, but John Bell." Sectional agitation would continue, he insisted, in the event of the election of either Douglas or Breckinridge,

... but elect Bell, and there is an end to it, and peace is restored and confidence is the order of the day among all parties. Bell's election will produce quiet and prosperity, and an end to this villainous agitation—while it will ensure the Enforcement of the Laws and the preservation of the Union.

In an editorial in the same issue he called attention to the fact that Bell was a statesman with thirty years of experience, that he was Southern by birth, training and interest, "Looking all the while to the honor, interest and welfare of the whole country."⁷⁸

Brownlow exerted himself in an effort to win the votes of the non-slaveholders. In a biased and garbled account, in which he did not propose to report Yancey's speech in Knoxville but only to give accurately the speaker's main points, he stressed the fact that:

He stated white women in the North stand over the wash tub and cook—that white men black boots and drive carriages, and perform all other menial services—while at the South where we were more elevated, we make negroes perform these degrading duties! This was a most unfortunate hit for this latitude. It might do in South Alabama, or the wealthy portions of the Cotton States. But every tenth man he was speaking to did not own a negro; while the wives and daughters of nine-tenths of all who heard him wash, cook and milk cows, without ever suspecting that they were performing menial services! Even our enterprising townsmen, Lackey and Hanks, who drove their carriages out to the Depot, and again to the speaking, never supposed they were less elevated than those who were riding in their carriages. And verily, if this aristocratic Southern party desire no votes from that class who black their own boots, and drive their own carriages and waggons, their share in East Tennessee will be small.⁷⁹

In an editorial entitled "Slave Holders Only to Vote," which he published about a week later, Brownlow touched again on the same subject. He declared that,

Some of our laboring classes think very hard, of Yancey's characterizing both the occupations of white men and women who do so (wash, cook, black boots, and perform similar tasks), as degrading and menial service. . . . True, it was very severe in its bearing upon our own citizens, nine-tenths of whom are degraded, according to Yancey's views of the dignity of labor. But this is really nothing to what awaits us, if a "Southern Confederacy" shall be established. The wealth and aristocracy of the "eight Cotton States" will be represented in that Confederacy and will control it, and the right of voting will be limited to those who own slaves. The Government will be that of a "Slave Oligarchy" and none but the owners of slave property will be allowed to vote. In this way they will get rid of the Irish and German vote, and the native poor of our own country! ⁸⁰

As the time of the election drew nearer the supporters of the various Presidential candidates in Tennessee redoubled their efforts to elect their favorites. All likewise became increasingly concerned about the


fate of the Union in the event of Lincoln's election as the likelihood of his victory became increasingly apparent.

Late in the canvass there was an unsuccessful attempt at a fusion movement between the two wings of the Democratic party in the state. The proposal apparently came from James Britton, Jr., the Douglas elector for the first Congressional District, who, it seems, had failed to consult most of the important leaders of the group supporting Douglas. In substance, the proposal was that the Douglas electors withdraw and unite with the Breckinridge group on condition that the state's vote, in the event of a Democratic victory, should go to Breckinridge if it would elect him and, if not, it was to go to Douglas if it would elect him.⁸¹

The supporters of Breckinridge appeared to be more favorable toward this plan of fusion than did those of Douglas. The *Lincoln Journal* approved of the Nashville *Democrat's* opposition to union on such a basis. For its own part, it could see no possibility of reuniting the two factions of the party because they both still held to the same principles which had caused their original split. The *Appeal* said that the move to unite was a project of the Breckinridge men and refused to have anything to do with it.⁸² According to *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, the Nashville *Democrat* was quite right in spurning the Britton-Johnson proposal to fuse with the Breckinridge leaders and run a joint ticket to defeat Bell, because the Breckinridge faction was not offering to surrender anything connected with the "Bolter's Convention," and "was still avowing opposition to Douglas and his doctrines, only preferring him to Bell or Lincoln."⁸³ On November 1, the Nashville *Union and American* published an editorial declaring that only a united South could beat Lincoln and urged Bell, who, it said, could not win the election, to withdraw and give his support to Breckinridge, who could win it. This proposal apparently received scant notice. Thus, when Tennesseans went to the polls to choose a President they still had the opportunity of voting for either Bell, Breckinridge or Douglas.

Election returns revealed that the voters of Tennessee had made no material change in the political pattern which had existed in the state during the preceding twelve years in Presidential and gubernatorial elections. They gave Bell 69,176 votes, Breckinridge, 64,809 and Douglas, 11,330.⁸⁴ Thus, Bell, who won the state, received only 47.6 per cent of the popular vote, while Breckinridge, the runner-up, received 44.6 per cent, and Douglas, a poor third, received 7.8 per cent.

POLITICAL PATTERN IN PRESIDENTIAL AND GUBERNATORIAL
ELECTIONS, 1847-1860 INCLUSIVE




Bell won six of the eleven counties which had wavered somewhat in their political allegiance during the preceding twelve-year period, three of which were in East Tennessee and three of which were in West Tennessee. Breckinridge gained four of them, two in Middle Tennessee and one each in the other two divisions of the state. Douglas carried one of them, located in West Tennessee. Only four of the counties which had maintained records of party regularity during this length of time changed sides in this election. Bell won three of these, two of which lay in East Tennessee and one of which lay in West Tennessee. Breckinridge gained one, which lay in West Tennessee.⁸⁵

Bell carried East Tennessee by a majority of 1,644, and West Tennessee by a plurality of 6,691. In addition, he polled 28,745 votes, that is, forty-four per cent of the total vote, in Middle Tennessee. He carried Shelby, Davidson and Knox counties, which contained the state's three leading business centers, Memphis, Nashville and Knoxville, respectively. He apparently held the normally Whig-Know-Nothing-American-Opposition areas. Nine of the sixteen counties which Bell won in East Tennessee were in the Knoxville area. Two of the other six formed the northeasternmost tip of the state, and four of them lay in the southern portion of this division. All of these counties were mountainous or hilly for the most part and were the homes of farmers who generally had small landholdings which they themselves, with the aid of their families, tilled as a rule. There were, of course, a small number of slaves in them. With the exception of Wayne, which

was in the southwestern section on the Alabama border, and White, which was in the eastern-central section, the twelve counties which Bell carried in Middle Tennessee were in the northern or central portion of this division. This group included all but two of the important tobacco-producing counties, many of those devoted to the raising of grain and livestock on an extensive scale, and two of those which produced a comparatively large amount of cotton. Slaveholdings in this region were generally medium or small in size. Bell carried eleven of the eighteen counties of West Tennessee. All but one of the largest cotton-producing and slaveholding counties in this division were in this group. They extended across the entire southern border of this section of the state and included also the greater portion of the central part of it.⁸⁶

Breckinridge carried Middle Tennessee by a majority of 3,384. In addition, he polled 18,000 votes, that is, 44.5 per cent of the total, in East Tennessee, and 11,697, that is, 31.1 per cent of the total, in West Tennessee. In the main, therefore, it would seem that he received the normal Democratic vote. Breckinridge won twelve counties in East Tennessee. The fact that the sheer weight of his personal influence caused many to follow where he led apparently enabled Andrew Johnson to carry seven of these for Breckinridge. Six of them, including his home county, Greene, lay in the northeastern portion of this section. The other lay on the western edge of the central part of this division. In general, all of these counties were mountainous or hilly, and their typical agricultural unit was the small farm which the owner and his family tended. There were, however, a few slaves in the area. The other five counties which Breckinridge won were in the southeastern part of this section. The adaptability of their soil to the growth of varied crops, including a limited production of the staples cotton and tobacco naturally allied their interests to those of the South to a certain extent. Johnson's advocacy of Breckinridge's election was also a factor in winning their votes for him. So, in spite of a divergence of economic interests, there was the phenomenon of Breckinridge's having secured the votes of the two different groups of the Democracy in East Tennessee. The twenty-one counties which Breckinridge carried in Middle Tennessee were those lying along the east bank of the Tennessee River, the tier along the southern border of this section of the state, those in the southeastern part of it, two in the northeastern portion of it and one which lay on the northern border in the central portion of it. This group of counties included those in the peanut

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1860



belt, several in which comparatively large-scale farming and livestock-raising prevailed, some in which general farming and livestock-raising on a small scale existed, two which grew large quantities of tobacco, and all except two of those which produced large amounts of cotton. Slaveholdings were, as a rule, small or medium in size. Breckinridge carried six counties in West Tennessee. Three of these, which extended across the entire northern border of the division, were large tobacco-producing counties. Another, Lauderdale, situated on the east bank of the Mississippi about midway between the northern and southern boundaries of the state, produced comparatively large quantities of both cotton and tobacco. In the other two, which lay on the west bank of the Tennessee River, general farming and livestock-raising on a small scale prevailed. Slaveholdings were usually small or medium.⁸⁷

Douglas won only 1,599 votes, that is, 3.7 per cent of the total vote, in East Tennessee, and only 2,183, that is, 3.3 per cent of the total vote, in Middle Tennessee. His appreciable strength in the state, therefore, lay in West Tennessee, where he polled 7,548 votes, that is, twenty per cent of the total vote. He carried one county, Tipton, in this division. He lost Shelby, which cast the largest vote of any county in the state, by only ninety votes, however, and limited Bell's victory in Hardeman County to a plurality. In addition, he displaced Breckinridge as runner-up to Bell in three other counties. It seems that Douglas drew votes from both Bell and Breckinridge in this section.⁸⁸ Four of the six counties in which Douglas polled his greatest vote extended across the whole southern border of this division, and the other two

lay immediately to the north of them. Except for McNairy, this entire group were large cotton-producing and slaveholding counties.⁸⁹ It would seem, therefore, that the *Memphis Appeal's* campaign in behalf of Douglas, whom it had represented as being the only candidate who could unite all sections and so insure the preservation of the Union as it then existed, was responsible in a large measure for the support which he received in West Tennessee, particularly in the area around Memphis.

Although the result of the election in the country at large was extremely displeasing to the people of Tennessee, they accepted it calmly and proposed to abide by it. They were bitterly disappointed over the election to the Presidency of a man who, although relatively unknown to them, had been the candidate of a party whose platform they believed to be at variance with what they regarded as the correct interpretation of the Constitution. They were fearful of what they termed Republican aggressions on their rights. Moreover, they were apprehensive concerning the future of the Union in view of the threats which certain extremist leaders of the lower South had made in the event of Lincoln's election.

The Presidential election of 1860 in Tennessee, of the importance of which the people of the state were well aware, was hard fought. The Democratic party, which had gained in power in the state during the preceding twelve years, found itself challenged by a rejuvenated opposition in the form of the Constitutional Union Party, which was enthusiastically supporting John Bell, a native son, for the Presidency. In addition, after the fiasco at Charleston, of which the subsequent episodes at Baltimore and Richmond were merely the anticlimax, the Democrats found themselves divided, with the regular party organization generally supporting John C. Breckinridge and with a small more or less independent group supporting Stephen A. Douglas. Although there was no Republican organization in the state, the leaders of the Bell, Breckinridge and Douglas forces saw that, because of the split in the Democratic ranks, Lincoln was the man to defeat and each argued that his candidate was the only one who could accomplish the feat. Each of these groups sought to win the conservative vote of the state by insisting that its candidate was the only one whose election could prevent the dissolution of the Union. As the election drew nearer and the probability of Lincoln's victory tended more and more to become a certainty, there was an unsuccessful attempt at a fusion movement in the state. While John Bell failed to win a major-

ity, he carried Tennessee with a plurality of between four and five thousand votes. Although the people of Tennessee greatly deplored the election of Lincoln, they were willing to acquiesce in it, since it was in accordance with Constitutional forms.

CHAPTER V

Conservatism Triumphant, February, 1861

The Presidential election of 1860 failed to alter party lines materially in Tennessee. The political alignment of counties remained largely the same from the gubernatorial election of August, 1847, through the election of Abraham Lincoln in November, 1860. Very few of them, a total of only seven, in fact, had changed their political allegiance in more than two elections during this period. Since they were widely scattered, and were evenly divided between the two parties, their shift apparently was not indicative of any definite political trend. There was, however, a change in the political affiliations of the sections during the period. While East Tennessee and Middle Tennessee maintained their loyalty to the Whig and Democratic parties, respectively, West Tennessee transferred its loyalty from the Whig to the Democratic party in 1856. Nevertheless, although both parties, of course, gained adherents throughout the period, the Democrats gained members more than twice as rapidly as did the Whigs. Notwithstanding the fact that the Democratic party had apparently established its ascendancy in the state, the Whig-Know-Nothing-American-Opposition-Constitutional-Union party continued to be a powerful and ever-present threat, especially in Congressional elections.¹

The election of Lincoln to the Presidency in 1860 set in motion a train of events which eventually broke all party lines in the state and ultimately created a situation in which there were two groups, those who favored joining the Confederate States of America and those who favored adhering to the Union. There were a few radicals who declared in the beginning that the elevation of a candidate to the Presidency by a sectional party hostile to Southern interests was a justifiable cause of secession and urged the taking of immediate steps in that direction. A small body of extreme conservatives apparently enter-

tained no fears concerning Lincoln's attitude toward the South and could not conceive of any action that he might take as furnishing sufficient cause for dissolving the Union. An overwhelming majority of the people of the state, however, although they found Lincoln's victory extremely distasteful, accepted it in a philosophical manner. They proposed quietly to await developments and, as opportunity offered, to try to compromise the dispute between the North and South.² The more skeptical among this number felt confident that Lincoln and his supporters would be guilty of some overt act of aggression which would ultimately force the issue of disunion. The remainder of this group, while it was somewhat apprehensive of danger to Southern rights, maintained an optimistic outlook and counselled a policy of "watchful waiting." Tennesseans, who were centering their attention upon the course of the President-elect rather than upon the efforts of President Buchanan to effect a solution of the national crisis through arbitration,³ were not thinking in terms of war.

With apparently few exceptions, the newspapers of Tennessee, regardless of party allegiance, sought to exercise a restraining influence upon public opinion immediately after the election of 1860. Editorial writers attempted to reason through the situation and to point out the fact that it was to the state's interest to consider carefully its future course and to avoid any rash commitments or acts.

The *Rutherford Telegraph*, which had supported Bell, declared editorially that it was the duty of all, regardless of party affiliation, to acquiesce in the results of the election, and that those who refused to do so on account of Lincoln's "election *per se*" were guilty of disloyalty and treason. Moreover, since the election was "an act of the sovereign people," those who refused to abide by it in effect denied the "sovereignty of the people." The new President, it went on to say, would be powerless to harm the South. His oath would bind him to support the Constitution of the United States, but if he should

...so far forget himself as to infringe upon the Constitutional rights of any section, the people have their Constitutional and legal remedies. . . . The attempt to remedy any evil by dissolving the Union would plunge the country into a scene of carnage and bloodshed, without a possibility of remedying any of the evils which a republican administration can bring upon the country. . . . The Union is of too much value to be lightly trifled away.⁴

The *Maury Press* of Columbia, another paper which had supported Bell, declared in an editorial that the Gulf States were

...proceeding with too precipitate and hasty action to the defense of Southern rights and interests. . . . We are not yet willing to precipitate ourselves into an abyss of ruin without practical overt acts of aggression and wrong. . . . The men who own three-fourths of the slaves of the South must be prudent for their interests. Let us be long-suffering rather than hasty. . . . Our position is, let Lincoln be inaugurated, as he has been elected, under the Constitution. If after his inauguration he tramples upon even the smallest Constitutional right of the South, let us depose him and fight within the Union. In that case we should have Northern aid. . . .

Let us wait for a violation of the Constitutional compact, and if that happens, our action will be justified in the eyes of the world as that of our forefathers was. Let us stand by the Union as long as the Constitution upon which it is based remains intact—then fight in it.⁵

The *Clarksville Chronicle*, also a supporter of Bell, stated that while Lincoln's election was to be "universally deplored, on account of the troubles that may grow out of it," it was "truly gratified" to observe the "temperate tone" of people of both parties. Their sentiments were "moderate and conservative." A week later it recommended what it considered the proper course for the South to follow in the event of certain contingencies. It said:

Should it become manifest that Lincoln's policy tends to aggression, a convention of *all* the slave states should be called, and that convention, without bravado, and in a tone temperate, but firm, should say to the North: "you have the numerical strength, and you have in your hands the reins of the Federal Government; your policy is violative of State equality and aggressive upon Southern rights; and whilst we do not mean to dissolve the Union until forced to do so as a last resort, every consideration of honor, justice, and patriotism compels us to take such steps as are necessary to the peaceable vindication of our rights; therefore we are resolved to withdraw our Representatives from both Houses of

Congress, and take no part, whatever, in the administration of the Federal Government. We are resolved, too, to offer no impediment to the enforcement of the Federal laws, in our midst, including all postal arrangements, and the collection of the revenue; but, in the meantime, all commercial intercourse between us must cease! . . . We will do our own export and import trade, and that in foreign vessels, until we can procure shipping of our own, and every pound of cotton you manufacture, hereafter, must be purchased in foreign ports. And this policy we will firmly adhere to until you give us such guarantees as shall justify us in re-establishing the Federal commercial relations with you that are, this day, suspended.⁶

No one can deny that such a course, as here indicated, would speedily build up an anti-Republican party in the North of such overwhelming strength as to crush the fanatics into passive insignificance, and to give the South the amplest security against all future aggressions; or did it fail to do this, it would at least secure to us the sympathies of mankind and cast upon the North all the odium that must follow the breaking up of such a government. Separate secession holds out no hope of any amicable adjustment of existing difficulties, and disunion, immediate and unconditional, would convert our Northern friends into alien enemies.

In a subsequent issue the *Chronicle* called attention to the fact that although those favoring disunion had said that the Constitution, long regarded as a masterpiece of political wisdom, had failed to give equal protection to the rights of all sections and encouragement to the complicated interests of commerce, manufactures and agriculture, they had not indicated whether this failure was attributable to "inherent defects" in the instrument itself or to "mal-administration." Since they had not planned a new government to take the place of the one which they were proposing to tear down, it asserted, they obviously were unable to show how they would remedy its shortcomings. It then suggested, for example, that there were certain problems whose solution was imperative unless there was to be trouble between the northern and southern states of a Southern Confederacy. The questions about which disputes would undoubtedly arise were slavery, especially the question of reopening the slave trade, and free trade, particularly as it affected the interests of the tobacco producers and as it concerned

the matter of procuring sufficient funds from taxation to pay governmental expenses. It asserted that Tennessee should carefully consider its position in such a government before it seriously entertained the idea of joining it. The disunionists had shown a weakness in not having settled on the form and policy of the government which they proposed to establish, the *Chronicle* concluded, which

...ought to warn the people of the danger of committing themselves, under such guidance, to all the hazards of so momentous an experiment—an experiment which it is freely admitted can not redress a single wrong of which we complain. Disunion will not secure a slave code for the Territories. The rendition of fugitive slaves can no longer be expected when we have not the right to demand it, and so long as the Gulf States look upon the border States as unsound on the slavery question, we can not even hope for a cessation of the slavery agitation. . . . We virtually say to the North, if you will not give us protection in the Territories, take them, we will have nothing to do with them. If you will not restore our fugitive slaves, we will surrender the right to demand them. This is not the way wise men would redress their wrongs. They would make a determined effort to maintain their Constitutional rights, within the Union, and dissolve it only when every legitimate means had been tried in vain.⁷

At about the same time, *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, likewise a supporter of Bell, pointed out that while the South had made progress, it still depended largely on the "mind and labor" of the North for "necessaries." It declared that,

The truth is, we are acting the fool, at the South, and the villainous Abolitionists are playing the same game at the North. We can't do without their productions, and they can't do without our Rice, Sugar, and Cotton. Had we not then better "live and let live"?

We desire, however, not to be misunderstood, in the foregoing remarks. The South holds in her hands a power to control the North mightier than the sword—the power of wealth—the exportable products of domestic industry—the sinews of Northern trade and commerce. We only state a *fact* when we say that the South

has failed to place herself in a position where she could wield her power.

A week later this paper ridiculed the extreme Southern-rights advocates in a "Picture of a horse and rider, A Southern 'Minute Man'" who was saying,

I shall shoot old Abe Lincoln or die in this attempt. He never shall take the Presidential chair. I am a commissioned officer in the Army of the new "Southern Confederacy," and if dangers multiply, I will clap spurs to my steed, and save myself. We who are after offices and wages, brought on the war, but we intend the common people to do the fighting. . . . They shall go on foot, carry their knapsacks and muskets, and fight for eight dollars per month, and live on one ration per day!

Obviously, it also intended this word-portrait to serve as a warning to the non-slaveholding group that it should have nothing to do with what it considered schemes of disunionists. In a subsequent editorial, the *Whig* declared that,

The few Southern states now preparing to go out of the Union will, in all probability go; and owing to Buchanan's utter want of *nerve*, they will be allowed to go out peaceably. The leading spirits in the movement have long contemplated this act of *treason*, and the election of Lincoln affords them, as they think, an excuse for taking their leave of the Confederacy. If it shall appear that a majority of the people in those States are really in earnest—a monstrosity we do not credit—and if after due and becoming consideration, they conclude that it would be better to dissolve their connection with the Union, we hope they may be allowed to go, and that the dissolution may be a peaceable one. A Union of *force* and *compulsion*, is no Union at all, and should be dissolved, and the sooner the better.⁸

The *Lincoln Journal*, a loyal and active supporter of Douglas, was uncertain whether "madness" or conservatism would prevail. It did not feel that Lincoln's election, deplorable though it was, was sufficient cause for disunion, at least while Congress stood opposed to his policy. "But," it observed,

driven into dis-union, confidence destroyed, trade broken down, business abandoned for military parade and preparation, when the country is almost at the point of starvation in consequence of short crops presents a picture that can only be contemplated with horror.⁹

The *Memphis Appeal*, the only powerful paper in the State which had supported Douglas in the Presidential campaign of 1860, declared that it had advocated the policy of maintaining Southern rights and honor in the Union and *not* out of it. The Constitution, it said, could protect the South and remedy all grievances. Furthermore, the election had shown that the conservatives of Tennessee were not in sympathy with the Hotspurs of the South; but if the lower South should secede, Tennessee, Southern in sympathy, interest and susceptibility, would be in no position to wage war on its sister states. The understanding in private political circles, it continued, was that Governor Harris did not regard the triumph of the Black Republican party as a sufficient cause to justify the secession of a state. It proposed, therefore, that the people of Tennessee press a call upon Harris to convene the legislature at some time in the near future for the purpose of taking into consideration the political affairs of the country. This body would tell the states of the lower South that if they would give up secession, Tennessee would unite with them in any "reasonable and Constitutional methods of securing our rights in this government." It believed, as Douglas had pointed out, that the South had more to fear from Southern Senators' leaving their posts than from any aggression by the mere occupancy of the White House by a "Black Republican" President. Such an executive, "tied hand and foot, powerless for good or evil, without the consent and support of his political opponents, should be the object of pity and commiseration, rather than fear and apprehension by a brave and chivalrous people," it concluded.

Two days later the *Appeal* took pleasure in noting that the *Avalanche*, which had supported Breckinridge and had declared as early as 1859 that it was "*ultra*" on the slavery question, and that the South had conceded enough, endorsed its suggestion of a proposed meeting of the legislature. The *Avalanche* did not regard it as a party measure but as an awakening on the part of the state from its political lethargy or "masterly inactivity." Tennessee, the *Appeal* continued, could afford to lead in considering political affairs, for "She will adopt the golden mean between the Scylla of silent submission to further wrong, and

the Charybdis of a too reckless and hasty action in the fearful present."

On November 22, the *Appeal*, however, took issue with a writer in the *Avalanche* signing himself "Common Sense," who had said that taking into consideration the state of political affairs was a matter for a convention, not for the legislature. The *Appeal* replied that the legislatures of other Southern states had been acting and that only the legislature could represent the voice of the sovereign people "*as a State*." To carry authority, it asserted, the matter must originate with the executive and have the endorsement of the legislature. As a matter of course, the legislature was to submit its action to the vote of the people for their approval or disapproval.

A few days later the *Appeal* called the *Memphis Bulletin* behind the times when it recommended a continued policy of "masterly inactivity." Tennessee should not continue to sleep, it said, but should take steps to prevent a catastrophe.¹⁰

The *Union and American*, the most influential paper which had supported Breckinridge, and one which had been insistent in its demands for Southern rights, carried an editorial in which it pointed out that although secession in South Carolina was imminent, Tennessee remained conservative. It said that "She is devoted to the Federal Union. She is no less devoted to her rights. Her attitude should be calm but decided." It was possible that perhaps Tennessee, which opposed the dissolution of the Union and yet would never consent to coercion, might bring about a settlement of the trouble by a policy of friendliness to both sides. The possibility of a peaceful settlement seemed unlikely, however, in view of the lengths to which the North had already gone against the South.¹¹

Meanwhile, on November 25, Neill S. Brown, Andrew Ewing, Leon Trousdale, Allen A. Hall and other prominent members of both the Opposition and Democratic parties had issued the following statement to the people of Tennessee:

In the present dangerous crisis of affairs the undersigned respectfully recommend the assemblage of the people in primary meetings, to request the Governor to call together a Legislature of Tennessee forthwith, with a view to their providing for a State Convention, the object of which shall be to bring about a conference of Southern States to consider existing political troubles, and if possible to compose our sectional strife.

They suggested that Davidson County hold its meeting at the courthouse in Nashville on December 1.¹²

Subsequently, the people in most counties in the state held meetings, supposedly nonpartisan in character, in which they expressed their views on national affairs and generally requested the governor to call the legislature into extra session. Although there was an attempt to create a feeling of unity, there was usually an alignment between unionists and disunionists, with the former in a decided majority.¹³

Pursuant to the call which the bipartisan committee of leading citizens had issued on November 25, a large number of the people of Davidson County met in Nashville on the appointed day. They chose F. K. Zollicoffer as chairman, Dr. W. R. Hurley and F. R. Rains as vice-presidents, and H. K. Walker, Ira P. Jones, Leon Trousdale and T. J. Kelly as secretaries. There was "an entire and most creditable absence of party feeling" and a determination to waive party prejudice in this movement to bring about a conference of the Southern states (apparently similar to the Nashville Convention of 1850) which might offer suggestions for an acceptable compromise between the North and the South. This body passed a resolution unanimously requesting Governor Harris to call together the legislature of Tennessee in order to effect this object.¹⁴

On the same day on which this meeting occurred the *Union and American* published a letter which Judge A. O. W. Totten of Jackson had written to Governor Harris on November 21. In this letter, Totten asserted that Lincoln's election was alarming. The North, he thought, wished to exterminate slavery in the South. In that event, the South would become "The Hayti of the American Union," with the destruction of property, political equality, and social position which such action would cause. The most obvious remedy for this situation was to sever the Union, which "except in form is virtually dissolved already," and form a "Southern Confederacy." Although the "cotton states" were already doing that, he declared that the border slave states were not ready for so ultra and extreme a measure "without one more effort for conciliation and harmony; but failing in that . . . they will no longer hesitate to make common cause with the cotton states to preserve the honor, rights, and independence of the South." He urged, therefore, that the South unite in the "demand of an *amendment* of the Constitution which shall contain a full and perfect *guarantee* of all its rights in respect to slavery and the public territories present and future."¹⁵

On December 1, 1860, W. C. Whitthorne, representative from Maury County and speaker of the state house of representatives, wrote a letter to Senator A. O. P. Nicholson setting forth his opinion on the condition of state and national affairs and giving his conception of the state of public sentiment in Tennessee. He wondered how long the Union would continue. He wished to have a united South "so we may have the Union preserved as the 'land of the free' and the home of equal rights." His inclination was to suggest that "a United South demand an amendment to the Constitution as the only means of preserving the union and securing future peace."

He said that there was soon to be a meeting in Maury County irrespective of party to consider the condition of national affairs. He expected to attend but not to participate because he wished "to keep aloof until our legislature meets, when if possible, I want Tennessee united."

His estimate of public sentiment in the state was that,

- 1st. She is for waiting in the Union.
- 2nd. She will be against Co-ercion.
- 3rd. She will be for a convention or consultation with all the Southern States, and propose either amendments or a united declaration as to future action, somewhat like the Georgia platform.
- 4th. If either before or after this the States South of her go out she will follow suit ultimately. I doubt this if but one or two went.¹⁶

About this time, the *Tri-Weekly Whig* of Knoxville, in its section bearing the heading, "Editor's Correspondence," observed that the disturbed financial condition was growing worse and that there seemed to be no hope for improvement. It added that it was a settled fact that Governor Harris intended to convene an extra session of the legislature, probably about January 7, 1861. This body would discuss political questions first and then take up the consideration of the banks and financial conditions.¹⁷

The *Memphis Appeal* of December 8 announced that Governor Harris, in obedience to what he believed to be the will of the people, would convene the legislature in extra session on Monday, January 7, 1861 in Nashville to consider the present monetary and financial crises and to take necessary steps concerning political affairs in the country. It asserted that since its sister states were planning to have repre-

sentatives in a general conference of the Southern states, Tennessee should plan to give them its advice and counsel. Indeed, the Volunteer state might lead the South or even the entire country profitably.

Several days later the *Chronicle* of Clarksville carried an editorial announcement of Governor Harris' call for the legislature to meet in extra session to consider the state of the Union. In connection therewith, it observed that,

The members not having been elected with any view to such an emergency, they cannot be considered fair exponents of popular sentiment, and, as a whole, we fear it is not just such a body as is capable of grappling successfully, the vital issues to be presented for its consideration.

It also called attention to the fact that many in the North were pointing out that they had voted for Lincoln to defeat the Democratic party and not because of antislavery feeling. "The question then is whether it were better to submit, a while longer, to corrupt rule, or to endanger the Union by a sectional triumph of the North over the South." The *Chronicle* hastened to point out that if those misguided people had supported the Union ticket, Lincoln could not have been elected. "By not adopting this policy," it declared,

they gave to the struggle in the North so decidedly a sectional character that thousands of Bell men in the South alarmed by the signs of the times, and disgusted with what seemed to them, the all-pervading antislavery fanaticism of the North, resolved, unwisely, we think, and without counting the probable cost, went over to the disunion party.

It went on to say,

...now that the mischief is done, we of the South, are asked to discriminate, in our commercial intercourse between the real anti-slavery fanatics and those who acted with them from hostility to Democracy, or devotion to certain State and local interests. Such discrimination is impracticable, because the South cannot know the individuals comprising the one class or the other.¹⁸

The *Lincoln Journal* announced that Governor Harris had called the

legislature together in accordance with the wishes of the people,

... as expressed in the resolutions adopted in their public meetings, and may embrace the financial condition of the country and other subjects as well as the political subjects which now overwhelm the country.

The *Journal* hoped that the people would lay aside party and personal animosities in one more effort to save the country. Although it had previously indicated its desire for the people to vote directly on the issue before the country, which it said was "Union or Disunion," it was "not disposed to offer any factious opposition to the movement" to call the legislature.¹⁹

At this juncture John Bell, the acknowledged leader of the Whig-Opposition-Constitutional-Union party in Tennessee, outlined his views on national affairs in a letter replying to A. Burwell of Mississippi, who had asked him whether or not Lincoln's election offered sufficient ground for secession. The election, he said, was entirely Constitutional in form, and he pointed out that,

The objection to it is that it was effected by a purely sectional party organized upon the principle of hostility to slavery and having for its prime object the repression of slavery, as a permanent administrative policy, with a view to its ultimate extinction. . . . The policy of making the Government an instrumentality for the repression or extinction of slavery as is now attempted by the party in power was never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution. . . . The election of Mr. Lincoln by a sectional party, organized and sustained upon the distinctive principle of opposition to slavery as it exists in the Southern States and avowing the policy of its repression and final extinction (by prohibiting its extension into Territories) was a bold experiment upon the temper and forbearance of the South and upon the strength of their loyalty to the Union.

He stated that the Republican party's continual agitation of the slavery issue was destructive of the "domestic tranquility." Moreover, the "simple announcement to the public that a great party at the North, opposed to slavery, has succeeded in electing its candidate for the Presidency, disguise it as we may," he continued, "is well calculated

to raise expectations among slaves and might lead to servile insurrection in the Southern States."

Bell, after having presented in the "strongest light" the danger to Southern rights and interests caused by Lincoln's election, including both the then existing grievances and future unpleasant possibilities, said that no Southern state had a right to leave the Union. In support of this contention he advanced four reasons. First, Lincoln himself, he affirmed, did not hold extreme views on slavery. In evidence of this fact, Bell asserted that,

It is certain that he has expressed a decided opinion that the South has a constitutional right to demand the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law; and that under certain circumstances he would feel it his duty not to oppose the admission of a new Slave State into the Union.

Second, he did not think that facts warranted the assumption that "Mr. Lincoln has disguised his true sentiments; that his true character has been misunderstood; and that he will be under the control of the worst men of his party." Moreover, he continued, the number of Southern men in Congress made it impossible for him to do any mischief for the first two years of his term anyway. Third, he stated his belief that apprehensions concerning Republican success in the elections of 1862 and their subsequent control of Congress had little foundation in fact, because Lincoln's election was largely attributable to the fact that many considered him the only one able to defeat the keenly disliked Democrats and because popular attachment to the Union was far greater than to antislavery ideas. Finally, he maintained that "all of the existing grievances of which the South may justly complain, can be redressed in the Union."

Bell held that the idea that there was right of secession was absurd. He declared that,

The theory [of secession] appears to me to have been conceived and propagated in a spirit of disaffection to the Union, and answers no other purpose than to lead the unsuspecting and credulous into the support of the scheme of disunion, under the delusive expectation that they would only be thereby exercising a right reserved to them under the Constitution and that they would be in no danger of incurring the penalties of treason, or

of exposing themselves and their country to the calamities of Civil War.

Viewing the subject in every light in which it can be presented, I am constrained to say that by no principle of Public Law, by no code of morals, by no law of Earth or Heaven, would Mississippi or any other state be justified, under existing circumstances, in withdrawing from the Union. I confidently believe that the happiest consequences would result from a conference of all the Southern States. I as confidently believe that a majority of the people of the North are this day prepared to agree to any fair and reasonable plan of adjustment which such a conference of the Southern States would propose. . . . I am resolved to adhere to the Union. I will not say that in *no possible contingency* would I consent to a separation of the States. But I would exhaust every constitutional means for the redress of our grievances before I would think of dissolving the Union.²⁰

About the middle of December, Samuel Milligan, editor of the *Greeneville Spy*, a prominent Democratic leader in East Tennessee, and an intimate friend of Senator Andrew Johnson, wrote a letter to Governor Harris in which he set forth his view of the national situation. He declared that he would like to hear from Harris, and requested a copy of his speech when he made it. He was conscious, he said, of the injuries and insults, some of which were unconstitutional, that the South had received, but he did not believe them to be "sufficient to justify a disruption of the Confederacy." He regarded the remedy as "too extreme for the disease and more likely to kill than to cure the patient."

Fanatics of the North had produced the existing conditions, he said. Since fanaticism was the real trouble, the remedy did not lie in "redress of present grievances, in additional guarantees or in the repeal of the personal-liberty laws," he declared. Time alone could restore confidence and re-establish fraternal feelings between the extremes.

He feared that disunion was inevitable. His plan in the event of that contingency was to establish a "Central Republic." He said,

Let South Carolina and the New England states, if they desire, with other fanatical states as wish, absolve their allegiance to the Confederacy, and form such government as they desire.

But let the border slave states and the middle free states, with such others north and south, as are conservative enough, to carry their people, unite, and form one grand Central Republic on the *old Constitution*, just as it is, with, if need be, additional guarantees, securing slave property, and the rights of the owners in the Territories. And then elect a new President, and go forward with a firm and a just administration.

This plan preserves our ancient and beloved form of government, and in the heart of our great country; sets up an overshadowing power, which if justly administered, will reunite all the rebellious states under the old banner, and the old Constitution.

Our people must be divided into parties, and this plan furnishes the bases of parties in all the seceding States. They will all leave the Confederacy with a nucleus around which a Union party will soon grow into power, and as time wears out the memory of the present grievances in the South, and demonstrates the folly of the North, one by one these rebellious states will naturally fall back, and again take shelter under the ample folds of the glorious old Constitution.

There was nothing in the way of the practicability of this "Central Republic," except the possibility of the opposition of Louisiana which controlled the mouth of the Mississippi River. He thought this unlikely, in view of Louisiana's desire for commercial relations not only with the border states but also with those of the Northwest.²¹

A vociferous minority in East Tennessee was attempting to popularize the cause of secession in that section. The first move which this group made in their effort to enlist East Tennessee in behalf of the lower South was to call a mass meeting in Knoxville in December, 1860 to consider the state of the country. The secessionist group predominated at this meeting, but the Unionists succeeded in deferring the adoption of resolutions until a second meeting of the same convention approximately two weeks later.

Meanwhile, the Unionists called upon the country people, in whom the loyalty to the government was strong, to attend this second meeting of the convention. By this means the Unionists were able to dominate the adjourned session of the group and to secure the adoption of resolutions denouncing secession as "illegal, unconstitutional, and

unjustifiable," and declaring their unqualified attachment to the Union. Although this convention had little effect on the state legislature, it was apparently of incalculable value in holding East Tennessee loyal to the Union. According to Temple,

Other counties followed the lead of Knox and held Union meetings which declared unreservedly for the Union with no "sickly" twaddle about the neutrality of the state in the event of a conflict of arms. . . . They lifted themselves up to the broad consideration of the single, the momentous question of the preservation of the Union on the one side or of its destruction on the other.²²

While the people of Tennessee, themselves, were trying to decide what steps Tennessee should take in the crisis confronting the country, Senator Andrew Johnson set forward his views upon the debated questions of secession and coercion in a speech in the Senate on December 18, which excited much comment not only in his own state but also throughout the entire country. He made this speech upon the occasion of the Senate's taking under consideration in the Committee of the Whole his joint resolution which provided for the popular election of the President, Vice President and United States Senators and the limitation of the tenure of Federal judges. He expressed his belief that, had Congress accepted these amendments when he presented them in the House several years earlier, the country would not have had to face the prospect of revolution as it was then having to do. He next hastened to a discussion of some reasonable effort, "to preserve the Union of these states by a preservation of the Constitution." Johnson felt that the South should not only insist upon the North's compliance with the provisions and guarantees of the Constitution, but that it should also demand additional securities for its Constitutional rights. He declared that his constituents shared his conviction that it should gain these ends, however, not by seceding but by fighting under the Constitution and within the Union. "We are not willing to do an unconstitutional act," said he, "to induce or to coerce others to comply with the Constitution of the United States." He took occasion during the course of his remarks to declare that the border states would not allow either the North or the South to coerce them into any confederacies which they might establish. With reference to the coercive powers of the Federal Government, Johnson said:

I do not believe the Federal Government has the power to coerce a state; for by the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States it is expressly provided that you cannot even put one of the States of this Confederacy before one of the courts of the country as a party. As a State, the Federal Government has no power to coerce it; but it is a member of the compact to which it agreed in common with the other States, and this Government has the right to pass laws, and to enforce those laws upon individuals within the limits of each State. While the one proposition is clear, the other is equally so. This Government can, by the Constitution of the country and by the laws enacted in conformity with the Constitution, operate upon individuals, and has the right and the power, not to coerce a state, but to enforce and execute the law upon individuals within the limits of a State.

I do not think it necessary, in order to preserve this union, or to keep a State within its sphere, that the Congress of the United States should have the power to coerce a State. All that is necessary is for the government to have the power to execute and to carry out all the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, whether they apply to the State or otherwise. This, I think, the Government clearly has the power to do. . . . It is not an invasion of a State for the Federal Government to execute its laws, to take care of its public property, and to enforce the collection of its revenue; but if, in the execution of the laws; if, in the enforcement of the Constitution, it meets with resistance, it is the duty of the Government, and it has the authority, to put down resistance, and effectually to execute the laws as contemplated by the Constitution of the country. . . . But it is declared and assumed, that if a state secedes, she is no longer a member of the Union, and that, therefore, the laws of the Constitution of the United States are no longer operative within her limits, and she is not guilty if she violates them. That is a matter of opinion. I hold that the Constitution of the United States makes no provision, . . . for its own destruction. It makes no provision for breaking up the Government, and no state has the constitutional right to secede and withdraw from the Union. . . . If the States have the right to secede at will and pleasure, for real or imaginary evils or oppressions, I repeat again, the Government is at an end; it is not

stronger than a rope of sand; its own weight will tumble it to pieces, and it cannot exist.²³

Senator Johnson's speech called forth widespread comment in Tennessee. Many of the leaders of the Democratic Party took issue very sharply with Johnson.²⁴ Some of the rank and file of the party apparently shared their sentiments because groups hanged and burned Johnson in effigy in Memphis and Nashville and attempted to do it in Knoxville, "But was deterred from it by the Union men of every party who was armed Capapie."²⁵ Some Democratic leaders, for example, Samuel Milligan of East Tennessee and Harvey M. Watterson and Cave Johnson of Middle Tennessee, commended Johnson for his stand.²⁶ Much of the rank and file of the party approved of Johnson's position under conditions existing at the time when he made it, it seems.²⁷

Johnson's speech found favor with the Opposition party in the state. The "Opposition in both houses [of the state legislature] endorse it. . . ." ²⁸ Even William G. (Parson) Brownlow, the militant editor of *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, and heretofore a bitter enemy of Johnson, advocated Johnson's course and attacked his enemies.²⁹ Many in all sections of the state who had differed with Johnson's political views earlier applauded him at this time.

With relatively few exceptions, the people of Tennessee resented South Carolina's withdrawal from the Union, which occurred on December 20.³⁰ Since they believed that several other states would follow it out of the Union, they felt that it was precipitating a crisis in national affairs. They were convinced that anything which jeopardized the existence of the Union affected adversely the interests of Tennessee.

The *Maury Press*, in commenting upon South Carolina's probable secession on the very day of Johnson's speech, said that South Carolina would take the Gulf states with it and that that would leave the eight border slave states, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, North Carolina and Arkansas, in a hopeless minority in the Union and at the mercy of an administration that was hostile to their interests. These states, the *Press* pointed out, had

always stood between the two sections as a mighty breakwater to sectional feeling and action, allied to the Northern border States by commercial relations, yet having the strongest common inter-

est with the Gulf States in institutions, in social organization and in general fate.

Where, then, should the border slave states go? Extremists in the Gulf states questioned their soundness on the slavery issue. They likewise rejected all overtures for a general Southern convention, "fearing . . . that the conservative influence of the border states in such convention, would by gaining all their demands from the North, thwart their designs of immediate dissolution." The Gulf states, declared the *Press*, had no idea of allowing the border slave states to participate in the organization of the new government, although they would allow them to come in after they themselves had perfected such organization. It stated that free trade, which all of the Gulf states except Louisiana favored, would not be acceptable to Tennessee. In answer to its own query, "What is the duty of Tennessee?" it said:

All the wrongs suffered by Federal and abolition injustice have fallen upon the border states. Their people have held to the Union as the best guarantee of their slave property. They are as chivalrous, as brave, as sensitive, as determined, as the most rabid secessionists of the South. . . . They have lost slave property by the under-ground railroad, and by the non-enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, but stand by the Union. They are long-suffering for the Union knowing it to be the bulwark of their rights. . . . Tennessee and the border States will not remain in the Union without amendments of the Constitution and additional guarantees to her and their rights. They will stand between freedom and cottondom . . . unwilling to go with the former without sufficient constitutional guarantees . . . and unwilling to retrace their Republican steps to monarchy, by the latter. . . . It is their part to be cool, wait and see the action of the Gulf States, what manner of organization they make—then to choose between being unwelcome members of either a Northern or Southern Confederacy, or to appeal to the God of right and battles in standing by themselves and to themselves.³¹

Not long after South Carolina had seceded, Tennessee's junior Senator, A. O. P. Nicholson, discussed the state of the Union in the Senate. He insisted that the South's fear of the Republican party was thoroughly justified. The "complaint" was that "the majority of the

people of one section of the Union, having the numerical power to obtain possession of the Government, form themselves into a political organization upon principles that exclude the minority section from co-operation, for the purpose of governing that minority section." This "species of dominion" which in this case was connected with the "aggravating circumstances attending sectionalism, combined with fanaticism," was something, he declared that "no brave and high-minded people would long endure."³² Southern people had come to the "settled conviction" that Lincoln's election on the Republican platform was "tantamount to a declaration of war against an institution which, in the South, is identified with all our interests, with all our prosperity, socially, politically and materially. . . . Lincoln," he continued, "believes that the Constitution can be so construed, administered and executed, that it will be, if not the instrument, at least no obstruction to the final extinction of slavery." He did not believe that Lincoln intended to violate the Constitution as he construed it. According to his interpretation, however, he could attain his objectives without doing so. Time was all that was necessary. Nicholson then stated that the South felt that a cessation of the agitation of the slavery issue was imperative, and that the only way of bringing it about was through "an express constitutional recognition" of the "right to hold slaves as other property." This guarantee was "a necessary condition to a final and satisfactory settlement of the issue between the North and South, and to the preservation and perpetuation of the Federal Union." A minority in the South, though deprecating Lincoln's election, asserted Nicholson, favored waiting for some overt act of aggression before taking any drastic steps, because of their devotion to the Union and because of their dread of the consequences of dissolution. He, himself, did not "look for danger so much in open aggressions" as in "insidious and covert attacks on our rights."

The Senator emphasized the fact that no state was "more conservative in its sentiments or more earnestly attached to the Federal Union" than was Tennessee. Nevertheless, he continued,

...the late election has been followed by the wide-spread convictions that the principles on which the Republican party triumphed are incompatible with the continued existence of a just constitutional union; and hence, in my judgment, the sentiment that is predominant in the state is, that new guarantees for the future, to be ingrafted on the Constitution, and to be unalterable, ex-

plicitly recognizing, among others, the principles as to the rights of property in slaves announced by the Supreme Court, in the late Dred Scott case, as the supreme law of the land, must be obtained, or that a sacred regard for the constitutional rights of her people will impel a majority of them to demand a severance of her connection with a Union which will then have ceased to be entitled to their allegiance.

Nicholson's own views coincided with what he believed to be the "predominant sentiment" of his state. He therefore purposed to "sustain every effort made here to secure such guarantees; and failing in that," to "co-operate in other measures that may be resorted to in the Southern states for accomplishing the same end." Furthermore,

Without indulging in profuse professions of devotion to the Union, it is enough for me to say that I shall exhaust all reasonable efforts for its preservation upon terms that will hereafter secure to all sections and every state and every citizen the enjoyment of all their just rights; and when these have failed, I shall have no hesitancy in choosing secession or revolution, rather than acquiescence or submission to the domination of sectionalism.

Nicholson wished that all of the Southern states had consulted together concerning the "best means of obtaining the redress or the security which we demand." He felt that the North would probably have been amenable to suggestions from a united South. Since the states of the lower South were acting independently, however, "the remaining border and middle states ought to concert measures for making their united appeal to the people of the northern states." They should likewise make an appeal to "the people of the southern states, with the view of urging upon them to delay the final consummation of their secession movements until our appeal to the northern people can have a response." Although Nicholson disapproved of the policy of secession which the states of the lower South were following, he refused "to pronounce judgment of censure and condemnation upon them" for they were "sovereign independent States." He did not think that Tennessee would "resort to the last remedy" until "every reasonable effort is exhausted."

Nicholson called attention to the fact that the secession of South Carolina "must soon present practical questions of the most momentous

character." With regard to the use of force in the matter, he said that,

This question must arise either in a proposition to resort to force for the purpose of executing the laws of the United States within the territorial limits of South Carolina, or for the subduing the people of that State and coercing them back to their allegiance to the United States. Whatever technical distinction there may be in the two propositions, I regard them practically as amounting to the same thing—a resort to force for either purpose amounts, in my estimation, to war upon the state of South Carolina.

Senator Nicholson felt that the people of his state concurred in his belief that any attempt to execute the laws of the United States within the territory over which South Carolina had established a separate and independent government *de facto*, if perhaps not, in the opinion of some, *de jure*, or to subdue the people of that state and coerce them back to their allegiance to the United States was inexpedient. He asserted that,

It would require a strong case to induce me to incur all the horrors of a civil war, either to execute the laws against the people of a sovereign state, or to conquer such people to their former allegiance. I cannot forget that the Union was not formed by force, and I know it can never be maintained by force. . . . If it is to be preserved, it must be done by the persuasive but efficient instrumentalities of kindness, forbearance, patience, and fraternity. If South Carolina stood alone in this crisis, I would see no blood spilled to coerce her; but knowing, as we all do, that in the grievances on which she is taking so responsible a step, fourteen of the other members of the Confederacy are strongly sympathizing with her, and are earnestly considering what measures for redress and safety they will adopt, it cannot be doubted for a moment that war upon South Carolina would involve the entire Confederacy in the conflict, and destroy forever all hope of either preserving, or reconstructing the Federal Union. . . . if nothing else can be saved; if the Union must perish; if the members of the Confederacy must be served, let us, at least, save the blood of our countrymen.³³

Senator Nicholson's speech, unlike that of Senator Johnson, appar-

ently called forth little comment of any kind.³⁴ Since the views of the two Senators differed markedly in some respects, especially in regard to the power of the Federal government to coerce states or citizens, this fact was significant. The very fact that Senator Nicholson's speech evoked neither a large measure of praise nor of blame was probably indicative of the fact that it did not do violence to the feelings of any substantial portion of Tennessee's population. While Senator Johnson apparently intended to formulate and guide public opinion in Tennessee, Senator Nicholson seemingly sought to interpret it.

On January 7, 1861, the legislature met in extra session pursuant to the call of the governor. On this occasion Governor Isham G. Harris sent to that body a message in which he declared that the

... systematic, wanton and long-continued agitation of the slavery question, with the actual and threatened aggressions of the Northern states and a portion of their people, upon the well-defined Constitutional rights of the Southern citizen; the rapid growth and increase, in all the elements of power, of a purely sectional party whose bond of union is uncompromising hostility to the rights and institutions of the fifteen Southern states . . .

had produced an unparalleled crisis in the country's history, and said that he had called them together for "the purpose of calm and dispassionate deliberation" concerning the proper course of action for the state to pursue in the crisis.

In reviewing the history of the past briefly, he said, among other things, that "*the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution*"; that Congress had only the "*power coupled with the duty of guarding the owner in his rights*"; that since a decision of the Supreme Court had declared that slave property rested upon the same basis and was due the same protection as all other property, Congress had no power to limit its extension; and that Congress could not interfere with slavery in the states where it existed. He declared, therefore, that,

The attempt of the Northern people, through the instrumentality of the Federal Government—their State governments, and emigrant aid societies—to confine this species of property within the limit of the present Southern States; to impair its value by constant agitation and refusal to deliver up the fugitive; to appropriate

the whole of the territories, which are the common property of all the States, to themselves by excluding therefrom every Southern man who is unwilling to live under a government which may by law recognize the free negro as his equal; and in fine, to put the question where the Northern mind will rest in the belief of its ultimate extinction, is justly regarded by the people of the Southern states as a gross and palpable violation of the meaning of the Compact of Union . . . as impertinent meddling with their domestic affairs destructive of fraternal feeling, ordinary comity, and well defined rights.

The governor, who claimed that the South had never attempted "to encroach upon a single Constitutional right of the North," said that if there were any remedy for the evils which afflicted the country, "consistent with the perpetuity of the Union," it would lie in the adoption of a series of amendments to the Constitution which would deprive the "fanatical majorities of the North" of the power to invade the rights of the South or to impair the value of its property. In pursuance of this object, he recommended five amendments: (1) providing for the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific; (2) providing for the addition of a clause to the fugitive-slave law providing for indemnification of the owner of a slave and securing his right of action in the Supreme Court; (3) providing for the protection of the owner in the possession of a slave "while *in transitu*" or temporarily sojourning in any state; (4) prohibiting the Congress from abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia or in any intra-state area under Federal control; (5) prohibiting the changing of the preceding amendments except by the consent of all the slave states.

Even so, Governor Harris, who was pessimistic as to the possibility of Tennessee's ability "to quell the storm" that pervaded the country, expressed the belief that the only "practical question" for the state to determine would be whether to align herself with the North or with the South. In that contingency, he was convinced that the people of Tennessee would refuse to participate in the coercion or subjugation of any of her "sister States, whose *people* may declare their independence of the Federal government for the purpose of being relieved from 'a long train of abuses and usurpations.'"³⁵

In response to the request of Governor Harris, the legislature, itself pro-Southern in sympathy, began the consideration of a measure providing for the holding of a convention in the state to consider the

question of Federal relations if the people of the state desired it. Representative Jones of Overton County moved to amend the Convention Bill by requiring that no ordinance which the proposed convention might pass changing Tennessee's relation to the Federal government should become effective until a majority of the qualified voters in the last gubernatorial election had ratified it. The debate upon the act in both the house and senate centered mainly upon this amendment.³⁶ Both houses unanimously ratified the amended bill. The law provided that the people should choose delegates to the proposed convention at the same time they voted on the question of holding the convention in order that a second election might not be necessary in case the inhabitants of the state favored the holding of the convention.³⁷

The assembly passed a number of resolutions giving expression to its views on the crisis facing the country. One of these, designed to aid in bringing about a peaceful solution of the sectional dispute then raging, declared,

That in view of the danger of civil war, this Assembly, in behalf of the people of Tennessee, ask respectfully, on the one hand, and, on the other, of the authorities of each of the Southern States, to the end that if possible peace may yet be preserved: that they reciprocally communicate assurances in response hereto to the General Assembly of Tennessee, now in session; that the *status quo* of all movements tending to coercion, collision, and concerning the forts and arsenals of the nation, shall on either hand be strictly maintained for the present except to repel any actual aggression.³⁸

Another asserted,

That this General Assembly has heard with profound regret of the resolutions recently adopted by the Legislature of the State of New York tendering men and money to the President of the United States, to be used in coercing certain sovereign states of the South into obedience to the Federal Government.

That this General Assembly receive the action of the Legislature of New York as the indication of a purpose upon the part of the people of the State to further complicate the existing diffi-

culties, by forcing the people of the South to the extremity of submission or resistance; and so regarding it, the Governor of the State of Tennessee is hereby requested to inform the executive of the State of New York that it is the opinion of this General Assembly that whenever the authorities of that State shall send armed forces to the South for the purpose indicated in said resolutions, the people of Tennessee, uniting with their brethren of the South, will as one man, resist such invasion of the soil of the South at any hazard and to the last extremity.³⁹

The assembly met in joint session and selected delegates to represent Tennessee in a proposed convention of the Southern states. They were:

First district,	Sam Milligan of Greene County
Second district,	A. Cullom of Overton County
Third district,	J. M. Anderson of Sequatchie County
Fourth district,	William Hickerson of Coffee County
Fifth district,	R. L. Carruthers of Wilson County
Sixth district,	G. W. Jones of Lincoln County
Seventh district,	Thomas Martin of Giles County
Eighth district,	F. K. Zollicoffer of Davidson County
Ninth district,	I. R. Hawkins of Carroll County
Tenth district,	W. H. Stephens of Madison County
State at large,	A. O. W. Totten of Madison County
State at large,	R. J. McKinney of Knox County ⁴⁰

The assembly also adopted resolutions setting forth Tennessee's position on the questions in dispute between the North and South. In its issue of January 26, 1861, the *Republican Banner*, probably the most conservative of the influential papers of the state, expressed the belief that they were satisfactory to the "great mass of people," for

They substantially adopt the Crittenden compromise as a basis of adjustment of the pending issues between the North and South; and Tennessee will say to the people of the North, not in a spirit of blustering defiance and braggadocio, but firmly and calmly, and with a sincere and honest desire that this adjustment may be accepted—we demand nothing more—we will accept of nothing less.

During the time when the people of Tennessee were considering the advisability of holding a state convention to consider the crisis in national affairs, practically all of their Representatives were discussing the state of the Union on the floor of the House.⁴¹ They were engaged, for the most part, in an effort to interpret the condition of affairs in Tennessee and the South in general to the Senators and Congressmen of the North, those who were members of the Republican party in particular. They believed that this information would lead that group to make such concessions as would enable the Union men in the border states to stay the tide of secession and perhaps to effect a reconciliation between the states of the lower South, with the possible exception of South Carolina, and those of the North, and thereby prevent the ultimate disintegration of the Union. Many of them sought at the same time to mold public opinion in Tennessee.⁴²

At one extreme, there were W. B. Stokes, an Opposition Congressman from the fourth district, who proudly admitted, "*I am a submissionist*,"⁴³ and Emerson Etheridge, an Opposition Congressman of the ninth district, who declared that he would meet disunion "with a torch in one hand and a sword in the other; and so help me God, so long as the stars and stripes wave over my State, or any part of it, I will never bow the knee to the storm of disunion." Both Stokes and Etheridge minimized the evils which the South feared from continued association with the North in the Union, criticized the inexcusably rash, uncalled-for and unjustifiable action of the seceding states, and affirmed their belief that disunion would not only fail to remedy any of the real or fancied injustices of the South, but would also destroy any possibility of redressing the grievances of which it complained.

Etheridge declared that,

It is a remarkable and most significant fact that this revolution is not justified or carried on with reference so much to anything which *has* been done by Congress or any political party, as because of dangers which, it is alleged, are to be apprehended *in the future*.

He did admit, however, that the personal-liberty bills which certain Northern states had already passed were an exception to this rule. But said he, the Southern states

... will be infinitely more the victims of the unfriendly legislation

of the free states, when the Government has been destroyed, than you now are, or ever can be, while the Constitution endures and the Union is maintained. It is the border slave States I have named which alone feel the injustice of Abolitionists; and now the Gulf states propose, by disunion, to aggravate all these evils, and add to their number a thousandfold.⁴⁴

Mr. Etheridge then presented a list of seven accusations, fairly stated, he thought, upon which the South indicted the North. They were that the people of the North opposed the execution of the fugitive-slave law; the Republican party, when it gained control of Congress, intended to pass an act excluding slavery from the territories; Northern people refused to grant Congressional protection to slave property in free territory; Northern people intended to alter the Constitution so as to abolish slavery in the states where it existed; people of the North and South were not homogeneous and they hated each other; some of the Northern people favored the social and political equality of Negroes; and there was danger of other raids similar to John Brown's.⁴⁵

He next proceeded to adduce what he insisted was sufficient proof to reduce these charges to an absurdity and to point out that they therefore did not constitute reasonable grounds for revolution. In any case, he argued that disunion would serve only to aggravate existing evils. In addition, he went on to prove to his own satisfaction that,

...from the time the Constitution was ordained down to this hour, no act has been passed by Congress in regard to slavery anywhere, in the States or Territories, which was not dictated or controlled by the statesmen of the South, demanded by the public opinion of the South or which has not received the sanction and approval of the leading statesmen of that section of the country.

In conclusion, he declared that the people had not elected the Thirty-sixth Congress expressly to solve the problems before it at the time, and that he therefore refused to regard its action as final. Said he,

I yet trust this House will do something; Yes, sir, do much to allay this alarm and apprehension; and while I shall continue to vote for every proposition to disarm those *whose aim is disunion*, and whose grievances are merely pretexts, I do not hesitate to

announce in my place, that if this Congress shall, finally, fail to meet the public expectation in patriotic quarters, I will not then be willing to abandon my interest in almost the only government in the world which is worth preserving. Before I consent to aid in the overthrow of my country, I will counsel with your masters—the people—those in whose unambitious hearts, love of country and kind burns as brightly as of yore.⁴⁶

At the opposite extreme from Stokes and Etheridge were J. H. Thomas, a Democratic Congressman from the sixth district, and W. T. Avery, a Democratic Congressman from the tenth or Memphis District. Both of these gentlemen expressed their opinions as to the current situation in the South. Mr. Avery also made a bitter attack on Mr. Etheridge, another Congressman from West Tennessee.

Southern people in general, Mr. Thomas said, would not spend time debating the question of secession but would have recourse to the right of revolution. He warned that "all efforts made to coerce a sovereign state will be deemed an attack upon the great body of the South." He called attention to the fact that "The feeling all over the South is, 'equality in the Union, or independence out of it.'" The North, he said, should have listened when the states of the lower South and the border states as well declared that they would not always submit to aggression. He concluded by saying that he and his constituents had not been for secession but that they could "be content with no adjustment that will not unite the South with us. The Southern states have a common interest and a common destiny."⁴⁷

Avery began his speech by remarking that he had not intended originally to say anything concerning the state of the Union because he thought that it was a time for actions rather than words. He now felt, however, that he must vindicate his constituency and state from the false assumptions which might arise from speeches in the House, particularly from the "extraordinary, and . . . unnatural speech" of Emerson Etheridge. He cited favorable comments which the *New York Tribune* and the *Cincinnati Gazette* had made concerning Etheridge's recent speech, and called attention particularly to the fact that the *Gazette* had mentioned the possibility of his becoming a member of Lincoln's cabinet. Avery said that this suggested that "a contingent fee, in the shape of high place in the Cabinet councils of Mr. Lincoln, sharpened the intellect, and quickened his defense" of the Union. He then challenged Etheridge's statements that the North had done noth-

ing to provoke what he had called the "extraordinary, unpardonable and indefensible action" of the people of the South and that the Southern mind was mad and insane. "And yet," Avery continued, "he wants to adjourn this question over to this mad and insane populace." Avery maintained that the people of the South themselves had moved this revolution. Furthermore, he declared, Etheridge would not submit to a vote of the people on a proposition which someone had recommended in the House, whereby all should resign their seats, the resignations to take effect on February 21, so as to make possible an election of members on the main issue before the country prior to the inauguration of Lincoln on March 4. He even went so far as to deny Etheridge's statement that Tennessee had at one time possessed a constitution which did not prohibit free Negroes from voting, but he did admit that the framers of the Constitution of 1834 had definitely limited the vote to whites. In conclusion, he pointed out that it was impossible for Tennessee to settle the question of union or disunion. The only issue confronting it was whether it should remain with the North or join the South. The idea of its submitting to subjugation, he said, was unthinkable. He expressed the conviction that one's highest allegiance was due his state; and Tennessee, he asserted, would resist the invasion of the South.⁴⁸

Although there were those in Tennessee who entertained the opinions set forth by Stokes and Etheridge on the one hand and by Thomas and Avery on the other, a large majority held views similar to those expressed by the less radical members of the State's Congressional delegation. This group agreed that the South did have substantial grievances and that its distrust of the Republican party was not without foundation in fact.

For example, Horace Maynard, an Opposition Congressman from the third or Knoxville District, who was by no means extremely pro-Southern in his outlook, declared that the South did misunderstand the Republican party. He insisted, however, that being misunderstood was an ineradicable defect of the Republican party, as it was of any sectional party. He pointed out, furthermore, that the extreme sentiments expressed by leading Republican speakers had contributed to this misapprehension. He wondered, in fact, how anyone could understand the doctrines of so heterogeneous a mixture as the Republican party, which included

... old Whigs and old Democrats; followers of Thomas Jefferson,

and admirers of Alexander Hamilton; friends of Jackson, friends of Clay; masons, anti-masons; "barnburners," "hunkers," "renters," anti-renters," "wooly heads," silver-grays," Know Nothings, Americans, foreigners, Catholics; protective-tariff men, free-trade men; bank men, bullion men; radicals, conservatives; men of strict construction and men of no construction; men of unquestionable political honesty, and men whose honesty I will not venture to call into question; men of all grades of political sentiment, all shades of political opinion, all bedded together, heads and heels, covered by a single blanket, and that woven of African wool.⁴⁹

The indifference which many members of the House, chiefly Republican, exhibited toward the matter of taking steps to preserve the Union was distressing to the moderate members among Tennessee's Congressional representatives, who urged upon the Republican members of Congress the imperative necessity of giving them assurances which they might use in staying the tide of disunion sentiment which was sweeping over Tennessee. Reese B. Brabson, an Opposition Congressman from the third district, declared that the fact that "Business of every kind is prostrate; commerce paralyzed, the whole country upon the verge of bankruptcy; and the Government of the United States forced to ask endorsement of her bonds by the states, that they may find a purchaser in the market at a heavy discount" was not merely an "artificial" matter. He implored Representatives to rise above party platforms to save the Union.⁵⁰ Robert Hatton, an Opposition Congressman from the fifth district, pleaded for weapons of "conciliation and compromise" which the Union men of the South could use to stop the secession movement and perhaps to bring some of the seceded states back into the Union. Pass the Crittenden resolutions and "you will send a thrill of joy through the national heart," declared Quarles, an Opposition Congressman of the eighth or Nashville District.⁵¹

Although this group denied the constitutionality of secession, they did not hesitate to affirm the right of revolution. They did not agree, however, as to what occurrences would justify recourse to revolution. Hatton, for example, declared that the Constitution did not warrant any such doctrine as peaceable secession, but "We have, however, reserved to us the great inherent right that overrides all Constitutions, of revolution."⁵²

While there was unanimity of opinion among the moderately con-

servative of Tennessee's Representatives with reference to the doctrine of secession and the right of revolution, there was no such complete agreement upon the subject of the coercion of a state. Notwithstanding the fact that all denied the expediency of such a policy at that particular time, they disagreed as to whether any conditions or circumstances could justify the exercise of such power by the Federal government. For instance, Quarles said that Tennessee, in the crisis immediately confronting the nation, would

... exhaust every honorable means of compromise; she will appeal to you, as she is now doing through her commissioners sent here to confer with those of other states . . . her action will be deliberate, conservative, patriotic and temperate.

But, . . . if, in an evil hour, led on by rash, inconsiderate and extreme men, you should attempt, under any pretext, however plausible, to subjugate her, or one of her sister states of the South by force of arms, . . . she will stand the dread arbitrament of the swords.

Thus, although he pointedly denied the Constitutional right of secession, he concurred in the view that the attempted subjugation of a state would constitute sufficient ground for revolution and declared that in such a contingency, "whatever may be her [Tennessee's] choice or her fate . . . I, as one of her sons, will abide it."⁵³ Maynard, however, as his later course of action proved, did not share that point of view.

Probably Congressman T. A. R. Nelson's speech of January 25 epitomized most accurately the views of the Union-loving majority in Tennessee. Nelson charged the House with apathy and indifference toward the condition of the country. This attitude he attributed mainly to "pride of opinion" and "party spirit." Since Nelson felt that the Crittenden resolutions, then before Congress, would bring peace to the country, he urged their adoption. Surprisingly enough, he said, the Southern Representatives had shown a willingness to accept them, although they necessitated some sacrifice on the part of the South. The Republicans, generally expected to agree to them, however, were averse to assenting to them. He said that,

I fear their fate is already sealed; but still, as the people in the

various states, and especially in the conservative states of the South, have signified their willingness to accept them, and have hailed the efforts of the distinguished and venerable Senator from Kentucky with rapture and delight; as they have rallied to their support in Northern as well as Southern states, I think this is an argument which is strong and powerful in its character, why we, and the representatives of the people, should endeavor to respond to the demand of the public will.

Nelson went on to point out, "We of the South think we have just cause for fear." This, he declared, was because of the publication in the North of abolition literature unjustly abusive of the South; the passing and sanctioning of personal-liberty bills by Northern legislatures and conventions; the violation of the Constitution by men who resisted legal efforts to recapture fugitive slaves and in so doing had even killed those attempting to enforce the law; John Brown's raid and other similar assaults; the sending of incendiary documents into the South for the purpose of inciting insurrections among the slaves; and

...the fact that prominent members of the Republican party have announced the doctrine upon the floor of the House of Representatives that the Supreme Court, as now constituted, is a partisan tribunal, and are doing all they can to sap public confidence in the greatest judicial tribunal upon the earth. . . .

Nelson pointed out, furthermore, that the South had been justifiably apprehensive of an attempt on the part of the North to abolish slavery in the states where it existed because of the "irrepressible-conflict" doctrines which Northern leaders had been avowing. Then he observed that,

Now, although we have an acknowledged Constitutional right to its preservation there, yet they give us more in these resolutions than we have under the Constitution; because, under the Constitution as it now is, slavery could be abolished in the states, as I take it, by the amendment of the Constitution, adopted by the consent of three-fourths of the states; but under the amendment proposed by the committee, slavery can never be abolished in the

United States where it exists without the assent of the slaveholding states, and, indeed, of every one of the states.

In urging upon the Republicans the acceptance of the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific, for which the Crittenden resolutions provided, Nelson said,

...it is only asking the Republican party not to pledge themselves to establish slavery, but simply to recognize a fact which exists without their agency, and for which they are in no conceivable form responsible; the one fact that the people of that country have recognized and established slavery themselves.

After having remarked that he did not believe that the Republicans understood the tenor of feeling in the South, Nelson called attention to the message which Governor Harris of Tennessee had just sent to the state legislature then meeting in extra session, which, he stated, constituted "a sort of bill of indictment against the Republican party of the North." He affirmed his belief, however, that four of Governor Harris' charges were untrue according to the Republican platform or to President-elect Lincoln's statements and that there was little foundation for the other. Nelson went on to say that,

I have endeavored to do justice to the Republicans, both in the charges I have made against them, and in those from which I have defended them. I deem it proper to say this, because a convention has been called in my state, because propositions are made to arm the state, and because the storm of secession is sweeping over the state today; and it is almost impossible to resist it, unless gentlemen come up and meet us in the spirit of compromise of which I have so often spoken.

He then quoted the following extract from the letter of a friend of his in Tennessee, "as much a friend of the Union as any other man in it," who said:

I am sorry to say the cause of secession is gaining strength daily in Tennessee, and all over the South. The Republicans are to blame for it. They refused to do anything in Congress. We con-

servative Union men have this thrown in our teeth, and we are disarmed and unable to hold out longer. Of the three divisions of the State, East Tennessee is the only one where the Union party can carry the day, and we are losing ground. If the Republicans do not join in a compromise between this and the 4th day of March, Tennessee will go out of the Union. I am candid in this, and you know how I stand, and how I have fought secession.

In conclusion, Nelson addressed his remarks particularly to the people of Tennessee. He cautioned them to beware of the tide of disunion already threatening to engulf them. He warned them against endangering their own best interests by casting their lot with those who had treated the border states with disdain, almost with contempt. He did not think that Tennessee would submit to coercion or dictation by either the North or the South. He said that,

If Tennessee chooses to go out of the Union, let it be done by the deliberate and voluntary act of her own sons, without constraint and without coercion. Let her go not as a seceder; but in a manner worthy of the volunteer state. Let her, like our Revolutionary sires, have the boldness to go as a rebel, because she thinks the Government has oppressed her, and because she has determined to throw off the yoke and resist all consequences.

Finally, he urged upon all the necessity of preserving the Union as the only means of avoiding a war of extermination. Said he, "It is in vain for either section to calculate upon the cowardice of the other. All are of the same race. All are alike brave; and a war once begun between us will have no parallel in the contests which history has described."⁵⁴

Tennesseans in general were equally as perturbed over the "great and distracting question which now disturbs the country in all its parts and in all vacations and pursuits" as was the state's Congressional delegation. For some time, the *Nashville Democrat* had been urging the "assembling of the people without respect to party, for the purpose of ascertaining and giving expression to the public sentiment." The *Republican Banner* and the *Patriot* concurred in this view, but the *Union and American* took the position that "public meetings are calculated to do harm rather than good." A proposal that the state ex-

ecutive committees of the Constitutional Union party and the Breckinridge and Douglas wings of the Democratic party issue a call for a meeting of all parties in Nashville,⁵⁵ however, came to nothing.

A very large majority in Tennessee were still conservative. The "dogged silence of the Republicans" on the question of compromise acceptable to the South, however, was tending to undermine this conservatism. Many felt that much depended upon the fate of the "Crittenden compromise" because they feared that its defeat would make it "impossible to stem the current of public opinion in favor of Secession, as it has been adopted by many Union Conservat [sic] men as an ultimatum."⁵⁶

Despite the deep desire of numerous Tennesseans vigorously to oppose "*Northern aggression and spurn Southern dictation*,"⁵⁷ it was apparently becoming increasingly clear that the practical problem confronting them was resolving itself into a question of "union or disunion for existing causes." It was beginning to seem that they would have to choose,

... whether they will remain true and loyal to the government of their fathers and demand of those in power a faithful administration of that government, or whether they will destroy all the safeguards and guarantees of security which it affords, and take their chances in the formation of a government, the character, plan and form of which they know nothing of.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, they still did not intend to decide the matter with undue haste.

As a matter of course, a heated campaign preceded the election on the question of "Convention" or "No Convention" in Tennessee. There were three different points of view concerning the proposed convention. The extreme Southern-rights advocates favored it and hoped to elect delegates who, if such a thing should be possible, would bring about Tennessee's secession. One group of the proponents of the Union were friendly to the idea of a convention, because they believed that conservatives would control it and use it as a means of checking or rendering powerless the disunion sentiment of the state. The other opposed the convention because they believed that there was really no necessity for it and because they feared that the disunionists might get control of it and take the state out of the Union. Nevertheless,

they urged everyone to support Union candidates so that in case there should be a convention conservatives would control it and render it harmless.

The radical group, apparently consisting mainly of Democrats drawn from both the Breckinridge and Douglas factions, hailed this election as an opportunity to select strong "Southern Right Anti-Coercion" men to guide the state's affairs. The *Union and American*, the leader of this group in Middle Tennessee, advised the people to

...select men who will resist coercion to the death. Select men who are opposed to all compromises that do not promptly and forever settle the differences existing between the Black Republicans and the South, in a manner satisfactory to the South. Select men who are for going with the South. Select men who have the intelligence to know your rights and the courage to maintain them.⁵⁹

The *Avalanche*, the chief spokesman of the similar group in West Tennessee, regretted that "the provisions of the Bill [calling the convention] forces Tennessee to remain in the Union a few days longer than her people desire" and declared that secessionists must go to work to elect their strongest men.⁶⁰ Subsequently, it denounced the "pitiable littleness" of "Union-shriekers" who had called upon the "working men" of Memphis to listen to addresses by the rich and proud who would not have them at their tables. The call to this meeting had said, "You have suffered most from the disunion movements, and in case of war, you will have to do the fighting." This, said the *Avalanche*, was a paltry appeal to passion, a mean effort to make the working man believe that he had no interest in slavery. Since this idea was the same as Helper's in his "scandalous and disgraceful" book, the proponents of the idea stole it from abolition literature. While the *Avalanche* did not have time to expose the fallacy of this position, it asserted that the working man knows "that slavery elevates him and that his pride, interest and duty should cause him to defend the institution, even at the risk of suffering and war, even if there were no principles involved."⁶¹

A portion of the Opposition or Constitutional Union party and some conservative Democrats who opposed secession also supported the move for a convention to discuss the condition of national affairs. Ira P. Jones,

the editor of the *Patriot*, was one of the main spokesmen for this minority, which felt that calm, dispassioned discussion would clarify the situation. They believed that through the holding of a convention it would be possible to ascertain the attitude of the people in this crisis. They were confident that the body would be conservative; even if it were not, however, its action was subject to the control of the people, since they had to approve its measures before they became binding. The electorate should therefore vote for the Union men as "they are neither unconditional Unionists nor unconditional revolutionists. They occupy what we conceive to be the true position of right and justice and will assert both to all sections at all hazards."⁶²

Apparently the normal attitude of the Opposition or Constitutional Unionists, under the leadership of the *Republican Banner*, was one of extreme hostility toward the convention. Many Democrats, particularly in East Tennessee, where Andrew Johnson's influence was still very strong, concurred in this view.⁶³ This entire group considered the convention only another move on the part of the secessionists to gain control and to carry the state out of the Union. Even if the proposed convention did not result in the withdrawal of the state from the Union, however, they believed that it would further inflame sectional antagonisms and so indirectly promote the cause of secession. Although they campaigned actively against the convention, they advised their constituents to vote for the Union delegates to the proposed convention so that, in case it did materialize, conservatives would dominate it. "All opposed to a convention are opposed to secession and will therefore vote for anti-secession delegates," they declared.⁶⁴

There were two phases of the contest. First, there was the question of holding or not holding the convention. Second, there was the matter of selecting delegates who had the right conception of the proper course for the state to pursue. Both the proponents and the opponents of the convention made vigorous campaigns. They urged the people to vote so that Tennessee might unmistakably declare her own attitude, whatever it might be, and so be able to speak with authority in trying to work out a solution of the difficulties between the North and the South.

Apparently the convention and anti-convention elements alike sought to break party lines both in the vote on the convention issue and in the choice of delegates. One of Senator John J. Crittenden's correspondents in Tennessee wrote him that,

Our party [the Bell Party] are mostly unionists. The Breckinridge party here is strongly tinctured with disunion. We are, however, doing all we can to lift the present question above party prejudice.⁶⁵

Brownlow's Knoxville Whig said, "Now let our Union people bring out able and true men, irrespective of old party associations. We have no parties but Union men and Disunionists."⁶⁶ The leading secession or disunion papers apparently agreed that there were two groups, Unionists or disunionists, without respect to party affiliation.⁶⁷

Cave Johnson⁶⁸ and Andrew Ewing,⁶⁹ two prominent Democratic leaders, made active efforts to bring about the election of union delegates. Some of Tennessee's Congressional delegation and other friends of various leading Union candidates for the convention urged them strongly to support the cause of union before the people.⁷⁰

Both the Unionists and disunionists made strong appeals for the votes of the small slaveholders and the non-slaveholders. One editorial writer asserted that,

This Slavery Aristocracy is to overshadow and dishonor poor white men. Look out, ye border State men, and all ye poor men in the South, who don't own Negroes! Your condition is to be worse, and your social position far below that of free Negroes! The majority of voters in all these border States, are men who own no Negroes, but they are a people who love liberty, secured, regulated, and guarded by Constitutions, as it has been from the foundation of our Government.⁷¹

Another editorial writer, who was a disunionist, pointed out that most of the slaveholders in Tennessee were among the laboring class and insisted that the laboring class was therefore very much interested in slavery and secession. Emancipation, by flooding the country with free blacks, would reduce the price of labor. This would be injurious to the whites because, as it was, their wages were higher than those of their contemporaries in the North. The working classes were unwilling, furthermore, for their children to become "ostlers, shoe-blacks, carriage drivers, washerwomen and house servants of wealthy landlords, the rich merchants and the lordly bankers of the country, while they

themselves shall be put on a level with the free blacks." "One Raised at the Handles of the Plow" warned the workers of the South to observe that property created castes in the North and urged them to look to their interests.⁷²

During this campaign *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig* published an editorial, "Let East Tennessee Secede," which foreshadowed the position that East Tennessee was later to assume. Said he,

If by hook, or by crook, in the course of coming events, Tennessee shall madly rush out of the Union, by act of the State Convention, let the Delegates elected from East Tennessee, enter their protest, and secede from the rest of the State, and form an independent Mountain State of Frankland, and we shall soon be reinforced by Virginians and Western Carolinians. We can never live in a Southern Confederacy, and be made hewers of wood and drawers of water for a set of aristocrats, and overbearing tyrants. We are candid in urging East Tennessee to withdraw from Middle and West Tennessee, if they shall be so reckless as to consent to go out of the Union. The people of East Tennessee are with us in this, and will demand it, sooner than be oppressed with direct taxes and forced loans. We have no interests in common with these Cotton States. We are a grain-growing and stock-raising people, and we can conduct a cheap Government, and live independent, inhabiting the Switzerland of America.


Our brave mountain boys are not willing to be disfranchised, because of their poverty, and it is now a settled point that *property qualifications* will be required under "King Cotton," while a man neither owning land or Negroes, will be disqualified for any of honor or profit.⁷³

The people of Tennessee defeated the move to call a state convention by a vote of 69,387 to 57,798.⁷⁴ According to one writer, a "very decided majority of the delegates" whom the people selected were unionists.⁷⁵ Another gives the total vote for union delegates as 88,803 and that for disunion as 24,749. According to this estimate, only 24,749 of the 127,185—that is, less than one-fifth—who voted on the convention issue were secessionists.⁷⁶

There was little correlation between the vote in this contest and

that in the Presidential election of the preceding fall. The vote in February, 1861, was 19,696 less than that of November, 1860. Whereas Bell had carried the state by a *plurality* of only 4,367, the convention lost by a *majority* of 11,589. Furthermore, the majority by which the convention failed was 259 votes greater than Douglas' vote in 1860.⁷⁷

SPECIAL ELECTION OF FEBRUARY 9, 1861



East Tennessee, which had voted for Bell in 1860, defeated the convention by a majority of 25,532 out of a total vote of 41,066. Only two counties in this section, Sullivan and Meigs, strongly Democratic in tradition, favored the convention. Therefore, all of the counties which had voted for Bell in 1860, and all but two which had voted for Breckinridge indicated their strong Union sentiment.

Middle Tennessee, which Breckinridge had carried in 1860, like East Tennessee, failed to support the move to hold a convention. Out of a total vote of 55,066, it gave a majority of 1,382 votes against it. In this division all but two of the counties which had supported Bell, the large tobacco-producing counties of Robertson and Montgomery, opposed the convention. Seven of the counties which had voted for Breckinridge, Humphries, Hardin, Coffee, Cannon, Van Buren, DeKalb and Overton, however, opposed it.

West Tennessee, which Bell had won and in which Douglas had polled a relatively large vote, unlike East and Middle Tennessee, favored the convention by a majority of 14,759 out of a total vote of 30,487. Only four counties in this area opposed the convention. These

were Carroll, Henderson, Decatur and McNairy, which had supported Bell.

The reaction of the press to the election varied in accordance with the positions which individual papers had assumed during the campaign. The *Maury Press* of Columbia, a journal of moderate views, rejoiced that the immediate-secession party had met defeat in this election and exulted that,

From Carter to Shelby the voice of Tennessee has gone thundering up to heaven, that she will not be dragooned into any action fatal to her interests, and that she will stand by the Union until the people of the Northern states have had ample time to guarantee to her the rights of late years denied.⁷⁸

Brownlow's Knoxville Whig, an organ of extreme Union sentiments, was elated because,

There never was a party so disgracefully beaten in any State in the Union since the formation of the Government as this Disunion party is beaten in Tennessee! . . . Glorious old Tennessee, has said at the ballot box, that her interests are in the Union, and that UNDER THE STARS AND STRIPES her people shall live. Tennessee has said in thunder tones, that she will not act with Yancey, Rhett, and Davis and that she will not render herself infamous by giving countenance to treason!

A few days later, the same paper called attention to the fact that,

The Union party, made of Whigs and Democrats, of Bell, Douglas, and Breckinridge men, should maintain their present position, at least until further developments are made, and be prepared to whip out the Secessionists on every occasion, and under whatever colors they may sail. We must remember that we have not killed the snake—we have only "scotched" him. He will appear again in some other form and give us trouble.⁷⁹

While the *Avalanche* of Memphis, a paper of extreme Southern-rights opinions, was in no state of mind to take a calm, dispassionate view of the election, it declared in an editorial that the defeat was merely

an incentive to the secessionists to keep fighting for victory. "Don't give up the ship," it pleaded. It urged all secessionists not to relax their efforts, but to work silently and speedily for the victory that must come. Remember, it said, "Faith is everything," and "work."⁸⁰

A preponderant majority of the people of Tennessee, although they had striven to prevent Lincoln's election, proposed to acquiesce in his victory. Since his election had been Constitutional in form, even though he was the candidate of a party which was purely sectional in its membership and interests, there seemed to them to be no legitimate reason for dissolving the Union before he had committed some overt act of aggression. They favored a policy of watchful waiting which they hoped would enable the state to take a position of aggressive leadership and to act as the mediator who should compose the differences between the North and South *in* the Union.

In furtherance of this project, they urged upon Governor Harris the desirability of calling together the legislature to formulate the policy of the state. Since the people of the state understood at that time that Governor Harris did not consider Lincoln's election a justifiable cause of secession, and since that body was not only willing to discuss Federal relations but also to attempt to improve distressing financial conditions, there was apparently very little objection to convening it in extra session.

As time passed, however, the secession movement, which at first had had very few adherents in Tennessee, began to gain some headway. Meanwhile, Tennessee's representatives in both houses of Congress exerted their best efforts to bring about the acceptance of some compromise proposals which would prevent the disintegration of the Union.

Governor Harris, in his message to the legislature when it met on January 7, 1861, ably recounted the South's grievances against the North and advocated immediate secession. The strongly pro-Southern legislature provided for a state election on the question of "Convention" or "No Convention" to consider national problems.

After an exciting campaign, the people of the state, irrespective of party lines and still hopeful of preserving the Union, voted down the proposition of holding such a convention because they feared that extremists would gain control of it and take the state out of the Union; and because they sought to discourage any discussion which might serve to aggravate sectional animosities and make the preser-

vation of peace more difficult. The Unionists were elated over their victory, and the secessionists were correspondingly downcast over their defeat. Neither side, however, showed any intention of giving up the fight.

CHAPTER VI

The Declaration of Independence and Its Aftermath

Conservatism triumphed over radicalism in Tennessee on February 9, when the people defeated the proposal to hold a convention for the purpose of considering the state's relationship both to the states of the Union and to those of the lower South. Nevertheless, neither the conservatives, who favored remaining in the Union and attempting to win back the Gulf states, nor the radicals, who advocated withdrawing from the Union and joining them, considered the matter of Tennessee's position finally settled. A realistic conception of the condition of national affairs prevented any definite feeling of assurance on that score by either the Unionists or disunionists.¹ It did not, in the opinion of the opponents of secession, however, preclude the possibility of Tennessee's acting effectively with the other border states in the role of mediator between the North and the South. Meanwhile, with the exception of avowed secessionists, Tennesseans were

... waiting, and impatiently, and anxiously watching, every move that is made in Congress, by the convention so called, by the movements and speeches of the Pres't elect, in his rout from Springfield to Washington to catch a glimpse upon which to hang a hope, for the salvation of the country.

Since Lincoln and the Republican party, which he dominated, failed to realize that their policy, based largely on their misconception of both the extent and nature of Southern Unionism, would eventuate in war, it is not strange that Tennesseans should have been bewildered during the crisis of 1860-61.²

Many were apprehensive lest the North had drawn the wrong inference from the result of the February election. They felt that,

If the Republican party see or fancy they see in this election an evidence of fear, and so assume upon it the bearing of a *conqueror* more than that of a friend, then indeed *God help Tennessee, and God help the South*; but if they receive it as an assurance that the old brotherly love beats strong in the South, and would flow back if it were not checked by the pride that leads to a dread of being mistaken for a suppliant, in lieu of being recognized as a *forgiving friend*, willing to forget the past and make provision for the prevention of any future misunderstandings; if they receive the news in this spirit, we say, why then all will yet be well.³

Although time alone could answer that question, they were fearful that "the failure to call the convention taken in connection with Andy Johnson's speeches" might "strengthen the backbone of the Republicans and increase the difficulties of settlement." The fact that the secessionists "trumpeted" this refusal to hold a convention as "unconditional submission" also contributed to the same end.⁴

The secessionists, who were extremely bitter at the outcome of the February election, took the point of view that the people of Tennessee had placed the state in a very unenviable position. "Doctrines of Helper,"⁵ they asserted, "have been taught in Tennessee; the poor have been appealed to against the rich—the non-slaveholder against the slaveholder; and the fight for abolitionizing will go on in Tennessee as certainly as in Northern states." They said that the speeches and conduct of John Bell, Emerson Etheridge, an Opposition Congressman, William B. Stokes, also an Opposition Congressman, N. G. Taylor, a prominent Whig leader in East Tennessee, and other "union-savers" had also contributed to the creation of Lincoln's belief that by arraying the Unionists and disunionists of the border states against each other, he could, in effect, add the border states to the North and force them to "help subjugate the South and reduce the States to provinces" and abolish slavery in the territories.⁶

Lincoln's Indianapolis speech proved alarming even to some of the Unionists. They interpreted it to mean that his policy would be to recapture Southern forts and forcibly to collect revenue. This, they believed, would make compromise impossible. They maintained that,

A sectional President backed by free States which have led off in a violation of the Constitution and nullification of a law of Congress, have no right to coerce, and the attempt will, at once, unite the whole South and submission will follow only when extermination is complete. Tennessee in voting against a convention, voted for time; but let coercion be attempted, and her volunteers will be minute men and on the march whilst steps are being taken for secession.⁷

The Unionists and disunionists continued to disagree rather heatedly as to the probability of the Republicans' acceptance of a fair and peaceful solution of the dispute between the Northern and Southern states. The *Republican Banner* declared that Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas and Tennessee would accept nothing less than the Crittenden Compromise.⁸ The *Union and American* pointed out that since the Black Republicans would not agree to the Crittenden amendments, there was no way to avoid secession.⁹ The Border States Propositions, substantially the same as Crittenden's proposals, were likewise acceptable to the Unionists.¹⁰ The Unionists hoped that the Peace Conference¹¹ would arrive at some satisfactory adjustment of the controversy between the North and South. Apparently the Tennessee delegation to the conference carried out the wishes of the majority of Tennesseans when they voted for all of the propositions which that body adopted.¹² Some of the Unionists believed that Congress would adopt the proposals of the Peace Conference.¹³ The secessionists characterized the Peace Conference as a "magnificent failure" and did not believe that there was the "remotest possibility of a reconstruction of the Union" upon the basis which this body of "venerable dummies" advocated.¹⁴

The Unionists were striving to hold the position which they had won in the election of February 9. While they were firm in their demand for Southern rights, they maintained their policy of opposition to secession. They vigorously opposed recourse to a policy of coercion by the Federal government. Such action, they were certain would not only make further attempts to compromise the dispute between the sections impossible, but would also lead directly to war. The Unionist press tried to expose what it considered the true motives of the secessionists and to allay the popular suspicion against the Federal government.

The *Republican Banner* asserted that the disunionists did not really

wish to accept the Crittenden amendments or any other adjustment.¹⁵ The disunionists or secessionists, themselves, made no denial of their unremitting efforts to bring about the secession of the state before March 4. They were excellent propagandists and the inflammatory articles which they designed to appeal to all groups must certainly have increased the popular unrest. The *Union and American* declared that,

...in every utterance from the anti-slavery party, from their papers, from their State Legislatures, from their members of Congress, indeed from Mr. Lincoln himself it is plain to be seen that it is the settled, fixed policy of the next administration not to recognize the Southern Confederacy and insist upon the collection of revenues at Southern ports. . . . On the fourth of March, without having openly declared war, all the measures necessary to legalize the use of military force against the Southern states will have been passed. The position taken by Tennessee in the election of the Convention has emboldened the anti-slavery party, and they do not now conceal their purpose to test, as they express it, "whether we have a Federal Government or not."¹⁶

At about the same time the Memphis *Avalanche* said that the South had conceded and compromised since 1820, and that the more she yielded the more she was expected to yield. But now, "from Virginia to Texas . . . from the Potomac to the Rio Grande," it continued, "there is one universal and determined purpose to submit to no further aggression upon Southern rights and Southern honor, and to allow no more concessions to Northern prejudices and Northern fanaticism."¹⁷

When Lincoln made his inaugural address, secessionists professed to see in it the verification of their worst fears. The Memphis *Avalanche* said that it was the signal for a union of all slaveholding states in opposition to his bloody program, which

... is a fit initiation of an administration elected upon the bloody idea of inciting insurrection among our slaves, turning non-property holder against property holder, burning down our residences, murdering our wives and children and carrying out all the infamous doctrines of the Helper book.¹⁸

A day later, in an editorial entitled "Lincoln's Cabinet—Raw—Head—and Bloody-Bones—the Irrepressible Triumph," it asserted that the inaugural address of Lincoln "threatens the immediate coercion by blockade, by land-invasion, by every means which fiendishness can suggest and power can afford, of our sister States of the South." Another editorial in the same issue declared that prior to March 4 the *Avalanche* would have opposed a call of the legislature in view of the fact that the people had cast a decisive vote against a convention; now, however, it thought that it was necessary for Governor Harris to convene that body in special session to put Tennessee in her rightful place. On the following day it declared that it felt the oppression of the Lincoln government.¹⁹ The tone of the remarks of the *Union and American* was similar to that of the *Avalanche*. It asserted that,

No man can read the inaugural without coming to the conclusion that *it is a declaration* of war against the seceded States and in less than thirty days, if its avowals are carried out we should have the clangor of resounding arms with all its concomitants of death, carnage and woe. . . . Let the bloody creed of coercion be carried out and the last vestige of hope for the reconstruction will have expired.²⁰

The Unionists professed to see no such danger as the secessionists apprehended in President Lincoln's inaugural address. The *Republican Banner* observed that he had merely said that,

...the laws shall be enforced "*as far as practicable*," and of course in all those states which by reason of hostility to the Federal Government their enforcement has become impracticable, there will be no attempt to enforce them since Lincoln declares that strangers will not be appointed to fill Federal offices in these states and that the Federal Government will assault no one.²¹

The *Patriot*, also a Unionist paper, commented to the effect that,

He very correctly denies the doctrine of secession, regards the refractory States as still in the Union, and expresses his determination to execute the laws as far as practicable. Coercion does not necessarily follow. He cannot collect the taxes in the seceded States except by force and he is powerless to use military force

except upon the call of the civil authorities. He will have to adapt himself to circumstances, therefore, and he will, we are persuaded, be far, very far from attempting force where it is not justifiable, and in self-defense. He is not so blind as not to see what will be the consequences of an attempt to coerce; and unless he desires madly to rush upon ruin, he will avoid hostilities.²²

The *Clarksville Chronicle*, likewise a Unionist organ, stated rather pessimistically that,

If the Inaugural was intended to give rise to a greatly divided opinion, it is a success, as almost every shade that can be imagined has been expressed. But if it does not mean coercion, it can be found in the appointments of Seward and Chase to leading places in the Cabinet. What the South can hope from such men—from a Republican President and an entire Republican Cabinet—must be anything rather than peace, equality and justice.²³

The *Maury Press* mentioned the fact that the Memphis papers were advocating an extra session of the legislature. "We do not know at present of any future necessity for such extra session," it declared, "except in the event of 'Coercion' being attempted upon the Cotton States by the Gov.,—and we are unable to construe Lincoln's inaugural address to mean such a policy".²⁴

Meanwhile, the people of Tennessee had long since begun to prepare for another gubernatorial election. Prior to the fall of Fort Sumter, it seemed that in this campaign, as in that preceding the election of February 9, the contest was to be between Unionists and disunionists on the issue of "*Union or Secession*."²⁵

Former Governor William B. Campbell was the man uppermost in the minds of many Unionists. He had not, however, indicated his willingness to make the race.²⁶

As early as November, 1860, William H. Polk, in response to an inquiry as to whether he intended to run for Congress, wrote that he had no desire to go to Congress but that it would be highly gratifying to him if the people of Tennessee would make him governor. Polk, who had been a state elector for Douglas in the Presidential campaign of 1860, emphasized the fact that "all good Union men" ought to "act in concert to protect our institutions from the mischevious [sic] fanatics both North and South who are and have been engaged in

the work of their distruction [sic] for the past four years." ²⁷ Because of Polk's affiliation with the Democratic party, some Unionists wished to be certain that he really was Unionist in his sympathy before agreeing to support him. For example, one Unionist from East Tennessee wanted to know whether he would "turn out of office all disunionists whatever may have been their former relations" to him. ²⁸

Although the *Union and American* did not mention the names of any possible candidates in connection with its announcement of a state convention to nominate a gubernatorial candidate on May 11, it invited all who opposed Black Republicanism, Federalism, and civil war to take part in the convention. It declared that state rights and the rights of the South would suffer as a result of the triumph of their opponents. ²⁹

Meanwhile, in the March 23 issue of his paper, *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, William G. Brownlow announced his candidacy for the governorship. Said he,

I come before you upon my own responsibility, without solicitations from or consultations with the Politicians of the State. To them, I do not look for "aid or comfort," as they are aware that they can never control me, if in office, or use me to promote the objects of selfish cliques or factions.

He gave a brief sketch of his life. Then he set his political principles before the people in a fourteen-point statement which was both somewhat equivocal and rather revealing. (1) There was a diversity of opinion and a clashing of personal ambitions when the Constitution was formed just as there is at the present. (2) The people of the several states formed the Constitution to govern the people, and no single state as a "sovereignty" ratified it. "No State, therefore, belonging to the compact has a right to withdraw, without consulting with the other members." (3) States having unconstitutional laws, such as personal-liberty bills, should repeal them, but their failure to do so does not give other states the right to secede. (4) President Buchanan should have suppressed this "rebellion when it first appeared, and before it grew up into its present gigantic proportions." The government should execute its laws. (5) The platform of the "Union, the Constitution, and the Enforcement of the Laws," upon which he stood, was the proper one. Said he,

I do not believe that the election of Lincoln affords any sort of pretext for dissolving this Union; I deny the right of Secession; I regard the States that have gone out of the Union as guilty of Treason, and I view the leaders of the Secession party as Traitors. If elected Governor, I would refuse to convene the Legislature, or take any step that would advance the cause of Secession, and treat them as men guilty of breaches of good faith and common honesty.

(6) He expressed hatred for both abolitionists and secessionists. (7) He commended Lincoln's inaugural address for its "temperance and conservatism" and inferred that there would be no war unless the seceding states should inaugurate it. However,

If Lincoln should attempt to inaugurate oppressive and unconstitutional measures, and Congress shall sanction or adopt these measures, either in reference to the slavery question, or any other subject, we of the South should await the decision of the Supreme Court, and if the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Departments of the Government; . . . unite in attempts to carry them out—then, and in that case, I would advocate resistance "at all hazards, and to the last extremity." But until this is apparent it is the duty of this patriotic state to stand firm, and not entangle herself with the extremes of either the North or South; and to act upon the sound maxim that *Disunion* is not a remedy for any wrongs whatever.

(8) Posterity would accord curses instead of blessings to the leaders of the move to dissolve the Union. (9) He disclaimed any part in having brought on the "terrible crisis now upon us." (10) The prudent and reasonable course for the South was to await developments in the Union and not to flee from it before the policy of the new administration is clear. He protested against the surrender of the rights of navigation on the Mississippi River and declared that he would not give up Tennessee's right if he became governor.

(11) The President of the New Confederacy has confined his Cabinet appointments, to the Old Democratic party—appointing none but Breckinridge Disunionists, although the Bell and Doug-

las men were a majority in some of their states. The Provisional Government is therefore a revival of corrupt Southern Democracy, and is a lawless mob banded together for the purpose of perpetuating that exploded, hateful, and God-forsaken organization.

(12) I take the ground steadfastly to support the General Government in the exercise of every Constitutional power, to enforce the execution of the Federal laws and to sustain in all their integrity, the Constitution and the Union. It treats resistance to its authority as *rebellion*, and those who join in such resistance as a *mob*, and when any number of its own citizens band together for treasonable purposes, and levy war upon the General Government, it holds them individually responsible and hangs them as traitors to this country. The founders of the Government avowed that it afforded the needful physical means to execute its powers.

I deny the right of any State or number of States to secede, and I insist upon it that the Seceded States, one and all, are *constitutionally* as much in the Union as they were six months ago. While laws exist in reference to them it is the duty of the Government to enforce them. A state cannot be *coerced*, but *individuals* in it can, and *ought* to be, who violate laws and plot treason.

(13) He would build state penitentiaries in both East and West Tennessee, and then work the convicts in order to economize. (14) "The Governor has the control of a heavy patronage in the Railroads and Banks of the State, and this is all now in the hands of the Secessionists, who must be swept from office, or the public interest will suffer. . . ."

Tennesseans, even in the midst of grave national difficulties, apparently continued to regard the business of selecting a governor as a highly interesting and intensely partisan matter. Nevertheless, they kept the condition of affairs in the country at large in mind.

On March 27 the Memphis *Argus* said that, "Sumter is played out, and no blood will be shed there to drown the voice of peace in the border States." It believed that the government at Washington had in effect virtually recognized the Confederate States. Those that are in will stay in, it continued, "and those that are out of office will stay out and shiver." A few days later it reiterated its declaration that,

Sumter is "played out," and not even the sensational dispatches and paragraphs of the New York *Tribune* can frighten the people of these border States through anticipation of an attack, which would be the knell of the administration. The same can be said of Pickens, and of every other supposed cause of immediate hostilities between the Washington and Montgomery governments.³⁰

There were those, of course, who did not subscribe to the view that hostilities between the North and South were unlikely.

Generally, there was apparently little change in public sentiment in Tennessee between the time of Lincoln's inauguration and the day of the firing upon Fort Sumter.³¹ That event, however, electrified Middle and West Tennessee, and shocked East Tennessee to some extent.

The secessionists saw in Lincoln's call for troops after the fall of Fort Sumter confirmation of their worst suspicions of the Federal government, and they rejoiced that there was no longer any real probability that Tennessee would remain in the Union. The *Union and American* said that,

The candid finger of impartial history will point with unerring finger to Black Republican fanaticism and Black Republican perfidy as the causes of the most lamentable and bloody strife which the world has ever witnessed. From the day of his election to the present hour the president of the United States and his confidential advisers have, now by silence and then by ambiguous givings out, attempted to deceive the people of the South into the belief that he was their friend, that peace was his policy that no coercion would be attempted, that the revolution in the seceded states would be left to right itself by the tardy, but . . . as he professed to believed . . . sure verdict of the people of those States.

It also remarked that many who were Union men until the news of Fort Sumter's fall had been active participants in a large secession meeting which had occurred in Nashville on the night of the reception of the news. "The spirit which prevailed in that meeting," it continued, "authorizes us to send greetings to the people of the Confederate States and bid them God speed in their struggle for independence."³² In announcing the attack upon Fort Sumter, the *Memphis Appeal* said

that "Right or wrong, every noble instinct of our natures, and every worthy aspiration of our souls prompt us to side with our native South."³³ A committee in Memphis received instructions from a mass meeting to inform President Davis "That the City of Memphis has seceded from the late United States forever . . . and she declares herself under the government of the Confederate States and will respond to any call for aid."³⁴

The news of Fort Sumter's fall dazed and immeasurably saddened the Unionists throughout Middle and West Tennessee. The *Republican Banner* observed that,

If the Lincoln administration have really determined upon a war policy we cannot but believe it is an unfortunate one . . . that devoted as are the Union men in the Border States to the Constitution and to the Union . . . deprecating as they do the course pursued by the leaders in the seceded States, they will not be expected to sympathize with a sectional administration of the Government, brought into power upon the basis of a war upon Southern rights, in its efforts to subjugate or coerce the revolutionists. The Union men of Tennessee and her sister Border States have clung to the Union in the very anguish of despair, while the course of its chief executive appears to have been vacillating and deceitful. . . . In any event it is the duty of the conservative men in Tennessee at present to preserve a "masterly inactivity" and not rush headlong into extremes.³⁵

The *Patriot* concurred with the *Republican Banner* in denouncing the course of the administration and in advising Tennessee to follow a policy of "masterly inactivity." Even so, it continued, "while the people are no more inclined to embrace the absurd theory of secession, they are still driven by most unfortunate events to consider to some extent the ultimate right of revolution." Yet, it continued, "we have denied secession and coercion. Can we not arrange for a settlement or a peaceful separation?"³⁶

The slight hopes, which the Unionists of Middle and West Tennessee had entertained of preserving the Union by compromise after the fall of Fort Sumter, practically vanished upon Lincoln's call for troops from Tennessee to aid in the subjugation of the seceded states. That act solidified the opposition of practically all groups in Middle and West Tennessee against the Federal government. The *Republican*

Banner declared that the President had forced the border states into rebellion by his proclamation calling for troops, since it, *ipso facto*, severed their allegiance to the Union. Furthermore, it continued,

While the doctrine of secession will never be endorsed or accepted by the men who have constituted the Union party, and sought to preserve the Union as long as there was hope for its preservation, they have ever been prepared, when the crisis came, for rebellion and revolution.³⁷

The *Patriot* said:

Lincoln *will get no* army from Tennessee who are ready and willing to march under the Northern anti-slavery and unconstitutional standard erected at Chicago last spring to deny practically the equality of individual and State rights, which were thought and intended to be guaranteed in the Federal Constitution.³⁸

The overwhelming majority of the people of these sections apparently entertained opinions similar to that of B. W. Binkley, who said,

I was for Union so long as there was any hope of our remaining in it with peace and honor. When Lincoln issued his proclamation calling for 75,000 troops to whip in the Seceded States, I was satisfied that day had passed, and now—though not what you'd term a regular Secessionist—I am the most uncompromising *rebel* you ever knew. . . ."³⁹

Although President Lincoln's call for troops after the fall of Fort Sumter caused practically all of the Unionists of Middle and West Tennessee to despair of the hope of preserving the Union, and consequently to favor Tennessee's uniting with the Confederate States, it had no such effect on the great majority of them in East Tennessee. "Parson" Brownlow, the publisher of the most influential paper in that section, after having looked the matter "full in the face" declared that he was for the "Stars and Stripes." He asserted that the Federal government should defend the capital, and that the army for which Lincoln had called was to do that.⁴⁰

Nevertheless, there were some Unionists in that section who were apparently somewhat uncertain as to the proper course to pursue.

A. W. Howard of Greeneville, a member of the Constitutional Union Party, wrote to T. A. R. Nelson for advice. Said he,

What are we to do? Last fall we were charged with affiliating with Black Republicans. Johnson, of Tennessee, and others joined in the said *false* charge up to the presidential election, after the Election for P—Johnson, came over and attempted to place himself at the head of the Union party—went to Washington and commenced his coercive policy in his speeches—got the confidence of the president and the Republicans, and the treacherous Devil, procured all the Executive appointments in Tennessee *for his old personal and party friends*. And now lingers around the Capitol to prise the president up to his coercive notions. Because He Johnson is mad, because the old Democratic policy has plunged the country into utter ruin, and after procuring all the appointments in the State for old party friends wishes to plunge the Border States into Battle with the South. In close alliance with *Lincoln, Black Republicanism—which he can't do—*

He took the position that the border states should not join either the North or the South, and observed that,

Before they will Respond to Lincoln's call for 75,000 Troops to coerce and whip the South—they will *secede in solid columns*. Sir, this last Requisition of the president Runs like fier in stubble—and Stirs up the people, old Democrats and Some Whigs (I love the name Whig) are cursing Johnson publicly in the streets in daylight in the town of Greeneville—(He ought to be Hung) and all those Extremists who will not hold and exercise patriotic forbearance and manly patience like Statesmen—patriots and Christians—with a steady aim to Save the Best government the Sun ever Shown upon—from the whirl pool of Conflict, Carnage and death, ought to be *Burned* in a lake of fier and Brimstone—the president's last proclamation has done more to increase cession in the Border states than everything else has done. But if the border States secede that does not necessarily connect them with the South—I hope the governors of the Border States will not pay any attention to the president's call for men and C—then if he undertakes to demand of us men—We will Refuse—telling him we can do so as easy as any State can *secede*,

have the same right—if he don't like that then let him help himself if he can—I am for the Border States declaring themselves to be the United States—and that the North and South have both gone off—But less give them a chance to get back after a while, If there is a proclamation in Tennessee for an Election for Congress a call cession, I hope my old friends will none of them be candidates, at present, unless they see further than I do Lincoln and all his cohorts ought to be hung. I am for neither the North, nor South, But for the Union.⁴¹

Apparently the majority of the people of Middle and West Tennessee and those in East Tennessee who favored withdrawing from the Union endorsed Governor Harris' spirited refusal to supply the troops which President Lincoln had requested. He telegraphed Secretary of War Cameron that "Tennessee will not furnish a Single Man for purposes of Coercion but 50,000 if necessary for the defence of our southern brothers."⁴²

Some hope, apparently born of sheer despair, still existed among certain Unionists, even after Lincoln's call for troops, that perhaps Tennessee could, by combining with the border states and refusing to join either North or South, bring about peace between the two sections.⁴³ This idea of establishing a Border States Confederacy, which had existed at least since the early part of December, 1860, was shortlived, however, on the part of all but a small group of Unionists in Middle and West Tennessee and of a larger number in East Tennessee. However, although Lincoln's call for troops finally revealed that he had chosen a policy of action in lieu of either a policy of continued "watchful-waiting" or a policy of "complete surrender by compromises sweeping enough to satisfy the now aggressive South," some Tennesseans still found it difficult to accept the fact that "The Blundering Generation" had "stumbled into" a war which would accomplish nothing of "lasting good that could not and would not have been won by the peaceful processes of social evolution."⁴⁴

The great bulk of the Unionists in Middle and West Tennessee, having despaired of the state's being able to maintain a position of neutrality, joined the disunionists in supporting all measures designed to carry the state out of the Union and to put it on a sound military footing. John Bell, the acknowledged leader of the Unionists of the state, in a speech in Nashville on April 23, said, in effect, that the past was a sealed book and that,

The time for action in the South had arrived and he was for standing by the South, all the South, against the unnecessary, aggressive, cruel, unjust wanton war which is being forced upon us. He advocated a strong and effective military league or union among all the slaveholding States for the successful prosecution of the War; but declined to discuss the question relating to the time and manner and character of a political connection, which he considered most appropriate for a future time. He was for arming the State and equipping the militia in the amplest and most effective way possible under the circumstances.⁴⁵

There were two outstanding Unionists, former Governor William B. Campbell of Middle Tennessee and Congressman Emerson Etheridge of West Tennessee, who did not follow the example of Ex-Senator John Bell, Ex-Governor Neill S. Brown and other prominent Unionists in these sections who had come to favor withdrawing from the Union. Etheridge made speeches favoring adherence to the Union wherever he could.⁴⁶ Many political and military leaders, Unionists and disunionists alike, attempted to persuade Campbell to alter his position. The Military Board and Committee of Safety of Memphis, apparently unaware of Campbell's unchanged position of loyalty to the Federal government, unanimously selected him for "Commander in Chief for Military" in West Tennessee.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, even before the firing on Fort Sumter, some of the leaders of the secession movement in Tennessee had sought to prepare themselves to render military aid to the Confederate States of America in case hostilities with the Federal government should occur.⁴⁸ Apparently Confederate authorities allowed military officers, perhaps in the role of observers, to come into Tennessee to make suggestions to those individuals who wished to become affiliated with the Confederate army in some capacity. At any rate, Captain T. H. Taylor sent the following telegram from Nashville to Secretary of War Walker at Montgomery on April 16: "Whole city in mass meeting last night. Unanimous for South. Recommended call of Legislature to call convention to secede."⁴⁹

After President Lincoln's call for troops, Governor Harris began to take steps to put Tennessee in position to co-operate actively with the Confederate States.⁵⁰ In pursuance of this object he sent W. C. Whitthorne, speaker of the house of representatives of the legislature to Montgomery, to confer with President Jefferson Davis and Secre-

tary Walker. In his telegram of April 30, announcing Whitthorne's visit, Governor Harris said,

He is fully advised and will make known to you the state of parties in our State, as well as our prospects, hopes and apprehensions. Large accessions every day to the secession cause, and we confidently hope to stand with you under the Confederate flag very soon. Unfortunately, we have delayed the important work of arming our state until it is difficult, if not impossible, to procure arms. If you have a surplus, we shall be happy to procure them.⁵¹

Governor Harris, it seems, however, did not intend to ally Tennessee with the Confederacy through an executive *coup d'état*. As General Pillow pointed out,

We are now ready and anxious to place Tennessee under the protecting aegis of the Confederate Constitution. This will be done as rapidly as the forms of constitutional action can be gone through with, if the State should not by revolutionary action be previously thrown into your arms.⁵²

Governor Harris co-operated with Confederate authorities in their military plans. He gave them permission to erect a battery at Memphis as a part of the fortification of the Mississippi River.⁵³ He responded to the call of Confederate officials for troops although there seems to have been some uncertainty as to who would issue the commissions of these forces.⁵⁴

Incidentally, one of the most eager volunteers to the Confederate cause was Peter Turney of Winchester, who informed Secretary Walker that he was the first "to make a tender of a Tennessee Regiment." He said, in addition,

General, my all, my honor, and that of my father is involved in this matter. My father was the first man in Tennessee to take grounds for our present position here. He sacrificed himself upon its altar. I feel that under the circumstances this regiment ought to be received first of all from Tennessee.—Remember that my name has been cursed in Tennessee (I allude to my father) for its devotion to the South.⁵⁵

With few exceptions, secessionists and Unionists alike in Middle and West Tennessee, and, of course, secessionists in East Tennessee endorsed the Governor's action in calling an extra session of the legislature to convene on April 25. Many Democrats, who believed in the legal right of secession, advocated the passage of an ordinance of secession. The *Union and American*, one of the leading secession papers, however, waived any discussion of the right of secession and said,

We have only to make a simple declaration of an existing fact, that Tennessee because of the usurpations of and aggressions of the Lincoln Government reassumes her sovereign authority, and is now an independent government free to stand alone or form such alliances as her interests and sympathies may dictate.⁵⁶

The *Patriot*, an anti-secession journal, insisted that,

Tennessee does not claim the right of secession but she acts like freemen ought always to act, upon the inherent right of revolution. She is already by the action of her chief Executive and by the most unanimous sentiment of her people in a revolutionary attitude and she must and she will complete it.⁵⁷

When the legislature met in extra session on April 25, Governor Harris declared in his message to the legislature, among other things, that,

The president of the United States—elected according to the forms of the Constitution, but upon principles openly hostile to its provisions—having wantonly inaugurated an internecine war between the people of the slave and non-slaveholding states, I have convened you again . . . , for the purpose of enabling you to take such action as will most likely contribute to the defence of our rights, the preservation of our liberties, the sovereignty of the State, and the safety of our people; all of which are now in imminent peril by the usurpations of the authorities at Washington, and the unscrupulous fanaticism which runs riot throughout the Northern States.

Whatever differences may have heretofore existed amongst us,

growing out of party division, as to the right of Secession as a Constitutional remedy against Federal usurpation, all admit the normal right asserted by our fathers of each and every people to resist wrong, and to maintain their liberties by whatever means may be necessary; that Governments "derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," and that "whenever any form of government becomes destructive of the ends" for which it was created, "it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundations on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form as shall to them seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. . . . As established by our fathers, that Union (U. S.) no longer exists. . . . Yet, as best comporting with the dignity of the subject, and also from a due regard to those who may hold a different opinion . . . and further still, that all the world may be advised of our action, I respectfully suggest that our connection with the Federal Union be formally annulled in such manner as shall involve the highest exercise of sovereign authority by the people of the State, and best secure that harmony, so much to be desired, in times like the present, upon questions even of mere detail.

Therefore, I respectfully recommend the perfecting of an Ordinance by the General Assembly formally declaring the independence of the State of Tennessee of the Federal Union, renouncing its authority, and reassuming each and every function belonging to a separate sovereignty; and that said Ordinance, when it shall have been thus perfected by the Legislature, shall, at the earliest practicable time, be submitted to a vote of the people, to be by them adopted or rejected.

Governor Harris also recommended that Tennessee take steps at once to ally herself with the Confederate States.⁵⁸

Although a great majority of the legislators were apparently eager to carry out the suggestions which Governor Harris had made, there was a comparatively small minority bitterly opposed to such action. Some, or perhaps all, of this group met in the room of Robert Johnson, son of Senator Andrew Johnson, on the night of April 28, and

...determined to stand to the last—we will vote against all their propositions and as soon as an ordinance of Secession is passed

will leave, protesting against all the proceedings of the legislature, including its secret sessions, etc.⁵⁹

At about this time Henry W. Hilliard, a representative of the Confederacy, who had accompanied Mr. Whitthorne back from Montgomery, addressed the legislature upon the cordial invitation of Governor Harris. The legislature and the visitors in the gallery received his speech urging Tennessee to join the Confederacy enthusiastically.⁶⁰

In pursuance of the recommendations of Governor Harris, the legislature passed a bill declaring that Tennessee had withdrawn from the United States and resumed her sovereignty as an independent state. It provided for the submission of this Declaration of Independence to a vote of the people on June 8.⁶¹ At that time they were to vote for "Separation" (from the United States) or "No Separation" and "Representation" (in the Confederacy) or "No Representation."⁶² The senate passed this measure by a vote of twenty to four. Those who opposed it were: Boyd, representing Knox and Roane counties; Nash, representing Claiborne, Grainger, Anderson, and Campbell counties; Stokely, representing Greene, Cocke, Sevier, and Blount counties; and Trimble,⁶³ representing Davidson County.⁶⁴ The House adopted the proposal by a vote of forty-six to twenty-one. The opponents of it were: Armstrong, representing Knox and Sevier counties; Brazelton, representing Jefferson County; Butler, representing Carter and Johnson counties; Caldwell, representing McMinn County; East,⁶⁵ representing Davidson County; Gillespie, representing Rhea, Bledsoe, and Hamilton counties; Gorman representing Greene County; Greene, representing Roane County; Havron, representing Marion County; Johnson, representing Hancock, Jefferson, Greene, and Hawkins counties; A. Kincaid, representing Anderson and Campbell counties; Kincaid representing Claiborn County; Morris, representing Wayne County; Norman, representing Carroll County; Russell, representing White County; Senter, representing Grainger County; Shrewsbury, representing Henderson County; White, representing Davidson County; J. Williams, representing Knox County; Wisener, representing Bedford County; and Woodard, representing Robertson County.⁶⁶ The fact that only one senator and four representatives from Middle Tennessee and two representatives from West Tennessee opposed it, revealed the sectional character of the opposition to the measure.

The legislature ratified the Military League which A. O. W. Totten,

Washington Barrow, and Gustavus A. Henry, the commissioners whom Governor Harris had appointed in accordance with a joint resolution of both houses of the legislature, had negotiated with the Confederate States of America.⁶⁷ The vote on this measure was similar to that on the Declaration of Independence.⁶⁸ In the senate the vote was fourteen to six in favor of it. Senators Bradford, representing Hawkins, Hancock, and Jefferson counties; Hildreth, representing Morgan, Scott, Fentress, and Overton counties; Richardson, representing Rutherford and Williamson counties; and Stokes, representing Wilson and DeKalb counties, joined Senators Boyd and Nash in opposition to the proposal. Senators Stokely and Trimble, who like Boyd and Nash had opposed the Declaration of Independence, failed to vote.⁶⁹ The house agreed to ratification of the league by a vote of forty-five to sixteen. Representatives East, Gillespie, Johnson, and Kincaid of Claiborne County did not vote. Representative Havron, who had opposed the Declaration of Independence, favored the League.⁷⁰

The legislature, under the leadership of Governor Isham G. Harris, had attempted to chart a course for the state which would meet with popular approval. While there was some criticism of the course of the governor and the legislature, especially in East Tennessee,⁷¹ a very large majority apparently endorsed it. The people in general considered that their state was not seceding but was taking recourse to the right of revolution. They had come to "regard Lincoln as a tyrant and the northern people as enemies bent on their subjugation." In their opinion, it was "no longer the negro question, but a question of resistance to tyranny."⁷² Tennesseans, like other Southerners, maintained that they

...claimed and asked nothing more than equal rights—not of persons only, but of States. Equal privileges in all parts of the Union; equal protection wherever the flag floated, to every person, to every species of property recognized by any State. Less than that was subordination, not equality.⁷³

Although the people of Tennessee in the main were still opposed to both secession and coercion, they believed that the situation which confronted them left no alternative but revolution and that their highest loyalty was to their state.

The *Nashville Union and American* of May 12 declared that Senator

Nicholson advised everybody to resist the Federal government. He also expressed no doubt of the popular approval of the ordinances which the legislature had recently passed.⁷⁴

There was a heated campaign between those who advocated ratification of the measures of the state legislature and those who opposed it. Although this contest centered mainly in East Tennessee, there was some activity in Middle and West Tennessee. William B. Campbell⁷⁵ and Emerson Etheridge were probably the most prominent speakers supporting the Union cause in these two sections. In spite of the tremendous pressure which numerous former Unionist leaders had brought to bear upon him, Campbell remained loyal to the Union.⁷⁶ Some Unionists in the area looked to William H. Polk for leadership.⁷⁷

Both Unionist and disunionist leaders campaigned actively in East Tennessee. In an editorial, entitled "Tennessee Ruined," Brownlow declared that "A Legislative mob of secessionists have voted this State out of the Union—have voted to raise an army of 55,000 and *five millions of Dollars*, which will bankrupt the State." Will the people ratify this "tyrannical and unconstitutional legislation?" "If they do, the deed is done," he said. "We shall await their decision with deep and painful anxiety, as by it we stand or fall, and by it we are all to abide, however humiliating, however ruinous to our best interests." In a second editorial in the same issue, he urged the people to stand firm for the Union and against disunion, and to be at the polls to give a death blow to the "Ordinance of Secession." He insisted that "This is our last pull through the ballot-box, if the Ordinance of Secession is carried. Now is our time to strike, or never! Our liberties are gone, when we are rushed into this repudiating confederacy, and Military Despotism!"⁷⁸

In view of the fact that East Tennessee was admittedly loyal, it was not surprising that the state's secession leaders made a pronounced effort to win it to the South.⁷⁹ There was even a rumor that President Lincoln planned to send troops into East Tennessee with the evident purpose of holding that section regardless of the vote of the state and then of using it to subjugate the rest of the state.⁸⁰ Then, too, there was some disunionist sentiment there. For example,

The East Tennessee Railroad from Georgia to Virginia, running through our principal towns became almost a continuous flame of secession fire. On these trains were always to be found the

noisy leaders, who, forsaking all business, went from town to town stirring up the people.

The passing of trains of Confederate troops also increased the sympathy manifested toward the South. As a result, "towns all along the railway line except Knoxville became disloyal in sentiment." Furthermore, the women of East Tennessee espoused the cause of the South generally. Finally, there were many considerable slaveholders and "independent gentlemen" whom strong economic ties made favorable to the South.⁸¹ One of the most prominent of these was Dr. J. G. M. Ramsey, who had gone so far in 1858 as to recommend the reopening of the slave trade and who declared that he owed his allegiance first to his "native Tennessee and second and through her to the United States."⁸²

On the whole, however, the people of East Tennessee remained loyal to the Union. O. P. Temple summarized the arguments which he said impelled them to this point of view in his last speech before the election of June 8, in which he declared that there was no justifiable cause for secession; that facts and figures showed that secession would fail; and that slavery was safest in the Union. He epitomized the position of his section when he asserted that "If we had to choose between the government on the one side without slavery, and a broken and dissevered government with slavery, I would say unhesitatingly, 'Let slavery perish and the Union survive.'" ⁸³

In view of the feelings which many of the people of East Tennessee entertained toward the Union, it was not strange that they should have considered an attempt to set up an independent state. Moreover, the spirit of sectionalism, which, according to Caldwell, had existed since 1795,⁸⁴ and had become increasingly bitter as the people of East Tennessee came to view their section as a hopeless minority in the state,⁸⁵ contributed powerfully to the same desire. Apparently the Unionist leaders saw no inconsistency in their position in asserting that Tennessee's withdrawal from the Union was unconstitutional and of trying at the same time to justify and actually to bring about the secession of East Tennessee from the rest of the state, in the event that the result of the June 8 election should prove to be unsatisfactory.

At any rate, the first meeting of the East Tennessee Convention, pursuant to the call of a number of outstanding Unionist leaders in East Tennessee, occurred at Knoxville on May 30 and 31, 1861. This

body discussed the possibility of East Tennessee's withdrawing from the state and forming a separate organization in the event of Tennessee's separation from the Union. T. A. R. Nelson, president of the convention, delivered a speech in which

...he forcibly reviewed the history of the revolutionary movement now convulsing the country, and exposed with masterly ability, the usurpations of the Governor of Tennessee, and the unconstitutional acts of the recent extra session of our Legislature, and closed with an earnest and eloquent appeal to the members of the Convention to discharge their responsible duties with calmness and firmness, to submit to no wanton tyranny, and to acquiesce in the will of the people, if constitutionally and legally expressed.

The convention unanimously adopted the following resolutions which the committee on business reported as expressive of its opinion on the condition of affairs of the state and country:

1. That the evils which now afflict our beloved country, in our opinion, are the legitimate offspring of the ruinous and heretical doctrine of *Secession*—that the people of East Tennessee have ever been and we believe still are opposed to it by a very large majority.
2. That while the country is now upon the very threshold of a most ruinous and desolating Civil War, it may with truth be said and we protest before God, that the people (so far as we can see) have done nothing to produce it.
3. That the people of Tennessee when the question was submitted to them in February last, decided by an overwhelming majority, that the relations of the State towards the Federal Government should not be changed—thereby expressing their preference for the Union and Constitution under which they lived prosperously and happily, and *ignoring* in the most emphatic manner, the idea that they had been oppressed by the General Government in any of its acts—legislative, executive, or judicial.
4. That in view of so decided an expression of the will of the people, in whom "all power is inherent and on whose authority all free governments are founded," and in the honest conviction that nothing has transpired since that time, which should change

the deliberate judgment of the people; we have contemplated with peculiar emotions the *pertinacity* with which those in authority have labored to override the judgment of the people, and to bring about the very result which the people themselves had so overwhelmingly condemned.

5. That the Legislative Assembly is but the creature of the Constitution of the State, and has no power to pass any law or to exercise any act of sovereignty, except such as may be authorized by that instrument, and believing as we do, that in their recent legislation the General Assembly has disregarded the rights of the people, and transcended their legitimate powers; we feel constrained, and we invoke the people throughout the State, as they value their liberties, to visit that hasty, inconsiderate and unconstitutional legislation with a decided rebuke, by voting, on the 8th day of next month against both the act of "Secession," and of union with the "Confederate States."

6. That the Legislature of our State, without having first obtained the consent of the people, had no authority to enter a "Military League," with the "Confederate States," against the General Government, and by so doing to put the State of Tennessee in hostile array against the government of which it then was, and still is, a member. Such legislation in advance of the expressed will of the people to change their governmental relations, was an act of usurpation, and should be visited with the severest Condemnation of the people.

7. That the forming of such "Military League," and thus practically assuming the attitude of an enemy toward the General Government (this too in the absence of any hostile demonstration against this State) has afforded the pretext for raising, arming, and equipping a large military force, the expense of which must be enormous, and will have to be paid by the people. And to this, the taxes, already enormous enough, will necessarily have to be very *greatly increased* and probably to an extent beyond the ability of the people to pay.

8. That the General Assembly by passing a law authorizing the volunteers to vote wherever they may be on the day of election, whether in or out of the State—and in offering to the "Confederate States" the Capitol of Tennessee, together with other acts—have exercised powers and stretched their constitutional limits, and not justified by the usages of the country.

9. That Government being instituted for the common benefit, the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.

10. That the position which the people of our sister State of Kentucky have assumed in this momentous crisis, commands our highest admiration—Their interests are our interests—Their policy is the true policy, as we believe, of Tennessee and all the border States. And in the spirit of freemen, with an anxious desire to avoid the waste of blood and treasure of our State, we appeal to the people of Tennessee, while it is yet in their power, to come up in the majesty of their strength and restore Tennessee to her true position.

11. We shall await with the utmost anxiety the decision of the people of Tennessee on the 8th day of next month and sincerely trust that wiser counsels will pervade the great fountain of freedom (the People) than seems to have actuated their constituted agents.

12. For the promotion of the peace and harmony of the people of East Tennessee, it is deemed expedient that this convention should again assemble—therefore, "Resolved that when this Convention adjourns, it adjourns to meet again at such time and place as the President, or Vice President in his absence, may determine and publish." ⁸⁸

The Nashville *Patriot* of June 8 apparently gave a rather accurate summary of the opinion of the majority in Middle and West Tennessee in an editorial entitled, "The 9th of February and the 8th of June." On February 9, the people had voted by a commanding majority to remain in the Union despite the fact that,

They believed that the South had been wronged, grievously wronged by the North, and that the sectional triumph in the election of Mr. Lincoln, no matter how it was effected, was a fearful import as to the future, and made it incumbent on them whilst they declined to join the Cotton States in their revolt, to demand new guaranties for the protection of the Constitutional right of the Southern people.

They had retained their confidence in the Federal government, "even

after the duplicity of the administration had resulted in the bombardment and fall of Fort Sumter." They might not have despaired of preserving the Union then,

...had not the President usurped the power to raise and equip armies, and navies, thus suspending the Constitution, for the purpose of engaging in a war of subjugation upon the people of the seceded States, and called upon them to send troops to aid him in the atrocious work.


After that, however,

The determination was spontaneous amongst the great masses of them, to demand of the constituted authorities an opportunity to assert their independence of the Federal Government and their right to adopt such government in its place as they thought best for their protection against oppression and tyranny.

The legislature, therefore, had acted in accordance with their wishes in submitting the questions of "Separation" and "Representation" to popular vote on June 8. Thus, the votes of February 9 and June 8 harmonized and were not contradictory.

During the campaign preceding the election of June 8, the press throughout the entire state urged the people to go to the polls and express their real sentiments. As a result of this insistence and because of the gravity of the situation confronting them, even more people

SPECIAL ELECTION OF JUNE 8, 1861



took part in the election of June 8, 1861, than had participated in either the Presidential election of November, 1860, or the special election of February 9, 1861.⁸⁷ Of the number voting, 104,913 voted for "Separation" and 47,238 voted for "No separation"; and 104,102 voted for "Representation" and 47,364 voted for "No Representation."⁸⁸ There was relatively close correlation between the votes of East and West Tennessee in the elections of February and June, 1861. Such was not the case, however, with Middle Tennessee.

Out of a total vote of 47,703, East Tennessee gave a majority of 18,143 for "No Separation." Whereas, 81.1 per cent of those voting in February had opposed the convention, only sixty-nine per cent of those voting in June opposed "Separation." Six counties in this area, Sullivan and Meigs which had voted for the convention, and Polk, Monroe and Rhea which had voted against it, and Sequatchie, a newly created county, cast the majority of their votes for "Separation." Democratic tradition, economic considerations, and, in the case of Sequatchie, proximity to Middle Tennessee, were apparently the main factors which determined the votes of these counties.⁸⁹

West Tennessee gave a majority of 23,010 votes for "Separation" out of a total vote of 35,244. While only 74.2 per cent of the voters had favored the convention in February, 82.6 per cent favored "Separation" in June. Four counties in this division voted for "No Separation." While the influence of Emerson Etheridge was an important factor in all of these counties,⁹⁰ it was apparently paramount in Weakley and Carroll, two comparatively large tobacco- and cotton-producing counties whose interests were somewhat the same as those of the South. Both economic considerations and the influence of Etheridge were important in holding Henderson and Decatur counties loyal to the Union.⁹¹ All of these counties, with the exception of Weakley, had voted against the convention in the election of the preceding February.

Out of a total vote of 66,463, Middle Tennessee gave a majority of 50,057 for "Separation." Although only 48.7 per cent of the voters had supported the move for a convention in February, 87.7 per cent of the voters cast their ballots for "Separation" in June. Only four counties in this section favored "No Separation." The fact that all of these counties, Wayne and Hardin lying along the Tennessee River, and Macon and Fentress situated in the northeastern portion of this area, had hilly, sterile soil and produced very little cotton and tobacco and not much else for sale indicates that economic conditions largely determined their votes. All of these counties except Fentress had

opposed the convention in the preceding election. Fentress County, which had supported the convention, however, was not the only county in this area to change sides between February and June. Bedford, Cannon, Coffee, Davidson, Jackson, Overton Rutherford Van Buren White, Williamson and Wilson, which had voted against the convention in February, voted for "Separation" in June.⁹²

In view of the intense excitement which prevailed at the time, it seems highly improbable that there was a total absence of fraud and intimidation at the election of June 8. The probability is that both sides resorted to violence and corruption in certain instances. The Nashville papers denied and resented the charges of *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig* that the disunionists in Middle and West Tennessee resorted to fraudulent voting and the use of force. The *Patriot* suggested that if there was any intimidation in the election, the victims were the "Separationists" of East Tennessee.⁹³ Apparently some Unionists in sections of Middle and West Tennessee voted freely and others refrained from voting merely because they saw the futility of doing so.⁹⁴ The commander of Tennessee's troops at Lynchburg, Virginia, reported to Governor Harris that the election there was thoroughly honest.⁹⁵ Since some Unionists asserted that there was virtual civil war in certain areas or that they wanted to seize the arms of the disunionists, the opponents of the state administration evidently had some equipment with which to combat their enemies.⁹⁶

The disunionists of Tennessee, who saw in the results of the election of June 8 a triumph of their principles, were very glad to abide by its result. They rejoiced that "Tennessee, by the Sovereign Action of the People," had become "a free, Sovereign and Independent State." They felt, too, that those who had opposed "Separation" and "Representation" should and would accept the result in good faith. This being true, they favored a conciliatory policy toward East Tennessee, where most of the "Union vote" was concentrated.⁹⁷

The Unionists were disgruntled over the outcome of the election and, in East Tennessee especially, showed no disposition to acquiesce permanently in it. On June 11, T. A. R. Nelson, the president of the East Tennessee Convention, pursuant to a resolution which that body had adopted on May 31, issued a call for it to meet again at Greenville on June 17.

Two hundred ninety-two delegates and two alternates from twenty-nine counties in East Tennessee and one delegate and one alternate from two counties in Middle Tennessee assembled at the appointed

time and place.⁹⁸ In its "Declaration of Grievances," which was merely an addition to the resolutions which the convention had adopted at its meeting at Knoxville on May 30 and 31, the convention asserted that although the people of East Tennessee had conducted the election of June 8 fairly, those of Middle and West Tennessee had not done so. It also emphasized the fact that since the government of the United States had been free and tolerant, it preferred it to that of the Confederacy, which was both oppressive and intolerant. Its "Resolutions" expressed a desire for peace; characterized the action of the state legislature in separating Tennessee from the Union and allying it with the Confederacy as unconstitutional; declared that in order to maintain peace, it was presenting a memorial asking the legislature to permit the formation of a separate state of East Tennessee; and provided for the holding of an election for delegates to a constitutional convention to meet at Kingston at some time after the legislature had granted permission for the organization of East Tennessee into a separate state.⁹⁹

The press and people of Middle and West Tennessee were greatly displeased by the attitude and action of the Greeneville Convention. Such a spirit caused many to wonder whether this group would "inaugurate the horrors of civil strife in our very midst." There was a feeling that its "Declaration of Grievances" did not "breathe that lofty spirit of protestation against wrong which a brave, free people are apt to feel when the hand of oppression is laid upon them." It seemed to be "pregnant rather with the bitter revenge of disappointed men, who are willing now to sacrifice the unity of the State's great brotherhood upon the altar of their own broken ambition."¹⁰⁰ Some in Middle and West Tennessee took the position that since the members of the Greeneville Convention had received their appointments before the election of June 8, it was not certain that they really represented the sentiments of the people after that event.¹⁰¹ There were those who believed that denial of the state's right to secede from the Federal government and advocacy of a section's right to secede from the state government were somewhat inconsistent.¹⁰² Middle and West Tennessee, however, still continued to favor a policy of conciliation toward East Tennessee.

In accordance with the instructions of the Greeneville Convention, O. P. Temple, John Netherland and James P. McDonald drew up and presented to the state legislature a memorial requesting that it permit East Tennessee to form itself into a separate state. This document was

substantially an incorporation of the ideas which the convention had expressed in its "Declaration of Grievances" and "Resolutions."¹⁰³

Senator Boyd of Knox and Roane counties presented this memorial to the senate. A joint select committee of five members from the house of representatives and five from the senate took it under consideration. This body subsequently recommended that the legislature take no action on the matter at that time. It was not satisfied that the memorialists adequately and accurately represented the sentiment of East Tennessee. It pointed out that the formation of a new state of East Tennessee was a matter of concern to the entire state, but that Middle and West Tennessee had had no opportunity of expressing their opinions on the subject. It declared that if the citizens of East Tennessee really desired to form a new state, the legislature which the people would elect in a few months would be the proper body to deal with the problem. It earnestly hoped for the removal of "all causes of irritation between citizens of different sections of the state." The legislature unanimously accepted the report of the committee.¹⁰⁴

Parson William G. Brownlow was not surprised that the memorial asking the legislature to grant permission to form a separate state of East Tennessee failed to make a favorable impression on that body. He took the position that the legislature had committed itself "to the policy of allowing East Tennessee to depart in peace, provided 'a majority of the hearts of the people' so desire." He said that East Tennessee accepted this pledge in good faith and would take steps to show that its people wanted statehood.¹⁰⁵

Meanwhile, on June 24, Senator A. O. P. Nicholson wrote as follows to Governor Harris:

Your Proclamation, of this date, declaring "all connection by the state of Tennessee with the Federal Union dissolved," by virtue of the vote cast by the people at the election held on the 8th inst., renders it proper for me to say to you, and through you to the Legislature and People of Tennessee, that I recognize the result so declared by you as a legitimate and valid exercise of popular sovereignty [sic]: and hence that I regard myself as no longer entitled to represent the State of Tennessee as a Senator in the Congress of the United States. I beg leave to add, that I acquiesce cheerfully in the result which dissolves our political connection with the Government of the United States and that I cordially concur in and approve of the judgment pronounced

by the people on the great issue submitted to them at the election held on the 8th inst.¹⁰⁶

Senator Andrew Johnson did not share Senator Nicholson's opinion of the action of the State of Tennessee in issuing its Declaration of Independence from the United States of America. Therefore, he retained his seat in the Senate of the United States.

Meanwhile, during the time when the campaign preceding the election of June 8 was in progress, and later while the Greeneville Convention was in session, neither the Unionists nor the disunionists had lost sight of the fact that the people of Tennessee would select a governor in August. They realized the importance of having an able leader as the state's chief executive during the critical period through which they were passing.

Although William G. Brownlow had announced himself as an independent candidate for the governorship, the Unionists whose nominee he had aspired to be were overwhelmingly in favor of William B. Campbell. At a convention which met in Nashville on May 2 their sentiment was virtually unanimous for him, it seems.¹⁰⁷ In addition, some who intensely disliked Governor Harris and the Democratic party, which they blamed largely for the state of affairs, supported him.¹⁰⁸ Emerson Etheridge favored Campbell's taking the position which he had taken in his contest with Trousdale in 1851, when he had said, "I am for obeying the Constitution and for *forcing* others to do so."¹⁰⁹ Samuel Milligan, Horace Maynard, Judge D. T. Patterson, son-in-law of Andrew Johnson, C. F. Trigg, John Baxter, John Fleming, and other prominent Unionists in East Tennessee wished Campbell to become governor. They believed that he would "call off our gallant and devoted but misguided troops from the field—and merely hold the state in a position of defense against *unlawful* and *unconstitutional* violence from the federal or other forces."¹¹⁰

The bulk of the disunionists, former members of the Constitutional Union Party and Democrats¹¹¹ alike, were rather enthusiastic in their endorsement of Governor Harris for a third term. The governor had sought to conciliate as many groups as he could and had won numerous adherents in spite of the fierce "internal feuds of the politicians of the State."¹¹²

W. G. Brownlow did not remain in the gubernatorial contest very long. William B. Campbell also withdrew after a while as the Unionist candidate. Then, Brownlow and a group of East Tennesseans suggested

the name of Connelly F. Trigg, a lawyer of Knoxville, for the governorship.¹¹³ Trigg, however, had not resided in the state long enough to qualify to make the race. Some in East Tennessee suggested that Judge D. T. Patterson, son-in-law of Senator Andrew Johnson, make the race. George W. Bridges and other supporters of William H. Polk, a brother of James K. Polk and a supporter of Douglas in 1860, secured a clear field for him as the Unionist candidate.¹¹⁴ Finally, Brownlow¹¹⁵ and all the others who disliked and distrusted Governor Harris supported Polk in opposition to Harris.

The supporters of Governor Harris, who were desirous of achieving political unanimity in the state, were exasperated at Polk's candidacy. They felt that inasmuch as Harris had guided the policy of the state during the existing controversy, he was better able than anyone else to continue to do so. They did not believe that Polk would show less partiality in appointments than had Harris. If, as his supporters claimed, he were as sound as Harris on the questions of "separation, representation, and the vigorous prosecution of the war," what was their object in supporting him? Furthermore, if that were the case, why should East Tennessee revolt if Harris won and not if Polk were victorious? If, on the other hand, the object of the election of Polk was to carry the state back into the Union, then it was easy to account for the revival of the Union party.¹¹⁶

Governor Harris defeated Polk by a vote of 73,082 to 42,416. Governor Harris carried both Middle and West Tennessee by decisive votes. Polk, however, won a large majority of the votes of East Tennessee. Governor Harris' supporters won control of the legislature by a big margin. The voters of the state elected ten representatives and two senators to the Confederate Congress. The Unionist voters of the first, second, and third congressional districts chose three Congressmen to represent them in the Congress of the United States.¹¹⁷

While the gubernatorial election of August was something of an anticlimax to the election of June 8, it served to re-emphasize the fact that a decided majority of the citizens of Tennessee favored uniting with the South. The re-election of Governor Harris, moreover, insured a vigorous war policy on the part of the state.

The refusal of the people of Tennessee in the election of February, 1861, to sanction the holding of a state convention which they feared might jeopardize the state's position, in the Union, or, at the least, serve merely to aggravate sectional animosity, was not indicative of their unqualified adherence to the Union. It was rather a manifestation

of their intense desire to remain in the Union provided certain conditions obtained, and an expression of their hope for, and belief in, the possibility of a peaceful solution of the problems confronting the country.

The willingness of the people of Tennessee to accept any compromise which would insure the preservation of the Union and guarantee what they considered their rights lasted until after the fall of Fort Sumter and President Lincoln's subsequent call for troops. These events convinced a very large majority of those who had previously refused to acquiesce in the policy of withdrawing from the Union of the futility of any longer expecting a peaceful settlement of the dispute between the North and the South. They knew then that Tennessee, practically as a matter of course, would have to take sides in the ensuing conflict.

In an effort to achieve unity, political leaders in Tennessee waived any discussion of the right of secession and based the state's action upon the undisputed right of revolution. Except for the Unionists in East Tennessee and those in a few counties along the Tennessee River in Middle and West Tennessee, Tennesseans generally approved of the manner in which Governor Harris and the legislature brought about the state's Declaration of Independence of the United States of America, formed its alliance with the Confederate States of America, and placed it upon a sound military footing. Therefore, the popular vote on "Separation" and "Representation" on June 8, in effect, proved to be largely a routine endorsement of deeds already accomplished.

Although the people of the state as a whole voted two to one for separation from the Union and representation in the Confederacy, those of East Tennessee voted two to one against it. This localization of the major portion of the opposition to the state's policy in one grand division of the state made the problem of sectionalism within Tennessee itself an acute one. East Tennessee was not successful in its attempt to establish itself as an independent state, however, and the boundaries of Tennessee remained intact.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

Geographic, Social and Economic Conditions

1. Roscoe Nunn, "The Climate of Tennessee," *The Resources of Tennessee* (Nashville, 1918) VIII, No. 1, p. 8.
2. George F. Cram, *Universal Atlas of the World* (Chicago, 1922), p. 285.
3. "Geologic Map of Tennessee," 3rd edtn., rev. by Wilbur A. Nelson, State Geologist, 1923.
4. Nunn, "The Climate of Tennessee," *loc. cit.*, p. 15.
5. United States Department of Agriculture, Weather Bureau, *Summary of the Climatological Data for the U. S.*, Sec. 78, p. 19.
6. John E. Pomfret, *The Geographic Pattern of Mankind* (New York, 1935), p. 350.
7. While slightly over thirty per cent of the population of Memphis was foreign born, the foreign-born element in Nashville's population was negligible. Memphis had a much smaller percentage of both free Negroes and slaves than Nashville. *Eighth Census of the United States*, 1860 (cited hereafter as *Eighth Census*), vol. on pop., pp. xxxi and 464. Memphis, whose prosperity was based on both the cotton trade, which accounted for one-third of its annual trade, and on trade with the "upper West," was the sixth city in size in the South in 1860. Gerald M. Capers, Jr., *The Biography of a River Town: Memphis: Its Heroic Age* (Chapel Hill, 1939), pp. 134, 136.
8. *Statistical View of the United States, 1850 (Compendium of the Seventh Census)* (Cited hereafter as *Statistical View.*), pp. 118, 346-7, 362, 368, 370, 383; *Eighth Census*, vol. on pop., p. 467.
9. Tennessee, which gave an excess population of 122,322 to other areas between 1850 and 1860, ranked fourth among the states having the greatest number of emigrants. *Eighth Census*, vol. on pop., p. xxxiv.
10. *Statistical View*, pp. 40, 45-6, 63, 65-6, 82, 85-6; *Eighth Census*, vol. on pop., pp. iv, vi, 467, 593, 595.
11. Blount, Grainger, Greene, Hamilton, Hawkins, Jefferson, Knox, Roane, Sullivan and Washington.

12. Davidson, Jackson, Rutherford, Smith, Stewart, Sumner, White and Wilson.

13. Davidson, Macon, Maury, Montgomery, Rutherford, Smith, Sumner, White and Wilson.

14. The number of free Negroes in Tennessee was never large, ranging in number from 307 in 1800, to 7,300 in 1860, with the greater increase having occurred prior to 1830, when there was a total of 4,555. Nevertheless, because of "frequent newspaper accounts of known or suspected servile plots linked in southern minds with abolitionist exhortations to revolt," Tennessee legislators eventually tried to limit the growth of what they considered a "dangerous social group" which did not fit into the "practical means of racial adjustment and social control" provided by the prevailing slavery system. J. Merton England, "The Free Negro in Ante-Bellum Tennessee," *Journal of Southern History*, IX, No. 1, pp. 37-38 (Feb., 1943).

15. Cannon, DeKalb, Fentress, Grundy, Lewis, Macon, Perry, Van Buren and Wayne in 1850; and Cannon, Cumberland, Fentress, Grundy, Lewis, Macon, Perry, Putnam and Van Buren in 1860.

16. Bedford, Giles, Lincoln, Montgomery, Sumner and Wilson.

17. Giles County's slave population had increased to over ten thousand.

18. Except for Giles, this was the same group of counties as in 1850.

19. *Statistical View*, pp. 302, 308; *Eighth Census*, vol. on pop., pp. 466-7. As a "slave section," West Tennessee was rapidly becoming an integral part of the lower South during the ante-bellum period. Bell Irvin Wiley, "Cotton and Slavery in the History of West Tennessee," unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Kentucky (Lexington, 1929), p. 121.

20. *Statistical View*, 95; *Eighth Census*, vol. on ag., pp. 238-39. Frank L. and Harriett C. Owsley, "The Economic Structure of Rural Tennessee, 1850-60," *Journal of Southern History*, VIII, No. 2, p. 179 (May, 1942); Blanche Henry Clark, *The Tennessee Yeoman, 1840-60* (Nashville, 1942), p. 7; Chase C. Mooney, *Slavery in Tennessee* (Indiana University Publications: Social Science Series No. 17.) (Bloomington, 1957), pp. 124, 126. See Appendices A and B.

21. *Senate Journal* of Tennessee (cited hereafter as *Senate Journal*), 1849-50, pp. 230-5; *Reports from Public Officers and Institutions Made to the General Assembly of Tennessee*, Sessions of 1859-60 (cited hereafter as *Public Documents*, 1859-60), pp. 17 and 30-31. By 1860, the total investment in slave property had increased to \$114,976,374, and the average value of slaves, to \$881.57. In East Tennessee, the total investment was \$10,558,652, and the average value was \$832.77; in Middle Tennessee, total investment was \$57,077,970, and average value was \$839.48; in West Tennessee, total investment was \$47,339,752, and

average value was \$951.52. *Senate Journal Appendix*, 1867-68, pp. 74-76.

22. *Statistical View*, 145; *Eighth Census*, vol. of misc. stat., p. 508.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 143-5; *Ibid.*, pp. 504-6.

24. Robert H. White, *Development of the Tennessee State Educational Organization*, 1796-1929 (Kingsport, Tennessee, 1929), pp. 69-71.

25. *Statistical View*, pp. 156-7; *Eighth Census*, vol. on misc. stat., pp. 321-2.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 159; *Ibid.*, p. 505; *History of Tennessee* (Goodspeed Publishing Company, Nashville, 1886), pp. 286-7.

27. Mrs. John Trotwood Moore, "The Tennessee Historical Society, 1849-1918," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*, III, No. 1, pp. 200-205 (March, 1944).

28. Thomas Cary Johnson, *Scientific Interests in the Old South* (D. Appleton-Century Company, Incorporated for Research in the Social Sciences), University of Virginia (Institute Monograph No. 23), pp. 3-4, 31-34, 67-72, 80, 111-112, 114, 118-25, 188-91, 197-99; F. Garvin Davenport, "Scientific Interests in Kentucky and Tennessee, 1870-90," *Journal of Southern History*, XIV, No. 4, pp. 501-3, 505, 508 (Nov., 1948).

29. *Statistical View*, pp. 133-6; *Eighth Census*, vol. on misc. stat., pp. 497-502.

30. John Bunner, *The Union of the Churches* (Cincinnati, n. d.), p. 75.

31. William W. Sweet, *The Methodist Church and the Civil War* (Cincinnati, 1912), pp. 27-8.

32. *History of the Organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, Comprehending All the Official Proceedings of the General Conference. . . .* (Nashville, 1845), pp. 127-31.

33. Sweet, *The Methodist Church and the Civil War*, pp. 46-7.

34. *Statistical View*, pp. 61, 163-5; *Eighth Census*, vol. on pop., pp. 631-33, 639-44, 647, 62-65; and vol. of misc. stat., p. 312; *Public Documents*, 1859-60, pp. 12-25, 130.

35. The number employed in manufacturing establishments producing over \$500 annually was 12,032 in 1850 and 12,436 in 1860. *Statistical View*, p. 129; *Eighth Census*, vol. on Mfg., p. 578.

36. *Seventh Census of the United States*, 1850 (cited hereafter as *Seventh Census*), vol. of misc. stat., p. 584; *Statistical View*, p. 218; *Eighth Census*, vol. on pop., pp. 656-80.

37. *Statistical View*, pp. 164, 180-1; *Eighth Census*, vol. of misc. stat., p. 512; and vol. on mfg., pp. 577-8.

38. Robert R. Russel, *Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism*, 1840-60 (University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, XI),

(Urbana, Illinois, c. 1924), pp. 199-201. In his report to the legislature in October, 1859, however, the state comptroller pointed out that the taxable value of property in the state, which had been "progressively increasing," had almost tripled since 1848, having increased from \$129,510,043 to \$377,208,641. He attributed this growth principally to the increase in the supply of money following the discovery of gold in California, although he also called attention to the increase in population and the consequent accumulation of property and to the influence of the development of the system of internal improvements and the building of railroads. He observed that while all of these factors affected the price of land, neither the system of internal improvements nor the agitation of the slavery question in the North (which he said the slaveholding states felt equal to handling) determined the price of slaves, which was governed by the increase in the supply of money and the demand for their labor. *Public Documents* 1859-60, ix-x.

39. *Public Documents*, 1859-60, pp. 585-88; Weymouth T. Jordan, "Cotton Planters' Conventions in the Old South," *Journal of Southern History*, XIX, No. 3, pp. 321, 345 (Aug., 1953).

40. *Seventh Census*, vol. on ag., pp. 588-91; *Eighth Census*, vol. on ag., pp. 132-9.

41. *Statistical View*, p. 169; *Eighth Census*, vol. on ag., pp. vii, 22, 215, 222; see Appendix B.

42. Wilson, Giles, Lincoln, Bedford, Montgomery, Sumner, Marshall and Robertson.

43. Cumberland, Fentress, Grundy, Lewis, Perry, Putnam and Van Buren.

44. Bledsoe, Campbell, Johnson, Morgan, Scott, Sequatchie and Union.

45. *Public Documents*, 1859-60, pp. ix-x, 17, 30. By 1860, the average taxable value of land per acre in Tennessee, which had increased from \$3.25 in 1850 to \$8.19 in 1859, had decreased to \$8.13. By 1861, however, it had risen to \$8.20. *Senate Journal Appendix*, 1867-68, p. 57.

46. *Statistical View*, p. 169; *Eighth Census*, vol. on ag., pp. 132-9.

47. *Seventh Census*, vol. on ag., pp. 588-91; *Eight Census*, *ibid.*

48. Weakley (which supplanted Montgomery as the leading tobacco-producing county in the state), Henry, Carroll, Dyer, Decatur, Gibson, Benton and Obion.

49. Montgomery, Williamson, Smith, Robertson, Macon and Sumner.

50. *Seventh Census*, vol. on ag., pp. 588-91; *Eighth Census*, vol. on ag., pp. xcvi, 132-9.

51. Maury, Giles, Lincoln, Williamson, Davidson, Rutherford, Wilson, Sumner, Marshall, Bedford and Smith. The value of the livestock raised in each of these counties amounted to more than a million dollars.

52. They are the first ten mentioned above. Of these, Maury produced more than three million dollars' worth of livestock; and Williamson,

Rutherford, Wilson and Lincoln produced more than two million dollars' worth each.

53. *Seventh Census*, vol. on ag., pp. 588-91; *Eighth Census*, vol. on ag., pp. cxxvi, 132-9.

54. Lewis C. Gray, assisted by Katherine Thompson, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860* (Washington, 1933), II, pp. 837-8.

55. *Statistical View*, pp. 172-3; *Eighth Census*, vol. on ag., pp. 132-9.

56. Constantine S. Belissary, "Industry and Industrial Philosophy in Tennessee, 1850-60," *East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications*, No. 23 (1951), pp. 46-57.

57. *Statistical View*, p. 179; *Eighth Census*, vol. on mfg., pp. 577-8. Since the value of home manufactures increased from only \$3,137,790 to \$3,170,977 during this period, both their value and increase were negligible. *Statistical View*, p. 173; *Eighth Census*, vol. on ag., pp. 132-9.

58. *Eighth Census*, vol. on mfg., pp. 578-9; Belissary, "Industry and Industrial Philosophy in Tennessee, 1850-60," *loc. cit.*, pp. 46-57.

59. Stanley J. Folmsbee, *Sectionalism and Internal Improvements in Tennessee, 1796-1845* (East Tennessee Historical Society Special Studies in Tennessee History, No. 1), (Knoxville, 1939), p. 265.

60. *Eighth Census*, vol. of misc. stat., p. 329.

61. James Phelan, *History of Tennessee* (Boston, 1888), pp. 284-6.

62. Folmsbee, *op. cit.*, p. 265; Belissary, "Industry and Industrial Philosophy in Tennessee, 1850-60," *loc. cit.*, pp. 46-54.

63. Folmsbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-7.

64. *Eighth Census*, vol. of misc. stat., p. 329.

65. *Ibid.*

66. Claude A. Campbell, *The Development of Banking in Tennessee* (Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1932. Published privately, 1932), pp. 128-9, 142-3, 152-3; and "Branch Banking in Tennessee Prior to the Civil War," *East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications*, No. 11, p. 43 (1939).

NOTES

CHAPTER II

The State and the Sectional Dispute between the North and the South, 1847-1850

1. Chauncey S. Boucher, "In re That Aggressive Slavocracy," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, VIII, pp. 15-16 (June-Sept., 1921).

2. For example, the results of the intensely partisan and shortsighted action of the "Immortal Thirteen" were far-reaching and long-lasting. Powell Moore, "James K. Polk and the 'Immortal Thirteen,'" East Tennessee Historical Society's *Publications*, No. 11, pp. 30-31 (1939). Charles G. Sellers, Jr., gives a detailed discussion of both intra- and inter-party rivalries in Tennessee, during all except the latter part of the Jacksonian era in *James K. Polk, Jacksonian, 1795-1843* (Princeton, 1957).

3. Carl S. Driver, *John Sevier* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1932), pp. 79, 194.

4. Folmsbee, *Sectionalism and Internal Improvements in Tennessee, 1796-1845*, pp. 266-7.

5. Mary S. Carroll, "Tennessee Sectionalism, 1796-1861," unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Duke University, 1931), pp. 355-6.

6. Daniel M. Robison, *Bob Taylor and the Agrarian Revolt in Tennessee* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1935), p. 3.

7. As time passed, however, this party, which was essentially conservative and favored the exercise of broad powers by the national government, strengthened the bonds of union with the Federal government in Tennessee. Thomas P. Abernethy, "Origins of the Whig Party in Tennessee," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XII, pp. 503-23 (March, 1926).

8. Allan Nevins, ed., *Polk, the Diary of a War President, 1845-49* (New York, 1929), p. 138. For example, Representative Lucien Chase of Clarksville and Representative Andrew Johnson of Greeneville, who were among the group of Southerners who formed the "hard core of Southern expansionism in Congress," were, like their associates, nationalists and not sectionalists. John Hope Franklin, "The Southern Expansionists of 1846," *Journal of Southern History*, XXV, No. 3, pp. 328-33 (Aug., 1959).

9. *Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 573.

10. Feb. 13, 1847.

11. John Bell to William B. Campbell, Nov. 11, 1846; Judge Ab. Carruthers to Campbell, March 18, 1847; William B. Campbell Papers (cited hereafter as Campbell Papers), Duke University Library. Knoxville *Register*, Feb. 24, 1847.

12. Sam U. Fite to William B. Campbell, Feb. 12, 1847, Campbell Papers; Knoxville *Weekly Register*, Feb. 24, 1847.

13. Feb. 13, 1847.

14. Knoxville *Register*, March 31, 1847.

15. *Ibid.*, April 7, 1847.

16. *Ibid.*, March 31, 1847.

17. Tri-Weekly Nashville *Union*, Feb. 13, 1847.

18. *Union*, Nashville, Aug. 5, 1847.

19. Knoxville *Register*, July 5, 1847.

20. *Union*, Nashville, Nov. 23, 1848. *Republican Banner*, Aug. 27, 1847. See table of election returns in Appendix.

21. *Republican Banner*, Nashville, Aug. 16, 1847; *Enquirer*, Memphis, Aug. 20, 1847. There were those, however, who felt that A. V. Brown's defeat by N. S. Brown "is not unlikely due to the fact that so many got mad at him because they wanted to fight and did not get to fight." W. B. Lenoir, *History of Sweetwater Valley* (Richmond, c. 1916), p. 291.

22. West Tennessee, the newest section of the state, had never furnished a Senator.

23. Middle Tennessee already had the junior Senator, Hopkins L. Turney.

24. Sept. 19, 1847.

25. St. George L. Sioussat, ed., "Letters of John Bell to William B. Campbell, 1839-57 . . .," *Tennessee Historical Magazine*, III, pp. 207-9 (Sept., 1917). *Republican Banner*, Nov. 24, 1847.

26. *Senate Journal*, 1847-48, pp. 56-7.

27. Eleven of the twelve Democrats in the senate opposed this measure, and the other one joined the Whigs in supporting it.

28. Except for Minnis, a Democrat who voted in the affirmative on this resolution, there was no change in the alignment of voters.

29. *Senate Journal*, 1847-48, pp. 508, 558-61.

30. John S. Jennings, *The Life of James Knox Polk and a History of His Administration* . . . (Auburn, [N. Y.], 1851), pp. 282-306; A. O. P. Nicholson, "Eulogy on the Life and Character of James K. Polk," delivered at McKendree Church, Nashville, Nov. 1, 1849, in pursuance of a resolution of the General Assembly of Tennessee (Nashville, 1849). J. T. Trezevant to John C. Calhoun, Aug. 16, 1848, Chauncey S. Boucher and Robert P. Brooks, eds., "Correspondence Addressed to John C. Calhoun." American Historical Association *Annual Report* for 1929, I, p. 463. *Enquirer*, Memphis, Dec. 8, 1847.

31. Eustis Prescott to Calhoun, Nov. 8, 1847, Boucher and Brooks,

loc. cit., p. 409. *Republican Banner*, Nashville, Oct. 22 and Nov. 11, 1847.

32. *Union*, Nashville, Aug. 5, 1847. *Enquirer*, Memphis, April 15, 1847.

33. *Enquirer*, Memphis, July 14, 1847.

34. Some Democratic papers went so far as to charge that General Taylor was not a Whig. The Whigs denied the charge and replied that Taylor himself had just recently said that he was a Whig, a Clay Whig. *Knoxville Register*, May 5, 1847. Although Democrats in various parts of the country had toyed with the idea of making Taylor the Democratic nominee, they had relinquished any such intention long before time for the nomination of a candidate had arrived. Henry Montgomery, *The Life of Major-General Zachary Taylor* (Philadelphia, [n.d.]), p. 378.

35. *Knoxville Register*, April 21, 1847.

36. George R. Poage, *Henry Clay and the Whig Party* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1936) pp. 165-6.

37. *Enquirer*, Memphis, July 14, 1847.

38. *Nashville Whig*, Jan. 11, 1848.

39. *Ibid.* According to Wyndham Robertson of Memphis, a large majority of the leaders of the party at this convention were favorable toward the nomination of Calhoun for the Presidency. Letter to John C. Calhoun, May 10, 1848, Boucher and Brooks, *loc. cit.*, p. 436.

40. Feb. 10 and 19, 1848.

41. John Bell to William B. Campbell, May 23, 1848, Campbell Papers; Boyd McNairy to John J. Crittenden, Feb. 2, 1848, Crittenden Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

42. The *Whig* was apparently apprehensive that the convention might nominate some candidate whom it did not regard as sound on the slavery issue.

43. Feb. 26, 1848.

44. *Ibid.*, March 18, 1848. Washington Barrow to William B. Campbell, April 1, 1848, Campbell Papers.

45. April 26, 1848.

46. Washington Barrow to William B. Campbell, June 19, 1848, and Neill S. Brown to Campbell, Oct. 1848, Campbell Papers.

47. Foster to Crittenden, Oct., 1848 and Balie Peyton to Crittenden, Oct. 21, 1848, Crittenden Papers.

48. *Daily Union*, Nashville, Nov. 23, 1848. *Daily Centre State American*, Nashville, Nov. 25, 1848. See election return tables in Appendix C.

49. Meredith P. Gentry to John J. Crittenden, Nov. 20, 1848, Crittenden Papers.

50. Cave Johnson, a prominent Democrat from Tennessee who had been President Polk's postmaster-general, said that the object of this appointment was to increase Gentry's prestige so that he might run for governor. Letter to James K. Polk, March 17, 1849, Papers of James K.

Polk (cited hereafter as Polk Papers), Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

51. J. W. Chew to William B. Campbell, Dec. 29, 1848; Washington Barrow to Campbell, Jan. 1, 1849; John I. Burnet to Campbell, March 12, 1849, Campbell Papers.

52. *Niles, National Register*, Feb. 7, 1849.

53. Polk had repeatedly expressed his hostility to the Wilmot Proviso and declared his determination to veto it if it extended to territory beyond the Missouri Compromise line. Nevins, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

54. President Polk likewise opposed the plan of Representative Robertson of Indiana to force the slavery issue on the Taylor administration by failing to settle the California and New Mexico issue. He told Robertson on January 18 that "we had a country as well as a party to obey and that it was the solemn duty of the present Congress to settle the question." Nevins, *op. cit.*, pp. 365-8.

55. *Union*, Nashville, Feb. 5, 1849.

56. *Ibid.*, April 19, 1849.

57. The *Centre State American* had promoted the candidacy of General Gideon J. Pillow, who had served in the Mexican War, as the most available man in the state for the governorship. However, it acquiesced gladly in the nomination of Trousdale. Nashville, April 21, 1849.

58. The action of the state Democratic convention when it was in session in 1848 in going *en masse* to the wharf to welcome General Trousdale, who was returning from the Mexican War, and in escorting him back to the convention hall, where the president delivered a "beautiful address" to him, had foreshadowed his probable nomination as the party's standard-bearer in 1849. Nashville *Whig*, Jan. 9, 1848.

59. *Supra*, 47-48. This was probably the twelfth resolution that virtually promised co-operation with other Southern states through a Southern convention or otherwise in resisting the Wilmot Proviso or a law abolishing the slave trade in the District of Columbia in the event that either became a law.

60. April 22, 1849.

61. *Supra*, pp. 40-41, 45-46.

62. *Centre State American*, April 24, 1849.

63. John M. McKee to T. A. R. Nelson, Jan. 24, 1849; E. Alexander to Nelson, Feb. 1, 1849; William H. Sneed to Nelson, Feb. 9, 1849, T. A. R. Nelson Papers (cited hereafter as Nelson Papers), McClung Collection, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville.

64. *Union*, Nashville, April 23, 1849.

65. March 11, 1849.

66. Cave Johnson to James K. Polk, March 22, 1849, Polk Papers. James C. Jones to Nelson, July 12, 1849; William Wales to Nelson, July 12, 1849; Allen A. Hall to Nelson, Sept. 8, 1849; and John Bell

to Nelson, Jan. 28, 1850, Nelson Papers. Circular letter, Campbell Papers.

67. Cave Johnson to James K. Polk, May 23, 1849, Polk Papers.

68. Andrew Ewing, who had protested unsuccessfully against portions of the Democratic platform dealing with the slavery question, was elected to represent the eighth, or Nashville, district, normally Whig, in Congress. *True Whig*, Nashville, Aug. 9, 1851. See tables of election returns in Appendix C.

69. *Whig*, Nashville, Aug. 9, 1849. Boyd McNairy to John J. Crittenden, Aug. 6, 1849, Crittenden Papers. Washington Barrow to William B. Campbell, Aug. 7, 1849; Balie Peyton to Campbell, Nov. 7, 1849, Campbell Papers.

70. *Whig*, Nashville, Aug. 14, 1849.

71. This statement is open to serious question. Brown's position on the slavery issue was substantially in accord with that of practically all of the Whig leaders in the state. J. T. Trezevant to John C. Calhoun, June 7, 1849, Boucher and Brooks, *loc. cit.*, p. 509.

72. Aug. 18, 1849.

73. *House Journal* of Tennessee (cited hereafter as *House Journal*), 1849-50, pp. 49-51.

74. Nashville's central location apparently was a main factor in determining its selection as the site for the convention. J. Franklin Jameson, ed., "Correspondence of John C. Calhoun," *American Historical Association Annual Report* for 1899, II, p. 1206. The desire of the leaders of the movement to gain the support of the border states was also undoubtedly important.

75. Dallas T. Herndon, "The Nashville Convention of 1850," Alabama Polytechnic Institute, *Studies in Southern History and Alabama History* (Montgomery, 1905), pp. 203, 210-11.

76. A few prominent Democrats, Cave Johnson, for example, were alarmed over the prospect of the Nashville Convention from the first. Johnson, who was genuinely shocked to hear "cool calculations of the value of the Union," feared that extremists would control the proposed convention. He was apprehensive of Calhoun's power, since there wasn't one with the strength and courage to oppose him, as Jackson and Polk had. Johnson to Buchanan, Jan. 20, 1850, Buchanan Papers. St. George L. Sioussat, "Tennessee, the Compromise of 1850, and the Nashville Convention," *Tennessee Historical Magazine*, IV, p. 221 (Dec., 1918).

77. Feb. 19, 1850.

78. Feb. 2, 1850.

79. March 2, 1850.

80. March 12, 1850.

81. April 20, 1850.

82. May 5, 1850.

83. The extreme Southern-rights Memphis *Enquirer*, although a Whig

paper, remained friendly to the Nashville Convention. It even recommended that it meet in Memphis rather than in Nashville when it concluded that public sentiment was not as favorable as it might have been in Nashville. Quoted in the *Nashville Union*, March 11, 1850.

84. Feb. 22, 1850.

85. *Ibid.*

86. Feb. 22 and 23, 1850.

87. It continued, "Our heart warms and thrills with love for the men [Webster and Cass] who thus, regardless of consequences, are moving the masses at the North to preserve both the constitutional rights of the South and our glorious Union" (March 25, 1850). John Bell wrote that "For this service [the speech of March 7 in which "he grappled directly and powerfully with the morbid and mischievous anti-slavery feelings and prejudices of the whole North"] alone, considering his high character and the weight his opinions are destined to have upon this subject . . . I consider that Mr. Webster deserves the lasting gratitude of the South, and the Presidency itself if sufficient strength could be rallied to elect him." Letter to William B. Campbell, March 20, 1850. Sioussat, "Letters of John Bell to William B. Campbell, 1839-57," *loc. cit.*, p. 216.

88. Quoted in H. D. Foster, "Webster's Seventh of March Speech and the Secession Movement, 1850," *American Historical Review*, XXVII, p. 256 (Jan., 1922). Cave Johnson was also rather enthusiastic about Webster's speech. Johnson to Buchanan. April 14, 1850, Buchanan Papers.

89. Letter to James B. Knowles, April 8, 1850, Tennessee Historical Society Papers, War Memorial Building, Nashville.

90. *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*, Feb. 19, 1850.

91. *House Journal and Senate Journal*, 1849-50.

92. Feb. 14, 1850.

93. Nashville, Feb. 15, 1850.

94. Nashville, Feb. 20, 1850.

95. Sioussat, "Tennessee, The Compromise of 1850, and the Nashville Convention," *loc. cit.*, p. 244.

96. *Thirty Years' View* . . . (New York, 1854), I, p. 781.

97. *American*, Nashville, June 16, 1850.

98. Herndon, "The Nashville Convention of 1850," *loc. cit.*, pp. 216-7.

99. "Resolutions and Address Adopted by the Southern Convention," (Nashville, 1850), pp. 1-21.

100. St. George L. Sioussat, "Tennessee and National Political Parties, 1850-60," *American Historical Association Annual Report* for 1914, I, p. 253.

101. *Ibid.*

102. J. H. Ingraham, ed., *The Sunny South or the Southerner at Home* (Philadelphia, 1860), 135.

103. June 17, 1850.

104. June 29, 1850.

105. June 16, 1850.

106. June 14, 1850.

107. June 29, 1850.

108. June 14, 1850.

109. June 17, 1850.

110. July 1, 1850.

111. May 25 and Aug. 3, 1850.

112. Even in Tennessee there was "a 'crying half dozen' that argued against submission." Arthur C. Cole, "The South and the Right of Secession in the Early Fifties," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, I, p. 380 (Dec., 1914).

113. President Fillmore signed each of the five measures constituting the Compromise of 1850 "amid energetic protests from the Northern Abolitionists and the Southern Secessionists." Ben Perley Poore, *Perley's Reminiscences of Sixty Years in the National Metropolis* (Philadelphia, 1886), I, p. 364.

114. Barsha R. Webb, "Attitude of Members of Congress from Tennessee on the Slavery Question, 1820-58," unpublished M. A. Thesis (University of Tennessee, 1931), pp. 100-103.

115. *Congressional Globe*, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, p. 439.

116. *Ibid.*, Pt. 2, pp. 1555, 1572-3, 1589, 1647, 1764, 1776, 1807, 1819 and 1830; Webb, "Attitude of Members of Congress from Tennessee on the Slavery Question, 1820-1858," pp. 100-103.

117. Sioussat, "Tennessee, the Compromise of 1850, and the Nashville Convention," *loc. cit.*, p. 243.

118. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig and Independent Journal*, Nov. 30, 1850. Andrew J. Donelson, adopted son of Andrew Jackson and a prominent Democratic politician, was one of the "few others" there. Sioussat, "Tennessee, the Compromise of 1850, and the Nashville Convention," *loc. cit.*, p. 244.

119. *Eagle*, Memphis, Nov. 18, 1850.

120. Tennessee's delegation had shrunk from one hundred to fourteen. Texas and Arkansas sent no representatives.

121. Herndon, "The Nashville Convention of 1850," *loc. cit.*, pp. 230-1. The conservatives, under the leadership of Pillow, A. V. Brown, Nicholson and A. J. Donelson, dominated it. They favored peaceful acquiescence in the Compromise of 1850 on condition of its faithful execution. Claiborne, of the minority, favored immediate secession.

122. Sioussat, "Tennessee, the Compromise of 1850, and the Nashville Convention," *loc. cit.*, p. 244.

123. Sioussat, "Tennessee and National Political Parties," *loc. cit.*, p. 253.

124. Nov. 19, 1850.

125. Nov. 18, 1850.

126. Nov. 30, 1850.

127. Nov. 20, 1850.

128. The institution of slavery had become an essential part of the social and economic system in Tennessee by the period of 1847 to 1861. The state's geographical location had predetermined, it seems, that slavery should come into its territory. Indeed, a provision of the Act of Congress to accept North Carolina's Western Territory stipulated "That no regulations made or to be made by Congress shall tend to emancipate slaves." (See *The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the United States* [Washington, 1878] II, pp. 1667, 1669.) Tennessee, following the constitution of its mother state, North Carolina, as a model, provided for slavery in its first constitution. (See Joshua W. Caldwell, *Studies in the Constitutional History of Tennessee*, 2 ed. [Cincinnati, 1907], p. 148.) Within the three and three-fourths decades between the adoption of Tennessee's first constitution and the meeting of the convention which was to draw up its second one, the antislavery workers, who had entered the state with the first settlers, built up a comparatively strong antislavery feeling, particularly in East Tennessee. In 1827, "East Tennessee alone contained nearly one-fifth of all the antislavery societies of the United States and nearly one-sixth of the total membership." The moving of aggressive agitators to the free states, the rise of the abolition crusade in the North about 1830, and the increasing profits derived from slave labor itself quickly changed this situation, however; and by 1830 no antislavery societies existed in the state. (See Asa E. Martin, "The Anti-Slavery Societies of Tennessee," *Tennessee Historical Magazine*, I, pp. 262-78 [Dec., 1915].)

The fact that the proponents of emancipation attempted to secure the incorporation of a provision for gradual emancipation in the new state constitution of 1834, nevertheless, afforded proof that antislavery sentiment had not entirely died out. There were 1,800 signatures to the antislavery petitions which groups of citizens from sixteen counties sent to the constitutional convention of 1834. Of these sixteen counties, eleven, Greene, Jefferson, Cocke, Sevier, Blount, McMinn, Monroe, Knox, Rhea and Roane, were in East Tennessee; and five, Overton, Bedford, Lincoln, Maury and Robertson, were in Middle Tennessee. The convention declined to consider the antislavery memorials by a vote of forty-four to ten. The ten negative voters were delegates from Bedford, Overton and Fentress counties in Middle Tennessee, and Blount, Monroe, Greene, Knox, McMinn, Washington, Jefferson, Grainger, Claiborne, Campbell, Sevier and Cocke in East Tennessee. (See *Journal of the Convention of the State of Tennessee* (Nashville, 1834), pp. 100, 125-6.)

Although the constitutional convention of 1834 refused to take any

positive steps looking toward the eventual abolition of slavery on the ground of inexpediency, it admitted that the institution was an evil. (See *Journal of the Convention*, p. 88.) As time passed, however, and the people of Tennessee began increasingly to feel the force of the abolition crusade, the attitude of many toward the institution of slavery underwent a change. Resentment against what they felt to be unwarranted and dangerous interference on the part of the North in their internal affairs led them not only to the justification of slavery on Biblical grounds but also to an active support of it as the only satisfactory foundation of their social and economic order. Thus, Tennessee, on the whole, a state of small farmers in which the ratio of white and slave population varied from one to twelve in East Tennessee, to one to three in Middle Tennessee, and to three to five in West Tennessee, had come to have a definite proslavery outlook by the period from 1847 to 1861. (See Caleb P. Patterson, "The Negro in Tennessee," *University of Texas Bulletin* No. 2205 [Austin, 1922], p. 63.)

NOTES

CHAPTER III

Political Rivalry and Union Sentiment in the Fifties

1. Philip M. Hamer, *Tennessee, A History* (New York, 1932), I, pp. 480-1.
2. *American*, Nashville, Aug. 13, 1851.
3. B. H. Shepherd, "Chairman of a Whig Central Committee," to William B. Campbell, Feb. 10, 1851, Campbell Papers.
4. M. P. Gentry to William B. Campbell, Nov. 1850, *Ibid.*
5. John Bell to T. A. R. Nelson, Dec. 17, 1850, Nelson Papers.
6. W. W. Pepper to William B. Campbell, Feb. 18, 1851, Campbell Papers.
7. J. W. Allen to William B. Campbell, March 3, 1851; G. A. Henry to William B. Campbell, Feb. 10, 1851; A. R. Burnet to William B. Campbell, Oct. 14, 1850; W. M. Cooke and seventeen others to William B. Campbell, Feb. 8, 1851; Boyd McNairy to William B. Campbell, Feb. 6, 1851; A. M. Looney, M. S. Fennon, A. M. Hughes, R. F. Looney, Minrod Porter, W. W. Porter and Anthony Gholson to William B. Campbell, Campbell Papers. See also letters of M. P. Gentry and W. W. Pepper, cited *supra*, p. 65.
8. *Union*, Nashville, Aug. 2, 1851.
9. *True Whig*, Nashville, June 27 and 30, 1851.
10. *Union*, Nashville, and *True Whig*, Nashville, Aug. 6, 1851.
11. *True Whig*, Nashville, Aug. 6, 1851.
12. *Ibid.*, June 27 and 30, 1851.
13. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig and Independent Journal*, June 21, 1851.
14. *True Whig*, Nashville, Aug. 6, 1851.
15. *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*, Oct. 11, 1853; *Union*, Nashville, Aug. 22, 1851. See table of election returns in the Appendix.
16. *True Whig*, Nashville, Aug. 21, 1851. Nevertheless, there were apparently some Whigs in Middle and West Tennessee who believed that Campbell was too mild in his treatment of the "free soilers of the North." Hugh Preston (fictitious name) to William B. Campbell, May 1, 1851, Campbell Papers.

17. *True Whig*, Nashville, Aug. 21, 1851. A very large majority of Tennesseans apparently placed complete confidence in the efficacy of the "principle of constitutional guarantees" as a source of protection for the South. For a discussion of the "principle of constitutional guarantees," see Jesse T. Carpenter, *The South as a Conscious Minority* (New York, 1930), pp. 5, 127-67.

18. *American*, Aug. 13, 1851.

19. *Union*, Nashville, Aug. 16, 1851; *American*, Nashville, Aug. 13, 1851.

20. Aug. 20, 1851.

21. *Union*, Washington, Oct. 12, 1851.

22. *Union*, Nashville, Oct. 21, 1851.

23. *Washington Union*, Oct. 12, 1851.

24. Oct. 21, 1851.

25. In the opinion of A. O. P. Nicholson, the divergent beliefs and personal antagonism of Henry Watterson, editor of the *Nashville Union*, and Thomas Boyers, editor of the *Nashville American* (Nicholson had mistakenly assumed that Major E. G. Eastman, associated with Boyers in the publication of the *American*, was responsible for the "ultra" editorials in the paper), was an important factor in the defeat of the Democrats. Therefore, Nicholson, who had had no sort of connection with the course of either paper and who had not participated in the canvass except "to aid in my own section by my conservatism and vote," set on foot a move to bring about the ultimate merging of the two papers because he was convinced that the Democratic party would suffer as a result of the dissension between them. Nicholson had "condemned" Watterson's position on the Compromise of 1850 as "yielding too much" and Boyers' position as being "too ultra." He felt that a single paper, with an editorial policy somewhere between those of Watterson and Boyers, would be desirable; and he seemed to be certain that no paper adopting the "ultra position" of the *American* could ever be the party's organ. A. O. P. Nicholson to Major Eastman, April 11, 1852, Nicholson Papers, New York Historical Society, New York City.

26. *Union*, Nashville, Aug. 12, 1851. F. P. Stanton of the eleventh, or Memphis, Congressional district, who had signed the Southern Address along with Turney, was victorious in his race.

27. J. M. Pryor to William B. Campbell, Aug. 8, 1851, Campbell Papers.

28. Message of Governor William Trousdale, Oct. 9, 1851, Archives of Tennessee, War Memorial Building, Nashville.

29. Message of Governor William B. Campbell, Oct. 29, 1851, Archives of Tennessee. Governor Campbell's message, with its cordial endorsement of the Compromise of 1850, its apparently naive acceptance of the finality of the Compromise, and its somewhat exaggerated concep-

tion of Tennessee's influence in national affairs, doubtless gave much satisfaction to those who were glad that he had defeated Trousdale because, as G. W. Cooke observed, "I believe Trousdale is opposed to the Compromise." Letter to Thomas Gilbreath, Aug. 18, 1851, Cannon Papers, McClung Collection, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville.

30. Return J. Meigs to S. J. W. Lucky, Sept. 8, 1851; M. P. Gentry to T. A. R. Nelson, Sept., 1851, Nelson Papers. Gentry hoped that Nelson would succeed Turney and that John Bell could defeat James C. Jones, whom Gentry considered the chief contender for Bell's place, and retain his position. Since Jones had been instrumental in bringing about Turney's election by Whig votes, Gentry said, there would be retributive justice in Bell's beating him in turn by the use of Democratic votes, if necessary.

31. William G. (Parson) Brownlow to T. A. R. Nelson, Aug. 28, 1851; A. G. Welcker to S. J. W. Lucky, Sept. 9, 1851, Nelson Papers. E. Alexander to William B. Campbell, Sept. 18, 1851; T. N. Van Dyke to Campbell, Dec. 5, 1851, Campbell Papers.

32. *Union*, Washington, Sept. 26, 1851. *Union*, Nashville, Oct. 31, 1851. The contest between Nelson and Netherland for the undivided support of East Tennessee was very bitter.

33. *Union*, Nashville, Oct. 31, 1851.

34. James C. Jones to William B. Campbell, Nov. 22, 1851, Campbell Papers.

35. *Union*, Nashville, Nov. 15, 1851. Differences of opinion among Democratic leaders in Tennessee had been growing for several years. Andrew Johnson had taken an active part in preventing President James K. Polk from securing a renomination in 1848. Senator Turney had tried to keep Lewis Cass from receiving the Democratic nomination in the same year chiefly because he understood that Henry Watterson and A. O. P. Nicholson were in favor of his election, according to Representative Andrew Johnson. (Johnson apparently was ignoring the fact that Turney, who had definitely aligned himself with the strongly pro-Southern group, probably doubted Cass's soundness on the slavery issue, as did numerous other Southern Democrats.) Andrew Johnson to A. O. P. Nicholson, May 11, 1851, Nicholson Papers. Some debate had occurred on the adoption of a portion of the state Democratic platform in 1849. *Supra*, p. 48. A fractional disagreement between Nicholson and A. V. Brown had developed during the second session of the Nashville Convention. Sioussat, "Tennessee, the Compromise of 1850, and the Nashville Convention," *loc. cit.*, p. 246.

In the early part of the campaign of 1851, when the Democrats were optimistic regarding their chances for victory, various leaders were concerned about the question of a successor to Senator Turney. Andrew Johnson wrote A. O. P. Nicholson that the candidate for the legislature in

that area would have to say whom he expected to support for the place. He said that he and several of the most prominent people of Greeneville, some of whom were Whigs, wanted Nicholson to indicate his opinion on the Homestead Bill "for the purpose of giving you an opportunity of throwing your Self before the public mind at the opening of the Canvass." Johnson continued,

They desire you to be united with your real friends and by taking the lead on the "Homestead" can do you no harm but much good. . . . We understand Brown up in this neck of the woods—. If he fails in making things work to suit his convenience, he will then be for Cave Johnson to defeat you, hence the importance of your being brought before the people—. Nicholson you have but little to expect from the politicians of Tennessee, they in the main are against you—. So just come down into the ranks with your true friends and we will do the best we can in the approaching contest—.

He stated that no East Tennessean would oppose Nicholson at that time, but that one might when Bell's place became vacant.

Johnson declared that he favored the popular election of Senators and suggested that perhaps Nicholson should take a stand on that question. He urged Nicholson to appeal both to the landless and the landowners. Letter of May 11, 1851, Nicholson Papers.

36. James S. Jones, *Life of Andrew Johnson* (Greeneville, Tennessee, 1901), p. 46.

37. *Acts of Tennessee* (cited hereafter as *Acts*), 1851-52, pp. 719-21.

38. *True Whig*, Nashville, Aug. 6, 1851. T. A. R. Nelson to William B. Campbell, July 9, 1851, Campbell Papers.

39. J. H. Howard to William B. Campbell, Oct. 24, 1851, Campbell Papers.

40. Gustavus A. Henry to T. A. R. Nelson, Feb. 10, 1852, Nelson Papers.

41. W. G. Swan to William B. Campbell, March 3 and June 16, 1852; W. N. Bilbo to Campbell, March 14 and 24, 1852; M. P. Gentry to Campbell, March 24, 1852, Campbell Papers; M. P. Gentry to T. A. R. Nelson, March 20, 1852, Nelson Papers.

42. W. G. Swan to William B. Campbell, March 3, 1852, Campbell Papers.

43. Arthur C. Cole, *The Whig Party in the South* (Washington, 1913), pp. 216-7, 225.

44. "These southern Whigs were always prepared to fall back upon a Union movement on the true basis, devoid of sectionalism and of the ultraism that had characterized all previous southern movements and that had made their defeat inevitable." *Ibid.*, p. 233.

45. Many Whigs in Tennessee severely criticized the course of the "seceders." However, a number of them minimized the effect of their course upon the unity of the Whig party. *Post*, Athens, Tennessee, May 2, and 21, 1852.

46. Cole, *The Whig Party in the South*, pp. 236-7, 251.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 253.

48. June 26, 1852. There is a pencilled note on the bottom margin of this issue of the paper which reads, "Scott defeated nomination of Clay in 1840."

49. Cole, *The Whig Party in the South*, p. 263.

50. Many in Gentry's own district censured him severely in secret, it seems, but refrained from attacking him publicly because of fear that he might injure the Whig cause in the state. John McGavock to William H. Polk, Aug. 23, 1852, Polk Papers, North Carolina Historical Commission, Raleigh.

51. *Post*, Athens, Sept. 17, 1852.

52. *Register*, Knoxville, Oct. 6, 1852.

53. Andrew Johnson Papers (cited hereafter as Johnson Papers), Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

54. There was some mention of General Gideon J. Pillow and A. O. P. Nicholson as possible Vice Presidential nominees. *Union*, Nashville, Nov. 17, 1851. W. N. Bilbo to William B. Campbell, March 25, 1852, Campbell Papers.

55. *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*, Oct. 11, 1853. See tables of election returns in Appendix C.

56. *Post*, Athens, March 25, 1853; *Union*, Nashville, April 26, 1853.

57. Jones, *Life of Andrew Johnson*, p. 46.

58. George F. Milton, *The Age of Hate* (New York, 1930), p. 85.

59. Andrew Johnson to A. O. P. Nicholson, May 11, 1852, Nicholson Papers.

60. Some Democrats in West Tennessee felt that the nominee should come from that section. *Post*, Athens, March 4, 1853.

61. *Union*, Nashville, April 28 and 30, 1853.

62. Quoted in Milton, *The Age of Hate*, p. 85.

63. *Ibid.*

64. April 28 and 30, 1853.

65. *Post*, Athens, May 6, 1853.

66. Thomas P. Abernethy, *From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1932), p. 315.

67. Hamer, *Tennessee, A History*, I, p. 401. The Athens *Post*, which had understood that Johnson was opposed to internal improvements, wondered how he would justify that opposition to those in the state who favored them, especially those in East Tennessee. Edition of May 6, 1853.

68. Hamer, *op. cit.*, pp. 490-2.

69. *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*, Oct. 11, 1853; *Union and American*, Nashville, Aug. 13, 1853. See tables of election returns in Appendix C.

70. S. R. Anderson to A. O. P. Nicholson, Aug. 16, 1853, Nicholson Papers.

71. *Senate Journal*, 1854-55, pp. 42-3.

72. Oct. 30, 1853.

73. *Union and American*, Nashville, March 7, 1854.

74. March 9, 1854.

75. *Congressional Globe*, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., pt. II, pp. 1254, 1321.

76. Sioussat, "Letters of John Bell to William B. Campbell, 1839-57," *loc. cit.*, p. 224. Letter of "Southron" in *Eagle and Enquirer*, Memphis, May 7, 1856.

77. March 9 and 13, 1854.

78. Nov. 11, 1854.

79. Milton, *The Age of Hate*, p. 88.

80. Abernethy, *From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee*, p. 321.

81. Milton, *The Age of Hate*, p. 88.

82. Hamer, *Tennessee, A History*, I, p. 497.

83. J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton, "Life of Andrew Johnson" (Reprint of the article which appeared in the *Dearborn Independent* published by the Andrew Johnson Woman's Club of Greeneville, Tennessee), p. 4.

84. *Union and American*, Nashville, Aug. 25, 1855. See tables of election returns in Appendix C.

85. For example, the *Union and American* of Nashville paid costs to secure the dismissal of a suit for libel which James W. Williams had filed against it. The *Union and American* had published a letter from a Democrat at Carthage which had challenged the truth of statements in an account of a Democratic meeting in Smith County, which Williams had had published in the *Nashville Patriot*. The correspondent had referred to Williams and to the American party in very objectionable terms. Record in office of Circuit Court of Davidson County, Nashville.

86. Robert Hatton, who became the gubernatorial candidate of the Opposition party in 1857, described the Republican national convention as "hard a set as was ever congregated together." Letter to wife, June 19, 1856, quoted in James V. Drake, *Life of General Robert Hatton* (Nashville, 1867), pp. 92-3.

87. June 11, 1856. This paper was under the influence of Cave Johnson.

88. Letter to William M. Lowry, June 26, 1856; letter to Robert Johnson, June 28, 1856, Johnson Papers.

89. Cave Johnson to James Buchanan, Oct. 10, 1849, Aug. 14, 1850, July 21, 1851, and Aug. 24, 1856. James Buchanan Papers, The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

90. *American Banner*, Nashville, March 22, 1856.

91. March 20, 1856. Donelson had changed his allegiance from the Democratic to the Know Nothing, or American, party.

92. July 11, 1856. John Bell to William B. Campbell, Sept. 10, 1856, Campbell Papers. The Americans realized, at any rate, that this was a life or death struggle for their party. W. H. Sneed to O. P. Temple, Jan. 25, 1856, Temple Papers, Tennessee Collection, University of Tennessee Library, Knoxville. Andrew Johnson, who was of the opinion that if the Democrats should by chance lose the state it would be "on account of the extreme weakness of our candidate and nothing else," said that the "Fillmore men" would make a strong attempt to carry the state because they were "struggling for political existence." He asserted, "They dare not join the Black Republicans and they are unwilling to be absorbed by the democracy; hence they will make a hard struggle, to carry a state or two and sell out to the highest bidder if the election comes before the house of Representatives." Letter to A. O. P. Nicholson, June 27, 1856, Nicholson Papers.

93. John Bell to William B. Campbell, Sept. 10, 1856, Campbell Papers. *Union and American*, Nashville, Oct. 28 and 29, 1856.

94. E. Alexander to O. P. Temple, Oct. 26, 1856, Nelson Papers. Jones had transferred his allegiance from the Whig to the Democratic party.

95. *Union and American*, Nashville, Oct. 10, Nov. 11, and Dec. 5, 1856. See table of election returns in Appendix C. Buchanan rewarded the Democrats in Tennessee by naming former Governor A. V. Brown a member of his cabinet.

96. *Union and American*, Nashville, Nov. 6, 1856.

97. Nov. 12, 1856.

98. Nov. 13, 1856.

99. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, Nov. 15, 1856.

100. *Post*, Athens, Dec. 5, 1856.

101. Letter to Samuel Milligan, Nov. 23, 1856, Johnson Papers (Letter copied from Madigan's Catalog and placed in the Johnson Papers).

102. Sioussat, "Letters of John Bell to William B. Campbell, 1839-57," *loc. cit.*, p. 226.

103. Nashville, Aug. 8, 1857; *Post*, Athens, Aug. 14, 1857.

104. For example, the *Southern Citizen*, a new weekly paper which John Mitchell and Wm. G. Swan were shortly to begin publishing in Knoxville, was to be "a 'thoroughly Democratic and States Rights Journal' with a squint for the formation of a *Southern* party and the reopening of the African Slave Trade." *Post*, Athens, Sept. 4, 1857.

105. Sept. 4, 1857.

106. William W. Stringfield, *Memoirs of the Civil War*, typewritten copy in McClung Collection, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville, p. 1.

107. *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*, July 15, and Aug. 2, 1857; *Patriot*, Nashville, July 16, 1857.

108. July 22, 1857.

109. M. A. Hayes to William B. Campbell, Jan. 20, 1857, Campbell Papers.

110. W. Hy Smith to William B. Campbell, April 18, 1857, Campbell Papers. *Union and American*, Nashville, July 11, 1857.

111. *Union and American*, Nashville, July 11, 1857. There was some opposition to Hatton in East Tennessee at least. R. Love to O. P. Temple, May 9, 1857; Nat Taylor to Temple, May 28, 1857, Temple Papers.

112. July 11, 1857.

113. *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*, July 15 and Aug. 2, 1857; *Patriot*, Nashville, July 16, 1857.

114. *Patriot*, Nashville, July 16, 1857.

115. *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*, Aug. 2, 1857.

116. *Patriot*, Nashville, July 16, 1857.

117. *Ibid.*

118. *Union and American*, Nashville, Aug. 30, 1857; *Republican Banner*, Aug. 15 and 18, 1857. See table of election returns in Appendix C.

119. *Union and American*, Nashville, Oct. 10, 1857. In the first election the Americans supported N. S. Brown; and in the second, they voted for John Bell, the incumbent, *Republican Banner*, Oct. 29, 1857. A. O. P. Nicholson to Franklin Pierce, June 3, 1857, Franklin Pierce Papers, Library of Congress.

120. *Union and American*, Nashville, Oct. 9, 1857.

121. *Ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1857. Other Democratic possibilities for the Senatorship were General G. J. Pillow, Andrew Ewing, L. C. Haynes, a Democratic leader from upper East Tennessee, William H. Polk, a brother of James K. Polk, Judge A. O. Totten, Judge Dunlap and retiring Senator James C. Jones. *Republican Banner*, Nashville, Sept. 13, 1857. Nicholson was aware of the competition for the post. Nicholson to Franklin Pierce, March 27 and June 3, 1857. Pierce Papers.

122. *Acts*, 1857-58, pp. 423-5. The minority of the Committee on Federal Relations reported a resolution which declared that "our Senators and Representatives . . . ought to be left perfectly free, and untrammelled to pursue that Course which in their judgment may best promote the public good, and do justice to all parties Concerned." Report of the minority of the Committee on Federal Relations, Archives of Tennessee.

123. Jones, *Life of Andrew Johnson*, p. 62.

124. *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, March 24, 1859.

125. *Opposition*, Nashville, May 10, 1859.

126. *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, March 17 and 24, 1859.

127. *Opposition*, Nashville, May 10, 1859.

128. *Republican Banner*, Nashville, Aug. 11, 1859.

129. "Circular" of the Whig party, July, 1859, Campbell Papers.

130. May 2, 1859.

131. *Republican Banner*, Nashville, Aug. 10 and 11, 1859.

132. *Opposition*, Nashville, July 8 and May 31, 1859. T. A. R. Nelson had an altercation with the *Greeneville Democrat* and the *Jonesborough Union* over their "endeavor to fasten the false charge of Black Republicanism on me." T. A. R. Nelson to S. S. Turner, June 14, 1859.

133. *Union and American*, Nashville, Aug. 30, 1859; *Daily News*, Nashville, Aug. 9, 1859; *Republican Banner*, Nashville, Aug. 11, 1859. See table of election returns in Appendix C.

134. *House Journal*, 1859-60, pp. 305-7, and *Senate Journal*, 1859-60, pp. 203-4. *Acts*, 1859-60, pp. 652-6.

135. For reaction in Tennessee, see: R. R. Butler to T. A. R. Nelson, Oct. 12, 1859; R. J. Meigs to T. A. R. Nelson, Dec. 12, 1859; Neill S. Brown to Nelson, Dec. 17, 1859; James C. Moses to Nelson, Dec. 21, 1859; John B. Gaines to Nelson, Dec. 22, 1859; Wm. McSween to Nelson, Dec. 22, 1859; Samuel D. Morgan to Nelson, Dec. 31, 1859, Nelson Papers. *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*, Dec. 13, 1859, *Congressional Globe*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. I, pp. 2, 18, 20, 47-48.

136. *Congressional Globe*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. I, pp. 138, 274, 277-8, 286, 318-9, 364-70, 395-9, 440-4, 507, 638-40.

137. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6, 98-107.

138. *Ibid.*, pp. 494, 623-8.

NOTES

CHAPTER IV

The Presidential Election of 1860

1. *Union and American*, Nashville, Dec. 4, 1859.
2. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig and Independent Journal*, Nov. 15, 1856.
3. *Supra*, p. 94.
4. Nov. 16, 1859.
5. Fayetteville, Nov. 17, 1859. By Jan. 18, 1860 the *Lincoln Journal* was following the example of the newly established *Lebanon Democrat* by carrying the name of Andrew Johnson at the head of its columns as its candidate for the Presidency, Fayetteville, Jan. 18, 1860. There were those in the Democratic party in Tennessee who had suspected Johnson of having Presidential aspirations even during his first gubernatorial administration. W. J. Sykes to Nicholson, 1854, Nicholson Papers.
6. As early as April 13, 1859, the Memphis *Avalanche*, a Democratic paper and the leading organ of the extreme Southern-rights group in Tennessee, had asserted correctly, it seems, that John Bell was the absolute ruler of his party in the state and that he was its avowed candidate for the Presidency in 1860.
7. Clipping from the *Patriot*, Nov. 1, 1859, T. A. R. Nelson Scrapbook, IX, McClung Collection, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville.
8. Nashville, Aug. 15, 1859. According to the *Daily News*, an independent paper, James C. Jones of Memphis conferred with Douglas in regard to his candidacy for the Presidential nomination in 1860 during the summer of 1859. Nashville, Aug. 2, 1859.
9. Nashville, Oct. 14, 1859.
10. Nashville, Dec. 10, 1859. John Brown's raid was the decisive factor.
11. Dec. 12, 1859.
12. *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*, Jan. 13, 1860, Nelson Scrapbook, IX.
13. Clipping from the *Greeneville Democrat*, Jan. 17, 1860, Nelson Scrapbook, IX.

14. *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, Jan. 26 and Feb. 2, 1860.
15. Murat Halstead, *Caucuses of 1860*. . . , (Columbus, 1860), p. 40.
16. George Fort Milton, says in *The Eve of Conflict* (Boston and New York, 1934), p. 403, "General Pillow drafted the slavery-planks in the platform so that they neither conflicted with Douglas' views nor compromised his friends. . . . Then the Johnson forces approached the Douglas men and an understanding was reached under which Johnson's instructions were accepted, but the delegation was to come to Douglas if and when Johnson dropped out. . . ."
17. *Union and American*, Nashville, March 20, 1860.
18. The delegation consisted of: Andrew Ewing, John R. Howard, J. D. C. Atkins, Samuel Milligan, William H. Maxwell, John D. Riley, Thomas M. Lyon, W. E. B. Jones, George W. Rowles, William Wallace, David Bunford, James M. Shied, John McGavock, Robert Matthews, W. L. McClelland, Thomas W. Jones, W. C. Whitthorne, Alfred Robb, Thomas Menees, H. W. Wall, James Comer, William H. Carroll, Samuel McClanahan and James M. Avent. Halstead, *Caucuses of 1860*, p. 1.
19. Clipping from the *Daily News*, Nashville, Jan. 22, 1860, Nelson Scrapbook, VIII.
20. Nashville, Jan. 20, 1860.
21. Clippings from issues of Jan. 24 and 19, 1860, Nelson Scrapbook, VIII.
22. Nashville, Jan. 19, 1860, Nelson Scrapbook, IX.
23. Jan. 27, 1860.
24. Madison Bratton, "The Unionist Junket of the Legislatures of Tennessee and Kentucky in Jan., 1860," East Tennessee Historical Society's *Publications*, No. 7 (Knoxville, 1935), pp. 64-80.
25. *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, Feb. 2 and 28, 1860.
26. Jan. 21, 1860.
27. Columbia, Tennessee, Feb. 8, 1860.
28. *Ibid.*, Feb. 15, 1860. County Union conventions throughout the state adopted similar resolutions.
29. Tennessee's delegates to the National Union Convention at Baltimore were: William G. Brownlow, Bailey Peyton, John S. Brien, Gustavus A. Henry, W. Brazleton, Robert Craighead, John J. Craig, Neill S. Brown, Edwin H. Ewing, J. W. Richardson, A. J. Donelson, W. Homar, O. P. Temple, C. F. Trigg, R. Brabson, Joseph Pickett, William Hickerson, S. H. Combs, Jordan Stokes, R. S. Northcott, A. S. Colyear, Henry Cooper, L. J. Polk, J. C. Brown, W. P. Kendrick, James C. Stark, J. H. Callender, Clay Roberts, Joseph Barbien, J. M. Parker, T. A. R. Nelson, H. Maynard, William Stokes, Robert Hatton, James M. Quarles, William (should be Emerson) Etheridge and P. W. Maxey. Halstead, *Caucuses of 1860*, p. 104.
30. Clippings from the *Daily News*, Nashville, Feb. 23, 1860, Nelson

Scrapbook, IX, and *The Gazette*, Chattanooga, Feb. 25, 1860, Nelson Scrapbook, VIII.

31. *Maury Press*, Columbia, Tennessee, Feb. 29, 1860.

32. *Ibid.*, March 7, 1860.

33. Clippings from *The Gazette*, Feb. 25, 1860, Nelson Scrapbook, VIII.

34. Feb. 25, 1860, Crittenden Papers.

35. Feb. 23, 1860.

36. Fayetteville, March 1, 1860.

37. *House Journal*, 1859-60, pp. 832-56.

38. *Acts*, 1859-60, pp. 681-82.

39. Clipping from the *Daily News*, Nashville, Jan. 26, 1860, Nelson Scrapbook, VIII.

40. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*.

41. Halstead, *Caucuses of 1860*, 1.

42. This was the platform which the Democratic Party had adopted at Cincinnati in 1856.

43. Marguerite B. Hamer, "The Presidential Campaign in Tennessee in 1860," East Tennessee Historical Society's *Publications*, No. 3, p. 10 (1931). *Supra*, pp. 109-10.

44. Halstead, *Caucuses of 1860*, p. 80.

45. Horace Greeley and John F. Cleveland, comps., *A Political Textbook for 1860* (New York, 1860), p. 41.

46. *Ibid.*

47. Milton, *The Age of Hate*, p. 95.

48. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, May 8, 1860.

49. *Maury Press*, Columbia, May 9, 1860.

50. *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, May 10 and 17, 1860.

51. Halstead, *Caucuses of 1860*, p. 119.

52. Greeley and Cleveland, *A Political Textbook for 1860*, p. 29.

A. S. Colyar of Tennessee violated his instructions and voted for Sam Houston on the first ballot. Clyde T. Ball, "The Public Career of Col. A. S. Colyar, 1870-78," unpublished M.A. thesis (Vanderbilt University, 1937).

53. *Union Guard*, Washington, Aug. 16, 1860.

54. *Maury Press*, Columbia, Tennessee, May 16, 1860.

55. *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, May 17, 1860.

56. Greeley and Cleveland, *A Political Textbook for 1860*, pp. 26-29.

57. T. J. Moore to Horace Greeley, July 4, 1860, Horace Greeley Papers.

58. Quoted in James S. Jones, *Life of Andrew Johnson*, pp. 64-65.

59. Greeley and Cleveland, *Political Textbook for 1860*, pp. 43-44.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-45.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

62. Nashville *Union and American*, Jan. 27, 1860.

63. Halstead, *Caucuses of 1860*, p. 198.

64. After Benjamin Fitzpatrick of Alabama declined the Vice Presidential nomination which the convention had tendered him, the National Committee nominated Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia to supply the vacancy. Greeley and Cleveland, *A Political Textbook for 1860*, p. 48.

65. Halstead, *Caucuses of 1860*, pp. 210, 213.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

67. Since the Shelbyville *True Union* was in an area where Democratic sentiment was decidedly in favor of Breckinridge, it shifted its support from Douglas to Breckinridge for pecuniary reasons. However, the proprietor, a strong supporter of Douglas, placed the paper in charge of S. H. Whitthorne for the duration of the canvass. The *Lincoln Journal* was apparently the only paper in its Congressional district which supported Douglas. *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, June 28, 1860.

68. Dwight L. Dumond, *The Secession Movement* (New York, 1931), citing Nashville *Union and American*, of July 1, 1860.

69. Aug. 16, 1860, Nelson Papers.

70. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, Sept. 1860.

71. Clipping from *Knoxville Register*, July 5, 1860, Nelson Scrapbook, IX. *Congressional Globe* and Appendix, 37 Cong. I Sess., p. 295.

72. Connelly F. Trigg to Oliver P. Temple, Aug. 4, 1859, Temple Papers.

73. *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, July 19 and Aug. 30, 1860. At a caucus of Democrats from Tennessee in Washington on Saturday night, immediately preceding the convening of the convention at Baltimore, Governor Harris, John C. Burch, editor of the *Union and American*, and a few others made speeches recommending that the delegates from Tennessee withdraw from the Baltimore convention if that body refused to admit those who had bolted at Charleston. Henry Watterson, a delegate who favored Douglas, spoke against such a course. *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, Aug. 30, 1860, quoting a letter from Henry Watterson which appeared in the *Union and American*.

74. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, July 14, 1860.

75. Aug. 9, Sept. 21; and Oct. 5, 23 and 31, 1860.

76. Sept. 29, 1860.

77. June 6 and July 18, 1860.

78. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, Aug. 18 and Sept. 1, 1860.

79. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, Sept. 22, 1860.

80. *Ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1860.

81. *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, Sept. 27, 1860.

82. *Ibid.*; Memphis, Oct. 9, 1860.

83. Oct. 29, 1860. Naturally the supporters of Bell were not eager to see a successful fusion movement among the Democrats in the state.

84. Nashville, Dec. 1860. See tables of election returns in Appendix C.

85. *Ibid.*

86. *Ibid.*

87. *Ibid.*

88. The single county which Douglas carried was normally Democratic. Two of the six in which he was runner-up to Bell were also Democratic as a rule. One of the six was normally Whig. Although the other three had wavered in their party allegiance, two of them had voted for the Whig-Know-Nothing-American-Opposition candidates more often than they had for the Democratic, and one of them had voted an equal number of times for each. *Supra*, p. 131.

89. *Supra*, pp. 18-19, 25-26.

CHAPTER V

Conservatism Triumphant, February, 1861

1. *Supra*, p. 95, tables of election returns in Appendix C.
2. For example, see: Henry Watterson to A. O. P. Nicholson, Nov. 16, 1860, Nicholson Papers; draft of a letter from William H. Polk to "My Dear Sir," Historical Commission, Nov. 19, 1860, Polk Papers (Manuscripts of Division, North Carolina, Raleigh); entries of Nov. 7 and 29, 1860, in Diary of John H. Bills (Southern Historical Collection, Library of the University of North Carolina); entry in David A. Deaderick's *Register of Events and Facts Recorded Annually*, typewritten copy in McClung Collection, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville, pp. 53-54.
3. Frank W. Klingberg, "James Buchanan and the Crisis of the Union," *Journal of Southern History*, IX, No. 44, pp. 455-57, 471-74 (Nov., 1943).
4. Murfreesboro, Nov. 10, 1860.
5. Nov. 14, 1860.
6. This plan had its origin in a belief in the soundness of the contention that cotton gave the South the bargaining power which David Christy had claimed that it did in his *Cotton Is King* (Cincinnati, 1855).
7. Nov. 9, 16, 30, 1860.
8. Nov. 10, 17, 24, 1860.
9. Fayetteville, Nov. 15, 1860.
10. Nov. 18, 20, 29, 1860.
11. Nov. 14, 1860.
12. *Union and American*, Nashville, Nov. 25, 1860.
13. Mary R. Campbell, "The Significance of the Unionist Victory in the Election of February 9, 1861, in Tennessee," East Tennessee Historical Society's *Publications*, No. 14, pp. 12-13 (1942).
14. *Union and American*, Dec. 2, 1860.
15. *Ibid.*, Dec. 1, 1860.
16. Johnson Papers.
17. Dec. 6, 1860.
18. Dec. 14 and 7, 1860. In his study, *Business and Slavery* (Chapel

Hill, 1941), Philip Foner emphasized the efforts of the merchants of New York, who had close economic ties with the South, to prevent the dissolution of the Union between 1850 and 1861.

19. Fayetteville, Dec. 6 and 13, 1860.

20. *Maury Press*, Columbia, Dec. 12, 1860, quoting the letter which had appeared in the *Republican Banner*, Nashville. There was a rumor that Bell had "signified a willingness to accept office in Lincoln's Cabinet." Letter of A. H. Harris to Rev. George Harris, Dec. 4, 1860, George Harris Papers, State Library, Nashville.

21. Dec. 13, 1860, Johnson Papers.

22. Oliver P. Temple, *East Tennessee and the Civil War* (Cincinnati, 1899), pp. 149, 154, 165.

23. *Congressional Globe*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. I, pp. 117-120, 134-143.

24. W. C. Kyle to T. A. R. Nelson, Feb. 6, 1861, Nelson Papers. M. R. Henly to Andrew Johnson, Dec. 23; R. B. Davidson to Andrew Johnson, Feb. 14, 1861, Johnson Papers. There was a rumor that the legislature would instruct Andrew Johnson to resign his seat in the Senate. *Republican Banner*, Nashville, Jan. 8 and 9, 1861.

25. M. D. L. Boren to Andrew Johnson, Jan. 7, 1861, Johnson Papers.

26. Samuel Milligan to Andrew Johnson, Dec. 24, 1860 (Milligan did not actually commend Johnson, because he had not read his speech at the time. Since he expressed the same opinion as Johnson had stated, however, there is apparently no doubt of his approval of Johnson's speech.); H. M. Watterson to Andrew Johnson, Jan. 4, 1861; Cave Johnson to Andrew Johnson (undated but in the volume containing letters written between Dec. 22, 1860-Jan. 3, 1861), Johnson Papers.

27. Letters cited above in addition to others which Johnson received emphasize this fact. *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, Jan. 3, 1861. (This paper carries the date, Jan. 3, 1860, but a study of its contents reveals that its actual date is Jan. 3, 1861); *Gazette*, Chattanooga, Jan. 8, 1861. See also H[enry] S. Foote, *War of the Rebellion* (New York, 1866), pp. 318-21.

28. Robert Johnson to Andrew Johnson, Jan. 31, 1861, Johnson Papers. Robert Johnson, the son of Andrew Johnson, was a representative from Greene, Hancock, Hawkins and Jefferson counties in the lower house of the state legislature.

29. M. D. L. Boren to Andrew Johnson, Jan. 7, 1861, Johnson Papers.

30. James W. Fertig, *Secession and Reconstruction in Tennessee* (Chicago, 1898), p. 15.

31. Dec. 19, 1860.

32. For a discussion of "the egocentric, the destructive, the evil, the malignant type of sectionalism that destroyed the Union in 1861," see Frank L. Owsley, "The Fundamental Cause of the Civil War: Egocentric

Sectionalism," *Journal of Southern History*, VII, No. 1, pp. 3-18 (Feb., 1941).

33. *Congressional Globe*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. I, pp. 185-189. Senator Nicholson communicated his view of affairs in Congress to his constituents through a letter to the editors of the *Union and American* of Dec. 13, 1860.

34. *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, Jan. 31, 1861.

35. *Acts*, 1 Ex. Sess., Jan., 1861, pp. 1-12. While the *Union and American* (Jan. 8, 1861) considered Governor Harris' message clear, logical and accurate, the *Republican Banner* (Jan. 15, 1861) considered it inflammatory.

36. Robert Johnson to Andrew Johnson, Jan. 13, 1861, Johnson Papers.

37. *Senate Journal*, Ex. Sess., Jan., 1861, p. 59. *House Journal*, *ibid.*, p. 105; *Acts*, 1 Ex. Sess., Jan., 1861, pp. 15-17.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

40. *House Journal*, Ex. Sess., Jan., 1862, pp. 161-168. Relative to this action, *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig* declared in an editorial that "The Tennessee Legislature has elected Delegates to a Southern Convention—a work they had no business to undertake, and not elected by the people to perform." It was glad to see in each case that the "Union men were elected by from one to three of a majority." "And out of the twelve," it continued, "there are but two Secessionists, Messrs. Totten and Martin. These two gentlemen, at least, are set down as doubtful men to the Secessionists, as Union men never suffer themselves to be misunderstood." Feb. 2, 1861. G. W. Jones, chosen to represent the sixth district, declined to serve because a majority of the legislators had not voted for him. Jones, who believed that some compromise or adjustment was necessary to quiet the public mind, approved of the legislature's course. He did not believe in the doctrine of secession, but he did believe in the right of revolution. George W. Jones Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.

41. Congressman John V. Wright, Democratic Congressman from the seventh district, did not make a speech concerning the state of the Union. Congressman Reese B. Brabson, who was unable to deliver his speech on account of an injury, received permission to insert it in the *Congressional Globe* as of March 2, 1861. *Congressional Globe*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, p. 1432.

42. Robert Hatton to William B. Campbell, Jan. 24 and 29 and Feb. 4, 1861, Campbell Papers; Horace Maynard to Oliver P. Temple, Jan. 29, 1861, Temple Papers. Letter of James H. Thomas to the citizens of the sixth Congressional district, *Union and American*, Jan. 1, 1861. "Letter of Hon. William T. Avery of Tennessee to his constituents" (Washington,

Dec. 27, 1860). Avery, who had been hopeful of a settlement of the sectional dispute when he arrived in Washington, was now convinced that there was "a grand war between the slave states and the free states" who had "by their voice alone," elected their President "to rule over" us, and who would make no concessions of value to the South. The only problem of Tennesseans, he thought, was to decide whether their state should go with the North or the South or participate in the formation of a "middle republic." "Letter," pp. 1-2, 6. The fact that none of the members of Tennessee's Congressional delegation were among the signers of an address, "To Our Constituents," which a group of Southern members had issued on December 14, 1860, saying that the Republicans would make no concessions satisfactory to the South, and recommending separate state secession and the organization of a Southern Confederacy is significant. Mary R. Campbell, "The Significance of the Unionist Victory in the Election of February 9, 1861, in Tennessee," *loc. cit.*, n. 11, p. 14, citing John G. Nicolay, *The Outbreak of Rebellion, Campaigns of the Civil War Series* (New York, 1941), Note, pp. 26-7.

43. *Congressional Globe*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, pp. 135-138.

44. Etheridge had listed: Maryland, Missouri, Kentucky and Tennessee. While the number of escaped slaves increased notably from two border slave states, Missouri and Virginia, from 1850 to 1860, it decreased markedly in those of Delaware, Maryland and Tennessee. At the same time, there was an increase in the escape of slaves from Mississippi, but a decrease in escapes from Georgia and Louisiana, also in the Deep South. The total number of slaves who ran away from their masters was both proportionately and numerically fewer in 1860 than it had been in 1850. *Eighth Census*, vol. on pop., p. xv.

45. Representative Etheridge had submitted a joint resolution, incorporating approximately the border-state position, which proposed the following eight amendments to the Constitution:

"Article 1. Congress shall have no power to interfere with slavery in any of the States of the Union.

"Article 2. Congress shall have no power to interfere with or abolish slavery in any of the navy-yards, dock-yards, arsenals, forts, or other places ceded to the United States, within the limits of any States where slavery exists.

"Article 3. Congress shall have no power to interfere with or abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, without the consent of the States of Maryland and Virginia; nor without the consent of the inhabitants of said District; nor without making just compensation to the owners.

"Article 4. Congress shall have no power to prohibit the removal or transportation of slaves from one slave State to another slave State.

"Article 5. The migration or importation of persons held to service or

labor for life or a term of years, into any of the States, or the Territories belonging to the United States, is perpetually prohibited; and Congress shall pass all laws necessary to make prohibition effective.

"Article 6. In all of that part of the territory of the United States, not included within the limits of any State, which lies north of the parallel of $36^{\circ} 31''$ of north latitude, slavery, or involuntary servitude, except for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall be prohibited; and in all that territory of the United States, not included within the limits of any State, which lies south of said parallel $36^{\circ} 30''$ of north latitude, neither Congress nor any Territorial Legislature shall have power to pass any law abolishing, prohibiting, or in any manner interfering with the right to hold slaves; and whenever, in any portion of the territory north or south of the said parallel of $36^{\circ} 30''$ there shall be, within an area of not less than sixty thousand square miles, a population equal to the ratio of representation for a member of Congress, the same shall be admitted by Congress into the Union as a State, upon the same footing with the original States in all respects whatever, with or without slavery, as its constitution may determine.

"Article 7. No territory beyond the present limits of the United States and the Territories thereof shall be hereafter acquired by, or annexed to, the United States, unless the same be done by a concurrent vote of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, or, if the same be acquired by treaty, by a vote of two-thirds of the Senate.

"Article 8. Article four and section two of the Constitution of the United States shall be so amended as to read as follows: A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime (*against the laws of said State*) who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime." *Congressional Globe*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. I, p. 279.

46. *Congressional Globe*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, pp. 111-16.

47. *Congressional Globe*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. I, pp. 437-8.

48. *Ibid.*, Pt. II, pp. 121-124.

49. *Ibid.*, Appendix, p. 165.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

51. *Ibid.*, pp. 170, 142.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

54. *Ibid.*, Appendix, pp. 106-111.

55. *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, Jan. 22, 1861. (This paper carries the date, Jan. 22, 1860, but a study of its contents reveals that its actual date is Jan. 22, 1861.)

56. G. A. Henry to John Bell, Dec. 4, 1860, and H. S. Foote to John

Bell, Jan. 12, 1861, Bell Papers. J. F. Henry to Sue Henry, Feb. 6, 1861, discussing public reaction to a recent letter and a recent speech of G. A. Henry, Henry Papers.

57. Letters of William H. Polk to "My Dear Sir," Jan. 4 and 19, 1861, Polk Papers.

58. *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, Jan. 22, 1861.

59. Jan. 20, 1861.

60. Memphis, Jan. 21 and 25, 1861.

61. Memphis, Jan. 25, 1861.

62. Nashville, Feb. 3, 1861.

63. Some believed that if it had not been for Senator Johnson's speech of December 18, 1860, there would have been trouble in holding East Tennessee. Letter of W. C. Kyle to T. A. R. Nelson, Feb. 6, 1861, Nelson Papers.

64. *Republican Banner* and *Nashville Whig*, Jan. 29, 1861.

65. T. W. Watkins, Jan. 19, 1861, Crittenden Papers.

66. Jan. 19, 1861.

67. *Union and American*, Nashville, Jan. 29, and Feb. 5, 1861. *Avalanche*, Memphis, Jan. 25 and Feb. 4, 1861.

68. Cave Johnson to William B. Campbell, Jan. 6, 1861, Campbell Papers. W. P. Titus, *Picturesque Clarksville* (Clarksville, 1887), p. 98.

69. *Union and American*, Nashville, Jan. 29, 1861.

70. Jordan Stokes to William B. Campbell, Jan. 15 and Jan. 29, 1861; Robert Hatton to Campbell, Jan. 24 and 29 and Feb. 4, 1861; J. C. Ramsey to Campbell, Jan. 16, 1861; H. S. Carrick to Campbell, Feb. 1, 1861, Campbell Papers. Horace Maynard to Oliver P. Temple, Temple Papers.

71. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, Jan. 19, 1861.

72. *Union and American*, Nashville, Jan. 27, 1861.

73. Jan. 28, 1861.

74. *Union and American*, Nashville, March 3, 1861. See table of election returns in Appendix C.

75. Titus, *Picturesque Clarksville*, p. 259. If, as some believed, it was the best policy for the people, themselves, to "adjust" the question of union or disunion, which was to be the "controlling subject for the action of the Convention," this vote represented a clear cut adjustment. See an entry in the Journal Kept by Judge William M. Bradford During the Extra Session of the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee in 1861 . . . , typewritten copy in the Chattanooga Public Library.

76. Clifton R. Hall, *Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1916), p. 5.

77. See tables of election returns in Appendix C.

78. Feb. 14, 1861.

79. Feb. 16 and 23, 1861.

80. Feb. 11, 1861.

NOTES

CHAPTER VI

The Declaration of Independence and Its Aftermath

1. John R. Neale, *Disunion and Restoration in Tennessee* (New York, 1899), p. 7.

2. Simon Bradford to Senator John J. Crittenden, Feb. 21, 1861, Crittenden Papers. Bradford, who was a candidate for the position of postmaster in Memphis, was asking Crittenden's support. David M. Potter, *Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis* (New Haven, 1942), pp. ix and 375. See also entry of February 9, 1861, in John H. Bills' Diary.

3. *Argus*, Memphis, Feb. 11, 1861. Since Tennessee was a part of that West of which the Ohio River was the "spinal cord," a West built upon the "blending of Southern and Northern elements into a new society differing from that of either of the regions from which its people had come," the spirit of Tennesseans was one of "mutual understanding—the ability to accept and absorb or concede and compromise varying points of view." William C. Binkley, "The South and the West," *Journal of Southern History*, XVII, No. 1, p. 12 (Feb., 1951).

4. *Chronicle*, Clarksville, Feb. 15, 1861.

5. Hinton R. Helper, the author of *The Impending Crisis of the South, How to Meet It* (New York, 1860). This book apparently circulated in Tennessee, although it was hard to get. R. A. McDonald to T. A. R. Nelson, 1860, Nelson Papers.

6. *Daily Argus*, Memphis, Feb. 11 and 15, 1861.

7. *Chronicle*, Clarksville, Feb. 15, 1861.

8. *Union and American*, Nashville, Feb. 10, 1861. The Opposition members of Congress from Tennessee were for the most part friendly to Crittenden's proposals. *Supra*, pp. 166–7. See *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, Feb. 23, 1861. See also: letter of Jordan Stokes to William B. Campbell, Jan. 29, 1861, Campbell Papers; and letters of T. W. Watkins to John J. Crittenden, Jan. 19, 1861; W. H. Morris to Crittenden, Jan. 21, 1861; and Simon Bradford to Crittenden, Feb. 21, 1861, Crittenden Papers.

9. Nashville, Feb. 10, 1861.

10. Robert Hatton to William B. Campbell, Jan. 31, 1861; Jordan Stokes to Campbell, Jan. 29, 1861, Campbell Papers.

11. This body met at the suggestion of Virginia. It remained in session from Feb. 4, to Feb. 27 in an attempt to find some practicable settlement of the controversy then agitating the county. L. E. Chittenden, *A Report . . . of the Conference Convention* (New York, 1864).

12. *Union and American*, Nashville, March 3, 1861. Judge A. O. Totten voted against the first proposition.

13. Robert Hatton to William B. Campbell, Feb. 25, 1861, Campbell Papers.

14. *Argus*, Memphis, Feb. 18, 1861; *Union and American*, Nashville, ville, March 3, 1861.

15. Feb. 19, 1861.

16. Feb. 19, 1861.

17. Feb. 12, 1861.

18. *Ibid.*, March 5, 1861.

19. *Ibid.*, March 6 and 7, 1861.

20. Nashville, March 5, 1861.

21. Nashville, March 14, 1861.

22. Nashville, March 7, 1861.

23. March 8, 1861.

24. Columbia, March 14, 1861.

25. *Republican Banner*, Nashville, April 5, 1861.

26. S. B. Moore to William B. Campbell, March (apparently), 1861; T. J. Campbell to Campbell, March 17, 1861; John Trimble to Campbell, April 9, 1861, Campbell Papers.

27. William H. Polk to "My Dear Sir," Nov. 19, 1860, Polk Papers.

28. John Fouche to W. H. Polk, Feb. 28, 1861, Polk Papers. Polk had already characterized Governor Harris' message to the legislature in January as "an insidious document, well calculated to inflame the public mind . . . , a cowardly production under the circumstances, failing in every point of view to meet the present State of things." William H. Polk to "My Dear Sir," Jan. 8, 1861.

29. Nashville, March 17, 1861.

30. April 6, 1861.

31. For example, the city council of Nashville by a vote of eight to seven endorsed the course of Senator Andrew Johnson and the state's seven Opposition Congressmen, Nelson, Maynard, Stokes, Brabson, Hatton, Quarles and Etheridge. *Union and American*, Nashville, March 17, 1861.

32. Nashville, April 14, 1861.

33. April 13, 1861. The April 12 issue of the *Appeal* had carried the following list of secession papers in the State:

West Tennessee

Memphis *Appeal*

Memphis *Avalanche*

Jackson *West Tennessean*
 Bolivar *Southerner*
 Somerville *Republic*
 Paris *Sentinel*
 Dyersburg *Recorder*
 Convention *Spy*
 Brownsville *American*

Middle Tennessee

Nashville *Union and American*
 Nashville *Gazette*
 Columbia *Herald*
 Lebanon *Democrat*
 Gallatin *Examiner*
 Murfreesboro *News*
 Shelbyville *Expositor*
 Fayetteville *Observer*
 Winchester *Home Journal*

East Tennessee

Chattanooga *Advertiser*
 Knoxville *Register*
 Cleveland *Banner*

34. J. P. Young, *Standard History of Memphis, Tennessee* (Knoxville, 1912), pp. 118-19. According to Peter Turney's account in a gubernatorial race in 1892, Franklin County had seceded from Tennessee and sought to attach itself to Alabama after the people of the state had defeated the proposal to hold a convention in February. Robinson, *Bob Taylor and the Agrarian Revolt in Tennessee*, p. 178.

35. Nashville, April 16, 1861.

36. Nashville, April 14 and 16, 1861. The only effort which the Union men had made to sway sentiment in Nashville was to hold a meeting on the night of April 17. There were eight hundred or a thousand, mainly old men, present. The group was orderly, and was determined to try to decide upon the best course to pursue. There were several speeches "from the Unionist point of view." R. D. Allison to William B. Campbell, April 18, 1861, Campbell Papers.

37. Nashville, April 18, 1861.

38. Nashville, April 17, 1861.

39. Letter to a friend, undated, miscellaneous collection of papers from West Tennessee, in the McClung Collection, in Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville.

40. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, April 2, 1861.

41. April 17, 1861, T. A. R. Nelson Papers.

42. What appears to be the original of the telegram, which Governor Harris sent to Secretary Cameron, is in the files of the Tennessee Historical Society in the War Memorial Building, Nashville. Evidently Harris originally thought of saying seventy-five thousand instead of fifty thousand men, because the number seventy-five is marked out twice just before the number fifty thousand.

43. *Republican Banner*, Nashville, April 19, 1861; *Patriot*, Nashville, April 14, 1861.

44. *Supra*, 149-50. Avery Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War* (New York, 1942), pp. 435-8; James G. Randall, "The Blundering Generation," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXVII, No. 1, 7 (June, 1940); Charles W. Ramsdell, "The Changing Interpretation of the Civil War," *Journal of Southern History*, III, No. 1, 27 (Feb., 1937).

45. *Patriot*, Nashville, April 24, 1861. General Gideon J. Pillow declared in a confidential letter to L. P. Walker, secretary of war of the Confederate States of America, that Bell had "held back as long as public opinion would tolerate him." *The War of the Rebellion, A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Washington, 1898, Ser. I, Vol. LII, Pt. 1, p. 69. Bell had previously had some correspondence with the administration at Washington concerning Federal appointments in Tennessee. John Bell to Montgomery Blair, P. M. General, March 7, 1861, Johnson Papers.

46. The people of Paris, a small town in West Tennessee, refused to let him speak "after a short conflict with pistols in which four men were wounded and one killed." G. J. Pillow to Secretary Walker, April 24, 1861, in *War of the Rebellion . . . Official Records*, Series I, Vol. LII, Pt. 1, p. 69.

47. A. J. Heiman to William B. Campbell, April 21, 1861; G. J. Pillow to Campbell, April 22, 1861; letter and telegram from Robertson Topp and John Martin to Campbell, April 24, 1861; W. P. Jones to Campbell, April 25, 1861; A. H. Douglas to Campbell, April 25, 1861; Campbell Papers. George Dixon, the man whom the Committee of Safety at Memphis had deputed to present to Governor Harris its resolution requesting that Campbell have charge of military affairs in that section of the state and to solicit his appointment, wrote that,

Owing to the delay of action on the part of the Committee at Memphis, Govr. Harris had deputed Genls. Pillow and Anderson to proceed to Memphis and organize the Companys before he was notified of their wishes in relation to yourself. With which he Could not have Complied having no authority by the laws, to make it. . . .

Letter to William B. Campbell, April 26, 1861, Campbell Papers.

48. Letter and telegram of John C. Burch (one of the editors of the *Union and American*) to L. P. Walker, secretary of war of the Confederate States of America, April 11 and 13, respectively, 1861, in *War of the Rebellion . . . Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. LII, Pt. 1, pp. 36, 37, 47.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

50. A commissioner from the Confederate States had been unable to persuade Governor Harris to make any provisions for Tennessee's co-operation with his government earlier. Henry W. Hilliard, *Politics and Pen Pictures* (New York, c. 1892), p. 325. In a move to strengthen the state's financial position, Governor Harris informed the officials of the Union and Planters' banks that he would require those institutions to supply money for the defense of the state. The officials felt compelled to yield, although the banks were "Northern institutions." "An Account of the Principal Difficulties Encountered by the Planters' Bank of Tennessee from 1861 to the Present time," by D. Weaver (Nashville, 1872), pp. 7-9.

51. *War of the Rebellion . . . Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. II, Pt. I, pp. 77.

52. Letter to Secretary Walker, April 20, 1861, *Ibid.*, p. 58.

53. Letter to Secretary Walker, April 22, 1861, *Ibid.*, p. 63.

54. Letter of G. J. Pillow to Secretary Walker, May 24, 1861; letter of William B. Bate to Secretary Walker, April 26, 1861, *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

55. Letter of April 21, 1861, *Ibid.*, p. 60.

56. Nashville, April 27, 1861.

57. Nashville, April 24, 1861.

58. *Senate Journal*, 2 Extra Sess., 1861, pp. 5-9. Governor Harris withheld his message from publication. The legislature resolved to carry on its deliberations in secret session. Henry W. Hilliard to Robert Toombs, secretary of state of the Confederate States of America, April 29, 1861, *War of the Rebellion . . . Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. LII, Pt. I, p. 76.

59. Robert Johnson to Andrew Johnson, April 29, 1861, Johnson Papers.

60. Hilliard, *Politics and Pen Pictures*, pp. 326-328.

61. Governor Harris had proposed this method of dealing with the situation because he was "unwilling to interpose a convention between himself and the people." Henry W. Hilliard to Secretary Toombs, April 29, 1861, *War of the Rebellion . . . Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. LII, Pt. I, p. 77.

62. *Acts*, 2 Extra Sess., April, 1861, pp. 13-23.

63. Washington Barrow later replaced Trimble in the senate.

64. *Senate Journal*, 2 Extra Sess., 1861, pp. 32-33.

65. Ira P. Jones later replaced East in the house.

66. *House Journal*, 2 Extra Sess., 1861, p. 57.

67. This league was similar to the one which the Confederacy had already negotiated with Virginia.

68. Andrew Johnson, and T. A. R. Nelson, Horace Maynard, C. F. Trigg, and O. P. Temple, prominent men of Knoxville, had sent a message to J. S. Boyd, John Williams and R. H. Armstrong in Nashville declaring that "By firmness and deliberation the State may be saved. With reasonable time for a canvass, East Tennessee will give twenty thousand majority against Secession." Published in *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, May 4, 1861.

69. *Senate Journal*, 2 Extra Sess., 1861, pp. 68-69.

70. *House Journal*, 2 Extra Sess., April, 1861, p. 79.

71. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, May 11, 1861.

72. A. O. P. Nicholson to a friend in another state, apparently Senator James S. Green of Missouri, May 5, 1861, Nicholson Papers. See also Foote, *War of the Rebellion*, pp. 321-2.

73. Gen. Wm. B. Bate, "Address at the Dedication of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park," Sept. 20, 1895, p. 9, in the writer's possession.

74. Thenceforth Nicholson was apparently a "deeply interested looker-on" at political affairs in the state. This was probably attributable to the fact that for the preceding ten or twelve years he had followed the leadership of Senator Andrew Johnson, and so incurred the enmity of Governor Harris and some other Democratic leaders. A. O. P. Nicholson to Governor Andrew Johnson, Dec. 28, 1864, Nicholson Papers.

75. Emerson Etheridge to William B. Campbell, May 9, 1861, Campbell Papers.

76. Washington Barrow to William B. Campbell, April 29, 1861; J. C. Cummings, G. A. Henry, and F. K. Zollicoffer to Campbell, May 2, 1861; Neill S. Brown, Balie Peyton, John S. Brien, John Bell and F. K. Zollicoffer to William B. Campbell, Campbell Papers. In a letter of May 1, J. C. Cummings told Campbell, "President Davis told Judge Perkins [who was presenting his name as "General to command the troops from Tennessee"] that your name had been presented to him before; and that he did not know of our views. 'That little matter between you and him had been forgotten on his part long ago.'"

77. Isaac Sampson to William H. Polk, May 24, 1861, Polk Papers.

78. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, May 15, 1861. B. M. McDannel of Greeneville, Tennessee, a friend of Senator Andrew Johnson, who was to be qualified as Marshal of East Tennessee, expressed somewhat similar views, and also alluded to the call for the meeting of the East Tennessee Convention to meet at Knoxville on May 30 and 31. Letters to B. F. Pleasants, Solicitor of the Treasury ad-interim, Washington, D.C., May 13 and 16, 1861, Records of the Solicitor of the Treasury, Selected Letters

Received from United States Attorneys, Clerks of Courts and United States Marshals, Tennessee, 1861-70, National Archives.

79. Thomas W. Humes, *The Loyal Mountaineers of East Tennessee*, p. 104.

80. *Republican Banner*, Nashville, May 28, 1861.

81. Temple, *East Tennessee and the Civil War*, pp. 187, 196.

82. J. G. M. Ramsey, Autobiography, with a few letters appended, typewritten copy, McClung Collection, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville, p. 58-a.

83. Temple, *East Tennessee and the Civil War*, p. 196.

84. *Constitutional History of Tennessee*, 2nd ed., p. 184. Avery Craven, *The Repressible Conflict, 1830-61* (University, Louisiana, 1939), p. 10.

85. Only twenty years earlier Andrew Johnson had introduced a resolution in the legislature looking to the formation of a separate state of East Tennessee. *Senate Journal*, 1841-42, p. 495, and *House Journal*, 1841-42, p. 663.

86. "Proceedings of the E. Tenn. Convention Held at Knoxville, May 30th and the 31st, 1861," pp. 1-13.

87. See tables of election returns in Appendix C.

88. *Union and American*, June 25, 1861. See tables of election returns in Appendix C. In as much as there was comparatively little difference between the votes on "Separation" and "No Separation," on the one hand, and "Representation" and "No Representation," on the other, the writer proposes to analyze only the vote on "Separation" and "No Separation."

89. For analysis of East Tennessee's votes in the elections of 1860-61, see Verton M. Queener, "East Tennessee and the Secession Movement, 1860-June, 1861," *East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications*, No. 20, pp. 59-83 (1948).

90. *Patriot*, Nashville, June 13, 1861.

91. *Ibid.*

92. See tables of election returns in Appendix C.

93. *Union and American*, June 9, 1861. *Republican Banner*, June 16 and 23, 1861. *Patriot*, June 9 and 26, 1861.

94. John Lellyett to Andrew Johnson, June 10, 1861, Johnson Papers.

95. John C. Vaughn to Isham G. Harris, June 8, 1861, Isham G. Harris Papers, State Library.

96. W. H. Cherry, D. T. Street, H. M. Wood, Thomas Maxwell, Julius S. Perry, H. K. Broyles and fourteen other men from Hardin and Wayne counties to John Lellyett, May 5, 1861, Johnson Papers. R. A. Crawford to T. A. R. Nelson, July 18, 1861, Nelson Papers.

97. *Union and American*, Nashville, June 11, 1861; *Patriot*, Nashville, June 13, 1861; *Republican Banner*, Nashville, June 16, 1861; *Chronicle*, Clarksville, June 14, 1861; *Lincoln Journal*, Fayetteville, June 27, 1861;

and *Avalanche*, Memphis, June 24, 1861. The Unionist press of Middle and West Tennessee bitterly resented and declared false the charges on the part of *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig* and other papers that the "Union Press" in Middle and West Tennessee was "corrupt and subsidized." *Patriot*, Nashville, June 28, 1861 and *Republican Banner*, Nashville, June 16, 1861. The legislature expressed its view of the results of the election in the following resolution:

WHEREAS, The people of Tennessee by a large majority, have dissolved all further political relations with the government of the United States, and trusting as we do to the patriotism and loyalty of those who cast their votes against such separation, that they will submit to the decision and abide the fortunes of thier State; therefore;

Resolved, That we, the members of the General Assembly, do earnestly appeal to the good citizens of the State to unite as one man against a common enemy; that we shall continue to trust to their love of country and their homes, rather than to stringent measures of legislation; and therefore that in our judgment neither new enactments for the punishment of treason, nor the passage of test oaths, to insure a pledge of loyalty from the citizens, are the remedies to be present applied; but rather a continued reliance upon the patriotism and intelligence of the masses of the people of Tennessee. PUBLIC ACTS, Extra Sess., April, 1861, pp. 81-9.

98. Rhea County was the only one in East Tennessee which sent no representative. "Proceedings of the E. Tenn. Convention held at Greeneville on the 17th day of June, 1861, and succeeding days," p. 27.

99. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-24.

100. *Republican Banner*, Nashville, June 28, 1861.

101. *Patriot*, Nashville, June 28, 1861. The *Union and American* characterized the body as "an irresponsible, self-constituted convention of Union politicians in East Tennessee." Nashville, June 27, 1861.

102. *Union and American*, Nashville, June 27, 1861.

103. "Proceedings of the E. Tennessee Convention . . . , pp. 26-28.

104. *Senate Journal*, 2 Extra Sess., June, 1861, pp. 70, 142-144, 176-178.

105. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, July 13, 1861. Brownlow, who had advocated that "East Tennessee Secede" in the event that the Unionists lost the election of February 9, declared that East Tennessee had indicated this desire in the Knoxville and Greeneville conventions. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, Jan. 26, 1861 and July 13, 1861. T. A. R. Nelson, president of the East Tennessee Convention, issued a call for the election of delegates to the East Tennessee Convention at Kingston on August 31. He was to announce the date on which the group would assemble at a

later time. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, July 13, 1861. The occupation of East Tennessee by the Confederacy prevented the meeting of this Convention.

106. This letter is unsigned, but the context clearly indicates that Senator Nicholson is its author.

107. Neill S. Brown, Balie Peyton, John S. Brien and John Bell to William B. Campbell, May 3, 1861; Jordan Stokes to Campbell, May 6, 1861, William B. Campbell Papers.

108. Washington Topp to William B. Campbell, May 29, 1861, Campbell Papers.

109. Emerson Etheridge to William B. Campbell, May 9, 1861, Campbell Papers.

110. John Lellyett to William B. Campbell, May 16, 1861, Campbell Papers.

111. *Union and American*, Nashville, had declared as early as April 4 that there was a general demand for Governor Harris to accept a third term.

112. Henry W. Hilliard to Secretary Toombs, April 29, 1861, *The War of the Rebellion . . . Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. LII, Pt. I, p. 83. General William B. Bate, a friend of Harris, asked and received permission for Governor Harris to recall troops whom he had sent outside the state for service, as "He will be candidate again, I think, and we want him right beyond cavil before the masses." Telegrams from William B. Bate to Secretary Walker, April 30, 1861, and telegram from Secretary Walker to Governor Harris, May 1, 1861. *Ibid.*, pp. 79, 81.

113. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, July 13, 1861.

114. George W. Bridges to William H. Polk, July 17, 1861, Polk Papers.

115. *Brownlow's Knoxville Whig*, July 20, 1861.

116. *Chronicle*, Clarksville, June 12 and 19, 1861. *Union and American*, Nashville, June 13, 1861.

117. *Union and American*, Nashville, Aug. 11, 1861. See tables of election returns in Appendix C. Gibson, the only county in West Tennessee which Polk carried, was normally Whig. Of the three counties in Middle Tennessee which Polk won, two, Hardin and Fentress, were normally Democratic and one, Wayne, was normally Whig. All seven of the counties in East Tennessee, that is, McMinn, Meigs, Monroe, Polk, Rhea, Eequatchie and Sullivan, which Polk *failed* to carry, were normally Democratic. *Supra*, p. 131.

APPENDIX A

SLAVEHOLDERS AND SLAVES, 1860

Number of Slaveholders and Slaves

East Tennessee Counties	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Anderson	25	12	15	14	8	6	5	3	2
2. Bledsoe	27	19	8	7	7	9	4	4	2
3. Blount	50	39	21	24	22	11	13	15	8
4. Bradley	58	46	28	30	23	12	7	13	5
5. Campbell	16	9	7	3	7	1	7	2	—
6. Carter	29	13	9	3	7	1	2	3	5
7. Claiborne	30	18	21	7	8	6	19	2	2
8. Cocke	39	33	23	18	10	11	8	4	5
9. Grainger	47	23	20	26	16	14	13	4	7
10. Greene	88	61	44	21	20	14	13	7	10
11. Hamblin	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
12. Hamilton	78	38	31	30	25	18	13	12	7
13. Hancock	21	13	8	9	3	6	13	2	1
14. Hawkins	66	41	32	21	30	18	12	16	12
15. James	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
16. Jefferson	55	45	40	37	30	21	21	15	8
17. Johnson	27	7	6	5	3	7	3	2	3
18. Knox	115	59	36	49	40	31	20	16	8
19. Loudon	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
20. McMinn	132	75	35	38	27	13	17	21	11
21. Marion	31	25	5	11	8	5	9	5	3
22. Meigs	29	18	9	12	8	8	8	3	5
23. Monroe	56	45	30	21	12	11	12	14	7
24. Morgan	11	5	—	1	1	1	—	—	2
25. Polk	26	8	4	7	4	5	6	2	1
26. Rhea	18	14	11	10	13	5	6	6	2
27. Roane	65	42	32	19	12	11	10	12	14
28. Scott	3	—	2	1	—	—	—	—	—
29. Sequatchie	7	4	6	4	2	2	2	1	2
30. Sevier	36	9	5	4	7	3	6	6	2
31. Sullivan	66	37	31	26	17	22	13	5	5
32. Unicoi	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
33. Union	18	13	11	2	2	4	—	—	—
34. Washington	75	24	36	25	17	16	11	3	8

APPENDIX A

SLAVEHOLDERS AND SLAVES, 1860

Number of Slaveholders and Slaves

Middle Tennessee Counties	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Bedford	185	136	97	95	72	59	53	39	41
2. Cannon	59	35	16	21	11	4	11	9	11
3. Cheatham	70	35	24	22	19	22	12	9	8
4. Clay	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Coffee	80	60	25	22	28	16	11	9	6
6. Cumberland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7. Davidson	574	299	207	168	160	116	85	84	56
8. DeKalb	62	36	30	23	17	13	16	9	10
9. Dickson	37	30	34	35	33	17	24	13	10
10. Fentress	22	8	9	3	4	1	1	1	1
11. Franklin	132	91	45	38	37	36	26	20	24
12. Giles	232	161	115	86	73	78	64	52	42
13. Grundy	25	7	4	7	7	1	3	2	2
14. Hickman	81	39	36	31	19	16	11	10	8
15. Houston	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
16. Humphreys	70	50	35	23	24	17	10	8	3
17. Jackson	57	36	25	27	16	14	9	6	8
18. Lawrence	75	40	29	14	13	16	6	3	7
19. Lewis	10	4	7	4	3	2	2	1	—
20. Lincoln	182	124	99	70	79	44	34	33	34
21. Macon	54	27	22	19	16	12	8	6	6
22. Marshall	141	82	76	76	56	40	39	27	30
23. Maury	251	142	144	106	82	72	76	69	61
24. Montgomery	135	95	63	90	58	49	56	53	33
25. Moore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
26. Overton	80	38	30	19	15	9	11	13	6
27. Perry	27	14	12	18	10	10	5	5	6
28. Pickett	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
29. Putnam	36	22	22	10	10	5	10	9	6
30. Robertson	140	97	75	74	59	46	36	33	31
31. Rutherford	239	115	107	87	79	81	57	60	38
32. Smith	134	85	54	55	40	54	39	36	31
33. Stewart	51	36	39	26	18	14	17	14	5
34. Sumner	160	115	84	77	56	45	65	37	35
35. Trousdale	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
36. VanBuren	9	2	7	1	3	2	1	—	2
37. Warren	80	45	31	30	28	31	20	19	13
38. Wayne	74	33	16	20	17	14	9	10	6
39. White	72	32	31	24	17	12	10	11	7
40. Williamson	196	119	81	82	70	63	63	53	51
41. Wilson	272	212	138	102	95	76	67	57	52

SLAVEHOLDERS AND SLAVES. 1860

Number of Slaveholders and Slaves

Middle Tennessee Counties

[illegible]

APPENDIX A

SLAVEHOLDERS AND SLAVES, 1860

Number of Slaveholders and Slaves

West Tennessee Counties	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Benton	31	13	12	15	10	8	5	3	3
2. Carroll	173	112	73	53	49	38	30	30	20
3. Chester	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4. Crockett	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Decatur	32	22	15	8	14	7	4	10	5
6. Dyer	125	42	41	35	32	12	21	17	12
7. Fayette	99	92	89	69	66	58	52	54	46
8. Gibson	219	138	114	98	70	53	57	50	47
9. Hardeman	93	77	69	49	43	33	34	27	24
10. Hardin	62	48	30	23	20	17	13	11	15
11. Haywood	124	93	72	59	65	41	34	52	33
12. Henderson	105	62	42	45	37	31	13	23	15
13. Henry	138	82	76	49	56	56	32	31	27
14. Lake	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
15. Lauderdale	59	34	24	26	19	19	12	14	11
16. McNairy	83	58	40	31	24	20	14	21	12
17. Madison	118	104	101	72	75	54	68	42	38
18. Obion	189	74	57	39	20	25	19	18	21
19. Shelby	492	230	194	154	123	121	90	88	53
20. Tipton	74	97	81	60	49	44	36	24	18
21. Weakley	149	91	81	60	49	44	36	21	18
Grand total	7,820	4,738	3,609	3,012	2,536	2,066	1,783	1,565	1,260

SLAVEHOLDERS AND SLAVES, 1860

Number of Slaveholders and Slaves

West Tennessee
Counties

10-14	15-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	70-99	100-199	200-299	300-499	500-999	300-499	Total Shareholders	Total Slaves
9	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	113	534
60	35	16	9	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	704	4,064
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8	7	2	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	136	784
30	20	18	4	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	415	2,641
176	87	103	53	36	24	13	7	—	—	—	—	1,124	15,473
83	34	29	14	3	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	1,011	6,141
70	41	63	15	16	10	7	1	—	—	—	—	672	7,236
17	10	9	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	280	1,623
102	61	77	20	22	26	7	4	2	—	—	—	894	11,026
43	21	24	12	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	476	5,530
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
41	20	14	9	9	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	313	2,854
28	15	9	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	356	1,900
126	68	53	29	15	13	11	1	—	—	—	—	988	10,012
20	18	10	3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	516	2,399
205	93	102	61	12	21	12	5	—	—	—	—	2,056	16,953
73	34	34	11	8	7	4	2	—	—	—	—	489	5,288
61	33	20	10	2	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	686	4,213
3,779	1,744	1,623	643	284	219	116	40	6	1	—	—	36,844	275,719

APPENDIX B

Farms Containing Three Acres and More, 1860¹

East Tennessee Counties	Acres						
	3 and Under 10	10 and Under 20	20 and Under 50	50 and Under 100	100 and Under 500	500 and Under 1,000	1,000 and Over
1. Anderson	6	29	198	209	152	5	—
2. Bledsoe	1	3	25	68	109	7	3
3. Blount	2	16	169	359	431	5	1
4. Bradley	9	26	171	308	293	8	1
5. Campbell	4	49	208	124	103	4	—
6. Carter	2	16	190	182	102	2	—
7. Claiborne	36	85	255	233	218	4	1
8. Cocke	16	125	415	292	204	2	—
9. Grainger	4	17	121	235	274	11	—
10. Greene	40	72	317	629	622	11	—
11. Hamblin	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
12. Hamilton	8	18	104	183	211	7	1
13. Hancock	—	5	137	175	128	1	1
14. Hawkins	2	22	115	220	371	19	3
15. James	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
16. Jefferson	25	54	277	393	455	5	—
17. Johnson	2	18	140	142	97	—	—
18. Knox	12	34	292	507	439	7	—
19. Loudon	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
20. McMinn	3	22	145	397	434	11	—
21. Marion	12	28	74	90	135	7	—
22. Meigs	6	14	71	141	146	1	1
23. Monroe	25	84	315	380	405	9	3
24. Morgan	22	68	197	71	44	—	—
25. Polk	6	24	82	102	99	4	—
26. Rhea	12	26	64	88	137	5	—
27. Roane	1	15	137	291	363	12	3
28. Scott	3	16	144	90	25	—	—
29. Sequatchie	8	19	50	58	53	2	1
30. Sevier	44	99	299	300	174	3	1
31. Sullivan	1	14	141	323	387	7	—
32. Unicoi	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
33. Union	5	19	135	193	123	1	1
34. Washington	42	51	255	420	461	5	5

Acres
Farms Containing Three Acres and More, 1860¹

Middle Tennessee Counties	3 and Under 10	10 and Under 20	20 and Under 50	50 and Under 100	100 and Under 500	500 and Under 1,000	1,000 and Over
1. Bedford	11	65	579	420	676	28	5
2. Cannon	12	262	454	262	127	2	—
3. Cheatham	15	43	265	164	105	3	1
4. Clay	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Coffee	35	154	264	198	216	—	1
6. Cumberland	4	25	109	89	32	1	—
7. Davidson	16	67	347	273	410	25	2
8. DeKalb	36	147	313	248	148	1	—
9. Dickson	147	183	312	291	154	2	1
10. Fentress	29	121	234	131	92	—	—
11. Franklin	12	125	358	257	286	14	1
12. Giles	11	130	381	395	566	48	12
13. Grundy	4	37	123	67	42	3	—
14. Hickman	78	117	244	234	143	1	4
15. Houston	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
16. Humphreys	2	252	365	245	90	1	—
17. Jackson	44	213	347	236	195	6	2
18. Lawrence	9	84	392	231	88	—	—
19. Lewis	3	16	73	54	26	—	—
20. Lincoln	76	352	508	546	574	38	12
21. Macon	7	250	303	205	128	—	—
22. Marshall	13	37	482	375	351	15	1
23. Maury	46	334	575	511	656	24	5
24. Montgomery	39	88	266	278	377	28	5
25. Moore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
26. Overton	1	41	249	364	270	3	—
27. Perry	18	31	142	163	83	—	—
28. Pickett	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
29. Putnam	31	312	263	244	170	1	—
30. Robertson	22	65	331	410	409	14	2
31. Rutherford	66	121	416	419	570	46	6
32. Smith	39	309	344	397	403	9	4
33. Stewart	14	105	273	178	125	3	1
34. Sumner	23	106	472	436	460	14	5
35. Trousdale	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
36. VanBuren	17	13	43	63	61	—	—
37. Warren	11	34	178	251	305	7	—

38. Wayne	11	160	350	206	162	2	—
39. White	1	31	219	280	217	3	—
40. Williamson	38	127	298	409	496	44	5
41. Wilson	5	78	568	659	829	24	—

Farms Containing Three Acres and More, 1860¹

West Tennessee Counties	3 and Under 10	10 and Under 20	20 and Under 50	50 and Under 100	100 and Under 500	500 and Under 1,000	1,000 and Over
1. Benton	26	72	318	233	104	—	—
2. Carroll	9	41	370	475	310	6	—
3. Chester	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4. Crockett	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Decatur	26	46	214	160	100	3	—
6. Dyer	15	67	266	203	126	2	—
7. Fayette	8	29	160	182	474	74	15
8. Gibson	33	105	632	579	335	9	2
9. Hardeman	1	13	216	280	313	34	9
10. Hardin	27	244	348	237	175	4	1
11. Haywood	25	85	263	247	318	58	8
12. Henderson	13	150	456	406	286	12	1
13. Henry	15	106	496	472	373	9	1
14. Lake	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
15. Lauderdale	30	40	149	113	125	2	2
16. McNairy	16	45	418	397	267	4	—
17. Madison	7	125	461	398	437	44	7
18. Obion	38	182	555	287	144	6	—
19. Shelby	42	64	199	205	381	55	9
20. Tipton	33	49	221	181	164	23	2
21. Weakley	18	59	573	432	234	1	—
Grand total	1,687	7,245	22,998	22,829	21,903	921	158

1. *Eighth Census*, Vol. on Ag., p. 215.

APPENDIX C

Gubernatorial Election Returns, 1847-61
East Tennessee

Counties	1847 ¹		1849 ²	
	N. S. Brown (Whig)	A. V. Brown (Democrat)	N. S. Brown (Whig)	Trousdale (Democrat)
1. Anderson	656	330	661	354
2. Bledsoe	527	355	517	290
3. Blount	1,082	734	1,106	758
4. Bradley	641	978	722	991
5. Campbell	408	401	426	512
6. Carter	744	186	697	265
7. Claiborne	634	826	670	926
8. Cocke	826	244	871	204
9. Grainger	1,067	658	1,101	620
10. Greene	1,023	1,522	1,027	1,672
11. Hamblen	—	—	—	—
12. Hamilton	628	721	750	601
13. Hancock	—	—	—	—
14. Hawkins	1,178	1,314	1,113	1,349
15. James	—	—	—	—
16. Jefferson	1,582	345	1,571	309
17. Johnson	368	99	404	112
18. Knox	2,126	573	2,186	1,572
19. Loudon	—	—	—	—
20. McMinn	911	1,040	904	37
21. Marion	526	391	547	370
22. Meigs	134	635	142	577
23. Monroe	905	1,057	915	1,040
24. Morgan	197	320	215	203
25. Polk	318	546	297	540
26. Rhea	260	379	292	355
27. Roane	942	806	936	869
28. Scott	—	—	—	—
29. Sequatchie	—	—	—	—
30. Sevier	830	104	895	93

31. Sullivan	392	1,343	362	1,490
32. Unicoi	—	—	—	—
33. Union	—	—	—	—
34. Washington	843	1,098	843	1,203
Totals	19,767	16,915	20,170*	17,312

1. *Daily Union*, Nashville, November 23, 1848.

2. *True Whig*, Nashville, August 9, 1851.

*. These totals are the writer's.

Middle Tennessee

Counties	1847		1849	
	N. S. Brown (Whig)	A. V. Brown (Democrat)	N. S. Brown (Whig)	Trousdale (Democrat)
1. Bedford	1,497	1,515	1,340	1,474
2. Cannon	360	842	431	872
3. Clay	—	—	—	—
4. Cheatham	—	—	—	—
5. Coffee	323	1,002	319	1,009
6. Cumberland	—	—	—	—
7. Davidson	2,347	1,728	2,217	1,919
8. DeKalb	601	623	590	592
9. Dickson	336	689	342	716
10. Fentress	97	450	125	457
11. Franklin	378	1,114	362	1,200
12. Giles	1,389	1,521	1,331	1,484
13. Grundy	—	—	—	—
14. Hardin	566	798	577	783
15. Hickman	270	992	255	991
16. Houston	—	—	—	—
17. Humphreys	278	525	278	511
18. Jackson	1,219	846	1,080	960
19. Lawrence	631	662	640	662
20. Lewis	—	—	—	—
21. Lincoln	677	2,400	665	2,475
22. Macon	—	—	—	—
23. Marshall	702	1,431	683	1,406

24. Maury	1,500	1,963	1,375	1,942
25. Montgomery	1,182	983	1,069	953
26. Moore	—	—	—	—
27. Overton	413	1,183	371	1,252
28. Pickett	—	—	—	—
29. Putnam	—	—	—	—
30. Robertson	1,196	804	1,165	920
31. Rutherford	1,708	1,593	1,416	1,331
32. Smith	2,389	823	2,085	782
33. Stewart	529	679	554	736
34. Sumner	833	1,902	777	2,100
35. Trousdale	—	—	—	—
36. VanBuren	113	239	138	208
37. Warren	376	1,223	393	1,262
38. Wayne	691	421	665	429
39. White	1,050	603	970	670
40. Williamson	1,893	927	1,688	792
41. Wilson	2,441	1,070	2,160	955
Totals	27,994	31,551	26,072	31,730

*. These totals are the writer's.

West Tennessee

Counties	1847		1849	
	N. S. Brown (Whig)	A. V. Brown (Democrat)	N. S. Brown (Whig)	Trousdale (Democrat)
1. Benton	331	446	318	451
2. Carroll	1,351	619	1,423	546
3. Chester	—	—	—	—
4. Crockett	—	—	—	—
5. Decatur	348	294	391	287
6. Dyer	378	261	414	321
7. Fayette	1,021	963	1,064	1,046
8. Gibson	1,339	864	1,417	788
9. Hardeman	616	943	637	1,035
10. Haywood	726	631	757	659
11. Henderson	1,141	525	1,113	461

12. Henry	720	1,249	769	1,284
13. Lake	—	—	—	—
14. Lauderdale	263	248	294	288
15. McNairy	882	853	958	925
16. Madison	1,451	779	1,316	721
17. Obion	308	463	405	586
18. Perry	476	321	410	283
19. Shelby	1,409	1,207	1,453	1,405
20. Tipton	308	447	323	511
21. Weakley	640	1,035	646	1,081
Totals	13,708	11,988	14,108*	12,678
Grand total for state	61,469	60,454	60,350	61,740

*. These totals are the writer's.

East Tennessee

Counties	1851 ¹		1853 ²	
	Campbell (Whig)	Trousdale (Democrat)	Henry (Whig)	Johnson (Democrat)
1. Anderson	659	327	648	379
2. Bledsoe	558	298	469	303
3. Blount	1,147	640	1,146	734
4. Bradley	671	883	562	1,085
5. Campbell	494	497	356	415
6. Carter	777	202	721	294
7. Claiborne	655	849	620	707
8. Cocke	890	245	867	383
9. Grainger	1,110	675	998	767
10. Greene	1,144	1,684	902	1,915
11. Hamblen	—	—	—	—
12. Hamilton	885	762	786	972
13. Hancock	—	—	221	432
14. Hawkins	1,236	1,313	805	1,180
15. James	—	—	—	—
16. Jefferson	1,606	346	1,396	639

17. Johnson	495	84	392	184
18. Knox	2,223	623	2,279	770
19. Loudon	—	—	—	—
20. McMinn	885	1,023	799	965
21. Marion	517	382	476	357
22. Meigs	154	554	118	561
23. Monroe	918	947	739	960
24. Morgan	232	267	229	260
25. Polk	305	581	249	527
26. Rhea	329	331	270	358
27. Roane	822	754	912	755
28. Scott	—	—	186	182
29. Sequatchie	—	—	—	—
30. Sevier	897	165	824	133
31. Sullivan	383	1,459	361	1,407
32. Unicoi	—	—	—	—
33. Union	—	—	—	—
34. Washington	969	1,151	967	1,069
Totals	20,961*	17,042	19,298	18,763

1. *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*, October 11, 1853.

2. *Ibid.*

*. These totals are the writer's.

Middle Tennessee

Counties	1851		1853	
	Campbell (Whig)	Trousdale (Democrat)	Henry (Whig)	Johnson (Democrat)
1. Bedford	1,438	1,413	1,359	1,257
2. Cannon	430	851	445	803
3. Clay	—	—	—	—
4. Cheatham	—	—	—	—
5. Coffee	307	996	274	824
6. Cumberland	—	—	—	—
7. Davidson	2,330	1,842	2,597	1,963
8. DeKalb	651	626	632	610
9. Dickson	329	708	357	743

10. Fentress	184	498	166	504
11. Franklin	441	1,228	356	1,224
12. Giles	1,284	1,428	1,301	1,468
13. Grundy	—	—	58	374
14. Hardin	603	732	671	827
15. Hickman	275	1,051	263	812
16. Houston	—	—	—	—
17. Humphreys	274	508	341	501
18. Jackson	1,295	900	1,154	995
19. Lawrence	611	696	523	739
20. Lewis	—	—	66	182
21. Lincoln	658	2,338	617	2,322
22. Macon	—	—	553	341
23. Marshall	761	1,302	671	1,282
24. Maury	1,495	1,830	1,238	1,731
25. Montgomery	1,132	921	1,309	1,004
26. Moore	—	—	—	—
27. Overton	461	1,258	431	1,282
28. Pickett	—	—	—	—
29. Putnam	—	—	—	—
30. Robertson	1,169	889	1,183	763
31. Rutherford	1,539	1,296	1,407	1,243
32. Smith	2,409	779	1,735	546
33. Stewart	489	697	479	718
34. Sumner	772	1,856	806	1,425
35. Trousdale	—	—	—	—
36. VanBuren	119	208	110	205
37. Warren	408	1,209	402	1,093
38. Wayne	730	484	709	430
39. White	1,016	618	974	634
40. Williamson	1,710	723	1,502	710
41. Wilson	2,327	1,600	2,241	995
Totals	27,647*	30,865	26,930	30,550

*. These totals are the writer's.

West Tennessee

Counties	1851		1852	
	Campbell (Whig)	Trousdale (Democrat)	Henry (Whig)	Johnson (Democrat)
1. Benton	312	499	393	465
2. Carroll	1,468	688	1,469	663
3. Chester	—	—	—	—
4. Crockett	—	—	—	—
5. Decatur	372	314	408	285
6. Dyer	483	383	476	373
7. Fayette	1,066	1,047	1,011	1,006
8. Gibson	1,591	1,016	1,514	1,024
9. Hardeman	633	965	651	1,025
10. Haywood	819	762	726	785
11. Henderson	1,089	497	1,301	593
12. Henry	812	1,325	891	1,496
13. Lake	—	—	—	—
14. Lauderdale	315	296	319	252
15. McNairy	949	967	1,016	984
16. Madison	1,383	709	1,261	795
17. Obion	412	674	547	792
18. Perry	424	286	387	329
19. Shelby	1,563	1,490	1,545	1,435
20. Tipton	320	531	284	527
21. Weakley	714	1,317	733	1,279
Totals	14,725*	13,766	14,932	14,108
Grand total for state	63,333	61,673	61,160	63,160

*. These totals are the writer's.

Counties	East Tennessee			
	1855 ¹		1857 ²	
	Gentry (Know Nothing)	Johnson (Democrat)	Hatton (American)	Harris (Democrat)
1. Anderson	772	333	657	376
2. Bledsoe	404	361	437	391
3. Blount	1,069	789	1,074	664
4. Bradley	644	1,021	620	1,051
5. Campbell	507	383	355	556
6. Carter	768	238	756	195
7. Claiborne	756	744	537	783
8. Cocke	929	422	752	583
9. Grainger	1,327	621	1,050	743
10. Greene	989	1,985	891	1,856
11. Hamblen	—	—	—	—
12. Hamilton	966	1,044	959	890
13. Hancock	264	589	212	497
14. Hawkins	887	1,158	900	1,136
15. James	—	—	—	—
16. Jefferson	1,697	444	1,446	746
17. Johnson	400	215	404	189
18. Knox	2,560	695	1,951	862
19. Loudon	—	—	—	—
20. McMinn	909	953	859	1,020
21. Marion	554	468	546	435
22. Meigs	97	588	94	554
23. Monroe	851	1,005	795	955
24. Morgan	219	358	164	269
25. Polk	385	676	383	682
26. Rhea	298	415	242	371
27. Roane	1,002	769	844	818
28. Scott	121	259	147	194
29. Sequatchie	—	—	—	—
30. Sevier	964	120	761	307
31. Sullivan	601	1,403	434	1,292
32. Unicoi	—	—	—	—
33. Union	—	—	—	—
34. Washington	847	1,338	745	1,151
Totals	21,787	19,394	18,951	19,537

1. *Nashville Union and American*, November 16, 1856.2. *Ibid.*, August 30, 1859.

Middle Tennessee

Counties	1855		1857	
	Gentry (Know Nothing)	Johnson (Democrat)	Hatton (American)	Harris (Democrat)
1. Bedford	1,630	1,293	1,512	1,480
2. Cannon	458	859	434	863
3. Clay	—	—	—	—
4. Cheatham	—	—	—	—
5. Coffee	294	880	293	943
6. Cumberland	—	—	—	—
7. Davidson	3,132	1,783	2,932	2,060
8. DeKalb	560	738	588	811
9. Dickson	388	745	362	815
10. Fentress	129	616	133	477
11. Franklin	894	1,302	264	1,258
12. Giles	1,312	1,439	1,057	1,407
13. Grundy	22	425	32	470
14. Hardin	745	775	592	855
15. Hickman	223	1,053	162	1,002
16. Houston	—	—	—	—
17. Humphreys	354	543	229	617
18. Jackson	1,122	1,131	1,212	1,221
19. Lawrence	524	845	446	809
20. Lewis	34	243	24	221
21. Lincoln	402	2,521	410	2,458
22. Macon	540	424	482	454
23. Marshall	678	1,310	575	1,224
24. Maury	1,444	1,793	1,228	1,745
25. Montgomery	1,502	881	1,229	993
26. Moore	—	—	—	—
27. Overton	290	1,528	263	1,356
28. Pickett	—	—	—	—
29. Putnam	—	—	—	—
30. Robertson	1,256	804	1,129	983
31. Rutherford	1,453	1,288	1,476	1,440
32. Smith	1,572	644	1,487	767
33. Stewart	563	785	465	793
34. Sumner	780	1,470	735	1,780
35. Trousdale	—	—	—	—
36. VanBuren	90	228	91	224
37. Warren	393	1,153	327	1,136
38. Wayne	687	535	639	527
39. White	978	604	812	740

40. Williamson	1,621	688	1,455	756
41. Wilson	2,290	937	2,091	1,217
Totals	27,852	32,623	25,166	33,882

West Tennessee

Counties	1855		1857	
	Gentry (Know Nothing)	Johnson (Democrat)	Hatton (American)	Harris (Democrat)
1. Benton	475	453	371	630
2. Carroll	1,567	694	1,634	876
3. Chester	—	—	—	—
4. Crockett	—	—	—	—
5. Decatur	353	429	364	482
6. Dyer	442	483	636	569
7. Fayette	1,151	940	1,007	1,020
8. Gibson	1,618	1,213	1,747	1,242
9. Hardeman	619	1,123	594	1,269
10. Haywood	803	762	812	953
11. Henderson	1,230	734	1,173	736
12. Henry	871	1,738	839	1,785
13. Lake	—	—	—	—
14. Lauderdale	354	297	391	389
15. McNairy	915	1,059	863	1,088
16. Madison	1,448	788	1,402	919
17. Obion	407	865	479	963
18. Perry	320	450	305	498
19. Shelby	1,831	1,477	1,806	2,022
20. Tipton	424	566	398	652
21. Weakley	885	1,411	905	1,647
Totals	15,713	15,482	15,726	17,740
Grand total for state	65,352	67,499	59,807	71,178

East Tennessee

Counties	1859 ¹		1861 ²	
	Netherland (Opposition)	Harris (Democrat)	Polk (Union)	Harris (Democrat)
1. Anderson	793	382	1,086	131
2. Bledsoe	486	343	525	235
3. Blount	1,267	734	1,372	417
4. Bradley	748	1,096	1,188	525
5. Campbell	363	625	775	67
6. Carter	880	283	1,216	83
7. Claiborne	684	765	949	472
8. Cocke	965	584	1,053	532
9. Grainger	1,141	991	1,145	856
10. Greene	1,022	2,102	2,368	810
11. Hamblen	—	—	—	—
12. Hamilton	1,121	1,056	1,136	782
13. Hancock	448	553	423	371
14. Hawkins	1,103	1,289	1,128	934
15. James	—	—	—	—
16. Jefferson	1,611	642	1,594	708
17. Johnson	565	196	1,096	109
18. Knox	2,603	926	2,571	732
19. Loudon	—	—	—	—
20. McMinn	1,031	1,122	977	999
21. Marion	462	414	546	416
22. Meigs	124	643	209	460
23. Monroe	911	1,107	531	1,093
24. Morgan	205	317	489	43
25. Polk	336	750	264	698
26. Rhea	339	446	186	414
27. Roane	1,031	851	1,238	490
28. Scott	225	264	—	—
29. Sequatchie	176	153	142	151
30. Sevier	1,046	266	1,262	61
31. Sullivan	566	1,672	433	1,400
32. Unicoi	—	—	—	—
33. Union	—	—	—	—
34. Washington	982	1,365	1,120	1,045
Totals	23,235	21,737	26,997	15,034

1. *Nashville Union and American*, August 30, 1859.2. *Ibid.*, August 18, 1861.

Middle Tennessee

Counties	1859		1861	
	Netherland (Opposition)	Harris (Democrat)	Polk (Union)	Harris (Democrat)
1. Bedford	1,585	1,435	744	1,467
2. Cannon	420	1,009	527	803
3. Clay	—	—	—	—
4. Cheatham	—	—	—	—
5. Coffee	395	995	188	976
6. Cumberland	—	—	—	—
7. Davidson	3,463	2,412	493	3,618
8. DeKalb	745	845	399	787
9. Dickson	432	861	182	857
10. Fentress	148	538	333	149
11. Franklin	315	1,443	18	1,387
12. Giles	1,295	1,472	155	1,989
13. Grundy	56	401	2	455
14. Hardin	585	890	751	602
15. Hickman	184	1,071	43	1,050
16. Houston	—	—	—	—
17. Humphreys	272	693	20	672
18. Jackson	1,339	1,155	233	1,094
19. Lawrence	539	794	204	841
20. Lewis	19	253	—	—
21. Lincoln	477	2,578	77	2,251
22. Macon	524	421	67	353
23. Marshall	640	1,302	134	1,324
24. Maury	1,379	1,916	452	2,199
25. Montgomery	1,353	1,043	56	1,469
26. Moore	—	—	—	—
27. Overton	347	1,457	194	1,694
28. Pickett	—	—	—	—
29. Putnam	—	—	—	—
30. Robertson	1,274	1,077	161	1,607
31. Rutherford	1,504	1,515	293	1,867
32. Smith	1,492	799	—	—
33. Stewart	521	827	149	840
34. Sumner	776	1,736	208	1,843
35. Trousdale	—	—	—	—
36. VanBuren	131	197	39	268
37. Warren	392	1,222	107	1,363
38. Wayne	679	582	766	380

39. White	968	844	218	948
40. Williamson	1,601	801	388	1,204
41. Wilson	2,240	1,255	623	1,888
Totals	28,090	35,839	7,195	38,245

West Tennessee

Counties	1859		1861	
	Netherland (Opposition)	Harris (Democrat)	Polk (Union)	Harris (Democrat)
1. Benton	393	740	122	757
2. Carroll	1,687	1,029	789	1,070
3. Chester				
4. Crockett				
5. Decatur	359	487	167	381
6. Dyer	712	681	412	551
7. Fayette	915	991	146	1,309
8. Gibson	1,953	1,392	1,218	1,080
9. Hardeman	580	1,148	315	1,110
10. Haywood	781	902	579	721
11. Henderson	1,290	811	680	933
12. Henry	978	1,868	393	1,853
13. Lake				
14. Lauderdale	458	422		
15. McNairy	999	1,109	525	1,232
16. Madison	1,355	909	106	1,540
17. Obion	611	1,118	244	1,100
18. Perry	329	523	59	648
19. Shelby	2,026	2,231	818	3,977
20. Tipton	365	616	24	200
21. Weakley	1,043	1,709	601	1,185
Totals	16,834	18,686	7,195	19,627
Grand total for state	68,159	72,262	42,416	73,082

Presidential Election Returns, 1848-60

East Tennessee

Counties	1848 ¹		1852 ²	
	Taylor (Whig)	Cass (Democrat)	Scott (Whig)	Pierce (Democrat)
1. Anderson	602	250	602	267
2. Bledsoe	508	229	464	209
3. Blount	965	663	827	566
4. Bradley	760	927	547	778
5. Campbell	473	279	313	251
6. Carter	715	129	585	139
7. Claiborne	700	744	503	519
8. Cocke	815	189	743	196
9. Grainger	1,095	489	852	477
10. Greene	963	1,483	780	1,301
11. Hamblen	—	—	—	—
12. Hamilton	685	634	774	648
13. Hancock	—	—	241	336
14. Hawkins	1,252	1,243	778	831
15. James	—	—	—	—
16. Jefferson	1,468	215	1,168	307
17. Johnson	382	66	365	93
18. Knox	2,140	439	1,863	565
19. Loudon	—	—	—	—
20. McMinn	960	1,024	796	866
21. Marion	562	336	453	292
22. Meigs	150†	534†	141	442
23. Monroe	962	960	805	847
24. Morgan	229	187	240	222
25. Polk	367	517	272	470
26. Rhea	299	325	300	307
27. Roane	998	671	820	678
28. Scott	—	—	199	127
29. Sequatchie	—	—	—	—
30. Sevier	787	57	621	80
31. Sullivan	436	1,375	260	1,114
32. Unicoi	—	—	—	—

33. Union	—	—	—	—
34. Washington	862	1,016	565	853
Totals	20,165	14,981	16,877*	13,781

1. *Daily Union*, Nashville, November 23, 1848.

2. *Republican Banner and Nashville Whig*, October 11, 1853.

†. Reported.

*. These totals are the writer's.

Middle Tennessee

Counties	1848		1852	
	Taylor (Whig)	Cass (Democrat)	Scott (Whig)	Pierce (Democrat)
1. Bedford	1,497	1,381	1,390	1,356
2. Cannon	469	827	453	727
3. Clay	—	—	—	—
4. Cheatham	—	—	—	—
5. Coffee	332	943	205	722
6. Cumberland	—	—	—	—
7. Davidson	2,698	1,976	2,617	2,058
8. DeKalb	571	573	559	588
9. Dickson	386	674	323	607
10. Fentress	113	432	153	411
11. Franklin	390	1,207	330	1,133
12. Giles	1,389	1,511	1,303	1,447
13. Grundy	—	—	44	327
14. Hardin	621	770	643	808
15. Hickman	301	988	241	839
16. Houston	—	—	—	—
17. Humphreys	309	482	263	471
18. Jackson	1,269	800	1,170	803
19. Lawrence	596	544	547	583
20. Lewis	—	—	43	186
21. Lincoln	680	2,584	606	2,297
22. Macon	—	—	617	374
23. Marshall	730	1,408	666	1,340
24. Maury	1,516	1,970	1,324	1,799

25. Montgomery	1,288	969	1,260	993
26. Moore	—	—	—	—
27. Overton	467	1,112	345	1,039
28. Pickett	—	—	—	—
29. Putnam	—	—	—	—
30. Robertson	1,236	839	1,013	769
31. Rutherford	1,754	1,439	1,495	1,313
32. Smith	2,330	719	1,742	520
33. Stewart	574	705	533	725
34. Sumner	922	1,994	825	1,563
35. Trousdale	—	—	—	—
36. VanBuren	130	198	107	165
37. Warren	407	1,161	344	922
38. Wayne	673	386	666	380
39. White	1,064	503	919	518
40. Williamson	1,883	793	1,583	763
41. Wilson	2,517	998	2,248	923
Totals	29,162	30,886	26,607*	29,496

*. These totals are the writer's.

West Tennessee

Counties	1848		1852	
	Taylor (Whig)	Cass (Democrat)	Scott (Whig)	Pierce (Democrat)
1. Benton	392	459	340	485
2. Carroll	1,493	560	1,498	649
3. Chester	—	—	—	—
4. Crockett	—	—	—	—
5. Decatur	384	277	400	315
6. Dyer	383	271	508	411
7. Fayette	1,217	1,060	1,006	1,034
8. Gibson	1,423	688	1,570	901
9. Hardeman	723	1,016	717	1,024
10. Haywood	800	672	790	732
11. Henderson	1,221†	479†	1,193	511
12. Henry	860	1,349	899	1,516

13. Lake				
14. Lauderdale	279	274	330	277
15. McNairy	939	786	921	872
16. Madison	1,562	737	1,426	819
17. Obion	357	487	431	644
18. Perry	433	287	325	314
19. Shelby	1,828	1,607	1,824	1,628
20. Tipton	352	48	357	565
21. Weakley	669	1,080	783	1,149
Totals	15,225	12,571	15,317*	13,846
Grand total for state	64,552	58,438	58,802	57,123

†. Estimated.

*. These totals are the writer's.

East Tennessee

Counties	Fillmore (American)	1856 Buchanan ¹ (Democrat)
1. Anderson	649	348
2. Bledsoe	354	271
3. Blount	1,246	623
4. Bradley	658	1,078
5. Campbell	345	434
6. Carter	728	228
7. Claiborne	543	735
8. Cocke	795	439
9. Grainger	1,117	736
10. Greene	880	1,852
11. Hamblen		
12. Hamilton	1,064	1,051
13. Hancock	241	525
14. Hawkins	916	1,144
15. James		
16. Jefferson	1,571	567
17. Johnson	459	178

18. Knox	2,551	838
19. Loudon		
20. McMinn	970	1,059
21. Marion	523	446
22. Meigs	125	635
23. Monroe	867	1,041
24. Morgan	162	263
25. Polk	402	798
26. Rhea	311	448
27. Roane	1,028	829
28. Scott	156	224
29. Sequatchie		
30. Sevier	921	164
31. Sullivan	548	1,477
32. Unicoi		
33. Union		
34. Washington	828	1,334
Totals	20,958	19,765

1. *Nashville Union and American*, December 5, 1856.

Middle Tennessee

Counties	1856	
	Fillmore (American)	Buchanan (Democrat)
1. Bedford	1,537	1,378
2. Cannon	428	809
3. Clay		
4. Cheatham	423	465
5. Coffee	307	990
6. Cumberland	243	261
7. Davidson	3,259	2,074
8. DeKalb	554	795
9. Dickson	382	816
10. Fentress	118	533
11. Franklin	331	1,427
12. Giles	1,236	1,584

13. Grundy	28	425
14. Hardin	748	905
15. Hickman	238	1,086
16. Houston	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
17. Humphreys	280	695
18. Jackson	1,261	1,180
19. Lawrence	514	876
20. Lewis	25	242
21. Lincoln	431	2,670
22. Macon	559	526
23. Marshall	649	1,278
24. Maury	1,316	1,823
25. Montgomery	1,368	944
26. Moore	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
27. Overton	322	1,505
28. Pickett	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
29. Putnam	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
30. Robertson	1,089	928
31. Rutherford	1,469	1,368
32. Smith	1,596	729
33. Stewart	606	895
34. Sumner	859	1,894
35. Trousdale	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
36. VanBuren	103	265
37. Warren	411	1,130
38. Wayne	714	563
39. White	808	740
40. Williamson	1,646	775
41. Wilson	2,186	1,134
Totals	<u>28,064</u>	<u>35,708</u>

West Tennessee

1856

Counties	Fillmore (American)	Buchanan ¹ (Democrat)
1. Benton	453	632
2. Carroll	1,710	863

3. Chester	—	—
4. Crockett	—	—
5. Decatur	453	495
6. Dyer	666	599
7. Fayette	1,082	1,080
8. Gibson	1,832	1,284
9. Hardeman	691	1,333
10. Haywood	842	920
11. Henderson	1,313	805
12. Henry	897	1,827
13. Lake	—	—
14. Lauderdale	395	411
15. McNairy	969	1,125
16. Madison	1,561	981
17. Obion	533	950
18. Perry	362	525
19. Shelby	2,083	2,016
20. Tipton	424	663
21. Weakley	859	1,628
Totals	17,156	18,165
Grand total for state	66,178	73,638

East Tennessee

Counties	1860		
	Bell (Constitutional Union)	Breckinridge (Democrat)	Douglas ¹ (Democrat)
1. Anderson	614	339	30
2. Bledsoe	361	177	38
3. Blount	1,261	586	47
4. Bradley	710	759	301
5. Campbell	345	271	20
6. Carter	859	205	15
7. Claiborne	614	718	10
8. Cocke	933	473	14
9. Grainger	1,047	667	17

10. Greene	1,048	2,054	38
11. Hamblen	—	—	—
12. Hamilton	1,074	820	165
13. Hancock	309	493	18
14. Hawkins	1,067	1,155	87
15. James	—	—	—
16. Jefferson	1,625	681	35
17. Johnson	508	140	4
18. Knox	2,471	859	128
19. Loudon	—	—	—
20. McMinn	986	978	141
21. Marion	498	347	56
22. Meigs	150	521	88
23. Monroe	915	1,099	52
24. Morgan	168	218	46
25. Polk	396	825	63
26. Rhea	289	386	24
27. Roane	1,105	839	43
28. Scott	252	154	1
29. Sequatchie	—	—	—
30. Sevier	1,035	188	7
31. Sullivan	538	1,517	69
32. Unicoi	—	—	—
33. Union	—	—	—
34. Washington	967	1,331	62
Totals	22,043	18,800	1,599

1. *Nashville Union and American*, December 2, 1860.

Middle Tennessee

1860

Counties	Bell (Constitutional Union)	(Democrat) Breckinridge	Douglas (Democrat)
1. Bedford	1,506	1,389	35
2. Cannon	445	922	20
3. Clay	—	—	—

4. Cheatham	—	—	—
5. Coffee	361	1,101	7
6. Cumberland	—	—	—
7. Davidson	3,850	2,432	383
8. DeKalb	677	882	13
9. Dickson	427	768	86
10. Fentress	135	465	16
11. Franklin	388	1,526	26
12. Giles	1,313	1,511	86
13. Grundy	74	431	—
14. Hardin	671	718	142
15. Hickman	273	1,067	16
16. Houston	—	—	—
17. Humphreys	350	654	14
18. Jackson	1,182	1,050	33
19. Lawrence	470	690	58
20. Lewis	40	255	8
21. Lincoln	517	2,442	293
22. Macon	563	430	27
23. Marshall	662	1,326	43
24. Maury	1,434	1,731	63
25. Montgomery	1,426	1,042	95
26. Moore	—	—	—
27. Overton	394	1,417	40
28. Pickett	—	—	—
29. Putnam	—	—	—
30. Robertson	1,309	930	79
31. Rutherford	1,540	1,505	21
32. Smith	1,475	618	60
33. Stewart	612	786	144
34. Sumner	883	1,677	153
35. Trousdale	—	—	—
36. VanBuren	116	187	12
37. Warren	378	1,220	14
38. Wayne	701	392	73
39. White	763	686	28
40. Williamson	1,587	797	32
41. Wilson	2,223	1,165	63
Totals	28,745	34,312	2,183

West Tennessee

Counties	1860		
	Bell (Constitutional Union)	Breckinridge (Democrat)	Douglas (Democrat)
1. Benton	452	713	5
2. Carroll	1,570	737	129
3. Chester	—	—	—
4. Crockett	—	—	—
5. Decatur	473	362	81
6. Dyer	798	450	154
7. Fayette	953	364	588
8. Gibson	1,909	1,039	241
9. Hardeman	767	555	754
10. Haywood	885	358	453
11. Henderson	1,246	611	74
12. Henry	887	1,808	24
13. Lake	—	—	—
14. Lauderdale	498	1,172	270
15. McNairy	1,064	493	514
16. Madison	1,441	460	429
17. Obion	686	885	165
18. Perry	391	520	19
19. Shelby	3,048	744	2,959
20. Tipton	420	91	563
21. Weakley	900	1,335	126
Totals	18,388	11,697	7,548
Grand total for state	69,176	64,809	11,330

State Special Election Returns of February 9, 1861¹

East Tennessee

Counties	Convention	No Convention
1. Anderson	132	1,077
2. Bledsoe	190	630
3. Blount	450	1,552
4. Bradley	242	1,443
5. Campbell	71	870
6. Carter	55	1,055
7. Claiborne	95	1,030
8. Cocke	192	1,332
9. Grainger	158	1,675
10. Greene	357	2,648
11. Hamblen	—	—
12. Hamilton	455	1,445
13. Hancock	100	746
14. Hawkins	422	1,738
15. James	—	—
16. Jefferson	250	1,999
17. Johnson	38	631
18. Knox	394	3,167
19. Loudon	—	—
20. McMinn	439	1,457
21. Marion	108	751
22. Meigs	338	323
23. Monroe	723	970
24. Morgan	13	488
25. Polk	335	389
26. Rhea	79	573
27. Roane	67	1,595
28. Scott	29	385
29. Sequatchie	—	—
30. Sevier	69	1,243
31. Sullivan	1,180	734
32. Unicoi	—	—
33. Union	—	—
34. Washington	89	1,353
Totals	7,767	33,299

1. *Nashville Union and American*, March 3, 1861.

Middle Tennessee

Counties	Convention	No Convention
1. Bedford	828	1,656
2. Cannon	301	1,038
3. Clay	—	—
4. Cheatham	—	—
5. Coffee	613	698
6. Cumberland	—	—
7. Davidson	2,525	3,083
8. DeKalb	336	1,009
9. Dickson	499	490
10. Fentress	334	325
11. Franklin	1,240	206
12. Giles	1,531	550
13. Grundy	393	58
14. Hardin	395	791
15. Hickman	765	298
16. Houston	—	—
17. Humphreys	385	327
18. Jackson	169	2,012
19. Lawrence	692	351
20. Lewis	192	84
21. Lincoln	1,863	815
22. Macon	73	960
23. Marshall	1,186	481
24. Maury	2,145	628
25. Montgomery	1,611	389
26. Moore	—	—
27. Overton	563	863
28. Pickett	—	—
29. Putnam	—	—
30. Robertson	1,621	332
31. Rutherford	1,003	1,529
32. Smith	303	1,829
33. Stewart	997	96
34. Sumner	1,535	770
35. Trousdale	—	—
36. VanBuren	103	142
37. Warren	821	452
38. Wayne	255	737
39. White	673	976

40. Williamson	430	1,684
41. Wilson	462	2,565
Totals	25,842	28,224

West Tennessee

Counties	Convention	No Convention
1. Benton	621	296
2. Carroll	678	1,495
3. Chester	—	—
4. Crockett	—	—
5. Decatur	251	514
6. Dyer	876	163
7. Fayette	1,521	19
8. Gibson	2,227	533
9. Hardeman	1,694	30
10. Haywood	918	544
11. Henderson	619	1,105
12. Henry	1,334	776
13. Lake	—	—
14. Lauderdale	407*	65*
15. McNairy	811	916
16. Madison	1,757	86
17. Obion	1,027	328
18. Perry	382	323
19. Shelby	5,699	197
20. Tipton	700	147
21. Weakley	1,472	483
Totals	22,623	7,864

Grand total for state

57,798

69,387

*. Taken from the William B. Smith Scrap Book, in McClung Collection, Lawson McGee Library, Knoxville.

State Special Election Returns of June 8, 1861¹

East Tennessee

Counties	Separation	Representation	No Sep.	No Rep.
1. Anderson	97	97	1,278	1,278
2. Bledsoe	197	186	500	455
3. Blount	418	414	1,766	1,768
4. Bradley	507	505	1,382	1,380
5. Campbell	59	60	1,000	1,000
6. Carter	86	86	1,343	2,343
7. Claiborne	250	246	1,243	1,247
8. Cocke	518	217	1,185	1,185
9. Grainger	586	582	1,492	1,489
10. Greene	744	738	2,691	2,702
11. Hamblen	—	—	—	—
12. Hamilton	854	837	1,260	1,271
13. Hancock	279	278	630	630
14. Hawkins	908	886	1,460	1,463
15. James	—	—	—	—
16. Jefferson	603	597	1,987	1,990
17. Johnson	111	111	787	786
18. Knox	1,226	1,214	3,196	3,201
19. Loudon	—	—	—	—
20. McMinn	904	892	1,144	1,152
21. Marion	414	413	600	601
22. Meigs	481	478	267	268
23. Monroe	1,096	1,079	774	775
24. Morgan	50	50	630	632
25. Polk	738	731	317	319
26. Rhea	360	336	202	217
27. Roane	454	436	1,568	1,584
28. Scott	19	19	521	521
29. Sequatchie	153	151	100	100
30. Sevier	60	60	1,528	1,571
31. Sullivan	1,586	1,576	627	637*
32. Unicoi	—	—	—	—

33. Union	—	—	—	—
34. Washington	1,022	1,016	1,445	1,444*
Totals	14,780	14,601	32,923	32,962

1. *Nashville Union and American*, June 25, 1861.

*. Errors in the June 25, 1861 issue of the *Nashville Union and American* are corrected according to the returns in the office of the secretary of state as published in the June 16, 1861 issue of the *Nashville Union and American*.

Middle Tennessee

Counties	Separation	Representation	No Sep.	No Rep.
1. Bedford	1,595	1,544	727	737
2. Cannon	1,149	1,145	127	118
3. Clay	—	—	—	—
4. Cheatham	702	697	55	59
5. Coffee	1,276	1,268	26	28
6. Cumberland	—	—	—	—
7. Davidson	5,635	5,572	402	441
8. DeKalb	833	823	642	655
9. Dickson	1,141	1,133	72	75
10. Fentress	128	120	651	657
11. Franklin	1,652	1,650	0	1
12. Giles	2,458	2,464	11	5
13. Grundy	528	528	9	9
14. Hardin	498	493	1,051	1,052
15. Hickman	1,400	1,400	3	3
16. Houston	—	—	—	—
17. Humphreys	1,042	1,042	0	0
18. Jackson	1,483	1,480	714	710
19. Lawrence	1,124	1,122	75	64
20. Lewis	223	216	14	17
21. Lincoln	2,912	2,892	0	9
22. Macon	447	446	697	697
23. Marshall	1,642	1,638	101	104
24. Maury	2,731	2,693	58	78
25. Montgomery	2,631	2,630	33	29

26. Moore	—	—	—	—
27. Overton	1,471	1,471	364	365
28. Pickett	—	—	—	—
29. Putnam	—	—	—	—
30. Robertson	3,839	3,835	17	12
31. Rutherford	2,392	2,377	73	93
32. Smith	1,249	1,247	676	675
33. Stewart	1,839	1,839	99	73
34. Sumner	6,451	6,441	69	82
35. Trousdale	—	—	—	—
36. VanBuren	308	308	13	13
37. Warren	1,419	1,400	12	15
38. Wayne	409	361	905	905
39. White	1,370	1,367	121	121
40. Williamson	1,945	1,918	28	35
41. Wilson	2,329	2,298	353	361
Totals	58,265	57,858	8,198	8,298

West Tennessee

Counties	Separation	Representation	No Sep.	No Rep.
1. Benton	798	796	228	226
2. Carroll	967	952	1,349	1,351
3. Chester	—	—	—	—
4. Crockett	—	—	—	—
5. Decatur	310	293	550	537
6. Dyer	811	779	116	133
7. Fayette	1,364	1,364	23	23
8. Gibson	1,999	1,954	286	219
9. Hardeman	1,526	1,508	29	50
10. Haywood	930	924	139	143
11. Henderson	801	790	1,013	1,013
12. Henry	1,746	1,734	317	317
13. Lake	—	—	—	—
14. Lauderdale	763	759	7	0
15. McNairy	1,318	1,305	586	591
16. Madison	2,754	2,751	20	21
17. Obion	2,996	2,957	64	88
18. Perry	780	779	168	169
19. Shelby	7,132	7,127	5	5
20. Tipton	943	941	16	18
21. Weakley	1,189	1,189	1,201	1,200
Totals	29,127	28,902	6,117	6,104
Military camps (8 in Tenn., Va., and Fla.)	2,741	2,741		
Grand total for state	104,913	104,102	47,238	47,364

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